Ministerial Visits
145. An important element of bilateral diplomacy
is the extent and frequency of contact between Minsters of the
governments of Russia and the United Kingdom. Meetings occur in
the United Kingdom and in third countries, but it is particularly
important that British Ministers are seen to visit Russia. Since
May 1997, there has been one visit by the Prime Minister to Russia,
and two visits by the Foreign Secretary. Another will occur later
in February 2000. Two other Cabinet Ministers have visited on
one occasion each (the Secretary of State for Defence and the
President of the Board of Trade), and there have been three visits
by junior FCO Ministers and five visits by junior Ministers in
other Departments.[373]
We would like to see more regular ministerial visits to Russia.
We recommend that FCO Ministers should give visits to Russia
a higher priority, and that Ministers from other Departments should
also be encouraged by the FCO to visit Russia.
Visa Regime
146. A common theme in the evidence we received was
criticism of the visa regime which operates in Moscow. This criticism
came from academics, journalists and business witnesses. Professor
Light believed that it was "widely perceived... that the
British Embassy is the worst Embassy in Moscow for getting a visa"
and that "consular staff are said to act with contempt towards
Russians."[374]
Professor White reported that the German Embassy was regarded
as even worse, but that the British visa section was regarded
as applying "a difficult and often humiliating process"
to visa applicants.[375]
John Thornhill of the Financial Times corroborated this
view, describing the "countless complaints" he had heard.
He, too, believed that other Western embassies were equally bad.[376]
The Russo-British Chamber of Commerce wrote that a "common
complaint from British business" was "the problem of
their Russian counterparts having great difficulty in obtaining
UK visas", and Mr Cant from the Chamber described examples
of rudeness to visa applicants.[377]
The CBI argued that the visa services were a major source of irritation
to United Kingdom companies who find their Russian partners complaining
of their treatment.[378]
Moscow Narodny Bank described the "general dissatisfaction
with the ability of the visa section to deal with applications"
as a "constraint on enhancing Russo-British trade and business".[379]
We therefore decided that it was important for Members to inspect
the visa section during our visit to Moscow.
147. It is certainly true that conditions in the
visa section which we visited were far from ideal. There was a
cramped, if clean and pleasant, waiting room, though on occasions
applicants have needed to queue outside (where shelter was provided).
Interview rooms were tiny and claustrophobic, and the accommodation
in which staff worked was extremely poor. This environment was
not conducive to maintaining good humour in what is often a stressful
situation. The Foreign Secretary described accommodation as "unsatisfactory",
though he believed that the position would be "transformed"[380]
now that the new Embassy building with what the FCO describes
as its "much better facilities for visa work"[381]
was open. On the old site, physical conditions had not kept up
with what has been an enormous increase in demand. In the Cold
War period travel outside the Soviet bloc was restricted by the
Soviet authorities. There were therefore comparatively few applicants
for visas, perhaps in the order of 3,000 annually.[382]
Nowadays, the Moscow Embassy issues more visas than any other
post in the world—78,000 in 1998, though the August 1998
economic crisis led to a reduction of about 35 per cent in application
numbers.[383]
148. We received evidence that there have already
been improvements in the visa system in Moscow. The Foreign Secretary
believed that there was no evidence of particular harshness, nor
did he believe that the 90 per cent of interviews completed within
ten minutes could be "particularly extensive, intrusive or
distressing".[384]
Dame Elizabeth Anson, the Independent Monitor, told us that there
had been reasons to complain about rudeness and delays in the
past, but that she felt that the problem was "now much exaggerated".
She also pointed out that, once such a perception arose, it was
difficult to dislodge it, and that Russians might consider questions
about personal circumstances as excessively intrusive.[385]
Mr Cant of the Russo-British Chamber of Commerce told us that
there was "no doubt at all" that things were getting
better, and Mr Putintsev of SGS UK Ltd gave persuasive, if anecdotal
evidence, of how the situation had changed from the days when
the British Embassy had been the worst in Moscow and he personally
had been forced to queue for five days simply to enter.[386]
A cross-section of those in the waiting room when Members of the
Committee visited also said that conditions had improved—and
there were no complaints about staff rudeness. We appreciate,
however, that, in this area, there is an unwillingness to complain.
The Ambassador in Moscow told us that he would vigorously investigate
any complaint he received, but that it was more difficult to act
against generalised complaints than specific ones. However, the
Russo-British Chamber of Commerce told us that companies were
unwilling to "put their heads above the parapet" on
this issue.[387]
149. A particular aspect of the problem is the requirement
for many applicants to attend in person. The difficulties for
a Russian based in Vladivostok being called for interview in Moscow
was mentioned by the Russo-Chamber of Commerce.[388]
The level of demand in Moscow has been reduced by the opening
of visa-issuing posts in St Petersburg and Ekaterinburg. New technology,
as well as new posts, could make the visa-issuing process simpler.
In theory, for example, not only can documents be sent by fax,
but applications can be submitted by e-mail and interviews conducted
by video-conference. We appreciate that changes in these areas
could not be introduced in Russia only, but geographically large
countries with thinly spread British posts have special problems
which are amenable to technologically innovative solutions. In
this context, we note FCO Ministers' interest in enhancing electronic
service delivery.[389]
The Foreign Secretary told us that electronic means could not
be used to process visa applications because the "charge
needs to be paid up front".[390]
We regard this as a pretty feeble argument in an age when cheques
and bank transfers are common in Russia, and electronic payment
will no doubt soon follow.
150. While the opening of a visa-issuing post in
Ekaterinburg was generally welcomed, and the efficiency of the
post praised,[391]
Dr Galeotti believed that it was "astonishing" that
a visa-issuing post had been opened in a city which he described
as "one of the most thoroughly criminalised in all Russia."
He said that his views were shared by British police officers
who had dealt with criminals whose visas had been issued in Ekaterinburg.[392]
Members who visited Ekaterinburg took this issue up, but were
assured that the Consulate General there had equal access to all
necessary databases, and that local staff were, if anything, better
equipped to identify local undesirables. The Foreign Secretary
told us that he was "puzzled" by Dr Galeotti's views.[393]
151. Another aspect of the criticism of the visa
regime is that it was particularly harsh on young, single women.
According to Mr Thornhill, these women "often face a particularly
gruelling time"[394],
while Professor White wrote of the "apparent assumption that
all female applicants were prostitutes."[395]
Mr Cant told us in oral evidence that young unmarried women have
been assumed to be travelling to the United Kingdom for marriage.[396]
For what is it worth, we can record that all of those being interviewed
by entry clearance officers (ECOs) when we visited the visa section
in Moscow were young women. Dame Elizabeth Anson told us that
she had found that the statistics disproved the belief that women
and girls were refused visas more often than men. She pointed
out that ECOs needed to ask certain questions to establish the
long term intentions of the applicant which might be regarded
by female applicants as personally intrusive. She also commented
"I am satisfied that the stories of sexual innuendo at interviews
are often historical and anecdotal, but I am not wholly satisfied
with the attitude of all the ECOs since 1994 in Moscow".
She had made recommendations for training.[397]
Any gender bias or stereotyping is unacceptable in dealing with
visa applicants, and lines of questioning adopted by ECOs must
reflect this.
152. As Sir Rodric Braithwaite put it, "a visa
regime exists to refuse visas"[398],
and he reminded us that the FCO had been required to implement
requirements of the Home Office and Security Service "which
not everybody thought were entirely necessary."[399]
In fact, the rate of refusals in Russia is small, at less than
3 per cent.[400]
This compares with what we understand to be a refusal rate of
around 20 per cent by the USA. It is the primary task of the visa
section in Moscow, as in other posts overseas, to ensure that
those who should not receive visas do not do so. But it is also
the visa section's responsibility to implement the law fairly
and with courtesy. A young man or young woman who could one day
be a political or business leader in Russia may well have had
his or her first contact with the United Kingdom through a visa
application. The visa section is our shop window.
153. The CBI told us that "any visa system must
not only protect British interests, but must also be flexible
enough not to impact negatively on legitimate commercial and political
interchange."[401]
Although we were pleased by the evidence that the situation was
getting better, there remains room for improvement. There is still
too great a weight of evidence that all is not right for anyone
to be complacent. As Sir Rodric said, part of the improvement
necessary will come from "general good management."[402]
As we recommended in a previous report, Heads of Mission should
see entry clearance as "a key element in the overall function
of their work of representing the United Kingdom."[403]
We are re-assured by the attention which Dame Elizabeth Anson
(who was visiting Moscow at the same time as us) is giving to
visa issues in Russia. We recommend that—
(a) senior management attention in Moscow,
including the personal attention of the Ambassador, should be
directed towards building upon the improvements already achieved
in the visa-issuing system;
(b) the FCO should examine with the Home Office
means of using information technology to simplify the system,
especially for applicants who live a long distance from British
posts; and
(c) the FCO should continue to monitor the
questions asked in visa interviews to ensure the avoidance of
unnecessary probing of an applicant's private life.
The British Council
154. The British Council has greatly expanded its
operations in Russia since 1992. As Dr Wozencraft of the Council
told us, a "very small operation in a stable block of the
British Embassy in Moscow" has become a nation-wide presence,
operating through ten regional offices from the Baltic to the
Pacific, and from the Black Sea to the Urals.[404]
The Council's directorate in Russia is, in fact, one of its eight
global priority operations, reflecting the FCO's view of international
priorities.[405]
The Council's evidence describes in detail its work in changing
outdated perceptions of the United Kingdom in the arts and in
science and technology, in demonstrating commitment to the reform
process in Russia by assistance in economic reform, education,
good governance and human rights and environmental protection,
in extending English language training in Russia and in promoting
educational services in the United Kingdom. All of this is vital
work: Professor White argued that "Russians have no wish
to find themselves marginalised at the level of exchanges between
civilisations."[406]
The British Council is in the vanguard of these exchanges between
Russia and the Untied Kingdom. Its impressive website, with pages
of information on human rights, also shows how central the Council's
work is in furthering the FCO's political aims.[407]
155. We received much evidence demonstrating the
Council's importance and praising its work in Russia. Dr Pravda
argued that:
"The British Council continues to do extremely
valuable work with very limited funding. Cultural relations remain
the most under-valued and under-used dimension of British foreign
policy. It is here in particular that we could punch above our
economic, military and political weight."[408]
John Thornhill of the Financial Times wrote
of "much valuable work in raising awareness of the UK and
capitalising on the enormous interest among the Russian population
in our language, culture, educational opportunities and business
links" which had been done by the Council.[409]
Among commercial witnesses, Invensys described the Council as
a "highly regarded institution."[410]
David Cant of the Russo-British Chamber of Commerce thought the
Council was doing "a very good job"[411],
while BP Amoco gave details of its joint ventures with the Council
in Sakhalin and (prospectively) in Irkutsk with their "real
benefit to local communities."[412]
From an independent viewpoint, Dr Bradshaw of the University of
Birmingham also praised the BP Amoco/British Council joint venture
in Sakhalin.[413]
During our visit to Russia, we visited the British Council's premises
in Moscow, St Petersburg and Ekaterinburg. We were greatly impressed
by the commitment and enthusiasm of the staff, as well as by the
large numbers of young Russians using the services provided.
156. There remains great untapped demand in Russia
for the British Council's services. The Council is very conscious
of this. Their written evidence referred to "considerable
potential to extend the outreach of Council programmes",
and their oral witnesses suggested that extending the Council's
regional outreach, and consolidating standards in the areas in
which they were at present operating, were priorities if the necessary
money became available.[414]
There were important cities, like Rostov-on-Don or Novosibirsk,
where the Council felt it could operate. It needed to target young
people better, and develop its programmes on human rights and
good governance.[415]
There is also "an enormous growth in demand for the English
language" which other English-speaking countries were not
meeting.[416]
The Council is, however, realistic about the extent to which it
is able to expand, and clearly recognises that there are some
regions of Russia where the local partnership necessary for its
work would not be forthcoming. It also needs to bear in mind the
advice of the FCO and DTI as to the appropriate regions into which
the Council should expand.[417]
Nevertheless, the Council is right in identifying regional expansion
as one of its priorities because of the increasing decentralisation
of power in Russia. The co-location of the British Council with
the Consulate General in Ekaterinburg illustrates an imaginative
response to combining resources for conventional diplomacy with
those for cultural diplomacy.
157. According to Dr Pravda "the Council simply
does not have the funding" to do the work it should be doing
in the regions, and the Council itself is clear that any further
expansion of effort "will require significant additional
resources."[418]
Its extended role has so far been performed without any increase
in real terms in the funding it has received from the FCO. Indeed,
the Council has needed to transfer money from programmes in other
countries in the region in order to maintain its grant-in-aid
budget in Russia in real terms.[419]
The first chart below shows the Council's total budget and total
grant-in-aid for each of the last three years, together with the
grant-in-aid and total budgets for Russia. The second chart shows
the figures in real terms.
158. To an extent the British Council can be expected
to raise money from other resources than its grant-in-aid. It
has done so successfully in Russia as the Charts demonstrate.
Its direct English language teaching operations are completely
self-sufficient financially, for example,[420]
and the Council manages programmes under contract from other bodies,
such as the Know How Fund or the EU TACIS programme, as well as
of more commercial organisations like oil companies or educational
establishments in the United Kingdom.[421]
However, in its work of changing perceptions of the United Kingdom
in Russia, in demonstrating that the United Kingdom is a committed
partner in the reform process or in promoting human rights or
environmentalism, the Council is performing a task on behalf of
the British Government which the Government should fund at a realistic
level. As the FCO itself says, "the Council does much to
spread knowledge of the UK, and to demonstrate British interest
and involvement across Russia."[422]
As we commented in a previous Report, the FCO should not will
the ends if it is not prepared to provide the means.[423]
159. The reduction of programmes in other countries
in the region so that the grant-in-aid in Russia can be bolstered
is, in our view, misconceived. Nor should it have been necessary.
In our recent Report on South Caucasus and Central Asia we called
for increased funding for the Council's operations in the countries
of the area,[424]
and there is a strong case for similarly strengthening the Council's
presence in other states which were once part of the USSR as well
as the states of Central Europe. These countries should certainly
not be downgraded at the expense of Russia.
160. In our Report of last summer on FCO Resources,
we described the British Council as "seriously underfunded"
and recommended an increase by 2002-2003 in real terms of 10 per
cent in its funding compared with the level of the early to mid
1990s. Such an increase was, in our view, "both affordable
and fully justified."[425]
In his response to this recommendation, the Foreign Secretary
said that the "FCO agrees that a further increase in funding
for the Council would certainly be beneficial, resources permitting."[426]
This Report demonstrates the scale of the challenge for the West
in engaging Russia. The British Council's work is at the forefront
of this process of engagement, and Russia thus could be an object
lesson of what might be done if a modest increase in means were
provided to the Council. We recommend that the British Council's
grant-in-aid in Russia should be increased in real terms by not
less than 10 per cent by 2002-2003, and that this increase should
not be at the expense of the Council's other programmes.
323 Ev. p. 127. Back
324 Q74. Back
325 Ev. p. 121. Back
326 Q314. Back
327 HC Deb 6
December 1999 col 409w; Ev. pp. 153-4, Appendix 1. Back
328 Ev. p. 121. Back
329 Q320. Back
330 Q314. Back
331 Ev. p. 117. Back
332 Reuters,
reported in RFE/RL Newsline, available on www.rferl.org Back
333 Ev. p. 117. Back
334 QQ249, 304. Back
335 Ev. p. 119. Back
336 Ev. p. 119. Back
337 Third Report,
Session 1998-99, HC 39, para 111. Available on the Defence Committee's
web site: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmdfence/cmdfence.htm Back
338 Ev. p. 115.
These figures were subsequently updated in letters of 1 and 2
February. Back
339 Ev. p. 50. Back
340 Ev. p. 55. Back
341 Ev. p. 85;
QQ183-184. Back
342 Ev. p. 179,
Appendix 17. Back
343 Q181. Back
344 Q205. Back
345 Ev. p. 217,
Appendix 29. Back
346 See paras
133 to 140. Back
347 Ev. pp.
79-81. Back
348 Q181. Back
349 Ev p. 236,
Appendix 31. Back
350 The Central
Bank of Russia is the majority owner of Moscow Narodny Bank. Back
351 Ev. p. 180,
Appendix 19. Back
352 Ev. pp.
170-1, Appendix 10. Back
353 Ev. p. 205,
Appendix 27. Back
354 Q183. Back
355 Ev. p. 236,
Appendix 31. Back
356 FCO Departmental
Report 1999, Cm 4209, p. 16. Back
357 Ev. p. 218,
Appendix 29. The Embassy web site is: www.britemb.msk.ru. Back
358 Ev. p. 182,
Appendix 20. Back
359 Ev. p. 161,
Appendix 4. Back
360 Ev. p. 217,
Appendix 29. Back
361 Ev. p. 55. Back
362 Ev. p. 217,
Appendix 29. Back
363 Ev. p. 85;
Q183. Back
364 Ev. pp.
193-4, Appendix 23-FCO translation. Back
365 ibid. Back
366 Q181. Back
367 Q125. Back
368 See para
141. Back
369 QQ 339,
349. Back
370 Ev. p. 122. Back
371 See para
134. Back
372 Ev. p. 122. Back
373 HC Deb 1
February 2000 c. 546W. Back
374 Ev. p. 52. Back
375 Ev. p. 167,
Appendix 7. Back
376 Ev. p. 171,
Appendix 11. Back
377 Ev. p. 79;
Q186. Back
378 Ev. p. 217,
Appendix 29. Back
379 Ev. p. 180,
Appendix 19. Back
380 Q338. Back
381 Ev. p. 122. Back
382 QQ 202,
356. Back
383 Ev. p. 122. Back
384 Q339. Back
385 Ev. pp.
186-8, Appendix 25. Back
386 QQ190, 204. Back
387 Q188. Back
388 Ev. p. 79;
Q186. Back
389 HC Deb 7
December 1999, col. 680. Back
390 Q340. Back
391 Q189. Back
392 Ev. pp.
58-9. Back
393 Q332. Back
394 Ev. p. 171,
Appendix 11. Back
395 Ev. p. 167,
Appendix 7. Back
396 Q186. Back
397 Ev. p. 197,
Appendix 25. Back
398 Q202. Back
399 Q216. Back
400 Ev. p. 122. Back
401 Ev. p. 217,
Appendix 29. Back
402 Q216. Back
403 Fourth Report,
Session 1997-98, Entry Clearance Operations with particular reference
to Islamabad and New Delhi, HC 515, para. 41. Available on the
Committee's web site:
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmfaff/cmfaff.htm Back
404 Q70. Back
405 Ev. pp.
34-35. Back
406 Ev. pp.
166-7, Appendix 7. Back
407 www.britcoun.org/russia/. Back
408 Ev. p. 55. Back
409 Ev. p. 171,
Appendix 11. Back
410 Ev. p. 193,
Appendix 22. Back
411 Q195. Back
412 Ev. p. 85;
Q194. Back
413 Ev. p. 161,
Appendix 4. Back
414 Ev. p. 34;
QQ70-71. Back
415 QQ73 and
96. Back
416 Ev. p. 38;
Q78. Back
417 QQ65-69. Back
418 Ev. p. 41;
Q119. Back
419 Ev. p. 35. Back
420 Q85. Back
421 Q70. Back
422 Ev. p. 116. Back
423 Sixth Report
from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1998-99, HC 349, para.
177. Available on the Committee web site: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmfaff/cmfaff.htm Back
424 Sixth Report
from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1998-99, HC 349, para.
178. Available on the Committee web site: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmfaff/cmfaff.htm Back
425 Fifth Report
from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1998-99, HC 271, para.
42, available on the Committee web site: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmfaff/cmfaff.htm Back
426 Cm 4462,
para 19. Back
