COMMON STRATEGY ON THE MEDITERRANEAN
(21016)
—
| Preliminary draft of the Common Strategy of the European
Union on the Mediterranean Region.
|
| Legal base:
| Article 13.2 TEU; unanimity
|
| |
| Department: |
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
|
| Basis of consideration:
| EM of 2 March 2000 |
| Previous Committee Report:
| None |
| To be discussed in Council:
| Feira European Council 19-20 June
|
| Committee's assessment:
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision:
| Not cleared; further information requested
|
Background
9.1 At the Vienna European Council in December
1998, agreement was reached on the preparation of four Common
Strategies (Russia, Ukraine, Mediterranean and Western Balkans).
The Common Strategy on Russia was adopted in June 1999 and the
Ukraine Common Strategy in December 1999. Work is now underway
on a preliminary text of the Mediterranean Common Strategy.
The preliminary text
9.2 The Minister of State at the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (Mr Hain) has provided us with a copy
of this preliminary text. In it, the strategic goal of the EU
for the Mediterranean region is described as "to help ensure
that it becomes a focus of peace, security, stability and prosperity
for the benefit of all its inhabitants and its neighbouring areas."
9.3 The strategy lays emphasis on the nature
of the relationship as one of partnership and describes the Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership as a basic component of the Common Strategy. The consolidation
of peace in the Middle East through the Middle East Peace Process
is the other.
9.4 In the case of those partners eligible
for EU membership, the strategy covers only the multilateral aspects
of their relationship with the EU.
9.5 The objectives, agreed with the partners,
include a paragraph which says that, as far as security matters
are concerned:
"... the EU intends
to profit from the evolving common European policy on security
and defence (in the area of crisis management) to [strengthen
co-operative security in the region]."
One initiative, in this connection, that the EU will
undertake is:
"— in agreement with the Mediterranean
partners, [to] examine the possibility to extend to the region
the Petersberg operations."
9.6 A specific initiative proposed is the
adoption of a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability.
This would be a politically, but not legally, binding document.
The paper says that:
"Based on the concept
of comprehensive security, the Charter will focus on the relevant
political and security issues and will address, without prejudice
to the existing decision-making procedures, economic, social,
cultural and human aspects where they affect and determine peace
and stability."
9.7 Annexed to the document is a Spanish-Italian
proposal on elements which might be worked up and included in
the section covering the Charter for Peace and Stability. These
include priorities to be set for the political and security dialogue
and items for consideration in relation to the security dimension,
such as:
- the implications for EU policy in the Mediterranean
of the new Petersberg-type responsibilities on crisis prevention;
- the development of the Pilot Project on the Prevention
and Management of natural disasters, part of the Barcelona Process,
and "with this aim in view, it will be necessary to explore
the modalities of an eventual participation of military forces
to support these tasks."
9.8 Another initiative put forward in the
Common Strategy is to urge the Partnership countries to accede
to international human rights instruments.
— Middle East Peace Process
9.9 The Common Strategy commits the EU to
"make every effort to take an even more active political
part in the [Middle East] Peace Process" and says that:
"If required by the
parties, Member States could participate in the implementation
of security arrangements on the ground."
— Economic and financial
9.10 Within the Barcelona Process there
are already efforts aimed at the gradual establishment of a free-trade
area, support for economic transition and the socio-economic balance,
as well as regional and South-South co-operation. The strategy
commits the EU to take further measures to maximise the
impact of financial co-operation. These include co-ordinating
financial assistance with other major donors. On the table —
but not yet definitely incorporated into the text — is a
suggestion that the EU will give macro-financial assistance to
Mediterranean countries.
9.11 There are further undertakings to promote
co-operation under the headings of social and cultural
co-operation and Justice and Home Affairs.
9.12 The Common Strategy is to be taken
into account when Member States and the Commission participate
in other fora, including the WEU Mediterranean dialogue and NATO's
Mediterranean initiative.
The Government's view
9.13 Somewhat succinctly, the Minister says:
"The Government is committed
to the Mediterranean Common Strategy as a means of bringing greater
coherence and impact to the EU's relations with the Mediterranean."
Conclusion
9.14 Much of this Strategy is unexceptional
and the Minister has given us no clue that the Government dissents
from any of the points made in it. We, therefore, ask him to submit
a Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum if the text changes substantially
before it is put to the Feira European Council for adoption in
June. We would expect him to highlight any changes, comment on
their significance and inform us of the Government's view on them.
If no important changes are made to the text, we ask the Minister
to inform us by letter, commenting rather more fully than in this
EM on the significance of the Strategy, as drafted.
9.15 Meanwhile, we shall not clear the
document.
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