APPENDIX 5
Memorandum submitted by Dr Roy Allison,
The Royal Institute of International Affairs
This memorandum is submitted on behalf of the
Russia and Eurasia Programme (REP) at Chatham House, which was
originally established as the Soviet Foreign Policy Programme
din 1986. Since then it has become the main organising centre
in Britain for work on the foreign policies of Russia and the
other CIS states and a leading centre for research and publications
on their political and economic development. It pursues a vigorous
programme of research, meetings and study groups and has a wide
variety of links with institutes in Russia and other CIS countries.
Dr Allison has been the head of REP since 1993.
During 1992-99 he has also been Senior Lecturer in Russian International
Security Policy at the Centre for Russian and East European Studies,
University of Birmingham. He has written or edited seven books
on Soviet/Russian foreign and security policies, directs several
large research projects and is a frequent commentator for the
national and international media.
CHALLENGES FOR
BRITISH ENGAGEMENT
WITH RUSSIA
1. A number of developments, which are mostly
internal to Russia, have increased the challenges and difficulties
of effective engagement between Western states and Russia although
the importance of such engagement should not be in dispute.
2. The Russian financial and economic crisis
during and after August 1998 led to a significant deterioration
in the opportunities for business investment in Russia and an
initial collapse in business confidence in the emerging hybrid
Russian market. This was compounded by the threat and reality
of defaults on international loans, the virtual collapse of the
banking sector in Russia and uncertainty whether crucial IMF and
World Bank loans could be re-negotiated.
3. The popular belief in Russia, exploited
by nationalist politicians, that a Western-driven model of market
reform and marketization applied by "Western-oriented"
economists has failed to deliver its promise. This belief has
been supported by the continuing failure of the Russian economy
to deliver growth, sharp falls in real incomes in autumn 1998
and a spectacular decline since 1991 in social provision and healthcare
in Russia.
4. Widespread accusations of corruption
and self-serving political activities, which are frequently levelled
at senior officials and politicians have undermined popular faith
in good governance or processes of democratisation, despite commendable
progress in the holding of freely contested democratic elections.
The influence of economic, financial and business lobbies on the
political process, and suggestions of their links with organised
crime, has also generated cynicism among Russian electors. Current
investigations into money laundering further damage the Russian
political image and may have broad international repercussions.
5. The inclination of President Yeltsin
to change prime ministers and governments frequently during 1997-99
has created a chaotic policy-making environment or resulted in
policy drift. Core policy decisions have increasingly been determined
by a coterie around Yeltsin based on relations of loyalty. The
president's capacity to focus on any specific policy area remains
limited, partly as a result of his poor uncertain health. This
environment allows for sudden, unexpected policy reversals or
changes. Yeltsin has become a lame duck president.
6. Strategic lines of Russian political
or economic (or perhaps even constitutional) development can not
be expected until the results of the forthcoming presidential
elections are clear. Policy in many areas may be regarded as in
abeyance, even if a new president may not choose to significantly
change such policy from its present directions. This also applies
to aspects of foreign and security policy.
7. Russian efforts to develop a distinct
foreign policy identity still incorporate nostalgia for Soviet
prowess and prestige despite the collapse of the resource base
that characterised the latter. This creates psychological difficulties
in various areas of foreign and security policy interaction with
other states and international organisations. The assumption by
Russia of broad-ranging interests in certain regions of the world
where traditional Soviet influence was exercised continues to
be problematic. The gap between Russian foreign policy ambitions
and the capabilities to support such ambitions has continued to
widen.
8. The conflict over Kosovo and its presentation
in the Russian media has significantly increased anti-Western,
more specifically anti-American and anti-NATO opinion in broader
nationalist thinking among Russian political elites. This is already
part of the electoral politics for the December State Duma elections,
although Russian voters concerns remain overwhelmingly domestic
ones. The impact of these anti-Western currents, especially in
the State Duma itself, will unavoidably continue to prejudice
various areas of practical British and Western cooperation with
Russia in coming months.
THE FOREIGN
AND SECURITY
POLICY CONTEXT
FOR ENGAGEMENT
WITH RUSSIA
9. Russian policy in Europe has been strongly
influenced by a perception of marginalisation from key decisions
on European security, notwithstanding the important, productive
diplomatic role played by Russian in the resolution of the Kosovo
conflict and participation in the KFOR peacekeeping force. This
partly reflects a Russian hankering for a former geostrategic
reality. But it also reflects the difficulty for Western states
in finding appropriate forums and channels to engage Russia as
an equal partner when the collapse in the Russian resource base
and the problems outlined above have themselves generated certain
soft security concerns as well as fluidity in foreign policy priorities.
10. The Permanent Joint Council (PJC) of
the NATO-Russia Founding Act is currently viewed askance by Russian
leaders and appropriate only for discussing issues related to
KFOR. The larger NATO-Russia relationship is in a trough (for
example the Russian Partnership for Peace Programme is suspended),
and it may not be possible to revive this effectively and purposively
until a new popular Russian president is in place-even one with
more nationalist credentials.
11. Despite this, the simultaneous conduct
by NATO and Russia of two major, complex peacekeeping operations
in the Balkans (in Bosnia and Kosovo) creates opportunities. The
success of this large-scale co-operation of military forces on
the ground could eventually have far-reaching consequences in
restoring and deepening NATO-Russian political and military relations
on various levels. The common interest of Russia and Western states
in preventing the destabilisation of the wider Balkan region should
become a basis for developing other areas of mutual understanding.
12. By contrast to NATO, the European Union
is viewed by Russian politicians as the appropriate framework
for closer Russian engagement in Europe (short of Russian EU membership
which is accepted as unrealistic in the medium term) and responds
to pressing Russian needs for economic, trade and financial integration
in the larger European region. The CFSP of the EU is viewed benignly
in Moscow compared to NATO policy. The EU Northern Dimension is
understood to have practical benefits for north-west Russia and
the recent EU Programme on Russia contains a wide spectrum of
practical, functional areas for co-operation and collaboration.
This could play an important role.
13. Russian leaders also continue to characterise
the OSCE, with expanded powers, as the appropriate institution
for the management of European security. But they probably now
accept that their idea of an OSCE European Charter will not be
realised. The OSCE could become more active in the CIS region
and be called on to provide peacekeeping forces. Recently, however,
its involvement in seeking a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict through the "Minsk process" has been bypassed
through direct meeting of the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents.
14. The ratification of the START II Treaty
has been withheld by the Russian State Duma as a hostage to other
policy issues, despite support for its ratification by the Russian
political and military leadership. There is little prospect for
ratification this year as a result of responses to the Kosovo
conflict and growing Russian concerns about United States' plans
to develop a national ballistic missile defence system. Yet, the
Russian leadership has argued that ratification is in the Russian
national interest since the decline in defence budgets will otherwise
result in the collapse of a credible Russian strategic nuclear
deterrent capability within ten years.
15. The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)
Treaty is clearly now in the Russian strategic interests since
it locks in constraints on preponderant NATO forces more than
on the decaying Russian force structure. Russia has also achieved
revisions to the treaty terms on Treaty Limited Equipment in the
North Caucasus Military District, which meet its needs for enhanced
forces in that region. Therefore, this treaty is unlikely to be
called seriously into question by the Russian leadership.
16. Russian defence budgets provide inadequate
funds to meet existing arms control agreements and take on new
ones; Russia should be urged to ring fence the necessary funding
to the greatest extent possible. Western assistance in specific
areas, for example with the destruction of Russia's chemical weapons,
should continue to be offered.
17. Russian political oversight, coordination
and control of conventional arms export activities is essential
but still inadequate. The pressures for the export of military
equipment to achieve foreign exchange revenues coexist with problems
of corruption and organised criminal activity. Structures to prevent
the spread of ballistic missile technology and other sensitive
technologies are particularly important and need to be reinforced
in Russia even if general state revenues and administrative capacity
in other areas continues to decline.
18. The continuing decay and demoralisation
of the Russian military forces at all levels, and the inability
to implement blueprints for military reform for lack of funding,
hampers efforts of the political leadership to stem the flow of
small arms into conflict ridden zones, such as the North Caucasus.
Corruption also seriously afflicts the Russian military institution
at all levels and further undermines its capacity to maintain
professionalism.
19. Bilateral programmes for Russian military
resettlement and other aspects of the broader British Ministry
of Defence defence diplomacy programme, provide useful assistance
and opportunities for constructive military to military dialogue,
even if such dialogue has been severely restricted by Russia in
response to NATO involvement in the Kosovo crisis. Efforts to
restore this dialogue are important and British NGOs may play
a role towards this objective.
20. The most serious immediate security
challenge for the Russian Federation is the destabilisation of
the republic of Dagestan. This requires first and foremost political
and economic responses. The capacity of the Russian armed forces
to contain or suppress perceived military challenges in the North
Caucasus is significantly lower than in 1994 before the commencement
of the disastrous conflict in Chechnya.
21. The danger of regional destabilisation
through the North Caucasus republics and in the larger Caucasian
region (including the independent South Caucasus states) is high
if Russian ground forces are committed to combat in Chechnya.
This is also likely to generate larger refugee flows that at present,
encourage more terrorist attacks on targets in Russia, and revive
international human rights concerns about the effects of Russian
policy in the North Caucasus.
30 September 1999
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