Examination of Witnesses (Questions 160
- 179)
THURSDAY 27 JANUARY 2000
RT HON
NEIL KINNOCK,
MRS JAN
ROYALL AND
MR STEVE
MORRIS
Chairman
160. Commissioner Kinnock, welcome to our meeting
of the European Scrutiny Committee. It is always a pleasure to
see you and it is a particular pleasure today to have you in the
House of Commons which will afford us the opportunity to discuss
with you what is happening in the Commission particularly with
the consultation paper that we are reading with interest at present.
Could you please pass on our kind regards to Andrew Cahn whom
we met in Brussels. We found it really interesting and we would
like to thank him for his help. It is a particularly important
time in the history of the European Union and our Committee is
looking at the IGC, but, as I say, with a particular interest
at what is happening in light of what happened last year. It is
of great interest to us all, both in the United Kingdom and throughout
Europe. We would look forward to having an exchange of information
and questions on how you see the future of the Commission. You
have set out in some detail the type of public service ethos that
you wish to create. In practice, how long will it take to create
this given the different national cultures and the staff involved?
(Commissioner Kinnock) Can I first of
all thank you for your welcome. It is a pleasure to be back in
what was for 25 years my stamping ground, occasionally stamping
and occasionally being stamped on. I do regret the fact that work
made it impossible for me to greet you when you came on your last
visit to the European Commission. I hope that will not be your
final visit and I will be around when you come next time. You
will always be welcome. It is a real pleasure to be here.
In terms of the time that it will take to implement
the mechanisms and changes in structures and systems set out in
the draft reform strategy document, I think we can be confident
that in about two and a half years those mechanisms will be in
place. It depends to some extent, of course, on the degree of
commitment shown by the European Council and by the European Parliament
to making legislative change in respect of the Staff Regulation
and the Financial Regulation but we have got no reason to anticipate
undue delay. And so the normal legislative procedure taking the
normal legislative time will probably, as far as we know, be preserved.
The completion of reform, of course, is a longer and much more
open-ended process. Because of the fact that the Commission of
today has inherited systems and structures, some of which were
set down in the 1950s, the demands of change are very substantial
and the seating in of modernisation requires not only changes
in mechanisms and in physical arrangements and in systems of appointment
will take time. But evidence of the consequences will take longer.
In the same way that an institution can get old, in the way that—in
some respects—the Commission has in its habits, it will
take some time for it to demonstrate its rejuvenation. In some
respects we will get quite rapid results, in terms of recruitment
for instance, and in terms of some parts of the promotion system.
In terms, too, of some of the reforms we have already achieved
in our first four months in office. In other respects it will
be a more organic process but the important thing is to get it
off to a very firm start with practical and radical policies and
that is what we have done.
Mr Cash
161. Commissioner Kinnock, I am very interested
in what you say at the beginning of your paper. You say: "The
events of 1999, including the resignation of the College of Commissioners,
graphically demonstrated the urgent need for reform"—and
we would all agree with that—however, you also just now
said that in certain instances you thought that we might get some
rapid results. I also see that you are proposing a whistle blowers
charter. The person who led to the resignation of the Commission
was in fact a whistle blower. That man, Mr Van Buitenen, as with
Bernard Connolly before him, was victimised, harassed and driven
out of the Commission, treated unfairly by any reasonable basis
of the rules of natural justice. The proposals for the new whistle
blowers charter, say, for example that he should "act in
good faith according to his best knowledge" and so forth,
so would it not be at least an admission that you were going to
deal with these questions in a fit and proper manner and to re-establish
the credibility of the Commission to reinstate Mr Van Buitenen
in the job to which he was already attached and to pay tribute
to the fact that he performed a public service? At the bottom
what this really amounts to is the concept of public ethos which
lies at the heart of this question which refers to accountability,
responsibility, efficiency and transparency, which are all matters
which need to be corrected. This real problem that lies at the
heart of Commission is one which I imagine you will want to redress
with practical and rapid results (and Van Buitenen is an example)
and a very good way to sort things out once and for all now would
be to get rid of the way in which the Commission has ended up
by being an example of systemic corruption of ethics rather than
the other way round. That is the problem and you have the opportunity
to resolve it. Will you put Mr Van Buitenen back in his job?
(Commissioner Kinnock) Thank you, Mr Cash. You did
say that you were expressing things in simple terms and that was
certainly accurate. I also find interesting the degree to which
you express enthusiasm for whistle blowing because my memory is
that that enthusiasm over the years has not been generally manifest,
but of course that is up to you. It would be inaccurate to say
that Mr Van Buitenen produced the resignation or the circumstances
of resignation of the Commission. Mr Van Buitenen in December
of 1998 caused to be disclosed details relating to several cases
of alleged misconduct and corruption. In every single case they
were already being investigated, in some cases subject to legal
proceedings, in other cases to disciplinary proceedings by the
Commission. The problem that arose then was that, by untimely
disclosure, Mr Van Buitenen could compromise the substance of
the cases against the individuals concerned. Indeed, in the disciplinary
proceedings particular attention was given to that since Mr Van
Buitenen himself had the integrity to acknowledge that he had
broken the rules and he had been advised about the rules. The
treatment of Mr Van Buitenen was referred to by Mr Cash. He was,
in keeping with the Staff Regulations as they exist, suspended
for four months. When he was reinstated in April of last year
he was reinstated on full pay with all of his terms and conditions
restored including the reduction in pay for the period during
which he had been withdrawn from his post. The post to which he
was appointed happens to be in my Directorate-General where he
has a very responsible job in the buildings section which has
a budget of about 120 million Euro. So no conclusion has been
made that would act to his disadvantage, nor has punishment been
meted out that would act to the career disadvantage of Mr Van
Buitenen. In addition of course, it is true to say that he has
been aware of his rights and exercised his rights, and in the
disciplinary procedure due note was taken of the fact that his
disclosure was to a Member of the European Parliament, and the
rules relating to disclosure were not as clear as they should
have been at the time. These have since been changed. These were
regarded to be serious mitigating factors and the result was that
the penalty levied against Mr Van Buitenen was formal admonition,
the second lightest penalty possible in the Staff Regulations.
I feel that as a matter of record Mr Van Buitenen knew that he
was breaching the rules, and the breach of the rules jeopardised
or compromised cases that were already the subject of action,
which he also knew. The penalty has taken account of all the objective
circumstances and therefore, as I said at the time, was both right
in terms of its proportionality and right in terms of recognition
of the occurrence. As far as provision for whistle blowing is
concerned! I set that out in very direct terms a couple of months
ago. The proposal includes all of the features I want to see in
new provisions under the terms of the Staff Regulations for ensuring
that officials are in a position to exercise their duty to report
any suspicions they have that misconduct has taken or is taking
place. Total career protection is offered in those circumstances.
The appropriate procedures for making the report are laid down.
They do not depend entirely on reports to the hierarchy but can
involve reports to the Independent Fraud Office or to the Secretary-General
of the institution, whether it is the Commission, the Council
or Parliament or anything else. In all those and several other
respects, what we will have when we conclude the implementation
of these proposals is probably the most comprehensive and secure
system for sustaining the officials' right and duty to report
suspicions of misconduct of any public administration, anywhere.
That is an ambition that I intend to see fulfilled and it will
be fulfilled. Mr Van Buitenen, as I have said, has not suffered
any relegation in his status or loss of his rights and I believe
that he, together with many others, has learned a great deal due
to the passage of events. I do not exclude many interested in
the affairs of the Commission from that general description.
Chairman
162. Commissioner, can I ask you how much does
the success of your policy depend on things like the circulation
of staff in your department and especially directorates general?
(Commissioner Kinnock) I believe that in terms of
the most senior jobs, directors general, chiefs of Services,and
deputy directors general, the reality of the action we have already
taken, and the signal communicated, will have a beneficial effect.
What we did within a fortnight of the Commission taking office
is to make the biggest rotation of posts in the history of the
Commission and we broke with several traditions by ensuring that
it could no longer be the case that an official from one nationality
could retain any one position for an over-long period of time.
In an administration, as you will understand Mr Chairman, that
has beneficial repercussive effects. Secondly, we made it very
clear, as a decision of the Commission, that merit would be the
prerequisite of senior appointments. Then, in December, we produced
the decision of the Commission that certainly guaranteed basic
geographical balance, which is essential in a multi-national organisation
like the Commission, but made that dependent upon the satisfaction
of criteria relating to merit as well as making commitments in
respect of the promotion of equal opportunities and general opportunities
for top officials. Following through such policies, which are
further confirmed in the reform strategy, will be promoted right
from the top, with the expectation of rotation of jobs at a reasonable
period of time and the promotion of the necessary flexibility
and mobility within the public administration. I think the basic
understanding will be that to belong to a public administration
is to have the advantage of a degree of career security for people
who have been hired on the basis of their evident capabilities-
and the quality of the staff of the Commission, as I think you
have already had reason to find, is generally speaking very high.
But in return, of course, for that general security and the opportunities
that go with it, it is reasonable for the administration (as long
as it makes proper provision in terms of training) to require
staff to be prepared to show certain mobility between functions
within that administration. That development will be characteristic
of the effect of the application of the reform strategy. The reason
I referred to changes we have already made at the topmost parts
of the Commission is to give evidence of action already taken
that is being followed up by specific proposals in personnel policy
in the reform strategy. They will have the effect of systematic
promotion of reasonable flexibility and reasonable mobility which,
apart from anything else, will enhance the career prospects and
job satisfaction of the very good people who work for the Commission.
163. Do you see any merit in actively encouraging
secondments, particularly at a senior level, between the Commission
and national administrations?
(Commissioner Kinnock) I am very much in favour of
a freer flow in both directions of qualified officials. I believe
that national administrations, in the very nature of the European
Union, can benefit from having people with extensive knowledge
of the working of the Commission and the particular perspective
that that provides for the operation of the European Union. I
also believe that the European Commission is enriched by the input
of people who are seconded from national administrations. Obviously
there has got to be a degree of proportionality in both directions,
but I think there is mutual advantage in ensuring that officials
get experiences, not just once but maybe on repeated occasions,
during their career. I would also add this: it is most definitely
in the interests of national administrations to see that several
of their officials in different departmental areas have the advantage
of working in the Commission, either in cabinets or in services
or certainly in the general ambience of the European institutions,
for part of their career. I think the additional insight and sharpened
perceptions can be of advantage to the Member States in their
participation in decision making and law making in the European
Union.
Mr Steen
164. Commissioner Kinnock, it is very nice to
see you again, albeit in a different place. Can I say we have
watched with great interest your fervour in trying to put right
the Commission that some of us feel needs quite a bit of attention.
The area which I think a lot of the public are concerned about
is the fact that the Commission is dominated by mainland Europe
and that we as a tiny island off that mainland Europe tend to
be affected by mainland Europe views of life and that we tend
to have to change our way of life for the way that mainland Europe
sees as their way of life. As a result of that most of the Directives,
rules and regulations are changing things in Britain towards a
mainland European approach rather than the other way round. The
problems are further compounded by the fact that a large section
of the public, of which I am one, feel that there is, if I use
this awful phrase, an uneven playing field in relation to enforcement
and that whereas Directives, rules and regulations, shall we say,
in the northern countries are applied with a particular activity
and approach and fervour, the further south you get—it may
have something to do with the climate—the more cavalier
the countries are towards actually getting those Directives and
rules and regulations dealt with. My concern is the total failure
the Commission, largely because it has not got the resources and
staff—not that I want larger bureaucracies but I do not
see a way round it—for actually seeing when Directives and
rules and regulations are imposed on European countries, even
those like ours which I do not think like a lot of them, they
are equally enforced. I do not see how that can be done unless
you have an army of officials in Brussels who are going out in
addition to the officials we have in each Member State to see
that there is fair practice going on. Unless there is cross-border
enforcement, I see that as a major problem for progress because
in this country people feel that they are carrying out the European
Directives even if they do not like them whereas, as I say, some
of the warmer countries tend to put them in filing cabinets.
(Commissioner Kinnock) Mr Chairman, I completely understand
the sentiment which Mr Steen—and it is a pleasure to see
him again—articulates. It is a realistic appraisal of a
general mood and that is understandable and it would be foolish
to ignore it. I also recognise the stereotypes that he puts in
a benign way, and that too is a reality. It has to be said, of
course, that stereotyping is not limited to the United Kingdom,
it is cross-Channel traffic, there is no question about that.
To come to the particular point, and there is a serious point,
relating to enforcement, the record, objectively, is mixed and
I would be happy to provide the Committee with what figures exist
upon the transposition of laws agreed to by the Member States,
(because, of course, laws are made by the representatives of the
Member States not by the Commission) and secondly on the levels
of satisfaction with enforcement. For instance, in the area of
the Single Market, we have constructed over the last three years
(when Commissioner Monti was looking after the internal market)
a "scoreboard" that does give an objective means of
judging the success being achieved in active enforcement. The
fact of the matter is, and this is part of the attractiveness
of the European Union, that, substantially, enforcement in day-to-day
policy terms rightly should remain with Member States in the name
of subsidiarity, Those who characterise the European Union as
a potential superpower or centralised state that wants to put
its fingers into everything and have the authority to enforce,
to the degree that I think is inferred in the question, suffer
a misunderstanding. In terms of trying to ensure faithful adherence
to the laws that are agreed to by Member State representatives
in the Union, certainly the Commission does try, throughout its
departments, to discharge its obligations because it has a legal
duty to uphold the Treaty. In terms of day-to-day enforcement
of course, it is really up to the appropriate authorities, including
legal authorities, in Member States. That is not to shift obligation
or to evade blame or duty; it is a reality, and I think that it
is an essential principle to uphold because I happen to believe
very firmly in the effective application of the principle of subsidiarity.
It would be conceivable, I suppose, to get more rigorous and even
enforcement if there was a super-inspectorate power allocated
to the Commission. But I really would regret such a degree of
centralisation because, although such an enterprise might begin
with all kinds of positive and productive purposes in mind, I
think that it probably would fall into error before very long.
So where it is appropriate in terms of co-ordination and enforcement,
and realistic too, for the Commission to uphold its powers to
secure adherence to the law, that should be done. In terms of
day-to-day adherence to the laws of the Union, I really think
that that primarily should remain with Member States, subject
at all times of course to the dispassionate judgment of the European
Court of Justice. I think that is the best way for matters to
proceed. I will happily provide what figures there are about the
levels of enforcement applying to each of the Member States. The
other point is, and I simply make this not as a polemic point
but because it was a fair point for Mr Steen to raise, I do not
think there is any ambition that I know amongst any serious people,
not just in the Commission but elsewhere, to change anybody's
way of life or to uproot the precious diversities of the Member
States and, indeed, the regions within the Member States. The
contrary is the case and as the European Union deepens I think
that the diversities become even more cherished than they were,
say, 20 or 30 years ago.
Mr Breed
165. Commissioner, could I ask three brief questions
but all related. Firstly, can you assure us that the reforms have
the very full support of Mr Prodi even when the going gets tough,
as it surely will? Secondly, do you believe that the Commission
can really go forward whilst it retains its existing union structure?
Thirdly, do you believe that in an age now where certainly far
more people are employed by international organisations that the
special tax status that they now receive is sustainable?
(Commissioner Kinnock) Can I respond initially by
simply asking a question. Could you, Mr Breed, more specifically
define what you mean by the "union structure of the Commission"
just so I do not misunderstand you.
166. The existing structure of labour relations.
(Commissioner Kinnock) I see, "union" as
in "trade union"?
167. Yes.
(Commissioner Kinnock) Right, first of all, I can
be very brief in my answer to the first question. The commitment
of Romano Prodi in principle and in detail to the reform strategy
is absolute. That certainly will be retained when pressures inevitably
arise. Secondly, as far as the trade unions within the Commission
are concerned, there are a couple of points to be made. First
of all, there are several unions at the moment. Secondly, only
one of those unions has significant membership. Thirdly, on the
best estimates, which are not seriously contested, something less
than 28 or 25 per cent of the staff of the Commission are actually
members of trade unions. The only circumstances in which elements
in the unions might have negative attitudes towards change which
can command any degree of support is when there is widespread
doubt about the direction or intentions of the administration.
It is one of the reasons, but only one, why my colleagues and
myself are very heavily engaged in a strategy of honest explanation
and offering detail to the good people who work for the Commission,
so that nobody is misled into thinking that there is some kind
of disruptive or oppressive purpose to the reforms that we are
proposing. I have to say (as someone who has already spoken to
6,000 members of staff in a series of meetings which will continue),
and has put very candidly to them the argument for reform as well
as the detail of reform and the implications for their tasks of
reform, that we are getting a positive response to this candid
and very adult, but nevertheless positive, expression about the
need for reform. There are a very large number, the overwhelming
majority, of civil servants who understand that after four decades
(without in any sense undervaluing past accomplishments) there
is a need for change and the Union will benefit from change but
so will they as professional civil servants. As far as the particular
provisions made for the incomes of civil servants are concerned,
I think what has to be taken into account is that career civil
servants in the European Commission and the Council and the Parliament
and the other European institutions cannot be strictly equated
either with members of the diplomatic service or with domestic
civil servants. They have longer tours of duty, longer tenure
than diplomatic staff but, of course, unlike domestic civil servants,
they frequently (indeed as a matter of rule) have to work in a
language other than their own. They move their families and they
have to take up a particular standard of obligations. It is appropriate,
therefore, for there to be recognition in terms of particular
financial provisions of the realities of their life. Therefore,
the system of allowances which has always existed and is akin
to the allowances provided for diplomatic staff on their tours
of duty, is likely to be recognised to be justified the more that
people come to know the reasoning behind it. There will be arguments
about the levels that are appropriate, but the principle is something
I think that can be very justifiably upheld because of the particular
nature of the demands of the employment and life as a consequence
of being a European civil servant.
Mr Casale
168. Commissioner, can I say that we are a Committee
of scrutiny but as a member of that Committee I am not approaching
this session in an atmosphere of suspicion over what the Commission
does because on the whole I think the Commission does a very good
job, but nevertheless as an elected representative there is a
concern about the Commission (some of that legitimate and some
of it based on misconceptions) about the role of the Commission
and, as we have heard, stereotypical views about some of the other
Members States of the European Union. I think it is important
that the Commission works to allay and dispel those concerns that
are unfounded but crucial that the Commission takes up the legitimate
ones. I think the changes that you have already made and the reforms
that are in the pipeline do go an important way to doing that
in terms of the concerns I have, particularly about the efficiency
of the Commission as a public administration and the quality of
the Commission as an instance of public administration. Of course,
bringing in the principle of appointments on merit is a central
part of that. All the time one has to cope with pressure from
Member States to resist that and not to allow the Commission to
appoint its public servants on the basis of merit but to have
people placed and allocated according to nationality. Will you
be strong enough as a Commission to drive through these reforms
and resist pressure from Member States to have their own people
rather than the people who are best suited to do the job because,
after all, in a modern public adminstration we need quality and
efficiency and not just to place people?
(Commissioner Kinnock) Thank you, Mr Casale. I would
emphasise at the outset that as we say very directly in the reform
strategy document, indeed I wrote the terms myself, a substantial
part of the purpose of reform is to respond to what are recognised
to be legitimate concerns amongst the European Union's public
and, indeed, the purpose of reform also is to try to secure high-quality
public service which the taxpayers and the general public of the
European Union deserve. By setting it out directly in terms we
give a definition of purpose which is lucid and one that we are
determined to follow through. As far as merit is concerned, I
would not want to convey at any time the impression that people
appointed to responsible positions in the European Commission
lack merit. Indeed, what is typical is that people have high merit
but over the years it is the case that some appointments have
been made with a prior importance given to which Member State
they come from. I have insisted that merit must be the pre-condition
of appointment and of promotion. In doing that, what I am seeking
to do, and there is a firm commitment in the reform strategy to
follow this through at all times, is to apply in practice what
has always been the provision of the Staff Regulation which in
very clear terms says that promotion shall be on merit. There
is no equivocation about it at all. I am trying to close the gap
between that definition which applies in the majority of cases
and the practice which has developed in some cases. So we will
apply the Staff Regulation and we will do it effectively and fairly
at all times. To give instance of that, in the changes we have
made so far in top positions a high premium has been attached
to merit. Refreshment is part of the justification between the
refreshment that comes with rotation of top jobs. But I think
that everybody will acknowledge that the people that we have been
in a position to promote and appoint, just in these first four
months, are people who are unequivocally appointed on the basis
of merit. You raise the question whether the Commission will be
strong enough to resist pressures that come along. First of all,
the answer to that is yes, partly because that is the nature of
the mandate of this Commission and that makes quite an important
contribution. Secondly, there is an understanding in this college
that there is mutual advantage in adhering to that principle for
everyone. It can cause occasional imbalances of appointment, but,
as I have pointed out incessantly to the people who raise the
question, it is foolish to take a still photograph of the balance
of appointments in the Commission because over a period of 12
to 18 months rotation, change and retirements restore those balances.
The other point that has to be made about the top appointments
is that there is a general recognition of the fact amongst the
Member States that they too have a vested interest in giving priority
to merit. I give evidence of the fact that in the initial changes
for instance, for the first time in history, a Director General
of Agriculture comes from somewhere other than France. The French
Government completely accepted that reality without any form of
pressure or protest. The person who occupied the post was a civil
servant of the highest quality who is now the Director General
of External Affairs and everybody is extremely happy about that.
But in previous times it may have been the case that in those
circumstances, a Member State government would have protested.
I think the general atmosphere, the context of reform, is partly
defined by the fact that not only did France not seek to intervene
when that change was made, but no other Member State has sought
to bring pressure to bear on me or my fellow Commissioners to
distort our judgment. I think that betokens a healthy shift in
attitudes and practices, and I am sure it will endure.
169. I completely accept the point that the
Commission needs to be strong to push forward reform against national
pressures, but it is a question of giving pre-eminence to the
question of merit when other issues are at stake, and of course
this comes to the fore very much in these top appointments, in
particular Directors General. You are now insisting that Directors
General should be of a different nationality to the Commissioner
they report to. To turn it around perhaps, what would happen in
a situation where the potential Director General of the greatest
merit happens, by chance, to be of the same nationality? Would
you exclude him on those grounds?
(Commissioner Kinnock) It is not an automatic exclusion
but as a general practice we would seek to get a person of high
merit who was from a different nationality. The reason for that
is to demonstrate a break with practices and refreshment of practices
in the European Commission and to end any possibility of people
drawing an inference that there was some kind of small empire
being established in respect of one Commissioner's portfolio matching
up with a Director-General. It is a "Caesar's wife"
activity, it must be said. I also have to say, of course, that
for the five years I was Transport Commissioner I am very happy
to report that my Director General was a fellow Briton who is
now Director General in another DG in the Commission and extremely
successful. He is very high-quality civil servant. The fact that
Robert Coleman and I both share the same passport inferred nothing
in terms of an unacceptable professional relationship, and we
conducted ourselves entirely appropriately within our respective
professional obligations. But to demonstrate beyond any equivocation
that there cannot be any kind of "sweetheart" relationship—and
I use the term professionally not emotionally—between a
Commissioner and a Director General, I want to sustain the improved
working practice of having people of different nationalities.
I do not think it will involve any compromise over the requirement
of merit that we have installed.
Ms Jones
170. Commissioner, I would now like to turn
to that part of your consultation document which discusses priorities
and responsibilities taken on by the Commission and the need to
match that to resources. Indeed, if I can quote: "activities
undertaken by the Commission will need to be supported by the
necessary human, administrative and financial resources."
Can you tell us how this is different from commitments that have
been made in the past from previous Commissions which could be
summed up best by saying "to do less and to do it better"?
How is this different from all the commitments we have had in
the past?
(Commissioner Kinnock) The commitment made by former
President Santer about doing less and doing it better was a product
of two considerations. One was the allegation that the Commission
(especially over the period of the introduction of Single Market)
had been too busy producing legislative proposals, and President
Santer was at that juncture drawing attention to the fact that
the volume of proposals would, perforce, be reduced. Secondly,
what President Santer was articulating was the ambition to achieve
higher standards of performance by lessening burdens on civil
servants for producing that volume. It was an ambition I entirely
supported. It was one that was earnestly offered. Events were
too strong for it, and that is why it is necessary in this reform
strategy, not just to express a desire for a better balance between
tasks and resources but to offer rigorous means of bringing that
about. This is why we have proposed the introduction of a system
of activity based management, so-called ABM, and a system of policy
formulation that lends itself directly to that. We put a very
strong emphasis, as you will see from the strategy paper, on the
identification of priority activities and (in some respects of
even greater significance), the identification of so-called negative
priorities, what some people call "sunset" priorities.
What we refer to there is activities that over the years have
been accumulated by the Commission, generally at the request of
the Council or the Parliament, that were entirely justified at
the time but because of the evolution of the Union, the justification
of the need for commitment of resources has been reduced in the
subsequent period. Picking negative priorities is never a popular
activity and it will require arduous judgment. It will also require
discipline to be shown in the Council and the Parliament as we
will be applying it in the Commission. But in order to close the
gap between tasks and resources, in some respects it is necessary
to judiciously reduce the tasks. When we can get a better balance
between what we are committed to doing and the resources that
we have to do it, then we will get an increase in efficiency and
rising performance. Can I make one last point which I meant to
make in response to Mr Steen's reference earlier on, just to define
the parameters within which we are working. The Financial Perspectives
agreed at the Berlin summit last year will provide for all the
European institutions, not just the Commission, an additional
1,000 jobs over the six years 1999 to 2005. 200 of those jobs
have already been committed to assist with preparations for enlargement
and it is self-evident, of course, that there is simply not, in
those Financial Perspectives, any significant provision for additional
resources. The only time when I and my colleagues in the Commission
will be able to seriously and convincingly argue for a change
in the Financial Perspectives is when we can demonstrate that,
in the Commission, we are using the resources at our disposal
to their maximum effect and producing the greatest possible value
for money. That will be when the reforms are being implemented
and evidence of improvement is forthcoming. In those circumstances,
if I can make the argument credibly and sincerely that the one
factor really retarding higher performance by the Commission is
shortage of resources, I will make that argument in good faith,
and it is one that I expect to get a positive response to. Until
we have made progress with reform I will not be able to do that
and people understand the constraints, the resource constraints,
under which we are working.
171. This does actually lead on to the obvious
next question which is do you think that the Commission should
shed any of its responsibilities? Should those be the choices
that have to be made at the end of the day?
(Commissioner Kinnock) It is a direct and simple question.
Unfortunately, there is no simple answer because even programmes
that you, Chairman, and I and Ms Jones might readily agree should
not continue to enjoy priority would be cherished programmes for
very good and sincere reasons amongst some Member States, several
Members of the European Parliament and that is apart from any
expertise that had been developed in the Commission. In order
to dispense with some of the activities the system of examination
and decision making has got to be rigorous, it has to be objective,
and the case has got to be proved for dispensing with those activities.
In those areas where it is possible to fulfil those requirements
it will be done, I do not think anybody has to doubt that. The
process of making the decision is necessarily a disciplined one
and often will be complex rather than simple. I am sure that every
practical politician or people who have taken responsibilities
understand what the selection of negative priorities and the ending
of activity in those areas implies in organisational, personnel
and other terms.
Mr Paterson
172. Good afternoon, Mr Kinnock, welcome to
the Committee, we have not met before. The document makes very
detailed and specific proposals about recruitment, training and
evaluation. However good the procedures, they will not work unless
the staff want them to. The Commission staff are demoralised and
suspicious: how easily will you be able to win them over?
(Commissioner Kinnock) Thank you very much. I am not
in a position to make a guess about how easily I can win staff
over to the adoption and effective use of new systems, which is
important as you suggest. What I can say is if the provision of
fair systems with objective assessment, the improvement in management
and the introduction of new training systems, can encourage people
to understand that the greater fairness, the greater thoroughness,
works to their advantage as professional civil servants then we
will get the results that we want. In other words, as a responsible
employer we are committed to providing the conditions in which
professional civil servants can reasonably be assured that they
have everything to gain from embracing and properly employing
the new system and nothing to gain by trying to remain with a
system which is inadequate and, I believe, has let them down and
not simply contributed to the under-performance of the Commission.
173. Your document looks to the future. It does
talk about greater efficiencies, making extra resources available.
I would point out that the scandals of last year, in which six
per cent of the budget was effectively stolen, did not happen
by accident. There are dishonest people in the Commission, there
are corrupt people and there are incompetent people. Would you
agree with Mr Van Buitenen that the best way to establish confidence
is to start removing those who may have committed irregularities?
(Commissioner Kinnock) First of all, if I could put
it to you as a parliamentarian, Mr Paterson, and I am sure you
will agree, in order to justify the removal of anyone, or the
punishment of anyone, such action has to be taken on the basis
of evidence and proof. Wherever there is evidence it is taken
seriously. Wherever there is proof the appropriate action is taken.
Difficulties can be encountered in any administration, the Commission
certainly is not special in this, in getting the evidence at a
sufficient level of weight to ensure that the action that you
might want and I might want is taken. I would not over-simplify
the situation. The laws of natural justice and the fairness required
in any civilised institution have to apply. It is easy for declarations
to be made about apprehending people who have been responsible
but, unless they can be satisfactorily proved to be responsible,
I do not think that either you or I would want to be part of an
injustice. The other point is this: if we are going to get universally
full adherence to the best standards we have to make sure that
any investigation is thorough and any punishment is fair otherwise
the system itself can fall into disrepute and that will have the
opposite effect on motivating people to act scrupulously and with
the highest integrity. If I can also make a generalised statement
relating to dishonesty and corruption in the Commission. The terms
used in the question are not justifiable in terms of all the evaluations
that have been done. I include those by the Committee of Independent
Experts, Court of Auditors and the assortment of other analysts
and commentators. I think it is quite probable that, as in other
administrations, there are people who simply do not come up to
the standards that you and I would require as basic. I have no
doubt at all about that. This is a human institution and misdemeanours
are committed. What we have to do is to ensure that with the new
anti-fraud office and the new Director (who is to take up his
position on 1 March, Herr Brauner, secondly with improvements
in the system of management, thirdly with improvements that we
want to bring about for the treatment of people who do not show
sufficient levels of competence, the new disciplinary arrangements
we want to introduce, that what we are doing is not only dealing
properly with those who commit, or who are likely to commit, misdemeanours
of various kinds but that we do it with sufficient rigour and
effectiveness to deter anyone who might be tempted to bend the
rules. This is a more arduous and painstaking process than making
a general declaration about the levels of integrity in the Commission
which typically, of course, as in most administrations, are very
high. The other point that was made was that six per cent of the
resources—I do not quote the exact figure but I do quote
the figure that was used—were effectively stolen. That was
not the conclusion that was reached by the Court of Auditors.
What was being referred to was inadequately explained expenditure.
Of course it has to be said, and this is a major challenge to
us all and that includes the Commission, that the overwhelming
majority of the resources of the Union are administered in Member
States. What we frequently need is much better co-ordination and
joint activity between the Commission and Member State administrations
in order to ensure that figure is reduced year on year and never
rises again. That does require rigorous, determined joint action.
I think that, with reform, we provoke the possibility that action
is more continual and more effective.
174. Speaking for the British taxpayer, who
will send £11 billion to the Commission this year according
to the Government's Red Book, a large slice of that did disappear.
That could have been spent on better things in this country. You
must have an idea of some of the people who are at best incompetent.
How many people have you dismissed since you took office in September?
(Commissioner Kinnock) I have dismissed no-one.
175. None at all?
(Commissioner Kinnock) No. There are a mixture of
reasons for that. Of course, apprehension and proof would be required.
Secondly, of course, there are specific employing authority obligations
attached to me and to my Director General. I have direct employer
responsibility for the upper grades, A1s and A2s; my Director
General, Mr Reichenbach, has responsibility for all other grades.
As far as I know dismissals have not taken place. If I may emphasise
the point I made earlier, the function of administration is not
to go around hunting for people to dismiss. The function is, however,
to ensure that there are a set of effective and fair rules that
ensure, if people are proven to be guilty of misdemeanours of
any kind (and that is a wide spectrum), they are effectively dealt
with by dismissal, by admonition, by punishment of various kinds
or even by legal proceedings. What we have inherited is a system
that does not do that effectively. What I insist upon is that
we do have a system that is certainly fair to those accused of
misdemeanour, whether it is petty or very serious, fair to the
colleagues of those who are accused, because they suffer demoralisation
if those who are guilty of a misdemeanour are not effectively
dealt with, fair to the institution and, therefore, fair to the
European taxpayer. Nobody who occupies a position of responsibility
in public life, whether elected like you or at the moment non-elected
like myself, could justify in any way any misuse, no matter how
small, of public resources. To describe the issue is one challenge,
to actually introduce mechanisms that effectively will deal with
it in a rigorous and fair way is something else. Part of the purpose
of the reform is to ensure that we do have the mechanisms that
greatly enhance the possibility of the apprehension of those who
fall below the standards that we want and do it in an equitable
way.
Ms Jones
176. It is a slightly minor point but as we
are talking about human resources and earlier we were talking
about training and career development of Commission staff, you
said earlier you were enthusiastic about secondments between Commission
staff and national member administrations. Are secondments between
Commission and the private sector, obviously companies of comparable
size and perhaps who could help fast track any training of staff
in terms of experience, of balancing priorities against resources
which I think is going to be needed, being considered as well?
(Commissioner Kinnock) We have to show a particular
sensitivity in this area. The reason is that the Commission is
in part a law enforcement agency that has the obligation to uphold
the Treaty of the European Union and the legislation derived from
that. Therefore, whilst no-one would forbid the movement between
the private sector and the Commission, no-one either would want
to place substantial reliance upon it because it has to be undertaken
with such palpable and transparent reassurances that it could
be difficult. There is a set of activities which have grown in
recent years that do involve the use by the Commission of private
sector companies. The reason why the use has grown in recent years
derives from the imbalance between tasks and resources to which
I referred earlier. The Parliament and the Council, mainly, have
allocated tasks to the Commission. The Commission has not refused
these tasks but sought to carry them out. It frequently has occurred,
for instance, in urgent conditions to meet humanitarian emergencies.
Not only that, far from only that, but that has been a case in
point. In order to be able to fulfil the tasks the Commission
has used external agencies, so-called technical assistance bureaux.
The effect has been a weakening of accountability and a lengthening
of the chain of management. Most of the people engaged on those
contracts are people of high integrity and of high capability,
but that increasing length and that loss of direct accountability
can have risky consequences. The risk may be small but we are
talking about public money and, therefore, we want the risk to
be eradicated. One of the reasons, therefore, that we are proposing
reforms in the so-called area of externalisation is to ensure
that, even when the Commission does have to resort to using external
bodies (as it always will have to, there is no question at all
about that), it does so through mechanisms that guarantee accountability
and the effective management of projects by accountable Commission
staff. We are working together with several very closely interested
people in the European Parliament to ensure that we have a mechanism
that retains the necessary flexibility of such arrangements but
maximises the accountability and integrity of such operations.
I think this is going to prove over the coming years to be one
of the most obvious sectors of the success of reform.
Mr Steen
177. Can I just go back to the point you just
made to Ms Jones about the Commission being a law enforcement
agency because there is a paradox which seems to get worse as
the Commission enlarges. As you bring in more and more countries
you either increase the size of your bureaucracy so you can be
a proper law enforcement agency or you continue along the lines,
which I entirely agree with, of subsidiarity. If you carry along
the lines of subsidiarity you get, as I say, some of the warmer
Mediterranean countries not enforcing their Directives and rules
and regulations and it gives an imbalance as to the cost of the
production so that companies in the colder climes following Directives
and rules and regulations, will have an on-cost on the production
of their goods where the other less enforcing countries of the
warmer variety you will find have a lower overhead. If the Commission
does not get bigger in terms of the enlargement of the countries
and at the same time does not enforce more but leaves it more
to subsidiarity, you are going to find that companies in our area,
cold, northern climes, are going to find their costs of production
of the same item very much more costly and that is not a fair
playing field.
(Commissioner Kinnock) Chairman, I hesitate to follow
Mr Steen in his interesting equation between climatic heat and
legislative or regulatary laxity. I do understand the general
point that he is making. In response I would make a general point
before going into slightly more detail. The determination of the
location of industry, particularly in our generation, is directly
related to the capability of people, the efficiency of practices
and the degree to which that location can contribute to competitiveness.
It has to be said that the general capability of a workforce has
tended to be a much stronger influence upon location decisions
by mobile capital than the relative record of enforcement by a
particular government. In addition, I would say that it would
be advisable for Mr Steen to examine the figures of application
and enforcement of particular requirements of European Union law,
before making a generalised conclusion about the impact of that
enforcement on location decisions by private companies. The other
point that I would make is that one fundamental purpose of securing
reform in the European institutions and particularly the executive
administration, the Commission, is to make proper preparation
for enlargement because the challenges coming from the next column
of enlargement, the next column of entrants, will be substantially
different, partly because of the historic inheritance of those
incoming countries and partly because of the complexity of the
single market and the European Union as it now exists. We need
to put at the service of the current 15 Member States and the
incoming Member States the highest attainable quality of administration.
Consequently, therefore, there will be some expansion of staff
to deal with the fact that we have got extra countries and a bigger
population. If we are acting to the maximum level of efficiency
I do not think that increase will be proportionate to the increased
size of the Union simply because, with better methods and modern
technology, we are doing the job better than was possible in a
different technological age, say, 15 years ago.
Mr Cash
178. Mr Kinnock, you referred to the question
of dismissals and said that you had not had any cause to dismiss
anybody so far but, of course, you were a Member of the previous
Commission and that Commission has resigned. Do you not think
it sends out rather an odd signal to those people who would be
the subject of these disciplinary arrangements that you are now
bringing in with respect to this next wave and the new Commission,
that the Commissioners themselves, who after all dismissed themselves
because of their own incompetence, actually stayed on in office
over a prolonged period of time, and to use your own words, "at
the public expense" and at the same time collected their
pensions and went on as if nothing had happened? That seems to
me to be rather a bad signal. I would like to hear from you that
if any such occurrence was to happen again, and I pay tribute
to Mr Van Buitenen—I do not think you quite understood my
questions on that but let us not go back into the history of it—if
in future any one, if it were possible, or other Commissioners
were to feel that they had to resign, do you not agree that in
fact, as is the case in this country where a Minister goes, he
does not then continue to stay in office after he has been dismissed?
It seems a little incongruous, does it not? Lastly, I would like
to ask a specific question with respect to the tobacco report
because we went down to the Court of Auditors and there is a report
which was connected with the suicide, or worse, of one of the
officials in the Commission and the Court of Auditors said to
us that they had tried, but had failed, to get access to that
report. It struck us as being extremely unfortunate and completely
contrary to the concept of public ethos that you have put forward.
Would you not agree that needs to be examined, that in fact that
report should be produced and the Court of Auditors should have
access to it in the way that they have demanded?
(Commissioner Kinnock) I do not think Mr Cash would
expect me to make an authoritative and final reply to the latter
part of his question. If he wants to give me details I will certainly
follow it through and see how with the provisions already of the
reform strategy, or some further consideration we can give to
it, we can secure a greater transparency. There is certainly no
desire on my part or the part of the Prodi Commission to want
to deny the Court of Auditors the information that they need in
order to fulfil their task, which is of course an essential task.
If I can further say, simply to correct an impression that Mr
Cash appears to have, the Commission of which I was a Member resigned
on 15 March last year after the production of the first report
of the Committee of Independent Experts, a report which said that
it was "difficult to find anyone with a sense of responsibility".
I have made public my disagreement with that declaration, and
also with the view that the Commission as a whole was worthy of
condemnation because it was a collegial body. I am abbreviating
what they said, obviously, but I think that I report the principle
faithfully. In those circumstances it appeared to me that there
was no honourable course but to resign, which I would have in
any case. That was the attitude taken after two hours of deliberation
by my fellow Commissioners. I do not want to deny Mr Van Buitenen
any attention or sense of satisfaction that he feels, and that
is evident, but the historical truth is that Mr Van Buitenen played
no part in the establishment of the Committee of Independent Experts,
indeed that was a joint proposition between the Commission and
the Parliament, nor did he play any part in the compilation of
the first report. It would be misleading, therefore, to consider
that Mr Van Buitenen's activities were those that produced the
resignation of the Commission. That is not what occurred. As I
say, I recognise the activities of Mr Van Buitenen but I would
not want two sets of events to be confused. As far as dismissal
is concerned, people are dismissed if there is proof against them
that they have committed an offence and that proof is accepted
through due process. Nobody, accused the Commission of acting
in a dishonest fashion or obtaining gain from any actions that
took place by anyone at all [indeed to the contrary]. In those
circumstances I do not think that it would be accurate to try
to equate the circumstances in which somebody might be dismissed
for misdemeanour and the Commission deciding to resign on 15 March
last year. I think it is important that there is clarity about
this. I do not acquit myself from the collective responsibility.
Neither I nor my colleagues would accept that we have personal
guilt which would have justified dismissal in circumstances similar
to those in which someone is dismissed because there is evidence
and satisfactory proof of the committing of a wrongdoing.
179. But you did go of your own volition.
(Commissioner Kinnock) Yes.
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