Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 480 - 498)

THURSDAY 16 MARCH 2000

THE RT HON ROBIN COOK, MR EMYR JONES PARRY AND MR BRIAN DONNELLY, CMG

  480. Funded from outside.
  (Mr Cook) They funded it and because they were funding it a system grew up in which they did not pay taxes to the official authorities, they made their contributions to their own community ethnic organisations. There is not a system or a culture of paying taxes to the official authorities. To be fair to the UNMIK operation, and in this case it is the EU pillar that is responsible for it, very considerable effort has gone into trying to create the basis for a future economy and tax raising system there. Dixon, who has headed up that EU section, has put particular priority into trying to tackle the basis for a functioning economy, sometimes to the point of criticism that he is not looking enough at the physical infrastructure, such as the housing. The reality is that not everything can be a priority. Now we have arrived at a situation in which there are customs collections and sales taxes which are operating at the main crossing points of the border.

  481. One of the results of that is the biggest traffic jams I have ever seen in my life. There were some 700 lorries at the border when we travelled across.
  (Mr Cook) I can believe that. The exit and entry points are very few. We cannot have it both ways. We cannot demand a tax system and then back off from the fact that this really does mean a customs system at the border plus, of course, one has to be frank, control over organised crime, because the point of intervention is at the crossing point. We are committed to providing resources for the reconstruction and Europe is providing 360 million euro in the current year, which is just over half the total amount coming from the world, very large sums of money. That kind of input is not going to end this year. As Kosovo progresses it is not unreasonable to expect a gradual transition to what was envisaged in 1244 which is that UNMIK will meet many of its costs for services in Kosovo from developing a tax system within Kosovo.

Chairman

  482. We visited Montenegro, we were received very warmly, and we were encouraged by the democratic spirit when parties opposed to each other politically were prepared to appear before us and give evidence. How do you answer the charge of a Montenegrin that "here you are, the international community, urging us strongly not to go for independence and at the same time denying us resources because we can only have access to the international financial institutions if we are indeed independent"?
  (Mr Cook) To be fair to ourselves, quite a lot of resources have gone into Montenegro since June of last year. I am conscious of the dilemma that you have identified. Frankly, there is nothing we can do about the rules of the IMF because it would require a change in the charter effectively.

  483. But we can do something about the EBRD.
  (Mr Cook) Can I come to it next one step down. In terms of the World Bank there is now a proposal for a trust fund to be set up in Montenegro which would be a useful way of enabling the World Bank to be active but without infringing its charter. That will depend on donors coming forward and paying into the trust fund but I think that is quite an imaginative way around the problem. In terms of the European Union, there are two issues of concern to Montenegrins. One is those projects put forward to the Stability Pact where we have now looked again to see if there are ways in which we can include some form of project in Montenegro. It is going to be very difficult but we are trying to crack that one. The more urgent and more difficult one is that ECOFIN, the finance Ministers of the European Union, have looked at this question on a couple of occasions and feel that they cannot offer financial assistance to Montenegro because they can only do so where the IMF would be engaged. To be candid, I would not necessarily find it unhelpful if the Committee was to press the European Union to find creative ways around the problem.

  484. Do you feel frustrated by the fact that whilst Europe dallies, whilst bureaucrats find excellent ways to say no, that democracy building and democracy potential in Montenegro is put at risk?
  (Mr Cook) You should not underrate the extent to which assistance has been provided by the European Union. Indeed, per capita we have probably put more resources into Montenegro than just about any other spot within the region. But, having said that, I am not disagreeing with you, Chairman. We cannot say to Montenegro "you should not demand independence" and then at the same time penalise them on their right to support and assistance from outside. That is why on that one I think we need to work hard to find an imaginative way through this thicket.

Mr Illsley

  485. I was very interested in your point about the amount of money the European Union have put into Kosovo bearing in mind Kouchner's comments at the UN Security Council while we were actually there when I think he referred to the EU as "a deadbeat donor". Coming back to Montenegro, and we left Montenegro as Chris Patten came in, there is a fear in Montenegro, a suggestion around Montenegro, that within the next 12-18 months Milosevic could look for a way of extending his mandate and his current position and the only way he could do that would be by forcing an issue to enable him to rewrite the constitution of Serbia Montenegro. To do that he would be quite prepared to relinquish Montenegro, to destabilise it before doing so, causing all manner of problems in that country. Is that a scenario which is subscribed to by the Government, or are you aware of that?
  (Mr Cook) Before I respond to you on Montenegro can I just respond to the point on which you quoted Bernard Kouchner. I think there is a misconception around the extent to which the European Union is putting in the bulk of the resources for much of the activity within Kosovo. If you take the budget of UNMIK, of OSCE and of the reconstruction pillar, the total budget for this year is £529 million. £354 million of that is coming from the European Union and, of that, £57 million is coming from Britain on top of our own bilateral expenditure within Kosovo. So the £354 million is actually spot on two-thirds of the total expenditure across those pillars. I really think that the European Union and ourselves, as a European nation, have come in for some unfair criticism about the extent to which we are playing our part in Kosovo. On Montenegro the position is very tense and we follow it with both very great interest and very real concern. We have gone out of our way repeatedly to show solidarity with Montenegro. I and other European Ministers have repeatedly met with President Djukanovic to show that solidarity. I think it was absolutely right and courageous of Chris Patten to go to Montenegro and show in a very visible way the European Union's commitment and support for Montenegro, and we will continue to do everything we can to get across that message of our commitment to Montenegro as a democratic and autonomous area. Whether Milosevic would put it out of the Federal Republic, nobody knows for certain what he would do. I think it is very important to keep him guessing as to what we would do if he was to take a precipitate or violent action. At the same time it is hard to see how he himself could gain constitutionally from expelling Montenegro because at the moment he is technically the President of the Federal Republic, not Serbia. Had he been President of Serbia for the two terms provided for in the constitution and if there was no longer a Federal Republic, technically he would have nothing to be President of.

  486. That is the point I am getting at. Taking out Montenegro he could—
  (Mr Cook)—rewrite the FRY constitution? It is true that it is the Montenegro representatives in the Federal chamber who have prevented him from rewriting the Federal constitution so far but he must find it difficult to figure out what would be the incalculable consequence of any move he made and it is our task to make it more difficult for him.

Mr Rowlands

  487. Last July you came before us, Secretary of State, and told us of specific conversations between yourself and President Djukanovic and mentioned the military technical agreement which ensured that any withdrawal of Serb troops from Kosovo did not go into Montenegro. That might have been observed by the letter but the President told us when we met him that he had seen a significant increase and build-up of Federal troops inside Montenegro since and indeed although they went into Serbia they now have been moved down to Montenegro. A) can you confirm that has happened or provide any information. Secondly, he told us he had approached NATO and raised this with Brussels. I wondered whether this matter had been followed up. Thirdly, part of the same question, you rightly said to us before that there would be grave consequences and we have made this very clear to Milosevic, but we made very clear to Milosevic a whole series of messages over the last decade and in the end he chose either not to listen to them or did not believe them. How are we going to make sure that Montenegro is not the next Kosovo?
  (Mr Cook) I cannot give the Committee any guarantee of what Milosevic will do. It would be dishonest of me to attempt to do so. All I can assure the Committee is that we are taking every possible step to show our commitment and solidarity with Montenegro and keep Milosevic in a state of uncertainty and indecision as to what would be the consequences of any action he may take. On the issue of the troops in Montenegro, subject to guidance, I do not think there has been a significant increase in number but what we have certainly witnessed—and I have discussed this with President Djukanovic—a successive replacement of the officers with tougher, hardliners. A year ago Milosevic replaced his officers with hardliners. Now he has replaced those hardliners with even more hardliners. This is particularly worrying in the case of Montenegro. Brian, you are more familiar with this than I. You have been to Montenegro.
  (Mr Donnelly) You are absolutely right, Secretary of State, we are not aware of any formal units that have come from Belgrade to reinforce the Second Army in Podgorica. Certainly there have been some interchanges of personnel with the intention of perhaps toughening up the middle-ranking officer corp and there has been a formation of what has been called the 7th Military Police Battalion attached to the Federal army in Montenegro which in fact is not really an army contingent at all but simply has been recruited from supporters of Milosevic. They are essentially political appointments but have been badged and presented as military officers.

  488. Is this not the pattern? Are these not the tell tale signs of someone putting in place the mechanisms for destabilisation?
  (Mr Cook) Yes, you are right to worry. As I said earlier, we view events with grave concern.

Sir David Madel

  489. On economic aid and financial assistance, the problem of where you have a country that cannot have aid because Serbia is a pariah, can we have a situation where a region of that country, which in a sense you would say Montenegro is, providing that region satisfies the Copenhagen criterion on democracy, could have economic aid? If we made that change in Europe then IMF economic aid could go in.
  (Mr Cook) The European Union, as I said, is already giving substantial quantities of aid to Montenegro and will continue to do so, but the issue really of concern to President Djukanovic is not the assistance for development and humanitarian aid purposes but the budgetary assistance for macro-financial stability which it cannot get from the IMF. As I understand it, and I am not myself a Finance Minister, the European rules prevent ECOFIN responding and the IMF cannot take part. It might be helpful if I put in to the Committee a note on what assistance there has been and where the various legal barriers lie. But, as I said earlier, I personally think that we have got to find imaginative ways round the barriers.

Chairman

  490. And suggestions as to how those legal barriers might be overcome.
  (Mr Cook) I do not think I can myself suggest to you things that I was pushing privately within the European Union, but any additional pressure from you would be of assistance and would be quite welcome.
  (Mr Jones Parry) Could I just add a comment. The problem with macro-economic financial assistance is that it is predicated throughout on an IMF programme. An IMF programme for Montenegro is not possible. We only do IMF programmes under the Charter for an entire country. It not possible to give that assistance. What we are concentrating on is budgetary and programme assistance with the EU and possibly the European Investment Bank giving project assistance. We are working on both of those.

Dr Godman

  491. Mr Donnelly, I think it was you who said that hardline officers had been moved in down to junior or middle ranking officers, but is it not the case that the soldiers that they command are largely conscripts from Montenegro itself or are they moving in hardline junior ranks as well? We passed the barracks every day and there is a massive presence there. But is it not the case that most of the other rankings are made up of conscripts?
  (Mr Donnelly) A high proportion of the other ranks are made up of conscripts who come from Montenegro and as such one would except them to reflect the divisions within Montenegro so some have allegiance to Djukanovic and some not. I could not tell you precisely what proportion they are and there are inevitable questions about the loyalty of those forces in the event they were called into action. I think the difficulty is that we cannot assume that they would not respond to Milosevic. It may be that in the event some would.
  (Mr Cook) One should not lose sight of the fact that part of the delicacy and complexity of Montenegro is that about a third of the population are more aligned with Milosevic than Djukanovic.

Sir David Madel

  492. Foreign Secretary, two final things which are currently side issues but have the capacity for becoming very central; Macedonia and the Presevo Valley. It seems to me valuable always to try and put oneself in the position of the other side and it would seem to me that an obvious tactic from Milosevic would be to undermine and/or discredit KFOR and NATO if he could. Both of those two places represent opportunities. Can I ask you about Macedonia first and then the Presevo Valley. The argument goes with Macedonia that it is the supply route for absolutely everything overland into Kosovo. If trouble could be fermented in Macedonia that supply route could be put into jeopardy. Would the United Kingdom Government, would NATO, would anybody intervene in Macedonia if things were to get difficult there on that basis?
  (Mr Cook) I have to show great care and caution in answering that question because it is capable of causing great alarm in Macedonia if I get it wrong among our allies and our friends. Macedonia is very jealous of its independence, and rightly so. It is quite explicit that the activities of KFOR and NATO on its soil are activities sanctioned by the Government and therefore not an intrusion upon its sovereignty. I think I would be very unwise, given the importance of our relations with Macedonia, to go beyond that.

  493. Could I put the argument into the record that was put to us. It goes as follows: Presevo Valley in Serbia has Albanians who are KLA, some of whom you say have been arrested, and either the KLA themselves fomenting trouble or Milosevic causing trouble results in those Albanians going into Kosovo which results in the Kosovar Albanians taking revenge on the Serbs in Kosovo because of yet more trouble which results in an exodus and, therefore, more trouble again which KFOR cannot handle. If that is the train of events predicted that might happen, what political steps would be taken in the event of a deliberate attempt to ethnically cleanse the Presevo Valley?
  (Mr Cook) We very much share your concern about the Presevo Valley and you are right to identify it as a potential source of instability. I have to say that the immediate and pressing prospect of that instability is from the activity of Albanian hardliners infiltrating over the border in order to act as a source of instability there. We have no evidence that they are themselves directly stimulated by the KLA, although elements of them undoubtedly have had former links with the KLA. I think the most valuable and immediately important priority for us is to effectively try to seal the border in particular circumstances. We will have to do our best to achieve that, which is why the action was taken yesterday to raid one of the headquarters on the Kosovo side of the border. We are not aware of very large numbers who are active going over the border to act as terrorist formations within the Presevo Valley, but it is very important that we do everything we can to minimise that and to deny them supplies.

  494. If the result of this were to be very serious reprisals within Kosovo, does the international community have both the will and the capacity to take whatever forceful steps are necessary to put down that sort of unrest in Kosovo?
  (Mr Cook) My answer to that is going to be dictated by my previous answer which is the immediate problem in the Presevo Valley is Kosovar Albanian extremists going across the border to create trouble in the hope that it will provoke Milosevic to be repressive in the expectation that will provoke floods of refugees coming to Kosovo, in the expectation that in turn will suck NATO into a wider conflict with Southern Serbia. Ergo, if I were to respond to what you are saying by saying that of course we will take action, I would be giving them exactly the incentive, the encouragement, that they want. We are saying to them very firmly "if you create trouble over the other side of the border, do not expect us necessarily to come riding to the rescue."

Chairman

  495. UNMIK's mandate is renewable, would you expect any problems from China or Russia?
  (Mr Cook) Certainly not from Russia, which is presently in KFOR. I would not anticipate difficulty with China.

  496. The Funding Conference for the Stability Pact, would you like to make any comment on our expectations?
  (Mr Cook) I very much hope that we will be able to come up with funding for the many worthy projects that have been identified and we will certainly be going in a positive spirit with a positive announcement.

  497. As always you have been extremely frank and helpful. May I also thank Mr Donnelly and Mr Jones Parry who has had a rather easy ride today. Thank you very much indeed.
  (Mr Cook) Just to ensure that I have an easier ride in future can I just check if there is anything I have said since we came back from the division that I need to correct? No.

  498. You have been given a clean bill of health.
  (Mr Cook) There is one point I need to put the record right on. Earlier I referred to General Drewienkiewicz as the Head of KVM, I am reminded that although that may be the way it appears to me he was actually the Deputy Head of the KVM.

  Chairman: Thank you very much indeed.





 
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