COMMON STRATEGY ON THE MEDITERRANEAN
(a)
(21016)
—
(b)
(21271)
—
| Preliminary draft of the Common Strategy of the European Union on the Mediterranean Region.
Presidency draft of the Common Strategy of the European Union on the Mediterranean Region.
|
| Legal base:
| Article 13.2 TEU; unanimity
|
| |
| Department: |
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
| Basis of consideration:
| EM of 6 June 2000 |
| Previous Committee Report:
| (a) HC 23-xi (1999-2000), paragraph 9 (8 March 2000)
(b) None
|
| To be discussed in Council:
| 13 June 2000 |
| Committee's assessment:
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision:
| (both) Cleared, but see paragraph 10.9 below
|
Introduction
10.1 The opening paragraph in the latest draft
of the Mediterranean Common Strategy, an unofficial text which
we consider here (document (b)), recognises that the Mediterranean
region is of strategic importance to the EU, and adds:
"A prosperous, democratic,
stable and secure region, with an open perspective towards Europe,
is in the best interests of the EU and Europe as a whole."
10.2 The Common Strategy builds on the Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership established by the Barcelona Declaration of November
1995. It will cover all the EU's relations with its partners in
the Barcelona Process[12],
and with Libya. It does not include the EU's bilateral relations
with Turkey, Cyprus and Malta which, as candidates for EU membership,
are covered by the Accession Process.
10.3 The Minister of State at the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (Mr Hain) made very little comment in his
Explanatory Memorandum on the earlier draft of the Strategy, which
we considered on 8 March (document (a)). We did not clear it and
instead asked him to comment more fully on the significance of
the Strategy, highlighting any important changes in any later
text.
The current draft (document (b)) and
the Government's view of it
10.4 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 6 June,
the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr
Vaz) describes the main purpose of the Strategy as being to promote
greater consistency in the EU's external action across the Pillars
where the Member States have important areas of interest in common.
10.5 The current draft is still under discussion
but, the Minister says, it is:
"... a considerable
improvement on the earlier text. It has been significantly reworked
and now gives a higher profile to UK priorities for the Mediterranean
region, including the promotion of democracy, good governance
and human rights, trade liberalisation, economic reform and the
environment."
10.6 While welcoming the "potential added
value of the Common Strategy as a means of bringing greater coherence
and impact to the EU's relations with the Mediterranean,"
the Minister says that the Government wants to ensure that it
adds value to existing instruments:
"In particular, we want
it to help us achieve more rapidly the objectives of the Barcelona
Declaration and its subsequent acquis. While the Common
Strategy will be consistent with the terms of the Barcelona Declaration,
we also want it — as a unilateral EU policy instrument
— to build on the principles of Barcelona in various key
areas, in particular, by promoting democracy/human rights; combatting
drugs trafficking and organised crime; protecting the environment;
promoting non-proliferation; advancing trade liberalisation and
economic reform."
10.7 Of the areas still under discussion, the
Minister says that the Government attaches particular importance
to the following:
"a) political and security
issues. The Common Strategy should make no commitment to arrangements
for the participation of Mediterranean partners in the European
Defence structures which Member States are still themselves discussing.
Any EU decision with defence/military implications will continue
to be taken in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty on
European Union, and will not be governed by the terms of the Mediterranean
Common Strategy. The Government wants to make clear that the Common
Strategy will not affect current arrangements by which Member
States take individual decisions regarding the recognition of
states, a state's membership of international organisations, or
the maintenance and conduct of bilateral diplomatic and other
(eg political, sporting and cultural) relations;
"b) Justice and Home Affairs. The Government
wants the Common Strategy to give a clear commitment to strengthening
co-operation to combat organised crime, terrorism and drugs trafficking;
"c) The Middle East Peace Process. The Government
attaches importance to the EU position on the MEPP, encapsulated
in the Berlin Declaration. The Common Strategy should be used
to help ensure that the EU is ready to make a positive contribution
to underpinning any settlement reached between the parties. Until
a settlement is reached, the Government will work to ensure that
EU positions on the detail of negotiations between the parties
remain subject to the political consensus which produced the Berlin
Declaration. We are examining ways of making this clear in the
Common Strategy. We shall also want to ensure that this position
is presented carefully to Mediterranean partners."
Conclusion
10.8 When we reported on this Common Strategy
on 8 March, we noted that a specific initiative proposed is the
adoption of a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability.
This was described as a politically, but not legally, binding
document. We are far from clear how this Charter is expected to
fit in with the Strategy and we are surprised that there appears
to be a willingness on the part of the Government to agree to
something which is of such unclear status. We ask the Minister
to inform us further on this point when the intentions of the
Member States have developed.
10.9 The Minister has, admittedly, provided
us with a clearer picture than he did in his earlier Explanatory
Memorandum of the Government's view of the proposed Strategy.
He tells us that several aspects to which the Government attaches
particular importance are still under discussion. We are uncomfortable
with the lack of time given by the Presidency to consider its
draft, but we do not propose to withhold clearance. However, we
clear the Presidency draft only on the understanding that the
Government will not agree to the Strategy, unless it is able to
ensure that there is no commitment to participation by the Mediterranean
partners in the European defence structures. We also broadly support
the Government in the other objectives which the Minister outlines
in his Explanatory Memorandum.
12 Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian
Authority, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta. Back
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