APPENDIX 1
PAPER FROM MR ANDREW DUFF, MEP
EUROPEAN LIBERAL DEMOCRAT GROUP PROPOSALS
FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE
At the European Parliamentary elections in June
1999, the non-voters delivered an important message to the European
Union. The Union must be reformed to provide the citizen with
real political choice. Its system of government must become more
democratic. And its long-term purpose must be clarified and endorsed.
This message is reinforced by the prospect of the enlargement
of the Union to twenty-five or more Member States within the next
decade. The larger Union will be even more difficult to govern
than the one we have now, and it is essential to strengthen all
the institutions as well as the partnership between them before
the first of the newcomers join.
So it is vital that the forthcoming round of treaty reform will
be more successful than those of Amsterdam and Maastricht. All
democratic forces must be engaged in the vital debate about Europe's
political future.
IGC 2000 is not the last chance we have to reform the way we are
governed. But it is an important turning point — and should
be seized with both hands.
Principles and Objectives for Reforming
the Union
European Liberal Democrats consider that
to adopt a narrow agenda for the Intergovernmental Conference
(IGC), as proposed by the European Council at Cologne, would be
a failure of leadership. Instead, the European Union should be
ambitious for a deep reform.
ELDR wants an enlarged and more democratic Union which is empowered
to act only where European action leads to better policy outcomes.
We are otherwise committed to decentralisation. We are building
a unique, diverse, federal union of states and peoples, not an
all-powerful, centralised super-state. We insist on maintaining
the cultural diversity of the Union, and in respecting the national
and regional identities of its member states.
Although the Union should have adequate capacity to act efficiently
and effectively, there should be no increase in the powers of
the Union institutions without corresponding efforts to enhance
its democratic legitimacy. The Union should only exercise its
competences by applying rigorously the principle of subsidiarity.
As part of the process of constitutionalisation, it should be
possible to define the share-out of competences, and, in certain
circumstances, even to envisage a reduction of those exercised
at the EU level. The Union should in any case become more decentralised
in managing and implementing its common policies, such as regional
development and agricultural affairs.
We also favour the adoption of a 'sunset' clause in the Treaty,
whereby redundant delegated legislation should be scrapped systematically.
Towards the Constitution
ELDR considers that:
- previous IGCs have not been successful in drafting
treaties enjoying clarity, coherence and credibility;
- this conference has to lay down the ground rules
for a Union of twenty-five or more states: because the Treaty
as it stands can only be amended by unanimity, it might be wise
to make necessary changes now, before enlargement;
- both the drafting of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights and anticipated reforms in the field of defence are taking
place in parallel with the IGC, and must be closely associated
with it.
We believe that the Union must therefore directly
address its own constituent process and promote its emerging constitutional
character. This is not to impede enlargement, but, on the contrary,
to facilitate it.
EU institutions have long since achieved a consciousness distinct
from that of the Member States, and it is both unreasonable and
inefficient that they are marginalised when it comes to Treaty
reform. In particular, we are encouraged by the rapidly developing
parliamentary character of the Union, and insist that the European
Parliament should henceforward be one of the principle participants
in Treaty revision. Writing the Treaty must no longer be the reserve
of intergovernmental diplomacy because the legitimacy of Europe's
representative government is at stake.
One of our major objectives, therefore, is a reform of Article
48 so that the European Parliament has the right of assent to
future Treaty amendment (not as a substitute for national ratification
procedures but as a supplement to them).
We propose that the Treaty is divided into two parts. The first
part — the basic law — would contain the preamble,
general principles and objectives, constituent articles, decision-making
procedures, rules of membership, and rights of citizenship. This
would remain amendable only by unanimity among Member States,
endorsed by the European Parliament, with normal national ratification
procedures.
The second part of the Treaty would contain the chapters implementing
the agreed areas of policy — economic and monetary affairs,
transport, agriculture etc. In cases involving no further transfer
of sovereignty, this part of the Treaty would be amendable by
a lighter procedure involving the EU institutions, possibly under
a system of super-qualified majority plus co-decision.
We believe that this more constitutional approach to Treaty reform
will ring-fence the issue of sovereignty, thus allaying public
disquiet, while at the same time serving to politicise EU policy
formation, thus exciting public interest.
Methodology and Timing
ELDR hopes that the new constitutional
conference will be prepared by an innovatory procedure designed
to achieve maximum, genuine and transparent agreement on the profound
reform suggested here.
We support the tight timetable ordained by the European Council
for this IGC, but if the conference is to succeed on time the
method of its preparation will also have to be intensive.
We hope that the European Council at Helsinki in December decides
to adopt a consultative procedure in order to prepare proposals
for the IGC. (This would mirror in some respects the constituent
forum created de novo by the European Council to draft
the Charter of Fundamental Rights). We propose the following methodology
for the IGC:
1. The Commission publishes
a draft treaty, and submits it to the Parliament and Council.
2. The European Parliament organises a debate
within civil society, including, notably, national parliaments,
Ecosoc and the Committee of the Regions.
3. The Council and Parliament together consider
the Commission recommendations.
4. The Parliament adopts its formal opinion on
the opening of the IGC, required under the terms of Article 48.
5. The Member States conduct the IGC in the presence
throughout of observers from the European Parliament, chosen on
a pluralistic basis.
6. Parliament pronounces on the result of the
IGC.
7. National ratification proceeds.
Applicant states should be consulted though the mechanism
of the European Conference.
Agenda and Proposals
We make five important proposals.
A. First, there are the items left unfinished
at Amsterdam, where we propose:
1. Qualified majority
voting plus co-decision should be the norm in all legislative
matters, except for quasi-constitutional matters such as the financing
of the Union budget.
2. Each Member State should nominate only one
Commissioner.
3. Votes in the Council may be re-weighted to
better reflect the size of population, but only in so far as a
hegemony is avoided of either a directorate of large Member States
or a coalition of small Member States.
B. Second, we propose the restructuring
of the Treaties as outlined above.
The conference should entrench within the first,
'constitutional' part of the revised Treaty the Charter of Fundamental
Rights. ELDR believes that the Charter should focus on the relationship
between the citizen and EU institutions and Member State governments
in so far as their implementation of EU law is concerned. To prevent
conflict with the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg,
the Union itself should accede to the European Convention on Human
Rights. But the Charter should be a modern articulation of civil,
social, environmental and fundamental rights with the aim of underpinning
transnational liberal democracy. One of its main aims must be
to ensure the open government of the Union.
If the Charter is to provide real added value to
the concept of European Union citizenship, it must be justiciable
by the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg, which clearly
implies a reform of its working conditions. We do not believe
that a mere 'proclamation' of existing rights will suffice.
C. Third, in order to square up to the challenges
that face an enlarged Union, the conference should adopt the following
proposals:
4. To strengthen the
accountability of the European Commission to the Parliament, the
Parliament should be able to censure individual Commissioners
after a formal inquiry into their administrative conduct, and
the President of the Commission should be given the right to propose
a constructive vote of no confidence in one or more Commissioners.
5. The Commission should be given full rights
to negotiate for the Union across the board in WTO, including
services and intellectual property (Article 133), and the Parliament's
right to give assent to all WTO agreements should be affirmed.
6. The EU should obtain legal personality in
order to strengthen its status and cohesion in international negotiations.
7. In order to strengthen its own performance
and discipline, the European Council should adopt, publish and
abide by its own rules of procedure.
8. In order to reform the Council:
— the General Affairs
Council should concentrate on the co-ordination of the work of
the whole Council and prepare meetings of the European Council;
the Foreign Affairs Council should concentrate on foreign and
security policy;
— the budgetary authority of Ecofin should
be enhanced;
— the use of the directive as framework
legislation should be clarified and reinforced in order to avoid
over-prescription;
— where the Council acts in its legislative
capacity, the meeting should take place in public and its record
should be published;
— as part of the legislative process, each
member of the Council should stipulate how its government intends
to implement each measure within its own state.
9. The EU citizen should be given the individual
right of access to the Court of Justice (Article 230). This would
(a) allow the Court to develop jurisprudence in the field of civil
liberties; and (b) allow individuals or special interest groups
to seek judicial review of secondary legislation, thereby helping
Parliament to render 'comitology' accountable.
10. The Court of Justice should be permitted
to streamline its own working methods to cater for the enhanced
justiciability of civil liberties and formerly third pillar issues,
as well as for enlargement.
11. Budgetary co-decision procedures should be
extended to all aspects of EU spending.
12. There must be a common framework for the
election of the European Parliament based on proportional representation
and regional constituencies (in large member states).
13. The IGC should examine the case for enabling
a number of MEPs to be elected on a transnational basis. It should
foster the development of European political parties, without
which the electorate will have no clear sense of choice and representation
at the EU level. The establishment of European political parties
should be granted a legal basis.
14. The European Parliament should be wholly
responsible for its own working arrangements.
15. The existing Treaty provisions on closer
co-operation should be developed to allow certain Member States
to deepen their integration in some policy areas without jeopardising
the integrity of the acquis communautaire.
16. The derogations of Denmark, Ireland and the
UK with regard to the Schengen Agreement and the Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice should be phased out.
17. In order to guarantee its efficiency in an
enlarged euro area, the size of the Governing Council of the European
Central Bank should be reduced.
18. The current Euro-11 arrangements should be
consolidated under the closer co-operation clauses.
19. Any Member State should be granted the right
of last resort to negotiate secession from the Union.
20. As part of the process of simplifying the
Treaty, a hierarchy should be introduced between legislative and
executive acts.
21. Member State parliaments should have the
right to challenge the legality of acts adopted by the European
Union in the Court of Justice.
22. In the interests of simplification and clarification,
the existing competences of the Union in the field of energy policy
and under the Euratom Treaty should be rationalised within one
chapter of the Treaty. Likewise, the competences concerning coal
and steel should be consolidated within another.
D. Fourth, common foreign and security policy
should be formulated and implemented according to the conventional
decision-making processes of the Union, except in so far as Member
States shall share with the Commission the right of initiative.
This implies the abolition of the 'second pillar' and the full
application of the flexibility clauses of the Treaty to CFSP.
A new pillar of the Treaty, entitled the European
Defence Community, should be established to deal with all
matters pertaining to the making of a common defence policy. A
Member State may choose whether or not it wishes to be associated
with this pillar.
There will be a standing joint committee of the European
Parliament and Member State Parliaments on defence policy. Decisions
on the deployment of forces will be the exclusive right of the
Member States concerned.
The code of conduct on arms control should become
mandatory, and the European Parliament should be granted the right
of scrutiny.
E. Fifth, we wish to give effect to the
communautarisation of police and judicial co-operation in criminal
matters as soon as practicable so that the handling of these sensitive
matters, close to the citizen, is made subject to the conventional
parliamentary and judicial disciplines of the Community system
and to the checks and balances implicit therein.
This implies the phased abolition of the 'third pillar'
which would also be in the interests of transparency. Normal decision-making
procedures would apply except that Member States would share with
the Commission the right of initiative in this field.
Building the Wider Europe
These proposals are based on the reform of the present
Treaties and institutions, and are aimed at making the Union more
efficient and coherent despite steady enlargement.
On the other hand, there is a growing political need
to speed up the pace of enlargement, as is reflected by the recent
Commission proposal to start official negotiations with a further
six countries and to confirm Turkey's status as an official candidate.
These decisions will probably trigger new applications from the
Balkans and elsewhere.
Under such political pressures, there is a risk of
watering down the achievements and ambitions of our mutual integration,
leading to a more and more fragmented Union.
ELDR believes that the IGC should consider institutional
reform within a Pan-European context, involving a realistic, far-reaching
evaluation of the scope and pace of future enlargement. It should
consider using the various formulas for differentiated integration
to establish a concentric Union, with a federated core and a less
integrated outer circle.
The whole Union should utilise the Council of Europe
to develop new tasks in areas of common interest and to assist
applicant countries prepare for EU membership.
The OSCE should be developed into a Pan-European
and Trans-Atlantic security system as a regional arrangement under
Article 7 of the UN Charter.
Enlargement, Legitimacy,
Efficiency — these are the goals of the European Liberal
Democrats for the constitutional conference of 2000. By making
the Union capable of acting where action is needed, these proposals
will facilitate enlargement in the interests of the security and
prosperity of all Europe.
Strasbourg, 17 November 1999
| 
