Examination of Witnesses (Questions 180
- 200)
THURSDAY 27 JANUARY 2000
RT HON
NEIL KINNOCK,
MRS JAN
ROYALL AND
MR STEVE
MORRIS
180. And the motion that led to that, contrary
to the impression given by the Socialist or the Labour Parties
in the European Parliament, and indeed even the Conservative Party,
was the actual motion that was driven by the Euro-realists who
actually put down the motion that led to the Commission going
as you know. You may not agree that they are Euro-realists but
you know the people I am talking about.
(Commissioner Kinnock) I think you would have to go
through the events again in order to get the correct series of
activities because, of course, there was no resolution before
the European Parliament, nor had there been one for two months
at the time of the resignation of the Commission. We can debate
this for a very long time but I think the point that I want to
emphasise is simply that in order to accurately describe the passage
of events it is necessary to get those events in the proper chronological
and systematic order and to understand who did or who did not
make a contribution to the combination of the resolution passed
by the European Parliament in January and the decision by the
Commission to resign, as it happens collectively, on 15 March.
The only point that I was making, and I do not want to labour
it any further, was that Mr Van Buitenen's activities took place
in December when decisions and dispositions had already been taken
up so far as the discharge of the 1997 Budget was concerned. So
his efforts were dramatic and they illuminated some, but they
were coincidental rather than contributory. As I say again, in
saying that as a fair description of what went on I am not trying
to isolate or to unduly condemn Mr Van Buitenen, I am simply trying
to put these affairs, which are important affairs, into perspective.
Mr Casale: I would ask the Commissioner to reaffirm
this point because certainly as far as I am concerned it would
not restore public confidence in the Commission to operate a kind
of lynch mob approach and simply take people out for the sake
of it; But what would restore confidence in the Commission much
more is for due process and due procedure to be observed and proper
protection to be in place; and at the same time a firm hand must
be taken in dealing with these matters but a fair hand as well.
Chairman: I think that was a comment in support.
Mr Paterson
181. This could be taken both ways. You said
on 14 January that when you had your previous portfolio you were
too preoccupied to realise the extent of the Commission's problems.
In some ways you have exonerated your ex-colleagues on the Commission
as not having made personal gain.
(Commissioner Kinnock) Let me interrupt, Mr Hood.
That was done by the Committee of Independent Experts. I was quoting
them almost with precision. Certainly I can provide the extract.
182. Okay. Large sums of public money did disappear
and that was why there was the crisis last year. Would you agree
with your new colleague, Mr Poul Nielson from Denmark, who said
that "... after five months in the job it is now clear to
me who owns the Commission. It is not necessarily the Commissioners
but prominent staff at a high level".
(Commissioner Kinnock) I have actually talked to Poul
Nielson about that, who is a good friend as well as a good colleague.
The reference that Poul was making was certainly not unprecedented
amongst Ministers and Commissioners since time immemorial. It
is that Ministers and Commissioners are, almost by definition,
transitory, even if it is for a fixed quinquennium or for even
a longer period, but civil servants are permanent. It will not
come as a surprise to any Member of this Committee to know that
from time to time, Commissioners and Ministers say that the very
permanence of the Civil Service does give them a substantial influence
on the conduct of affairs. Knowing Poul Nielson as I do, no-one
would accept the idea that this is other than a strong, self-determined,
highly intelligent man who is capable of looking after himself
in circumstances where there is great permanence and great talent
in the Civil Service. Poul will undertake his political responsibilities,
which is the function of a Commissioner, he will not seek to administer
his department or any other part of the Commission, but he does
command respect and he will command respect because of his innate
ability and transparency amongst his colleagues and amongst the
professionals who work with him in the Civil Service. I do not
think his contribution should be exaggerated, or the contribution
that was published should be exaggerated or misunderstood.
Chairman
183. Mr Kinnock, I would like to move on to
Pillar Three, financial management. How practical will it be to
make progress with the proposed changes before a new Financial
Regulation and Staff Regulation can be adopted?
(Commissioner Kinnock) If I can separate out the two
sets of regulations, Mr Hood. What we have set in place, as you
will see in the reform strategy, is a transition system which
will take us from the conventions that are currently operated
in financial management through to the time when, following the
amendment of the Financial Regulation, we have a new system fully
established. Because of the urgency of the situation we are able,
within the terms of the law, to proceed with the appointment of
a potential head of the new Audit Service and on May 1 to establish
that new Audit Service. That is completely consistent with the
law. In addition, we can make further developments with, for instance,
the establishment of a Central Financial Services Unit which will
be available for advice and counselling and examination and support
to the decentralised financial controllers that will eventually
go to the Directorates-General. In other words, the system of
transition will be completely coherent with the law and will provide
us with a welcome opportunity for preparation of the fully employed
system which will come into force the moment that the amended
Financial Regulation permits it. As I said earlier, I do not anticipate
undue delay in the necessary amendment by the Council and Parliament
of the Financial Regulation. So far as the Staff Regulation is
concerned, there are some changes, for instance like those relating
to training and other developments that we would like to take,
in the promotion of equal opportunities, the encouragement of
officials and a number of other developments—we can go through
those if you like—that can be proceeded with without amendment
to the Staff Regulations. The other areas, for instance in changing
the career structure to one which will enable more officials of
suitable quality to move from what is now a stratified rating
system into a linear career structure, which will require changes
in the Staff Regulation, and of course changes cannot be made
without the law being changed. Again, I do not reasonably anticipate
undue delay in the passage of the law. What I have said to colleagues
in the Council, as well as to Members of the European Parliament
in a Committee, is that we want consideration of the changes to
be thorough, as befits democratic institutions. But we do urge
that there is no undue delay because the whole of the Union and
every Member State in it, as well as the European Parliament,
and the staff of the Commission, have got a direct vested interest
in getting a renovated and improved system.
Mr Dobbin
184. You have just referred to the decentralising
of financial control to the DGs. Along with that there is power
and responsibility. Do you feel that the DG staff will be willing
and able to assume those new responsibilities? Of course as part
of that you will have to set up monitoring and an advisory system
as well, will that be able to weed out the poor performers?
(Commissioner Kinnock) I am grateful for that because
it does permit me to underline again the fact, as we set it down
in the reform strategy, that the full allocation of financial
control responsibilities on a decentralised basis to the Directorates-General
will only be made when there is absolutely satisfactory evidence
of the fact that the unit responsible in the Directorate-General
is capable of fulfilling those financial control responsibilities.
That capability will be checked by the new Audit Service, as well
as counselled by the new Financial Services Unit. That is the
primary safeguard, that the DGs will not be proceeding with the
full operation of this system unless and until they manifest their
ability to do so. The second essential thing, as Mr Dobbin suggests
in his question, is that there are inbuilt safeguards in the form
of the operation of the new financial management structures. These
are necessary, not just at the outset of the new system but continually
in order to ensure, for instance through the Audit Progress Board,
that the recommendations of the Audit Service are implemented
and carried through and that the Central Financial Services Unit
is available at all times to provide basic standards and to provide
advice on the application of those standards. Now, so far as the
people who will be charged with the responsibilities are concerned,
most of them will come from the very capable financial control
Directorate-General we have at the present time. What we are seeking
to do, completely consistent with the strong recommendation of
the Committee of Independent Experts, and indeed the Court of
Auditors, is to move away from a centralised, inherited, ex
ante visa system of financial control to one in which, in
the Directorates-General, decisions on spending are taken, so
that there is an absolute connection between that spending decision
and the accountability for that spending decision to a degree
which is not possible when the centralised system is employed.
The other point I would like to make about the deficiency of the
current system is that the deficiency is not one of integrity
or the ability of the people who are charged with financial control
responsibilities. I think everybody testifies to that. The deficiency
is that when those decisions are taken to spend money in the Directorates-General,
there is a feeling that if the intentions are not fulfilled then
there is a centralised checking system to be able to rely on.
This is in an institution that undertakes half a million financial
transactions a year. By definition, the ex ante system
can only be exercised on the basis of sampling and, although the
sampling is by general standards substantial, it is still around
about 30 per cent. Consequently that system is inadequate as a
way of advising effective financial decision making. So the change
that we are making is substantially related to the lessons learned
from that and will overcome those weaknesses. A decentralised
financial control system, in short, that is fully accountable,
properly counselled by Central Financial Services, subject to
rigorous audit and then having to follow through the advice of
the audit system because of the attentions of the Audit Progress
Report. So, wherever possible, we are seeking to implement the
"belt and braces" philosophy, strongly recommended by
the Committee of Experts and by the Court of Auditors, and I think
good advice. The last point I would make is this: in making these
changes in the allocation of financial responsibility and the
use of an audit system, we are bringing the Commission into line
with the best practice of ten Member States that are already using
these systems, including our own, and, in addition to that, two
Member States are in an advanced stage of contemplating similar
changes. So it is the convention of the European Union. We learn
from the best practice of that, and we apply it in the Executive
Administration.
Mr Casale
185. Commissioner, how quickly can you reduce
reliance on the technical Assistance Offices, which have caused
problems in the past with financial accountability?
(Commissioner Kinnock) To some extent the rhythm of
doing that is determined by two factors. One, the speed with which
we can get procedural changes necessary to enable it to take place
but, because there is a degree of consensus, or I believe consensus,
between the Commission and the Parliament on that, I do not think
that should be subject to undue delay. Secondly, there are contractual
considerations. Obviously we are not going to guillotine contracts
which have been honestly entered into, so to some degree the process
of transition will be determined by the length of existing contracts.
The other thing that has to be said is that there will be not
many different systems but there will be a degree of diversity
in the managing of external activities, for this very simple reason:
some of those activities are very substantial and they lend themselves
to explicit systems of management and accountability quite easily,
and we can make progress there using the system that has been
suggested both in the Parliament and the Commission as a preferable
alternative to the current system. Of course, there are other
contracts which are fairly small and do not lend themselves to
that system. Where we can get a critical mass of associated projects
then we can use the reformed system. For those projects that may
be many in number but are very, very small in budget some system
that is similar to the current technical assistance system may
continue to be used. In every case there will be a judicious and
well informed choice. We will not generalise, we will particularise
so that we get the best accountability and the best achievable
system of management.
Ms Jones
186. I have just got three short questions to
do with the new Anti Fraud Office. You said in reply to an earlier
question the new Director takes up his place on March 1st, if
I heard that right. Could you just confirm who the new Director
is going to be accountable to, who they will be answerable to?
The second one is about resourcing of the Anti Fraud Office, how
is its resourcing going to compare with its predecessor, is it
going to be on the same level or is it going to be more? Finally,
I do not know if I heard you rightly, did you say the Anti Fraud
Office is going to be up and running by May 1st? If I did not
hear that correctly, could you just say when you expect it to
be fully operational?
(Commissioner Kinnock) Thank you. The new Anti Fraud
Office has been operational since June of last year following
the passage through the Council and Parliament of the new regulation
governing the establishment and operation of that office. Regulation,
of course, is law by the Council and Parliament. It was established
as an independent office. In the original proposal the Commission
made there would not have been any form of connection between
the office and any institution, including the Commission. The
Parliament's view was, however, that a degree of connection was
necessary in order to ensure that all are operating in the environment
that it was intended to police, for want of a better word. That
is why, logistically, the Commission has responsibility for paying
OLAF officials and providing premises and so on. In all other
respects the office is completely independent. In that sense it
is publicly accountable and not connected to any of the institutions.
I believe that is how it should be. The responsibility for the
appointment of the director of OLAF unavoidably was allocated
to the Commission in the Regulationand we went through a very
exacting system of selection, publishing internationally a notice
of intended appointment which attracted, I think I am right in
saying, 492 applicants who were then narrowed down to a shortlist
of over a hundred, a further shortlist of 90 and then, eventually,
by exacting examination of the various qualifications, to a shortlist
which was interviewed by the Parliament, assessed by the Council
and interviewed by the Commission. The result was, as I say, that
Dr Brauner was appointed. Currently he is working on establishing
a new judicial system in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He is an international
lawyer of high reputation and I am sure that he will be a very
effective appointment. The resourcing of the Anti Fraud Office
is the obligation of the European Union and all its institutions.
Clearly in order to enable it to do its comprehensive work with
full effect, we will be waiting to hear from Herr Brauner about
the personnel needs that he has. Already, the commitment has been
made to a build up of staff, I cannot quote the figure precisely
but it does mean a very significant increase is already committed.
By definition that has to be gradual and we have to await the
appointment of a new director so that he could offer his assessment
of potential candidates in what are very responsible investigatory
and legal jobs. It is fundamental, however, to ensure and to guarantee
that in all respects, other than the Commission's duty to meet
the resource obligations and personnel appointment obligations
of having this office, the office is completely independent.
187. Right.
(Commissioner Kinnock) Its independence is further
guaranteed by ensuring that the body that supervises these activities
generally is detached from all the European Union institutions
and is itself independent and not obligated in any way to any
of the institutions.
Mr Paterson
188. The Commission in the past has often disputed
the Court of Auditors' Reports, can you comment on the three proposals
which might improve relations between the Court and the Commission.
Would it be a good idea to strengthen the European Parliament's
Budgetary Control Committee? Do you think the European Parliament
should be given the power to dismiss individual Commissioners
for maladministration or fraud? Do you think the European Commission
should be made personally responsible in any EU law which might
be administered by them mirroring current obligations on officials?
(Commissioner Kinnock) Thank you very much. I am in
favour of strengthening Parliamentary bodies. For instance, I
have very great respect for the work of the Public Accounts Committee
in this House. Without having details of what is proposed in terms
of strengthening of the Budgetary Control Committee, which is
colloquially known as COCOBU, it would be unrealistic of me to
comment. But, I believe that in the Commission there is a strong
readiness to be fully accountable to that and other parliamentary
committees in the European Parliament. The changes that were proposed
by the Commission yesterday in the regulation relating to public
access to documents for instance are, I believe, a further manifestation
of the Commission's eagerness to be more accountable than the
institution has ever been before. I think developments are moving
in the right direction. If you want to specify what you mean by
strengthening I will happily comment on that. Secondly, in relation
to allocating the power to dismiss individual Commissioners: obviously
if the Member States want to make a Treaty change that would permit
that, that is what would occur. I believe actually that the requirements
set down by Romano Prodi, who has a Presidential office that is
defined in the Treaty and is more authoritative than has previously
been the case, and the fact that each individual Commissioner,
Member of the current Commission has given a solemn and public
undertaking that if asked to resign by the President they will
immediately resign, are developments which I regard to be healthy.
In the deliberations that the Commission had yesterday on our
Opinion submitted to the Inter Governmental Conference we advocated
that arrangements similar to that should be considered for inclusion
in the Treaty. So I believe that fundamental responsibility for
making decisions of this kind should rest with the person charged
by the European Council and the Treaty to fulfil those obligations.
As an interim development, the readiness of the current Commission
to bear individual responsibility if required to do so by the
President I think is a productive advance. So far as holding the
Commissioners personally responsible, I have got no resistance
to that. I feel personally responsible in any case and I do everything
I can to discharge my responsibilities with efficiency and integrity.
I wonder about the practicality of setting down individual responsibility
in the Treaty since, in some respects, Commissioners equate to
Ministers and it is not typical, I do not think indeed it is even
known, for Ministers to bear the form of responsibility which
is being suggested in the question. Obviously if a Commissioner,
or indeed a Minister, can be shown to be guilty of negligence
or of deliberate maladministration, the individual should bear
the full penalties in any case.
189. Can I just pick up one example you have
had recently, actually from a Conservative MEP. The desk officer
in charge of the Ivory Coast has suggested that £18 million
of £70 million going missing was not grave enough to warrant
disciplinary action. This MEP had written to you in exasperation
because it does not seem to me there is a mechanism through which
he can get this individual who appears not to be taking seriously
the disappearance of a substantial sum of taxpayers' money.
(Commissioner Kinnock) I heard, Mr Hood, this morning
that Mr Nirj Deva, Conservative Member of the European Parliament,
had written to me along these lines. Mr Deva may or may not know
that a very comprehensive reply was provided last week to a French
Member of the European Parliament, Mr Jean-Pierre, about the case
that is specified. I will very happily provide the Committee with
the full response which demonstrates that the Government in question
has undertaken to make full reparation of the misallocated resources,
and indeed has repaid, I think, something like 60 per cent and
is continuing to do so. So far as allegations relating to officials
are concerned, I will take counsel on that, as naturally I would
do in compiling a full reply to Mr Deva. It would not be advisable
for me at this juncture to make an off the cuff statement about
the liability or treatment of an individual official of the Commission
for reasons that I am sure the Committee would understand. What
I am confident of, having seen the response provided to Mr Jean-Pierre
last week, is that the Commission has acted with rigour, that
when the case was first discovered by the Commission, I think
something like two years ago, immediate action was taken, and
that action is proving to be effective in terms of the recovery
of substantial sums of money which were improperly used. I hope
that the result will be full repayment. As I say, I will provide
details of the comprehensive reply I will give to Mr Deva.
Mr Cash
190. Mr Kinnock, we know the Commission has
a responsibility overall with regard to financial matters but,
of course, 80 per cent of European Commission expenditure is in
fact channelled through the Member States. At a rather crucial
time in John Major's Government, when I was making myself busy
keeping a watch on these matters, I put forward a proposal that
the Public Accounts Committee, through mechanisms which are available,
could work more closely with the Court of Auditors. We have a
very distinguished Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee now,
Mr David Davis. Certainly it seems to me to be a very good idea,
and I think I am right in saying Sir John Bourn would agree with
me on this, as he indicated to me in the past, that we should
have a greater degree of control within each Parliament in co-operation
with the other Member States through the Public Accounts Committee,
but not only exclusively with respect to the British Parliament.
The question which arises is why is it that we do not insist or
arrange or encourage the other Member States to have the same
rigorous examination of the expenditure which relates to these
huge sums of money within each of the Member States? In a nutshell,
to have public accounts committees in each of the Member States
working as efficiently as our's does. The second question, if
I may, because I think that is an important question, is there
are some investigations going on at the moment, so we are to believe,
into Mr Romano Prodi, and one can only say if that is the case
there is, as Vice President of the Commission, quite clearly a
need for you to be looking very carefully and responsibly, of
course, at the extent to which any of these investigations have
substance which could lead to another embarrassment within the
Commission of the kind that we saw last year. Could you be kind
enough to comment on the general question that I have put about
the importance of improving the quality of investigation in each
of the Member States and, secondly, to comment on the nature of
the observations that you yourself are now engaged in to ensure
that you are completely apprised as to the allegations that are
being made against Mr Romano Prodi and, if anything was to be
triggered in terms of the prosecution, what steps you would take
as Vice President of the Commission?
(Commissioner Kinnock) I will answer the two questions
in the order in which they were asked. In principle I would do
nothing but encourage the closest possible co-operation between
the Court of Auditors, individual parliaments, the Comptroller
and Auditor General and counterparts in all Member States. I think
that would add to the form of co-operation that we have strongly
advocated to ensure that the 85 per cent of the Union budget that
is administered in Member States is administered with maximum
efficiency, maximum effect and with maximum safeguards.
191. Could I be very quick and ask you this
too, because I think it is important in answering this particular
question. You know the procedures well enough in the House of
Commons before the Public Accounts Committee and the rigour with
which these civil servants and others are called before the Committee.
I would just like in this context to ask you can you see the other
Member States, without mentioning any in particular, actually
allowing that to happen?
(Commissioner Kinnock) There are several Member States
that would insist,( and it would be invidious for me to list)
that their parliamentary counterparts to the Public Accounts Committee
are as effective. They have counterparts of the Comptroller and
Auditor General, they have counterparts of the Court of Auditors
and the Member States would give evidence of the fact that they
seek to demonstrate rigour at a level which will be acceptable
to Mr Cash and any other dispassionate examiner of what goes on.
I think that the practice, the character, the traditions as well
as the performance of the Public Accounts Committee is worthy
of admiration and I think that the same case would be made by
several of my colleagues from other Member States.
192. From some other Member States?
(Commissioner Kinnock) From some other Member States.
I am not sufficiently familiar with the provisions in detail in
every Member State, some I do know and some, I would be happy
to testify, are extremely rigorous and effective in detecting
misuse or incompetent use of public funds. I think there is strong
evidence to demonstrate that is the case. As I said, it would
be invidious for me to try and rank the Member States in terms
of rigour.
193. Excuse me. In fact, of course, it is essential,
given the fact that there is movement towards this so-called political
union, that in fact there should be equivalence of treatment because,
after all, we end up by paying our contribution to the whole,
so as far as we are concerned it would be, shall we say, a pretty
poor state of affairs for us to have to rely on the fact that
50 per cent did it properly but the other 50 per cent were allowed
to get away with it. So you would, if I may suggest, have responsibility
to ensure that the other 50 per cent comes up to the level of
the 50 per cent that does the job as well as they should do.
(Commissioner Kinnock) I understand the nature of
the question, Mr Hood, and I would simply say that, like Mr Cash,
I am a positive evangelist for identifying and ensuring the implementation
of best practice. I think that whilst the practice in our country,
here in the United Kingdom, is very good, indeed excellent, there
are many who would suggest that there is equivalent performance
in other Member States and that there should be equivalent performance
in every Member State. Not only for the general European Union
reasons that Mr Cash very fairly suggests, I totally agree with
him, but also, of course, in terms of the effectiveness and accountability
in the financial affairs of every single Member State. If I can
move to the question raised about the President of the Commission,
Romano Prodi. I have seen the allegations in the newspapers in
exactly the same fashion as Mr Cash. I have also seen the statements
that have come from President Prodi, very confident statements.
I am aware also of the convention of the conduct of the law in
Italy and the way in which cases can be returned to repetitively
Like any fair minded person, therefore, I will await the outcome
of the present round of further investigations that have been
undertaken in the Italian judicial system. From what I know of
Romano Prodi and of the application to his tasks, which he conducts
with integrity, I think that the assertion that he has made with
great confidence that there is not a blemish on his character
is one made with justice.
194. You would not say—finally—that
the kind of excuse that is being offered with respect to Mr Craxi,
for example, in the newspapers in the last couple of days and
in the context of Chancellor Kohl, that somehow or other there
should be a form of amnesty on account of their enthusiastic promotion
of political union, you would regard this as a pretty absurd proposition?
(Commissioner Kinnock) I think that is eclectic reasoning,
I use the word "reasoning" in its broadest sense, and
I think that it borders on being defamatory even with the protection
of Parliament, quite proper protection of Parliament. To make
connections between the allegations levelled at former Chancellor
Kohl and the evidence of very grave misconduct by former Prime
Minister Craxi and the allegations that have been made in recent
times about Romano Prodi is I think not really worthy of Mr Cash
as the honourable man that I know him to be.
195. They are separate questions, they were
to be divorced from one another. There was not meant to be any
direct connection between them. I want to make that quite clear.
In fact, I put my question with respect to Mr Prodi in very measured
terms and I referred specifically to the question of allegations
that we have read in the newspapers and I think that is a fair
way to describe it. I too believe that people have to be given
the opportunity to be able to answer questions in due course in
the proper form. I entirely divorce the idea of putting the two
things together.
(Commissioner Kinnock) I am very happy to have provided
Mr Cash with an opportunity to put that on the record because
I knew that was really his sentiment.
Chairman
196. Commissioner, I wonder if I could move
on to a general point. I am seeing the Commission's recommendations
on reform of the Commission as to the maximum numbers of Commissioners
and I see there is a proposal here for a maximum of 20 Commissioners
in relation to future enlargement. Has there been any view sought
of the applicant countries as to such a proposal?
(Commissioner Kinnock) I am grateful for that question.
There have been discussions, as one would expect, with the applicant
states in a variety of fora but no conclusions have been drawn,
and indeed since they are not members of the Union yet one would
not expect conclusions to be drawn. What I would refer to is the
discussion that took place in the College of Commissioners yesterday
and the document that we produced as a consequence which has been
widely publicised in this morning's press. In that document the
issue of numbers of Commissioners, the size of the Commission,
is addressed. The conclusion by the College was that the fairest
contribution that could be made to deliberations in the IGC and
to public debate was to present two options for consideration,
together with some detail about the implications of adopting either.
The reason it was put in this setting of course is that the Commission's
involvement in the IGC is limited, absolutely rightly, to the
submission of opinions. The Commission does not play any form
of conclusive role in making decisions about the outcomes of Inter-Governmental
Conferences' as the name of the Conferences suggests. The two
options offer the idea of a Commission appointed by national rotation
so that at some period of time not all Member States would have
a Commissioner around the table. There are rational arguments
offered for developing such a system to do with proportionality,
to do with size, to do with the efficiency of the conduct of the
Commission, the number of portfolios to be managed, powers of
the President and I am sure the Committee is familiar, and will
become increasingly familiar, with the pros and cons of that approach.
I have to say speaking personally, none of the arguments offered
in favour of some system of rotation or a system that would at
any time have less than one Commissioner per Member state has
persuaded me. For a long time past I have taken the view that,
both in terms of public reassurance and in the interests of demonstrating
the multi-national nature of the Executive body, it is always
going to be necessary to have one Commissioner per Member State.
I long ago took the view that, with anticipated enlargement, it
was unrealistic to assume that any Member State would retain two
Commissioners. Obviously there are implications for a change in
the size of the Commission, for the voting balance in the Council,
and indeed in some respects for the extent of the use of Qualified
Majority Voting and the retention of unanimity requirements. I
think the document produced yesterday does demonstrate understanding
of the need to sustain a reasonable balance which will ensure
that there is a connection between the size of a Member State
and its population and the voting strength that it is capable
of deploying in the Council. There are others, and I am one of
those, together a significant number of people, who for reasons
that you will understand, Mr Hood, continue to sustain the argument
that it is necessary for a variety of reasons, some political,
some constitutional, to retain at least one Member of the Commission
per Member State. The final point is that colleagues have reasonably
suggested, I do not just mean Commission colleagues but others
who participate in these discussions as well, that when there
are 23 or 28 or even more than 30 Member States of the Union,
it will be an organisational challenge to fully and effectively
employ 23 or 28 or maybe even more than 30 Commissioners. I believe
that the ability to meet the organisational and administrative
challenges of that are small by comparison with the challenges
that would be offered by having a system that did not provide
for all Member States the reassurance of direct participation
in the Executive administration through having a Commissioner
from that Member State. It is a balance of choices. My choice,
as my colleagues in the Commission are well aware—and this
is the purpose of having options to discuss—continues to
be strongly for having one Commissioner per Member State.
Mr Casale
197. Commissioner, one of the most refreshing
things about the appointment of President Prodi, has been that
he has refocused attention on the world outside the European Union.
It is really in that fast moving, competitive international context
that he has made the point so forcefully that the European Union
has changed and become more dynamic. Indeed, he has made the contrast,
as I understand it, between the integration and the internationalisation
of economic activities and economic systems and so on with a much
slower pace of change with in our political institutions, especially
at the international level. In that context, could you tell the
Committee whether you think that the reform proposals on the table
in the context of the IGC, especially as they relate to the Commission,
which are sometimes described as tidying up the Amsterdam leftovers,
are really radical enough and, especially against the background
of Prodi's vision, is not much greater, faster, more radical change
required?
(Commissioner Kinnock) First of all (I have offered
this view elsewhere and I certainly put it before the Committee),
that the way in which the term "Amsterdam leftovers"
is used can be somewhat misleading. The reason why those three
very significant issues were not resolved at Amsterdam is that
they are very significant.
Mr Cash
198. Exactly.
(Commissioner Kinnock) The reason why I am not just
making a semantic point about the use of the term but a political
point is that I would not want to rob the issue of the significance
it deserves by using a diminutive reference. They are not "leftovers",
they still constitute substantial issues that require to be resolved
by democratic deliberation. I am sure that advances will be made
on that in the forthcoming conclusion of the IGC. As I say that
is not a semantic point, that is a point of some political substance.
So far as the role of the Union in the world is concerned, Romano
Prodi is absolutely right to draw attention to the fact that there
is an evolution of international development that does offer huge
opportunities for Europe- Europe generally, not just the Union
as it now exists- but also very significant challenges. My belief
is that the Union should be more conscious, as some of my colleagues
try to ensure to their credit, of the fact that this is the biggest
single trading bloc in the world. It has become increasingly sophisticated
as a world partner and can increasingly be an influence for good,
acting in a cohesive and coherent fashion for modernising, for
instance, the financial architecture of the world. We heard a
great deal about that in the crisis of 1998 in the world financial
community. We talk about it in a kind of detached sense but the
interests of the European Union in making a positive contribution
to that are consistent. It is developments like that, which I
refer to only for illustration, which do give substance to the
view very graphically expressed by President Prodi that the Union
should be conscious of its own potential and responsibilities
and act accordingly. There is nothing imperial in that sentiment,
quite the contrary. The argument is made as a potentially effective
contributor to improvement, not out of any sentiment of conquest
and I think I can certainly assure the Committee of that. One
of the opportunities that arise for further refining that reality
and encouraging practical action on that basis comes with the
IGC. In expressing his views I know that Romano Prodi is not only
putting forward a personal point of view but articulating widely
held views among many of the Member State Governments about the
role that, unavoidably, the European Union, at its present size
but increasingly in bigger size, must seek to fulfil in the wider
world, not only commercially but in terms of making a sustained
contribution to the better governance of what is obviously an
increasingly inter-dependent world, economically and politically.
199. Before we finish, may I just ask one more
question. Of course Mr Prodi did refer to the ball and chain the
other day when he was referring to the question of the speed at
which reforms of the kind that my colleague, Mr Casale, would
advocate should take place. For example, he clearly indicated
that the veto should go in very large areas, that we should have
a European army. Some of the comments that you made in general,
when reduced to the specifics, do indicate a programme in Mr Prodi's
mind which does take us well into the kind of political union
that is quite obviously advocated by many other than myself.
(Commissioner Kinnock) I do realise that in discharging
his parliamentary duties Mr Cash has from time to time erred on
the alarmist side. I think he was doing that and I am sure this
is a debate we will continue between us, and more widely, on many
future occasions.
Chairman
200. Commissioner Kinnock, you may recognise
the bells are tolling for us to rush and vote. Can I thank you
very sincerely for what has been two hours of real quality evidence
for this Committee which I am sure will serve us well in our deliberations.
I was just thinking, as I have been listening to your evidence
for the last two hours, your great achievement according to my
own beliefs in the great reorganisation you achieved in the Labour
Party and this Government to this day is a testament of your skills
there. I just wish you the same success in reorganising the Commission.
Thank you very much.
(Commissioner Kinnock) Thank you very much. I hope
that you take up the standing invitation to come back to the Commission
and meet more of my colleagues. After the experience of the Labour
Party, and just a few months of this job, I have at least decided
on what the title of my autobiography is going to be, it is "Why
Me?".
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