Examination of Witnesses (Questions 280
- 296)
TUESDAY 1 FEBRUARY 2000
DR SUSAN
WOODWARD, MRS
ELIZABETH ROBERTS
AND DAME
PAULINE NEVILLE-JONES
Sir David Madel
280. If we are trying to get a common European
foreign policy we could not pick a more difficult area to try.
In May 1944, at a gloomy conference between Hitler and Rommel,
Hitler said to Rommel, "The trouble is nobody will negotiate
with me and make peace with me". Is that what Milosevic thinks
now? Is that what we think, that nobody will negotiate or could
what is happening in New Hampshire today catapult whoever it is
in the Whitehouse next January and the whole situation may change?
After all, after January 20 next year there is no certainty Mrs
Albright will still be Secretary of State.
(Dame Pauline Neville-Jones) I think the fact that
he is an indicted war criminal makes it very difficult to deal
with him and I think that fact remains irrespective of genuine
reflection in the White House or anywhere else. I think myself
that policy has to revolve around but not through Milosevic and
I would like to see policies developed which help separate the
Serb population from Milosevic. I do not think this is at all
easy and I do not think they have an effect immediately. I do
not myself believe that you can lift the wall of sanctions immediately,
but what I would like to see is a policy put in place which is
partly at the outset declaratory, which says this is what you
need to do and these are the prizes you will get so that the Serb
population is given a much clearer view of the incentives and
the opportunities that lie ahead of them if the position of the
country changes and the leadership of the country changes. I think
they are feeling hopeless at the moment. I think they feel they
have been bombed by the West and so who are our friends in the
West? This man cannot be got rid of. There is a very depressed
negative acquiescent mood other than just a few figures who mill
round and who have low credibility in terms of real leadership.
One has to try to get at the wider population there and start
giving them a perception of a future without Milosevic. It is
not easy. There are little bits of policy that are in place but
there needs to be a great deal more.
281. Much bigger effort is needed?
(Dame Pauline Neville-Jones) Yes. Down the road there
needs to be, and it may be a new Administration, a regrouping
of policy which I suspect may require a bigger conference.
(Dr Woodward) I do think there is a chance that either
party could generate a candidate—it is too soon to say who
will get the nominations on either side—who says we have
had enough of the former Yugoslavia, we want to retreat. I do
think the person who is most likely to take that position, Bush,
himself has in his inner circle of foreign policy team people
who have been particularly strident in support of the action in
Bosnia and the Albanians in Kosovo. It is not at all likely even
now that that would be the outcome, namely a change in policy
under the next US administration. I think much more dangerous
is what I perceive to be the problem now in Europe, namely a waiting
game yet again. Dame Pauline mentioned today and in her written
presentation how dangerous the lapse on Kosovo from 1996 to 1998
was. We know the same thing happened in Bosnia between 1993 and
1995. I think we are in another one of those waiting games where
Europeans are generally saying we will have to wait and see what
happens in Washington and then the American elections and then
we will act. We do not have that kind of time. I say that because
it does seem to me that what really matters in the region, coming
back to your Rommel example, is not as much a partner for negotiations,
although that is now the obstacle, you cannot negotiate with Milosevic.
He is an indicted war criminal. If we wanted to support the negotiations
between Podgorica and Belgrade, between Montenegro and Serbia,
who do we support? We do not have a partner in Belgrade and that
is a very serious obstacle. There is an alternative, which is
to see this as a problem not simply of trying to support a particular
political negotiation up front where you do need to have partners,
but changing the conditions under which people on the ground themselves
can come to a solution. The Montenegrin process towards independence
is generated solely by the frustration that until the sanctions
are lifted they cannot get access to any credit because they cannot
be members of the International Monetary Fund. Therefore, they
cannot reform their system and they cannot begin to revive living
standards which is the electoral promise that the Djukanovic coalition
made and they are running out of time electorally. If, for example,
we lifted the sanctions we might begin to get an entirely different
set of conditions that might enable Podgorica and Belgrade to
resolve their problems on their own.
Mr Chidgey
282. Can I turn our minds to the European Integration
and Stability Pact which we have touched on in passing. Dame Pauline,
you have argued in your evidence that you submitted that "the
Stability Pact is a good concept provided that it is given the
means, it is tightly managed and does not become too procedural
and bureaucratic". I would like to ask all the witnesses
here how optimistic they are that this will be the case? The second
point is that the Government say that membership of the European
Union is "not an immediate prospect for most countries of
the region". The free trade area for the countries having
Stabilisation and Association Agreements is intended to be achieved
within ten years. Do the witnesses believe that the SAA countries
could aspire eventually to full EU membership and, if so, in what
timescale?
(Dame Pauline Neville-Jones) On the Stability Pact,
I have to say that I think on its present trajectory and as presently
organised and managed it is going to be something of a busted
flush and I am worried about it. I think it can be revived and
I think it can be made a real concept. I do think it has to be
managed differently from the way it is at the moment. On your
second question about membership of the EU, it must be correct
to say it is not going to be an immediate prospect. Is it a longer-term
prospect? That opens up a quite separate issue which we cannot
go into here which is what one believes about the nature of the
EU enlargement process. I do not believe that you can have classic
enlargements to 30 countries on the present regime, I think the
process has to change. If you asked me the question do I believe
that over time these countries could join various aspects of the
European Union to their profit and to that of the European Union
the answer is yes, but I believe myself that the whole process
and the nature of enlargement over time is going to change.
(Mrs Roberts) I think the Stability Pact was heralded
almost as though it was going to be a New Deal and I think that
in a way has influenced the disappointment that is felt in countries
in the region about the Stability Pact. There is a feeling that
it is a busted flush. There is not a lot of optimism about the
Stability Pact. To take Montenegro's case, it has observer status
and I get the impression that at first they were very aggrieved
and saw this as yet another punishment for Montenegro and now
they realise that the way things are going does not matter terribly
unless there is new impetus given to the Stability Pact. It comes
closer to the idea that we thought there was going to be at the
beginning. As to the association of the EU, I could not agree
more that it is going to be a long process. I think some form
of linkage is ultimately desirable. I do not know what institutional
form it would take, but I think that there will be a need in some
way to wield the individual units of the area together again with
forms of linkage. If we want stability and we want regional security
and development then there has to be some form of linkage between
the different countries of the former Yugoslavia and perhaps one
way of doing this is through co-ordination with certain aspects
in the EU.
(Dr Woodward) The Stability Pact as I see it now is
simply a mechanism for strategic co-ordination, it is trying to
rationalise all the factors that are now on the ground, to eliminate
some, to try and spend money better. There is no strategy behind
it and that is clear now in the way the working tables have been
evolving, the financing conference is developing, this idea that
you invite a number of small projects and you will try and find
financing from them. I am very concerned. It could easily do some
good. I do not see it doing harm except in the way that Elizabeth
Roberts has mentioned, which is that the expectations on the ground
are such that you are going to get consequences from their being
disillusioned and I think that is serious, which then leads to
your second question about accession. There is no question in
my mind that all of the ex-Yugoslav states, whatever their final
borders are and that process is not over, we may even have several
wars ahead of us, but in the end, whatever these units become,
will they be eligible for membership of the European Union? Of
course they will be. They are very sophisticated educated populations.
They have been trading and been a part of Europe for the last
500 to 600 years and they are crucial to Europe in transportation
terms so it is important for Europe to have it as part of this
economic space, but the delay that will be necessary could have
very serious political consequences, as we have seen in Turkey.
I think the problem lies not so much in membership but that that
is the sole European strategy for the region, because the fact
of the matter is that until states know firmly what international
environment they are a part of and which alliances they belong
to they will be internally unstable.
283. My final question is referring back to
some evidence provided by Dame Pauline and I alluded to it in
your first answer and this concerns me greatly because I think
you are suggesting that because of the problems of these various
states in meeting the requirements of accession to the European
Union they should not be held back in some sort of "convoy
principle", but, most importantly, you are suggesting that
they should be able to be selective about what aspects of membership
to the EU they should aspire to. It sounds to me rather like a
proposal that they should be able to cherry-pick certain principles
which are fundamental for a state to belong to the European Union.
Are you suggesting that democratic principles should be of certain
value and economic principles another value and human rights a
third and you could pick one or three or two?
(Dame Pauline Neville-Jones) First of all, I realise
that this view is controversial. Secondly, clearly there is a
hierarchy of things that are fundamentals and some things you
have just listed are fundamentals. I think what I mean by my position
is that if you wait until the countries are fully qualified right
across the board you are going to be waiting a very long time
and I have some of the anxieties which Susan Woodward has expressed
about this endless delay and non-belief in the reality of accession.
I think that there are certain things that you cannot do without.
284. What are the things that you cannot do
without?
(Dame Pauline Neville-Jones) One of them is democracy
and that is very clear.
285. Human rights?
(Dame Pauline Neville-Jones) They go together in my
view. Some of the reasons why they want in is they believe that
were they to come in this would provide a guarantee of an internal
kind of good behaviour for the future. That is both true and untrue
in that it probably would help. It also carries quite a risk for
the European Union with it. What I think I am saying is this is
not a simple process. At the end of the day I think we ought to
look seriously at allowing them to have degrees of relationship
with the European Union which are different according to candidates
and which do not constitute full membership. Never say that is
the end of the road. I think we should always leave it open.
286. What are the improvement processes?
(Dame Pauline Neville-Jones) I think there is an argument
for saying you could have members of the common and foreign security
policy process when they are not qualified to be full members
in the so-called Pillar I. That may be not what they want. I am
not saying that this is something which is very simple to do,
but I think it is a serious option and I am concerned about the
delay involved in total membership.
(Dr Woodward) I think we are so busy focusing on what
conditions these countries will meet that we will forget it is
in our interest to have this part of the world stabilised, economically
prosperous and not a breeding ground for organised crime and we
forget that and if these countries are more rapidly incorporated
into our economic space by freer trade and with increased regulation
of environmental rules and all of the other good things that come
out of Brussels fast we will see that the political consequences
will not be favourable, it will only support democratic movements
and we are putting the burden on them without realising that that
is a cost to us.
Chairman
287. What are your criticisms of the current
Government response? What more can be done on Montenegro?
(Mrs Roberts) The paper I submitted was written in
November and I would like to say that my feeling about the security
situation is slightly less acute now than it was then. The threat
to security of the regime is more likely to come from other destabilising
activities with which Milosevic is quite likely to be involved.
You asked me what I think we should be doing to help Montenegro.
I think we should have two branches to our strategy. The first
is to continue to do what we are doing on security which is to
make it clear that we will not tolerate security being threatened.
I think this has been helpful. Milosevic cannot be quite sure
what the Western response would be.
Chairman
288. But not falling into the trap of threatening
and then the question of credibility?
(Mrs Roberts) No, I think that would be very foolish.
The way in which we would do it is to continue with what we are
doing. Perhaps there is space for increasing the visibility of
some form of security presence. I do not know whether it would
be possible, for example, to make greater use of facilities at
the port of Bar to bring goods in to Kosovo, but in some way to
make Milosevic aware that we would consider this a very serious
threat. I know that policy has articulated that and I think it
is very important that that is not let up on. I think policy has
been much less successful on the second thing we need to do for
Montenegro and that is to offer some way out of the present difficulties
for the regime. I think the regime faces many problems and one
is economic, they are failing to deliver on their promises of
a better life. They do face electoral problems. If they cannot
deliver then they have huge problems in terms of how to keep the
budget ticking over, how to pay pensions, how to pay child benefits
and they have local elections coming up so we will see the results.
It will be very cleverly played upon by Bulatovic and by campaigns
from Belgrade to say, "You are being fêted in the West.
You behaved in this kind of way and what do you get? We told you
the West's actions are empty." I know that there is a fear
that giving money to these regimes creates great temptation. I
do not think we should be naive about that. I do not think we
should entirely close our eyes to it at all. I think we have to
be realistic and that to the best of our ability we should be
tailoring these plans to specific opportunities and to holding
the Government accountable, demanding things like transparency
in privatisation, but on the basis of that fear of corruption
(and some money will be siphoned off if we are being realistic)
it would be wrong not to act at all and not to support the Government
while we may criticise it and in contact with them and say something
has to be better, but we need to give overall support on economic
grounds because we are asking them to do something very contradictory.
289. How do you circumvent the IFI's requirement
that there must be a sovereign state? There has been the suggestion
that there should be specific investment projects. That is not
going to deliver in the short-term and it is not going to provide
the child benefit and the pensions in time for elections.
(Mrs Roberts) I think there are two problems here.
There are immediate short-term problems. One of the things to
remember is that Montenegro is a very small country, it has a
population of only 650,000 or so. In comparison to the amount
of money that we have spent in Bosnia and Kosovo it would take
a relatively small amount of money to deal with these emergency
problems, but they need to be addressed. The problem of attracting
investment is incredibly difficult. It is difficult not just because
of the status of Montenegro as a republic within the federation
of Yugoslavia but it is also very difficult because of the continuing
lack of security in the region and that companies understandly
we do not want to invest when they do not know what is going to
happen. I am not sure that it is an insuperable problem. I feel
that there ought to be a way in which if the political will was
there it would be possible to devise a way in which investment
could be attracted in to Montenegro. I think it is very important
that that is done because creating jobs in the long term will
mean we will be able to tackle the problems of smuggling and those
sorts of problems which have an indirect impact certainly on countries
close to Montenegro and on the whole region. I think there needs
to be a lot of imaginative consideration. I know when President
Djukanovic was here he had contact with some of the IFIs and I
do not know what came out of it.
290. I would like to finalise on Kosovo and
to get the views from each of you on the charge that we are losing
the peace, that there is not sufficient commitment in the legal
structure to the political structures there, that there is perhaps
inevitably the ambiguity about the future political status, the
sort of criticism made by General Reinhardt, for example. What
is it that in your judgment we are failing to do which we should
do to increase stability, civilian and political, in Kosovo?
(Dr Woodward) There is no question that the internal
security situation, both organised crime, gangs, disagreements
among political factions both within the Albanian community and
between the Albanians and the minorities is the greatest problem
and that the only way in the short-term to solve that is an infusion
of police forces. There is an innovative suggestion coming out
from colleagues of mine in Norway which is to have national contingents
of police rather than the United Nations civilian police structure.
291. Armed police?
(Dr Woodward) They might have to be or they might
not because the idea is that you would have national units so
that a Norwegian unit, a British unit or whatever would go, countries
would deploy them and they would be attached to KFOR rather than
to UNMIK because then you could deal with this military issue
and because internal security and border security and the whole
arrangement with the new KPC and disarmament are linked makes
a lot of sense, but I think we have to deal with it and we have
to deal with it very very fast. The lack of resources to the United
Nations is really appalling given what we were willing to do with
the bombing campaign. The second element I would like to mention
is that it does seem to me that while Kosovo will never again
be governed by Serbs, what its political status is is a matter
of decision and clarity to the people on the ground and a matter
of timing. The reason not to decide it now has to do with its
effect on outsiders, on Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and views
in the European Union.
292. And the UN resolution.
(Dr Woodward) Yes, all the reasons that you know.
That does not mean to say that ambiguity is a benefit. I think
it would be much smarter to say that this will be the political
status at X period of time and in the meantime here are the conditions
that have to be met. Despite all the difficulties with the Good
Friday Agreement, you have a process moving forward that says
here are the conditions to do and if you meet these conditions
you get this reward. There is no reason why we could not structure
it in that way given the problems that an independent Kosovo will
pose for Montenegro, for Macedonia, for Bosnia and Herzegovina
let alone for Serbia and why everyone is so concerned about that.
You can either say it is not going to be independent but it is
going to be some kind of confederal relationship and we will begin
to build the border relationships very clearly now—
293. Or you will not see trusteeship for some
time.
(Dr Woodward) It will be that anyway so why not make
it clear what it is. You either identify a political status that
you can begin to build on now in the trans-border and regional
relationships that make sense for the neighbouring states or you
have an agreement that is negotiated by the leaders of all of
the states that are affected and say what conditions do you in
Sarajevo and so forth expect from Pristina and let us build a
mutual agreement among you that will enable the Kosovo population
to govern themselves but at the same time not threaten the integrity
of the other states.
Ms Abbott
294. Do you think that the creation of a multi-ethnic
Kosovo where Serb and Albanians live in harmony together is possible?
(Dr Woodward) No, not any more, but I do think that
the issue of multi-ethnicity is not an issue of multi-ethnicity
but an issue of tolerance and that Albanians themselves need a
regime in Kosovo that protects their individual rights of expression
as much as Serbs and Turks and Gorans and all the other ethnic
minorities. So the goal behind the idea of a multi-ethnic Kosovo
remains politically the same.
(Mrs Roberts) I would agree with Dr Woodward, I think
that the situation on the ground is a cause of great concern and
I think it is very important to do something about it in the short
term. There is a risk that morale will slip very badly. The thing
that needs to be done is that the people who are willing to spend
a great deal of money on the campaign need to be willing to spend
money particularly to bring in more civilian police, I think they
definitely need to be there. Reports I have heard from Kosovo
from different people suggest that the situation is very bad and
it is looked at with great concern by people, for example, in
Montenegro. So I think something should be done in the short-term
very quickly. It is not logical to do nothing having spent so
much in the first place. I also do not think we are going to see
a multi-ethic Kosovo in the way it was before.
Chairman
295. Do you agree with that?
(Dame Pauline Neville-Jones) I think the best we can
hope for is co-existence rather than integration. I think it is
unlikely that you are going to get a return of anything like the
former proportion of the Serb population of Kosovo.
296. Are we losing the peace?
(Dame Pauline Neville-Jones) I think there are real
threats to it. I think we have to recognise we are going to be
there for an indefinite time into the future. The notion that
we can hope to get out next year is damaging to the credibility
of the Western effort. I am chary about going for trusteeship.
The aim should be to be gradually inculcating domestically rooted
institutions. I agree entirely with the urgency of the internal
security situation. It ranges all the way from the insecurity
of the Serb minority through to the white slave trade, the girls
being carted off. People do not feel secure. I do not believe
it is right to begin the political process while the situation
on the ground is so insecure. So policemen are very very important.
I understand that the budget for Mr Kouchner and his effort for
the whole year is equivalent to the cost of one day's bombing.
That gives you some idea of proportions. That cannot be a sensible
proportion because we do have to increase the resources. Finding
the qualified people to do these things is very very difficult
and I think one should not under-estimate the sheer difficulty
of assembling the teams. I do not believe that the political process
should be hastened because I think that Bosnia shows—and
I think that we can see this in Kosovo—that actually accelerating
it too fast tends to hand the power to the nationalist and the
extremist figures rather than allowing the time to grow for some
of the elements of moderation to emerge. In other words, I think
it would benefit the extreme and not Mr Rugova if we go bashing
down the road of elections too fast. Ultimately, just as it is
the case with Montenegro, you will not find a place for Kosovo,
whatever it is, in the absence of dealing with Serbia. I keep
on coming back to that. That is the area where policy does need
to focus and have a coherent whole and an overall relationship
with what we are doing in Kosovo.
Chairman: May I thank you all very much. Our
Committee hopes to visit both Kosovo and Montenegro in early March
and the material that each one of you has given to us will be
a very useful foundation for that. Thank you all very much indeed.
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