Memorandum submitted by the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office
SERBIA AND
MONTENEGRO
1. The Committee asked for evidence that any
change of government in Belgrade would lead to an acceptance of
a new relationship with Kosovo and Montenegro.
2. It is difficult to speculate on this
question without having a clearer indication of the likely composition
and programme of a post-Milosevic government in the FRY. But the
European Union and the United States, in their continuing dialogue
with representatives of the Serbian democratic opposition and
their contacts with the democratically-elected government of President
Djukanovic in Montenegro, have made clear our preference that
Kosovo and Montenegro should remain within a more devolved and
democratic FRY. This will require appropriate constitutional and
political reforms.
3. The interest of the Serbian democratic
opposition in a closer relationship with the EU can be used to
further our arguments on the need for a revised constitutional
balance within the FRY. The EU's 11 October Declaration on the
FRY (attached), which sets out how the EU would respond to the
establishment of a democratic government in the FRY/Serbia, is
premised on a relationship with a government in Belgrade which
would accept this kind of approach.
4. The wider challenge behind this agenda
is to encourage moderate political groups in all parts of the
FRY, and in the neighbouring states, to enter into a reasoned
dialogue about the future of the FRY. It is clear from our contacts
that some individuals are more ready for this kind of dialogue
than others. The process will take time and will need to be carefully
handled. We are ready to help facilitate informal, private contacts
when the time is right.
5. The Committee asked what consideration
was being given to practical aid and assistance to Serbia should
Milosevic remain in power.
The Government's position is clear. We will
respond to genuine humanitarian need in Serbia, but we will not
support wider reconstruction while the country is governed by
men indicted for crimes against humanity by the International
criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
6. International humanitarian organisations
are operating in Serbia with programmes to meet genuine humanitarian
need. An important part of the problem is the large number of
refugees (estimated at around 600,000), who have been displaced
there from the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia.
7. Non-governmental organisations are operating
in Serbia, as is the European Community's Humanitarian Office
(ECHO). ECHO has increased its programme in Serbia to 62 million
euros this year. The International Committee of the Red Cross
has an assistance programme in place. The ICRC distributes food
and hygiene parcels to internally displaced people and refugees
in Serbia. Soup kitchens provide hot meals for 100,000 people.
A winter programme is being put in place, providing clothes, shoes
and stoves helps 300,000 people.
8. The EU's sanctions measures against Serbia
include humanitarian exemptions, so there is nothing to prevent
local authorities, NGO's charities or individuals from contributing
to humanitarian aid programmes.
9. The humanitarian effort will continue
through the winter and beyond. But we must be wary of playing
into Milosevic's hands. His regime exercises control, often through
corruption and personal connections, across much of the Serbian
economy, public and private sector alike. We have to ensure that
the aid we give is carefully targeted so that it goes to the families
of those in need, not to the regime.
10. The EU has launched a project called
"Energy for Democracy", to supply heating oil to local
authorities in Serbia controlled by the democratic opposition.
The first deliveries arrived in early December. The project combines
measures of practical help to the population, with a signal to
the people of Serbia that we are ready to help those who support
democratic values and want change. Opposition-run municipalities
have been discriminated against systematically by Belgrade, particularly
in terms of finance and fuel.
MONTENEGRO
11. The Committee asked what consideration
is being given to measures which might avert or mitigate bloodshed
in the event of a Montenegrin bid for independence.
12. The best way to avert bloodshed in Montenegro
is to help secure a change of government in Belgrade. This would
open the way for an eventual negotiation on the status of Montenegro
within the FRY between democratic governments in Belgrade and
Podgorica. The UK remains committed to the encouragement of democratic
forces in Serbia and to the isolation of the Milosevic regime.
13. Milosevic should be aware that the international
community continues to follow closely developments in Montenegro.
NATO Foreign Ministers, in the Communique following their December
meeting in Brussels, noted that they were continuing to pay close
attention to Montenegro. This message was repeated most recently
in public on 25 January by the Foreign Secretary, following his
meeting in London with President Djukanovic of Montenegro. The
Secretary of State said that he UK remained vigilant about what
was happening in Montenegro. He reaffirmed our commitment to support
for the democratic forces in Montenegro and to participation in
Montenegro's economic reform.
14. The international profile of Montenegro
has also been raised by its participation and contacts with regional
and international organisations. Djukanovic was present at the
official launch of the Stability Pact in Sarajevo in July 1999.
We welcome Montenegrin participation in the Pact. President Djukanovic
also attended the OSCE Summit in Istanbul in November 1999. He
has held high-level talks with the European Commission and with
NATO in Brussels, calling on Commissioner Patten and Secretary-General
Lord Robertson. He met the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary
during his visit to London. The UK has supported this high-level
engagement with Montenegro, which in itself sends a strong signal
to Belgrade of international commitment to provide support to
a democratic, autonomous Montenegro.
15. One Milosevic tactic has already become
clear: the impoverishment of Montenegro through a trade embargo
and other administrative measures which have lead to rising inflation
and shortages of basic goods. This economic blackmail carries
the risk of stirring social dissatisfaction and unrest, which
Milosevic might seek to exploit. We therefore believe that the
Montenegrin government's programme of democratic and economic
reforms should be given strong international support.
16. The support provided by the European
Union for Montenegro has been substantial. The EU has approved
and started to implement programmes for Montenegro which include:
financial support for social welfare programmes, budgetary support
for electricity prices, refugee programmes, food aid, agricultural
improvements, support for independent media and technical assistance
(economic and monetary reform, public administration). The total
amounts to tens of millions of euros. The UK is providing bilateral
assistance through the Know How Fund—including experts on
privatisation and on the regulation of public utilities—and
through the British Council, which is continuing a valuable programme
of public administration reform in close co-operation with the
Montenegrin government. The UK is also supporting the professionalisation
of the media and the strengthening of civil society in Montenegro.
17. Whilst supporting the attempts of the
Montenegrin government to build a better society, the UK and its
partners have been careful to warn Montenegro of the dangers of
pursuing political aims which would give Belgrade a pretext for
intervention. One positive result of this message has been that
the Government of Montenegro has resisted internal pressure to
call a referendum on independence. We continue to stress our support
for a renegotiation of Montenegro's status within the FRY. (The
Serb opposition have already declared their support for negotiations
with Montenegro on the basis of the document submitted to Belgrade
by the Montenegrin government in August 1999, which called for
equal status for Montenegro within the Federal Republic.)
KOSOVO
18. The Committee asked for our assessment
of the advantages and disadvantages associated with:
(a) immediate recognition of Kosovo by the
UK;
(b) establishment of a timetable and conditions
for the recognition of Kosovo by the UK; and
(c) continued ambiguity about the future
status of Kosovo.
19. The Government is bound by the position
set out in UN Security Council resolution 1244, which established
the international civilian and military presences in Kosovo. That
resolution gave the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) the task of promoting
the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government
in Kosovo. UNMIK was also required by UNSCR 1244 to facilitate
a political process to determine Kosovo's future status, taking
into account the Rambouillet accords. The nature of the current
Belgrade regime makes it difficult to imagine that there could
be a meaningful political process in present circumstances on
the future of Kosovo.
20. Our position on FRY sovereignty and
Kosovo independence is unchanged. We believe a settlement under
which Kosovo remains in the FRY would be preferable. This position
is widely shared in the international community, and by neighbouring
countries, especially Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It would,
for example, be more difficult to retain the Republika Srpska
as part of a single Bosnian state in circumstances in which the
international community had accepted secession by Kosovo.
21. It follows that we see no advantages
and serious disadvantages in taking steps, such as establishing
a timetable and conditions for recognition, which might encourage
movement towards Kosovo independence.
22. The FAC asked for our assessment of
whether "the West's insistence on maintaining a multi-ethnic
Kosovo is viable in view of continuing sectarian violence and
whether the policy is hampering the establishment of democratic
institutions."
23. It is not the West alone which insists
on maintaining a multi-ethnic Kosovo. UN Security Council resolution
1244 gives the international presences in Kosovo the task of promoting
a secure environment in which "all refugees and displaced
persons" can return.
24. The longer-term challenge is promoting
the establishment of democratic institutions and a political and
civil culture in which pluralism and tolerance are accepted as
fundamental values. The Committee rightly questions how this can
be combined with continuing ethnically-motivated violence, which
itself derives from the repression of recent years and decades
of mistrust and discrimination before that. It is because such
violence is incompatible with the kind of society we are seeking
to build in Kosovo that the European Union has warned Kosovo's
leaders, in particular the Kosovo Albanians, that it has to stop.
We hope the Committee will use its visit to Kosovo to reinforce
this message. The UK is working with its EU partners and NATO
Allies and with the UN Mission in Kosovo to develop a strategy
to encourage the emergence of moderate political forces and to
tackle hardline elements on all sides.
25. The international presences, KFOR in
particular, are making a substantial effort to reassure and protect
the Serbs and other minorities in Kosovo. Around half of KFOR's
resources are currently devoted to minority protection. Soldiers
conduct patrols in Serb and other minority communities across
Kosovo; soldiers live in apartment blocks where individuals are
assessed to be at risk; KFOR troops escort people to school and
to work; Serb religious and patrimonial sites are guarded around
the clock. But, as UNMIK and KFOR have stated, to create a secure
environment they need the full co-operation of the local population.
26. We do not believe that insistence on
the rights of all communities in Kosovo will hamper the establishment
of democratic institutions. Kosovo's democratic institutions will
need to include adequate provisions for minorities rights, as
the Rambouillet Accords did.
27. The Committee asked for our view on
the ability of Kosovo Albanian politicians to provide effective
and stable government in the foreseeable future.
28. The challenge of democratisation is
a significant one. It involves not only establishing democratic
institutions, but also seeking to ensure that suitably prepared
and qualified politicians are there to run them. Within the UN
Mission the OSCE leads on these aspects, with work under way on
political party development, development of NGOs and civil societies
and promotion of the independent media. The UK is making its own
contribution, through a programme of advice and training for Kosovo
political parties organised by the Westminster Foundation for
Democracy and funded by the FCO.
29. The UN Mission wants to involve Kosovo's
politicians more closely in administration of Kosovo, in preparation
for elections to local and Kosovo-wide institutions. The UN Secretary-General's
Special Representative (SRSG), Bernard Kouchner, announced on
15 December that the main Kosovo Albanian parties had agreed to
the creation of a new joint administration, headed by an Interim
Administrative Council (IAC). The IAC will bring together three
leading Kosovo Albanian politicians, a Kosovo Serb and the leadership
of UNMIK, under the overall authority of the SRSG. The IAC will
supervise joint departments, bringing together international and
local experts to run education, health, finance and other sectors
of Kosovo's administration. This will be a good way of giving
UNMIK the benefit of local expertise and experience and of giving
Kosovo's politicians involvement in, and growing responsibility
for, making decisions about Kosovo's future.
GAC, 11 OCTOBER: DECLARATION—EU/FRY
The Council agreed the following declaration:
The EU, and representatives of the democratic
forces of the FRY met in Luxembourg on 11 October 1999. The meeting
was convened in the interests of the strengthening of good relations
between the EU and the people of the FRY, and in the spirit of
aspiration towards democracy and economic prosperity.
The EU and the people of the FRY have a common
interest in working with the international community to enhance
stability and growth in South Eastern Europe. Such a process is
possible only through democracy, respect for human rights and
the rule of law, market economy and the development of good neighbourly
relations in the region.
As soon as the governments of Serbia and the
FRY are under the political control of democratic forces, and
as soon as all individuals indicted by the ICTY have been removed
from Federal and Republican offices and the FRY fully co-operates
with ICTY, as part of a general and determined effort to make
a new beginning in the region, the EU undertakes to pursue the
following objectives:
The EU and its member states will:
— support democratic Serbian and FRY
governments as the legitimate expression of the desire of the
people of Serbia and the FRY to be part of the European family;
— lift EU sanctions at an early stage;
— launch EU reconstruction programmes
at an early stage;
— strengthen EU relations with the
FRY and work towards a stabilisation and Association Agreement
in line with other Western Balkans Countries;
— support FRY membership in international
and European organisations, facilitate the FRY's entry into the
international financial institutions and support FRY participation
in regional political processes and co-operation, including the
Stability Pact;
— facilitate the rapid resolution of
SFRY succession issues;
— work closely with the Council of
Europe to help the FRY identify and implement the reforms needed
for early Council of Europe membership;
— persuade the countries of the former
Yugoslavia to normalise relations with the FRY;
— continue to exert pressure on countries
of former Yugoslavia to make rapid progress on returns for refugees/deportees
living in FRY.
The European Union in turn expects the representatives
of Serbia and the FRY to pursue the following goals:
— the introduction of legislation to
bring Serbia and the FRY into full compliance with the principles
of democratic government and institutions, human rights, the rule
of law, independent and pluralistic media and respect for minority
rights;
— holding of free and fair elections
with international supervision;
— the opening of a genuine dialogue
with all concerned on the future of the FRY;
— the establishment of good co-operation
with neighbouring countries;
— full implementation of the Dayton
Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina including establishment of
diplomatic relations, refugee returns and co-operation with the
ICTY.
The European Union is committed to a continued
common process for discussion on political and economic issues.
The future work will address issues such as democracy, economic
development, reconstruction and energy development with a view
to developing a closer relationship between the EU and the FRY.
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