Conclusions on the likely scope
and timetable of the IGC
35. It is worth noting at this early stage of the
IGC the extent to which there is, at least broad, agreement not
only between Member States but also between them and the Community
institutions, as well as those matters on which there remain considerable
divergences of view.
36. There is universal agreement that the purpose
of the 2000 IGC is to make the European Union ready for an enlargement
process during which its membership will more or less double (comprising
28 Member States if all current applicants successfully surmount
the hurdles on their way to accession). Although that enlargement
process will necessarily take place in stages it is generally
agreed that the necessary Treaty amendments must be in place before
it begins.
37. It therefore follows that there is broad consensus
that, in principle, the scope of the IGC is limited to institutional
matters and excludes new powers to act (in other words it is about
how the Union does its business not about what business it should
do)[45].
The Commission's inability to resist the temptation to make at
least one proposal for substantive amendment (on prosecution of
cross-border fraud) does not affect the validity of this general
conclusion.
38. It is also noteworthy that there is universal,
if implicit, agreement that the main elements of the 1957 structure
must be maintained. Even the proponents of an ambitious agenda
do not call into question the main elements of the Union's institutional
structure, in particular the exclusive right of an (unelected)
Commission to propose Community legislation and the subordination
of the European Parliament to the Council (which, taking the Union's
activities as a whole, would remain even if co-decision were extended
to all legislation adopted by QMV). On the other hand, those Member
States which have in the past expressed reservations about the
Union's ultimate objectives are not seeking to use this IGC to
tilt the institutional balance in favour of Member States. The
1957 structure is a delicate compromise between supranationalism
and inter-governmentalism and advocates of more of the one and
less of the other have implicitly acknowledged defeat.
39. There is universal agreement that the elements
comprised in the Amsterdam Triangle at least must be tackled and
negotiations on them brought to a successful conclusion. There
is also broad agreement that there are other institutional questions
closely linked to the Amsterdam Triangle which ought also to be
tackled, for example, the composition and functioning of the Community
courts.
40. Although there have been isolated voices questioning
the logic of the link generally made between conclusion of the
IGC and the start of enlargement, there is broad agreement that
the IGC must end by December 2000 at the Nice European Council.
41. On other matters there is as yet no consensus;
on the scope of the agenda there remains a considerable divergence
between minimalist and maximist positions, in particular on flexibility
and the splitting of the Treaty into its constitutional and policy
parts. On the main agenda comprised in the Amsterdam Triangle
there remains considerable controversy on the extension of qualified
majority voting.
42. We shall now proceed to consider in detail the
main issues, dealing first with topics on the IGC agenda, then
with issues likely to be considered by the IGC at a later stage,
and finally with related issues which will not lead to Treaty
changes but which form part of the current programme of reform
of the European institutions.
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