Internal Commission Reform
157. Following the two reports of the group of "Wisemen"
on the financial management of the Commission[198],
President Prodi initiated an extensive review of the Commission's
operation. A Task Force for Administrative Reform was established,
headed by a high ranking Commission official, Claude Chêne.
It holds monthly meetings to consider proposals for reform based
on the advice of the Reform Group of Commissioners[199].
The Group will define the reform strategy and oversee the implementation
of agreed measures.
158. At its first meeting, on 18 September, the new
Commission adopted a series of texts on internal reform: a Code
of Conduct for Commissioners; a Code of Conduct for Commissioners
and Departments; Rules of Procedure of the Commission; Principles
for the establishment and operation of working groups of Commissioners;
Principles for closer internal co-ordination; and Rules of conduct
for appointments to posts in grades A1 and A2 (senior management
grades in the Commission)[200].
159. The Commission started to put its programme
of reform into effect in the autumn. One of the better publicised
developments was a re-organisation of the Directorates, particularly
in the area of external relations, to try to rationalise the administration,
and to provide clearer parameters of responsibility. It is as
yet too early to see the benefits, if any, of these changes. In
addition, to promote coherence and a common ethos, and to break
the habit of regarding certain posts as the birthright of particular
nationalities, there was a reshuffle of Directors General, particularly
focussing on those who had stayed too long in one post[201].
160. At the same time, it was decided that Commissioners
should no longer have offices together but instead should be physically
based in their own departments. The size of their Cabinets was
reduced and they were required to make their Cabinets more international[202].
The Commission also felt that there had been insufficient demarcation
of the rôles of the Cabinets and the departments: the new
Code of Conduct for Commissioners and Departments lays down the
division of responsibilities between Cabinets and departments[203].
Commissioner Kinnock emphasised to us that these changes are designed
to allay any suspicion that Commissioners can build their own
'empires'[204].
161. Overall, the Commission has emphasised that,
in order to provide good service to both European taxpayers and
their representatives in the other European institutions, it needs
to promote an ethos of independence, responsibility, accountability,
efficiency and transparency. It has highlighted a number of specific
actions to develop this culture: a proposal for an Inter-Institutional
Agreement for a 'Committee on Standards in Public Life'; new rules
on public access to documents[205]
(these have already been published, and are being criticised in
some quarters as being at least as, if not more, restrictive as
the present rules); a code of conduct for relations with the EP;
and measures to ensure prompt payment of money owed by the Commission.
162. The Commission has now turned its attention
to more detailed reforms. On 19 January Commissioner Kinnock published
a consultation document entitled Reforming the Commission[206],
a blueprint for a "comprehensive Reform Strategy" on
which he sought the views of the Commission staff, the European
Parliament and the Council, and which was a precursor to a White
Paper issued by the Commission on 1 March[207].
The consultation document and the subsequent White Paper have
been criticised in some quarters as trying to force an alien "northern"
(or even "British") model of public service management
on the Commission. Some elements in the original consultation
document were abandoned or modified in the White Paper[208],
but the core proposals remained.
163. In his preface to the consultation document,
Commissioner Kinnock analysed the problem as follows:
"Over the decades, ever-increasing
obligations — particularly executive functions — have
been given to the Commission. Against that background the systems
and procedures of the Institution have become outdated, the burdens
of work have been unevenly distributed, responsibility has been
fragmented and sometimes obscured, and the skills of management
were not always given the necessary premium".
164. The White Paper sets out a programme to tackle
this problem in the form of three strands: action on priority
setting, the allocation and efficient use of resources; "human
resources development"; and changes to audit, financial management
and control.
165. On priority setting, the White Paper states[209]:
"Resources have not
generally been linked to priorities for two reasons. First, the
Commission's own decisions on activities have generally been taken
separately from those on the allocation of resources. Second,
the Council and [European] Parliament have given additional tasks
without approving extra resources. Moreover, the prevailing management
culture emphasises control rather than objectives. The fact that
results and responsibilities are not always adequately defined
or assigned further compounds the problem".
166. The first action the Commission is taking is
to conduct an overall assessment of its priorities, activities
and resources, including the identification of activities "which
can be stopped because they are not priorities with sufficient
value-added at European level"[210].
This assessment is to be completed by September 2000. However,
the Commission considers that "these issues [of prioritisation]
need to be addressed on a more continuous basis", and is
therefore proposing three further improvements. First is the establishment
of a comprehensive system of "Activity Based Management"[211].
This is intended to be fully operational by July 2002[212].
(The Commission has already decided to adopt Activity Based Budgeting,
which directly links objectives and activities to budgetary resources.)
The second improvement relates to delegating and contracting-out
functions, or, as the Commission puts it, "developing an
externalisation policy". Some of the most astringent criticisms
of the Committee of Wisemen were directed at Commission control
over functions contracted-out (chiefly to the Technical Assistance
Offices (TAOs)). As Commissioner Kinnock told us, TAOs present
intrinsic difficulties of financial management simply because
there is a longer chain of management and therefore weaker accountability[213].
The White Paper emphasises that the Commission is not necessarily
planning to contract out more functions — nor can it totally
abandon contracting out[214]
— but to bring dependability and order to what already occurs
by better defining what can be 'externalised'[215]
and what core tasks must be retained by the Commission, and by
ensuring proper public accountability for contracted-out tasks.
The third area of reform is the promotion of more efficient and
performance-oriented working methods by simplifying procedures,
reducing the number of layers in decision-making, better co-ordination
between Directorates-General and sharing best practice[216].
The aim is to draw up an Action Plan by the end of 2000. The Secretariat-General
is to have the main responsibility for these tasks and, as a result,
the Commission intends to appoint a second Deputy Secretary General
to supervise this area.
167. A large section of the White Paper is devoted
to personnel issues[217].
It commits the Commission to giving more weight to the criterion
of management abilities in both selection and promotion procedures.
The Commission proposes to introduce systematic evaluation of
managers, and appointments will at first be for a probationary
period[218].
Special training will be introduced. Managers not reaching the
required standard of managerial capability "would revert
to a non-management position at the same grade"[219].
168. Previous Commissions had not established strict
promotion on merit[220]:
there was both an over-emphasis on seniority as such and a tendency
to take too much account of the nationality of potential post-holders
— indeed, there were accusations that some posts had permanent
"national flags" attached to them. Moreover, Commission
officials were not circulated from Directorate to Directorate
in the same way as, for example, senior civil servants are in
the UK. As a result, it was thought, officials identified too
much with the (narrow) interests of their own Directorate and
took too little account of wider interests. And it was felt that
women were under-represented in the senior management grades.
The proposed agenda for reform therefore includes detailed provisions
about recruitment, training, equal opportunities[221],
performance appraisal of post-holders, the breaking down of barriers
between grades so that talented individuals can be more easily
promoted, and procedures for dealing with individuals who underperform.
The Commission is also keen to pursue secondment (both ways) between
the Commission and national administrations[222].
The consultation document summed up the new attitude: "mobility
should be expected, encouraged and regarded as a career asset"[223].
169. Another element of the package of reform is
initiating an effective disciplinary system[224].
As part of this a new Whistleblower's Charter is being proposed[225].
170. Not least because of reports that Commission
staff were very concerned about the proposed changes to the career
structure and promotion procedures, we asked Commissioner Kinnock
about staff reactions. He said that he and his team were devoting
a lot of time and energy to explaining the proposals to staff
in order to win their understanding and acceptance. He was optimistic
that staff would understand the need for the changes and the benefits
to themselves[226].
He also commented that the very tight financial constraints on
the Commission would not be relaxed — and therefore it would
be impossible to recruit extra staff — unless and until
he could convince the Member States and EP that the existing staff
were being used as effectively as possible[227].
171. The perceived weaknesses in the area of financial
management and control by the Commission are a primary reason
for the proposed reform. Such weaknesses have been systematically
identified by the European Court of Auditors for years[228],
as well as by the "Wisemen", and include such matters
as the current separation of financial and operational management
controls (which, it is alleged, discourages managers from taking
proper responsibility for their decisions[229]);
overlapping responsibilities for financial control and internal
audit, with the result that it may be the same person who both
approves and audits items of expenditure; over-detailed procedures
and rules; insufficient effort to 'fraud-proof' procedures (for
example in drafting legislation relating to Structural Funds or
for tendering); a culture of measuring performance by whether
appropriations have been fully spent rather than on evaluating
outcomes against set objectives; and slow and ineffectual action
against irregularities or fraud.
172. The Commission concludes that procedures need
to be "simpler and faster, more transparent and decentralised"[230].
Much of the White Paper is devoted to proposing solutions such
as ensuring that managers in DGs take financial responsibilities
for operational decisions; separating internal audit functions
from financial authorisation; establishing the internal audit
function in each DG but as part of a Commission-wide Audit Service
overseen by an Audit Progress Board; and improving co-ordination
between the anti-fraud office (OLAF) and other services[231].
Commissioner Kinnock assured us that responsibility for financial
control would not be handed over to the DGs until the Commission
was confident that all the necessary staff were in place and training
had been completed[232].
However, the Commission also emphasises the need to improve co-operation
with Member States as "it is in the Member States that the
'vast bulk' of expenditure that is not properly used and/or accounted
for takes place"[233].
173. The Commission has set itself a tough timetable
for achieving the White Paper reforms. It aims to complete internal
consultation on all aspects of the White Paper by early 2001,
and then immediately to start implementing measures that do not
require changes to the Staff and Financial Regulations[234].
The amended Staff Regulations, covering personnel policy and pay
and pensions, are to be presented to the Council by December 2001.
The new Financial Regulation[235]
was to be brought forward in April 2000, but has not yet appeared.
The Commission underlines its dependence on the other institutions
to achieve its timetable, especially the Council and the European
Parliament which have to approve the new Financial and Staff Regulations[236].
"On this basis, the full implementation of the Reform proposals
set out in this White Paper should be achieved by the second half
of 2002."[237]
174. The UK Government has deposited in Parliament
an Explanatory Memorandum[238]
in which it warmly welcomes the White Paper proposals, while noting
that the reforms will take time to deliver and "real change
will require a political commitment throughout the lifetime of
this Commission."
175. We also welcome the Commission's proposals,
which seem a sensible, balanced attempt to bring the administrative
structure and culture of the Commission more into line with widely
accepted concepts of good practice in both the private and the
public sector elsewhere in Europe. However, like the Government
— and Commissioner Kinnock[239]
— we note that the White Paper is just a first step. Once
the Commission's immediate review of priorities is complete (in
September this year) and proposals are made to axe, scale down
or devolve areas of current activity, existing support for the
reform process from the Commission staff, individual Member States
and the EP is likely to crumble. The divisions will only be made
worse if the interests of some Member States are perceived to
be affected disproportionately. And the recent EP debate on the
Commission's legislative programme, in which a number of interest
groups suggested significant additions to the programme, does
not augur well for self-restraint and a realistic view of the
Commission's capacity by the other institutions in the future.
Furthermore, according to press reports, some Commission officials
remain deeply worried by or even hostile to the proposed reforms.
Therefore, although we commend the Commission's initial approach,
we anticipate considerable difficulties before long. However,
given the crucial importance of this programme of reform to restoring
public confidence in the Commission and — as a consequence
— the legitimacy of the EU institutions in general, we urge
both the Commission and the Government to continue whole-hearted
support for this process.
Reform of the Council
176. Like the Commission, the EP and the Courts,
the Council has been experiencing strains even before EU enlargement.
Commentators have expressed general concern over whether the various
formations of the Council[240]
operate effectively (whether they all have a reasonable workload,
whether there is sufficient co-ordination between different formations
in areas of common interest), the degree of overall supervision
of the different formations, and the lack of continuity engendered
by the system of six-month Presidencies (and, connected with this,
the adequacy of the administrative back-up to provide continuity)[241].
There have been frequent criticisms of the Council — in
which we concur — on the grounds that a body with such extensive
legislative powers ought not to meet in private[242].
There have also been concerns over the detailed administrative
arrangements for coping with meetings of 20 or more Ministers
and their officials after enlargement, ranging from the issue
of interpretation to the simple need to find rooms large enough
to accommodate all the participants. As a result, the Council
Secretariat has undertaken an initiative to examine the working
methods of the Council and put forward options for improvements.
177. In March 1999, a Working Party set up by the
then Secretary-General of the Council, Jürgen Trumpf, issued
its report entitled Operation of the Council with an enlarged
Union in prospect, known as the Trumpf-Piris report. The report
concluded that, even before enlargement and despite previous efforts
at reform, there are major weaknesses in the way the Council functions.
It highlighted three principal weaknesses. First, the complexity
of EU affairs now makes it very difficult for a single Presidency
to handle the business of the Council in all its compositions:
the burden is heavy for both Ministers and their civil servants,
and will increase after enlargement. Secondly, the report concluded
that the system of six-monthly Presidencies has significant drawbacks
for continuity. Finally, it suggested that it is increasingly
difficult for the General Affairs Council to play its co-ordinating
rôle[243]
because the other Councils have gained in autonomy; the result
is that, where Councils disagree and there is inadequate co-ordination
among national government ministries, then Councils often seek
arbitration from the European Council, which is not its real job.
178. The report put forward a number of options for
consideration by the Member States. On the Council's legislative
rôle, it advocated that the Council adopt greater openness
by making public at a later time all documents relating to preparatory
work on legislation, opening some legislative debates to the public
and improving the provision of information on its work. It also
suggested some practical changes to enable the co-decision process
to function more smoothly (such as fewer and better focussed meetings,
the use of sub-committees to do detailed negotiation and drafting,
and more use of written exchanges).
179. The report made several suggestions intended
to ease the burden on individual Presidencies; some of these entailed
greater influence for the Council Secretariat itself at the expense
of the successive Presidencies, but others were simply intended
to promote co-ordination[244].
180. On the question of the efficiency of the current
organisation of the Council formations (which is not set
out in the Treaty, and is therefore for the Council itself to
determine), the Trumpf-Piris report suggested that the Tourism,
Youth and Civil Protection Councils could be abolished; and other
Councils could be merged, with different Ministers attending according
to the agenda[245].
The report recommended no longer holding joint Council meetings
(because of the number of participants); and tightening procedures
by Councils refraining from issuing purely declaratory texts (as
a waste of time and potential source of legal difficulties) and
severely limiting the use of Resolutions.
181. Co-ordination of the Council formations is currently
the responsibility of the General Affairs Council, which has been
criticised for not exercising it properly. There also appears
to be a developing power struggle between the General Affairs
Council and the Economic and Financial Affairs Council ("ECOFIN"),
which is increasingly taking the view that it should have a significant
rôle in co-ordinating initiatives which have financial implications.
The report suggested that Member States should consider splitting
the General Affairs Council into two separate compositions, with
a new Institutional and Horizontal Affairs Council (composed of
either junior Foreign Affairs/Prime Minister's Office Ministers
or Deputy Prime Ministers) to deal with co-ordination. The other
formation would then be able to concentrate on foreign policy
issues[246].
On ECOFIN, the report suggested that the real problem lay at Member
State level: some Member States were better at internal co-ordination
over financial issues than others. If such national co-ordination
took place, then, the report said, there should be clearer demarcation
of the areas to be dealt with by ECOFIN. The implicit threat is
that, unless Member State Governments organise their approach
to EU business better, ECOFIN must be given an increased rôle
in financial co-ordination by examining every proposal that has
financial consequences.
182. The over-riding principle of the report's approach
to the European Council is the need to uphold that Council's real
rôle, which the report defines as being "a source of
political impetus, an arbiter and a final decision-maker for key
issues in the life of the Union: revision of the Treaties, enlargement,
general guidelines for internal policies, medium-term financial
perspective, certain appointments and decisions specified in the
treaty". The report sought to defend the European Council
from being dragged into more detailed disputes between Council
formations[247].
183. Finally, the report suggested that it is necessary
to face up now to the increased translation requirements and other
practical difficulties arising from enlargement.
184. Not surprisingly, the Trumpf-Piris report does
not tackle such key issues as the fundamental principle that a
legislative body should meet in public, or the question of whether
the current system of six-month Presidencies is too inefficient
to be sustained. However, within its remit, the report does make
a number of sensible suggestions, many of which could be put in
hand by the Secretariat and Member State officials without the
need for endorsement by Member State Governments[248].
We hope that these have already been put in hand because, judging
by events so far, there seems little will or capacity on the part
of the Member States to agree the more ambitious parts of the
package. Perhaps because of the Council's addiction to secrecy,
very little information has emerged about any actions that are
being taken on the report's proposals; but what information there
has been is not encouraging. To some extent, this is confirmed
by the conclusions of the Helsinki Summit (which took place nine
months after the publication of the Trumpf-Piris report), which
state:
"Substantial changes
in the Council's working methods are necessary and must be gradually
introduced starting now [our italics] so that by the time
of enlargement, the Council can smoothly accommodate a larger
membership."[249]
The Conclusions go on to endorse a large number of
detailed recommendations set out in an Annex, which include the
statement "the number of Council formations shall be reduced
to a maximum of 15"[250].
The Bulletin Quotidien Europe of Saturday 18 March[251]
reported that the General Affairs Council meeting on the following
Monday would consider the question of the merger of certain Council
compositions; however, in the event, the Council was inquorate
and therefore could reach no decision on this subject[252].
(During our visit to Brussels, we were informed that there are
fairly frequent problems with obtaining a quorum for meetings
of the General Affairs Council.) When a later meeting of the Council
finally did reach an agreement, the British Government together
with some other Member State Governments declared some disappointment
that the total number of Council formations had been reduced only
to 16, instead of the 15 envisaged by the Helsinki Summit. Presumably[253],
individual Member States were unwilling to surrender pet Council
formations even in the interests of greater efficiency and effectiveness.
185. If this type of delay and unwillingness to
think radically are typical of Member States' approach to Council
reform, little of significance will be done before enlargement
takes place. We think that it would be disgraceful if the Council
missed this opportunity for reform. It is still the primary decision-taking
body in the EU, and comparatively minor amendments to its administrative
arrangements and procedures could significantly improve the quality
of EU legislation. We urge the UK Government to press for implementation
of the recommendations made in the Trumpf-Piris report and endorsed
by the Helsinki Council.
197 QQ 34 and 71. Back
198
More properly called the Committee of Independent Experts. This
was convened, following a Resolution of the EP, under the auspices
of the EP and the Commission. Its first report (on allegations
regarding fraud, mismanagement and nepotism in the Commission)
was published on 15 March 1999 and led to the resignation of the
Commission headed by President Santer; its second report (Analysis
of current practice and proposals for tackling mismanagement,
irregularities and fraud) was published on 10 September 1999. Back
199
This Group is chaired by Mr Kinnock and comprises Commissioners
Loyola de Palacio, Michaele Schreyer, Mario Monti, Franz Fischler,
Poul Nielson, Pascal Lamy, and Antonio Vitorino. Back
200
Copies of these papers have been deposited in the Library and
are available on the Commission's website at http://europa.eu.int/comm/reform/refdoc/index_en.htm Back
201
For Commissioner Kinnock's comments on Member State reactions
to the reshuffle, see Q 168. Back
202
The rules on size and composition of Cabinets form part of the
Code of Conduct for Commissioners. The Code describes the rôle
of Cabinets, and lays down the ethical standards expected of Cabinet
staff, the appointment procedure, the number of staff (maximum
of nine advisers in the President's office, maximum of six advisers
for other Commissioners), and requires a mix of at least three
different nationalities among the advisers (with preferably either
the Chef de Cabinet or the Deputy Chef de Cabinet being of a different
nationality from the Commissioner). Back
203
For example, some Cabinets had intervened frequently in the work
of departments and some Directors-General had been denied direct
access to their Commissioner: all communication had to be via
the Cabinet. The new Code makes it clear that Directors-General
have full management responsibility for their departments, and
they must have frequent and direct contact with Commissioners. Back
204
Q 169. Back
205
Draft Council Regulation regarding public access to documents
of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission: see
(20968) 5817/00: HC 23-xiii (1999-2000), paragraph 7 (5 April
2000). One of the critics of this proposal is the EU Ombudsman.
Back
206
Deposited in Parliament: document (20962) 5638/00. Back
207
For our previous consideration of this, see (21070) 6302/00 and
(21071) 6302/00 ADD1: HC 23-xiv (1999-2000), paragraph 8 (12 April
2000). This document is referred to in the form "Commission's
White Paper, p. x". Back
208
The changes mainly relate to personnel policy. Back
209
P. 4. Back
210
Commission's White Paper, p.1. The Commission recognises that
it will be difficult to get all the institutions to agree the
results of this assessment: Q 171. Back
211
Which aims at clearly defining the desired end results, and planning
the allocation of human, administrative, IT and financial resources
accordingly, and conversely allows "decisions about policy
priorities to be fully informed by the related resources requirements".
Activity Based Management is also intended to promote clearer
lines of responsibility and thus accountability. Back
212
For further details, see the Commission's White Paper, pp 5-6. Back
213
Q 176. Back
214
QQ 176 and 185. Back
215
For example, the Commission's White Paper says: "Increasingly
.., experience shows that many operations are best delivered close
to the target group rather than centrally from Brussels":
p 6; see also Q 185. Back
216
Commission's White Paper, pp. 7-8. Back
217
See especially pp. 8-15. Back
218
New rules for appointments to the most senior management grades
(A1 and A2) have already been adopted. Back
219
Commission's White Paper, page 9. Back
220
Despite the fact that there is an explicit requirement in the
Staff Regulations that promotions should be based on merit: Q
168. Back
221
The Commission has set itself a minimum target of doubling the
number of women in top management by the end of its mandate. Back
222
Q 163. Back
223
See also Q 162. Back
224
QQ 173 and 175. Back
225
Commission's White Paper, pages 13-14; Q 161. Back
226
QQ 167 and 172. Back
227
Q 170. Back
228
See our Reports on Court of Auditors reports, for example on the
Court of Auditors Annual Report for 1998: (20764): HC 23-vi (1999-2000),
paragraph 11 (26 January 2000). Back
229
The central unit currently responsible for financial control can
examine no more than 30% of transactions per year: Q 184. Back
230
Commission's White Paper, p. 15. Back
231
The Commission emphasises that the majority of Member States already
employ these methods of financial administration themselves: Q
184. Back
232
Q 184. Back
233
Commission's White Paper, page 16. Back
234
Ibid., pp. 20-22; and Q 183. Back
235
Which will, amongst other things, deal with the new internal audit
arrangements. Back
236
Q 183. Back
237
Commission's White Paper, p 21. Back
238
Explanatory Memorandum of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
dated 28 March 2000 on the Commission White Paper: Reforming
the Commission, Council Document No. 6302/00. Back
239
QQ 160 and 170. Back
240
The Treaty refers simply to "the Council" which is to
consist of "a representative of each Member State at ministerial
level". The Council meets in various "formations"
when considering different topics, so that, for example, transport
issues are decided by the Council meeting in the formation of
the Transport Council, which is attended by Member States' transport
ministers. Back
241
A lively account of the problems, from the perspective of the
Council Secretariat, was given to the EP's Constitutional Affairs
Committee in April by M. Pierre de Boissieu, Deputy Secretary-General
of the Council: see Agence Europe's Bulletin Quotidien Europe,
6 April 2000, pp 12-13. M. de Boissieu expressed the same views
equally forcefully when we met him in Brussels in December. Back
242
We are pleased to note that the UK Government shares our views:
Q 74. Back
243
The Council consists of Foreign Office Ministers and deals with
both EU external relations issues and 'horizontal' questions,
that is, those that affect more than one Council formation. Back
244
Such as improving the handover by entrusting preparatory work
for the next Presidency to the next President, and, in the case
of long-running issues, involving future Presidencies beyond that;
and, in some cases, giving national officials a remit to continue
with a specified task beyond their country's Presidency in order
to complete it. Back
245
Such as General Affairs with Development; ECOFIN with Budget;
and a jumbo Council resulting from the merger of four (Industry,
Telecoms, Energy and Research) under the heading of an Internal
Market and Competitiveness Council. Back
246
The report made more detailed suggestions about the 'external
relations' Council, such as that it should make full use of the
scope offered by the Amsterdam Treaty to give real authority,
responsibility and prestige to the new Secretary -General/CFSP
High Representative; organise the Council's meetings more efficiently;
and use delegated authority to ensure continuity between Council
meetings. (Again, these suggestions tend to give power to the
Council Secretariat at the expense of the Member States, and particularly
their Permanent Representations in Brussels.) Back
247
The report also made some practical suggestions about arranging
the European Council's business more efficiently. Back
248
We are thinking here particularly of the proposals about the preparation
of Council meetings and the practical arrangements necessary for
an enlarged Council. M. de Boissieu, the Deputy Secretary-General
of the Council, has recently confirmed that the Secretariat has
embarked on implementation of at least some of these proposals:
op.cit. in footnote 234. above. Back
249
Presidency Conclusions, paragraph 20. Back
250
Annex 3, paragraph 9. Back
251
P.8. Back
252
Bulletin Quotidien Europe, 22 March, p. 5. Back
253
As we suspect will also happen when the Commission tries to end
certain initiatives on the grounds that they are an inefficient
use of resources: see paragraph 166 above. Back
