PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE RELATING
TO THE REPORT
TUESDAY 23 MAY 2000
Members present:
Mr Donald Anderson, in the Chair
| Ms Diane Abbott | Sir David Madel
|
| Sir Peter Emery | Mr Ted Rowlands
|
| Dr Norman Godman | Sir John Stanley
|
| Mr Eric Illsley | Dr Phyllis Starkey
|
| Mr Andrew Mackinlay |
Mr David Wilshire |
* * * *
Draft Report (Kosovo), proposed by the Chairman,
brought up and read.
Paragraphs 1 to 46 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 47 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 48 to 51 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 52 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraph 53 read, as follows:
"It is worth rehearsing
the principal bilateral contacts made during this period between
the British Government and other parties in the Kosovo dispute.
In chronological order, these were:
5 Mar 1998 Foreign Secretary meets Milosevic
in Belgrade, following telephone conversation with Rugova
11 Mar 1998 Minister of State visits Belgrade
26 Mar 1998 Senior FCO Officials visit Belgrade
and Pristina
3 Apr 1998 Foreign Secretary's personal
envoy meets Milosevic
10 Jun 1998 Minister of State visits Belgrade
to hand over Prime Minister's letter to Milosevic. Then visits
Pristina.
11 Jun 1998 Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary
meet Kosovo Albanian leaders in London.
2 Jul 1998 Foreign Secretary's personal
envoy again meets Milosevic.
28 Sept1998 Mr Ashdown delivers Prime Minister's
letter to Milosevic.
30 Jan 1999 Foreign Secretary meets both
parties in Belgrade and Skopje
Combined with the multilateral work conducted through
the Contract Group, the EU, NATO and the UN—where British
Ministers were frequently in the lead—this displays a considerable
investment in diplomacy."
Amendments made.
Another Amendment proposed,
in line 17, at the end add the words "We conclude that
it is difficult to criticise the United Kingdom for doing too
little on the diplomatic front: on the contrary the Government
should be praised for the efforts it made during this period."—(Dr
Phyllis Starkey)
Question proposed, That the Amendment be made.
Amendment proposed to the proposed Amendment, in
line CHECK, to leave out the word "praised" and to insert
the "commended" — (Dr Norman Godman)
Question, That the Amendment to the proposed Amendment
be made, put and agreed to.
Question, That the Amendment, as amended, be made.
The Committee divided.
| Ayes, 5 | Noes, 4
|
| Dr Norman Godman | Ms Diane Abbott
|
| Mr Eric Illsley | Sir Peter Emery
|
| Mr Andrew Mackinlay |
Sir David Madel |
| Mr Ted Rowlands | Sir John Stanley
|
| Dr Phyllis Starkey |
|
Paragraphs 54 to 64 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 65 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 66 to 69 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 70 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraph 71 read, as follows:
"The Foreign Secretary
has argued: first, that Milosevic was planning a large-scale offensive
in Kosovo; second, that this offensive would have provoked a humanitarian
catastrophe in Kosovo; third, that air strikes would reduce Milosevic's
capacity to engage in ethnic cleansing; and fourth, that, before
the event, it was not possible to predict the scale and direction
of Milosevic's response to NATO's bombing campaign. Opponents
of this line criticise the humanitarian consequences of NATO's
action, both because of the direct impact of air strikes on Serb
civilians, and also because in their view air strikes provoked
a humanitarian catastrophe rather than preventing one. An additional
criticism advanced is that NATO action has provoked a reverse
ethnic cleansing by establishing Kosovo Albanian supremacy in
Kosovo, with Serbs fleeing Kosovo, just as Albanians did before
NATO action. Others believe that NATO should have launched a ground
assault as well as action from the air. There have also been criticisms
of NATO's expectation that Milosevic would back down, either as
soon as air strikes were launched, or after a few days of strikes.
We examine each of these criticisms in turn."
Amendment proposed, in line 6 after the word "the"
to insert the word "alleged"—(Dr Phyllis Starkey)
Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived.
Paragraph agreed to.
Paragraph 72 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 73 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 74 and 75 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 76 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 77 to 85 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 86 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraph 87 read and agreed to.
Paragraphs 88 and 89 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 90 to 97 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 98 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 99 and 100 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 101 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs102 to 104 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 105 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 106 to 114 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 115 read, as follows:
"None of this means,
of course, that a ground war from the outset of the campaign was
the right course of action, or that the Alliance should have developed
plans for a ground assault more rapidly in the course of the campaign.
In addition to the problem of Alliance unity, there were great
logistical and military challenges in launching a ground war.
These are issues for our colleagues on the Defence Committee to
address. But given the apparent importance of the prospect of
a ground assault in convincing Milosevic to back down, and the
fact that, despite the political difficulties involved, some alliance
members were considering the possibility of a ground assault by
the end of the air campaign, it is particularly unfortunate that
the use of ground forces was ruled out at the outset of the campaign.
In William Hopkinson's view, "US unwillingness to suffer
casualties dictated a form of intervention which exposed the Western
position to a very high degree of risk." As with the issue
of the credibility of NATO's threat to use force, there was little
that the United Kingdom could do in the face of opposition from
important members of the alliance, except attempt to convince
others of the rightness of the United Kingdom position. If press
and other reports surrounding the Washington summit are to be
believed, the United Kingdom certainly attempted to do this. We
conclude that, because a ground assault was ruled out at an early
stage, NATO was in no position to launch a ground assault in March
1999, and it would have taken many months to build up sufficient
forces. Serious consideration of a ground assault only began towards
the end of the campaign, and, given the military and logistical
difficulties involved, it is likely that if it had proved necessary
to launch a ground assault the conflict might have been prolonged
and might have involved many casualties."
Amendment made.
Another Amendment proposed, in line 20 at the end,
to add the words "However, if, after the bombing had started,
NATO had given clear indications sooner that it was considering
a ground assault, Milosevic might have settled earlier with a
significant saving of civilians' lives."—(Sir
John Stanley)
Question, that the Amendment be made, put and negatived.
Paragraph, as amended, agreed to.
Paragraph 116 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 117 to 122 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 123 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 124 to 133 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 134 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs135 to 137 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 138 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 139 to 149 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 150 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraph 151 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 152 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 153 to 155 read and agreed to.
Paragraphs 156 and 157 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraph 158 and 159 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 160 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 161 to 164 read and agreed to.
Two paragraphs—(Mr Andrew Mackinlay)—brought
up and read, as follows:
"Parliamentary aspects
There is also an aspect of
constitutional law which is thrown into focus by the Kosovo campaign.
Our inquiry has been part of a wide ranging involvement of the
House of Commons and its Committees on Kosovo. As we mentioned
earlier, the Defence Committee is at present undertaking an inquiry
into The Lessons of Kosovo, and the International Development
Committee reported in May 1999 on Kosovo: The Humanitarian
Crisis. During the period January to June 1999, the Prime
Minister made five statements to the House on Kosovo, the Deputy
Prime Minister one, the Foreign Secretary five, the Defence Secretary
four and the International Development Secretary one. Kosovo was
also raised frequently in question time, and was the subject of
backbench adjournment debates. There were four whole day debates
initiated by the Government—on 23 March, 19 April, 18 May
and 17 June. Kosovo was also debated and the subject of statements
in the House of Lords. Parliament thus had considerable opportunities
to probe the Government on its conduct of the conflict, both on
the floor of the House and in Committee.
Parliaments in other NATO states had a specific opportunity
to approve the decision of their governments to engage in hostilities
over Kosovo. However, the British Government commits our armed
forces to any conflict by exercise of the Royal Prerogative. For
that reason, it has become normal for Governments to rely on motions
for the adjournment to debate the United Kingdom's involvement
in a conflict. These procedural motions are unamendable. This
is a traditional means of preventing an alternative proposition
to that of the Government being offered to the House. Governments
have not always shied away from substantive motions. The Korean
War and the Suez intervention were both approved by substantive
resolution of the House. The Falklands War was, however, only
debated on the adjournment, and the Gulf War was also debated
on the adjournment on four occasions before a substantive motion
was moved. All the debates on the Kosovo conflict were held on
the adjournment. We recognise, of course, the danger that even
a small minority vote might be exploited by the adversary as evidence
of division and hence weakness, but in a modern democracy it should
be possible for Members to be able to demonstrate their support,
or otherwise, with greater precision than can be afforded by an
adjournment motion. In our view, in any comparable future conflict,
an opportunity should be found at the earliest practicable moment,
for the House to express its view by voting on a precise substantive
motion to which it would be possible for Members to table amendments.
This will bring the United Kingdom in line with other states,
and give extra democratic legitimacy to military action. We
recommend that the Government should table a substantive motion
in the House of Commons at the earliest opportunity after
the commitment of troops to armed conflict allowing the House
to express its view, and allowing Members to table amendments."
Question put, That the paragraphs be read a second
time.
The Committee divided.
| Ayes, 6 | Noes, 4
|
| Ms Diane Abbott | Mr Eric Illsley
|
| Sir Peter Emery | Mr Ted Rowlands
|
| Dr NormanGodman | Sir John Stanley
|
| Mr Andrew Mackinlay |
Dr Phyllis Starkey |
| Sir David Madel |
|
| Mr David Wilshire |
|
Paragraphs added (now paragraphs 165 and 166).
Paragraphs 165 to 176 (now paragraphs 167 to 178)
read and agreed to.
Paragraph 177 (now paragraph 179) read, amended and
agreed to.
Paragraph 178 (now paragraph 180) read and agreed
to.
Paragraph 179 (now paragraph 181) read, amended and
agreed to.
Paragraphs 180 to 184 (now paragraphs 182 to186)
read and agreed to.
Paragraphs 185 and 186 (now paragraphs 187 and 188)
read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 187 and 188 (now paragraphs 189 and 190)
read and agreed to.
Paragraphs 189 and 190 (now paragraph 191 and 192)
read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 191 and 192 (now paragraphs 193 and 194)
read and agreed to.
Paragraph 193 (now paragraph 195) read, amended and
agreed to.
Paragraphs 194 to 205 (now paragraphs 196 to 207)
read and agreed to.
Paragraph 206 (now paragraph 208) read, amended and
agreed to.
Paragraphs 207 to 209 (now paragraphs 209 to 211)
read and agreed to.
Paragraph 210 (now paragraph 212) read, amended and
agreed to.
Paragraphs 211 to 232 (now paragraphs 213 to 234)
read and agreed to.
Paragraph 233 (now paragraph 235) read, amended and
agreed to.
Paragraphs 234 to 242 (now paragraphs 236 to 244)
read and agreed to.
Paragraph 243 (now paragraph 245) read, amended and
agreed to.
Paragraph 244 (now paragraph 246) read and agreed
to.
Paragraph 245 (now paragraph 247) read, amended and
agreed to.
Paragraphs 246 to 259 (now paragraphs 248 to 261)
read and agreed to.
Paragraph 260 (now paragraph 262) read, amended and
agreed to.
Paragraphs 261 to 266 (now paragraphs 263 to 268)
read and agreed to.
Paragraph 267 (now paragraph 268) read, amended and
agreed to.
Paragraphs 268 to 289 (now paragraphs 270 to 291)
read and agreed to.
Paragraph 290 (now paragraph 292) read, amended and
agreed to.
Paragraph 291 (now paragraph 293) read and agreed
to.
Paragraph 292 (now paragraph 294) read, amended and
agreed to.
Paragraph 293 (now paragraph 294) read and agreed
to.
Paragraph 294 (now paragraph 296) read, amended and
agreed to.
Paragraphs 295 to 304 (now paragraphs 297 to 306)
read and agreed to.
Paragraph 305 (now paragraph 307) read, amended and
agreed to.
Paragraph 306 (now paragraph 308) read and agreed
to.
Paragraphs 307 and 308 (now paragraphs 309 and 310)
read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraph 309 (now paragraph 311) read and agreed
to.
Paragraph 310 (now paragraph 312) read, amended and
agreed to.
Paragraphs 311 to 313 (now paragraphs 313 to 315)
read and agreed to.
A paragraph—(Mr Ted Rowlands)—brought
up, read the first and second time, and inserted (now paragraph
316).
A paragraph—(Mr Ted Rowlands)—brought
up, read the first and second time, amended and inserted (now
paragraph 317).
A paragraph—(Mr Ted Rowlands)—brought
up, read the first and second time, amended and inserted (now
paragraph 318).
A paragraph—(Mr Ted Rowlands)—brought
up, read the first and second time, amended and inserted (now
paragraph 319).
A paragraph—(Mr Ted Rowlands)—brought
up, read the first and second time, amended and inserted (now
paragraph 320).
Paragraph 314 (now paragraph 321) read, amended and
agreed to.
Annexes agreed to.
Motion made, and Question put, That the Report, as
amended, be the Fourth Report of the Committee to the House.
The Committee divided
| Ayes, 8 | Noes, 0
|
| Ms Diane Abbott |
|
| Sir Peter Emery |
|
| Dr Norman Godman |
|
| Mr Andrew Mackinlay |
|
| Sir David Madel |
|
| Mr Ted Rowlands |
|
| Sir John Stanley |
|
| Dr Phyllis Starkey |
|
Ordered, That the Chairman
do make the Report to the House.
Ordered, That the provisions
of Standing Order No. 134 (Select committees ((reports)) be applied
to the Report.
Several papers were ordered to be appended to the
Minutes of Evidence.
Ordered, That the Appendices
to the Minutes of Evidence taken before the Committee be reported
to the House.—(The Chairman.)
Several papers were ordered to be reported to the
House.
****
[Adjourned until Tuesday 6 June
at 10.15am.
| 
