APPENDIX 1
KOSOVO: FCO WEEKLY ROUND-UP
SUMMARY
1. Day 66 of airstrikes. Air campaign intensifying
and hitting the mark. The cracks beginning to show in Milosevic's
regime. Perceived NATO wobble on ground forces successfully steadied.
NATO planning now for increased Kosovo force of 45,000. UK contingent
due to rise to over 19,000. Implications of ICTY's indictment
of Milosevic for G8 and other diplomatic efforts. Continued fallout
from Chinese Embassy bombing. 840,000 refugees have now left Kosovo
and 300-500,000 inside Kosovo have fled their homes. Airdrops
start on 28 May. Stability Pact launched. Forward look.
DETAIL
2. This telegram summarises military, diplomatic
and humanitarian developments in the Kosovo crisis since guidance
telnos 16 and 17. MIFT contains updated lines to take on Kosovo.
MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
3. Day 66 of the bombing campaign. NATO
is continuing its intense campaign against Serbian ground forces
in Kosovo and a wide range of military targets throughout Serbia.
NATO aircraft are flying around 740 sorties per day and they are
having serious impact:
— 75 per cent of fixed SAM sites and
12 per cent of mobile SAM systems have been destroyed;
— 69 per cent of MIG-29 aircraft and
34 per cent of all other combat aircraft have been destroyed;
— 11 battalion/brigade command posts
have been destroyed;
— 31 per cent of all Serb heavy forces
in Kosovo (645 major items, including tanks, artillery and armoured
vehicles) have been struck;
— 50 per cent of ammunition storage
in Kosovo and 60 per cent of Serb ammunition production facilities
have been destroyed;
— 41 per cent of petroleum reserves
have been destroyed.
4. Although there is no sign yet that Milosevic
is ready to accept the demands of the international community,
or that his regime is about to crumble, there are credible reports
of desertions from Serb military units in Kosovo. Ordinary citizens
are demonstrating against the Government and Milosevic's critics
in Yugoslavia are starting to speak out. Djukanovic, the President
of Montenegro, told the Secretary of State on 25 May that the
FRY military were increasingly unwilling to sacrifice their lives
for Milosevic's policies.
5. There has been intense media speculation
about alleged splits in NATO over use of ground forces in Kosovo.
The Secretary of State's visits to Washington (21 May) and Rome,
Bonn and Paris (26 May) have done much to restore a sense of unity
and common purpose. Domestic opinion in the US, Germany and several
other NATO states has made it hard for their leaders to say anything
that could appear to support the use of ground forces in a hostile
environment. But NATO leaders understand the need to plan ahead
for a range of different scenarios and to avoid giving comfort
to Milosevic by ruling out any option.
6. NATO has always recognised the need for
a ground force to ensure the safe return of the refugees once
the air campaign had achieved its aims, which is why it has already
been assembling a Kosovo Force of about 14,000 in Macedonia (present
size 14,000 and rising). Given the wide destruction wrought by
Milosevic's forces in Kosovo and the scale of the effort required
to re-establish civil infrastructure, provide humanitarian aid
and clear mines, NATO now considers it necessary to plan on an
increased force of 45,000, with a possible further 10-15,000 under
national command to provide logistical support. This plan will
need adapting as the situation develops and discussions need to
take place about Allies' contributions soon. The Defence Secretary
announced on 26 May that he was placing in readiness 12,750 UK
personnel, in addition to the 7,000 who are already deployed in
the region.
WAR CRIMES
7. The International Criminal Tribunal for
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) announced on 27 May the indictment of
Milosevic and four others for being criminally responsible for
the mass deportation and murder of Kosovo Albanians. The Secretary
of State issued a press statement giving strong support to the
Tribunal and pledging continuing UK co-operation with its work.
On the question of whether we should still deal with Milosevic
he said "NATO must have channels to the authority in Belgrade
that has the power to implement our objectives. So long as Milosevic
retains that power in Belgrade, it would be irresponsible of us
not to talk to him about the implementation of our objectives
in Kosovo."
8. Every day brings new stories of savage
atrocities systematically perpetrated by Milosevic's forces against
the innocent civilians of Kosovo. On 18 May, the Secretary of
State placed in the Library of the House of Commons Library a
chronology of atrocities committed in Kosovo between January and
April 1999, based on media reporting and the personal accounts
of refugees fleeing Serb brutality. It is a sickening catalogue
of deliberate violence. We are determined not to let these brutal
crimes go unpunished.
DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENTS
9. Diplomatic efforts have continued to
be focussed on:
(a) G8 sessions (at Political Director level)
principally trying to hammer out the text of a UN Security Council
Resolution based on the G8 principles drawn up on 6 May (guidance
telno 16); and
(b) meetings between Chernomyrdin, Ahtisaari
and Talbott aimed at narrowing the gaps between the Russians and
the rest.
The two interact: the detailed discussions among
Political Directors have usefully clarified common ground (eg
on the role of the envisaged post-settlement international civil
and security presences) as well as the areas of continuing differences
(principally sequencing; the extent to which the package would
be imposed on rather than agreed by Belgrade; the scale of withdrawal
of Belgrade's security forces; and the nature of the international
security presence). If a common position can be achieved, the
goal is a joint Chernomyrdin/Ahtisaari visit to Belgrade to present
it to Milosevic. But the gaps are proving hard to bridge, and
there is no immediate prospect of a breakthrough (and some uncertainty
about real Russian bottom lines).
10. Milosevic's indictment may accentuate
his diplomatic isolation and may in the medium term help to undermine
his political position within the FRY. But it also complicates
the immediate diplomatic track, both in terms of the likely Russian
response, and also because it may encourage Milosevic's bunker
mentality. Politically, it also rules out any notion of negotiating
with Milosevic. But that was not on the cards anyway: we look
to him to accept the demands made by NATO/the G8. And as long
as he remains FRY head of state, he is the only person with the
authority to stop the killing, withdraw Serb forces and agree
to the deployment of an international security force. So our public
line on this point (MIFT) has been carefully crafted with allies.
11. The diplomatic fallout from the mistaken
bombing of the Chinese Embassy persists. The PUS's visit to China
on 26 May confirmed that the UK has, along with the US, been singled
out for particular blame for the incident. NATO and US reports
(the US report will be the main vehicle) will be presented to
the Chinese Government in due course. The Chinese continue to
claim that their Embassy was deliberately targeted by NATO: untrue.
HUMANITARIAN DEVELOPMENTS
12. There has been a large influx of refugees
into Macedonia in the last week. According to UNHCR over 840,000
refugees have now left Kosovo. The majority are in camps and with
host families in Albania and Macedonia. The number of Internally
Displaced Persons remaining in Kosovo is still unclear, with estimates
ranging from 300-500,000. Around 63,000 refugees have been airlifted
out of the region, nearly 2,000 of these to the UK. The UK operation
is fully underway and six flights per week are arriving from the
region. A UNHCR assessment team has just completed a visit to
the FRY, including Kosovo, and are due to give their report early
next week.
13. The UK remains fully engaged in the
international humanitarian effort. DFID hope to start construction
on a new camp at Vrapciste in Macedonia, to house initially up
to 10,000 refugees (it is hoped that the camp's capacity will
eventually may be expanded to 20,000). Humanitarian air drops
to the IDPs in Kosovo will start on 28 May. The UK is contributing
US $100,000 to a SU-led operation.
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
14. The German EU Presidency launched on
27 May the Stability Pact for South East Europe (guidance telno
16) at a meeting of all participants in Bonn. This initiative
has wholehearted UK support. Our own Strategy Paper sets out detailed
action agendas for each of the main institutions (EU, NATO, OSCE)
and is fully compatible with the Stability Pact, which is seeking
to co-ordinate all these activities.
PUBLIC OPINION
15. Governments in most NATO, EU, G8 UNSC
states and neighbouring countries remain broadly supportive of
NATO action. The exceptions are Russia, China and Greece, where
the government position reflects vehement public opposition to
the NATO airstrikes. Public opinion is more split, both within
and outside NATO. We are working hard at persuading the doubters
through articles or interviews in the media abroad, briefings
of foreign journalists, etc. We welcome any bids or ideas from
posts where public opinion needs stiffening.
FORWARD LOOK
16. Kosovo remains a long-haul job. But
we are entering a critical period in the crisis. ICTY's indictment
of Milosevic, and now NATO's decision to plan for an increased
force should all help to increase the overall pressure on Belgrade,
even if there is a question mark over whether our current efforts
with the Russians will bear fruit.
KOSOVO: FCO WEEKLY ROUND-UP
SUMMARY
1. Apparent breakthrough in the crisis as Milosevic,
FRY Government and Serbian Parliament accept text agreed by Ahtisaari,
Chernomyrdin and Talbott. Text fully meets objectives of NATO.
Cautious welcome from Prime Minister, but no premature celebrations.
NATO airstrikes to continue until verifiable withdrawal of Serb
forces from Kosovo. Chernomyrdin accused in Moscow of giving away
too much. Likely next steps: G8 Foreign Ministers to agree UNSCR
and civil implementation arrangements on 6 June; NATO Foreign
Ministers to meet on 7 June to progress military planning, so
that KFOR can enter Kosovo as soon as possible. ICJ rejects FRY
case against UK and nine other NATO states for illegal use of
force. Some airdrops to IDPs in Kosovo underway. Difficult work
ahead. It is not in the bag yet.
DETAIL
2. This telegram summarises developments
in the Kosovo crisis since guidance telnos 19 and 20. MIFT contains
updated lines to take.
DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENTS
3. A series of intensive meetings between
Ahtisaari, Chernomyrdin and Talbott over the past week led to
a breakthrough on the two key areas of continuing difficulty.
Russian agreement in Bonn on 2 June to a text specifying withdrawal
of "all" Serbian forces from Kosovo and "substantial
NATO participation" in the international security force provided
the green light for Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin to travel to Belgrade
and hand the text to Milosevic, emphasising that they could not
accept amendments. Ahtisaari made clear to Milosevic that the
force going into Kosovo would include all major members of NATO
and have unified NATO command and control. Milosevic informed
them on 3 June that the Serb parliament and the Federal government
had accepted the text. Ahtisaari then travelled to Cologne to
brief the European Council and G7 Foreign Ministers agreed a revised
draft UN Security Council Resolution, based on the Ahtisaari/Chernomyrdin
text, which now requires Russian agreement.
4. What made Milosevic cave in? Probably
a range of issues: the cumulative effects of NATO's bombing campaign;
the continued unity and resolve shown by NATO partners; the mounting
likelihood of a ground offensive in Kosovo; and the realisation
that the Russians were not going to bail him out of this. His
indictment by ICTY as a suspected war criminal may also have helped.
The text that has been accepted by the Serbs fully meets stated
NATO objectives throughout the conflict. The tragedy is that Milosevic
could have accepted it two months ago.
5. This apparent breakthrough in the crisis
has received a cautious welcome from the Prime Minister and President
Clinton. The new is encouraging, but we need to guard against
any premature celebration. Milosevic's record of repeated bad
faith and deceit does not inspire confidence. We have brought
him to this point only by demonstrating determination; it is important
that he is under no illusion that we remain determined. The air
campaign will continue until verifiable FRY/Serb troop/paramilitary
withdrawals from Kosovo begin. There is no sign that that is happening
yet. But rapid planning is now going ahead on the assumption that
Milosevic is in earnest:
— NATO personnel will be in contact
with the Serb military to work out technical details of withdrawal
from Kosovo and other issues.
— Meetings are being considered to
get the draft UN Security Council Resolution into final shape.
— Bildt plans a meeting on civilian
implementation structures with the relevant international organisations
on 8 June in Geneva.
— There may also be an early meeting
of NATO Foreign Ministers to take forward military arrangements,
so that KFOR can start entering Kosovo as soon as possible—we
hope by 12 June at the latest.
6. It is not clear how wholeheartedly the
Russians are on board. Chernomyrdin achieved Yeltsin's key objective
of getting agreement to stop the bombing, but he has been accused
by the communists and nationalists of giving too much away and
there are dissenting voices in the Russian military. The Russian
failure to attend the meeting of G7 Foreign Ministers in Cologne
on 3 June and the trilateral in Helsinki with Ahtisaari and Talbott
today may suggest that the Kosovo package has run into problems
in Moscow. The Russian bottom lines on their participation in
KFOR remain unclear, and NATO has more work to do in this area.
We are determined to avoid de facto partition of Kosovo.
Meanwhile, we are taking every opportunity to reassure the Russians
and pay tribute to their key role in securing Belgrade's agreement
to the package.
MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
7. Day 73 of the air campaign. NATO are
being careful to transmit the message that it is business as usual
until NATO's requirements are met. NATO airstrikes are continuing
until there is verifiable withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo.
8. Meanwhile planning continues for KFOR.
A NATO Force Generation Conference on 1 June went well, and forces
offered by member states broadly met the requirements envisaged
for the peace implementation force. Macedonia agreed on 3 June
to NATO's request to station an additional 14,000 troops there.
The MoD announced on 4 June that it has reduced the notice to
move of more than 4,000 UK personnel in preparation for deployment.
Their deployment is imminent.
ICJ RULING
9. On 2 June the International Court of
Justice gave its ruling in the case filed by the FRY on 29 April
against UK and nine other NATO members for illegal use of force.
The ICJ rejected a request for provisional measures against the
UK and the nine other NATO states. It held in each case that the
FRY had not established, even prima facie, that the Court
had jurisdiction. At the same time, the Court expressed deep concern
at the human tragedy in Kosovo and continuing loss of life and
suffering in all parts of the FRY, and noted that the use of force
raised very serious issues of international law.
OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
10. The rate of outflow of refugees has
steadied after surging last week. Humanitarian air drops by the
International Rescue Committee (for which the UK has offered US
$100,000) have got underway albeit on a very small scale, while
plans by the Greek/Swiss/ Russian consortium focus to distribute
aid food by land convoy have come up against a lack of reliable
distributors on the ground. Some 73,000 refugees have now been
airlifted out of the region—nearly 2,500 of these to the
UK.
FORWARD LOOK
11. Some difficult work lies ahead in the
next few days translating the agreement into action: getting the
Serbs out and NATO troops into Kosovo; finalising the details
of post-conflict implementation structures for Kosovo; and disarming
the KLA and establishing peace in the province. We will need to
work hard to keep the Russians on side. It is not in the bag yet.
KOSOVO: FCO WEEKLY ROUND-UP
(AMENDED DISTRIBUTION)
SUMMARY
1. Objectives achieved. G8 agreement on draft
UNSCR paved way to conclusion of NATO/FRY Military Technical Agreement,
start of Serb withdrawal, suspension of NATO's air campaign and
adoption of SCR. Total KFOR likely to be 45,000 (with 13,000 UK
troops). First detachments, led by General Sir Michael Jackson
and with British forces in the lead, preparing to deploy into
Kosovo on 12 June. Last minute flurry about Russian deployment.
NATO working with agencies to prevent a rush northwards by refugees
in Macedonia and Albania. UN to lead civilian implementation efforts.
Further planning for Stability Pact. UK widely credited with playing
key role in crisis: we should make the most of this. Defining
moment for the region. Slobba clobbered, but daunting tasks ahead.
DETAIL
2. This telegram summarises developments
in the Kosovo crisis since guidance telno 21. MIFT updates lines
to take in guidance telno 22.
DIPLOMATIC AND
MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
3. The real test of Russian commitment to
the Ahtisaari/Chernomyrdin package came during marathon negotiations
in Bonn/Cologne on 7-8 June, when G8 Foreign Ministers eventually
agreed a draft UN Security Council Resolution, incorporating the
G8 principals of 6 May and the provisions of the Ahtisaari/Chernomyrdin
text agreed by Milosevic on 3 June. In essence, the Russians backed
down on a number of key issues (eg not wanting the whole resolution
under Chapter VII; wanting a UN handle on the envisaged international
security presence), with the Foreign Secretary playing a leading
role in negotiating language which preserved our/NATO's objectives
while assuaging specific Russian concerns.
4. Russian insistence that the UNSCR could
not be approved before a suspension of NATO airstrikes, coupled
with Serb refusal to withdraw without a UNSCR, raised a complicated
sequencing issue. It was agreed to seek, in a rapid succession
of moves: the signature of a Military Technical Agreement (MTA)
with the Serbs, the start of Serb verified withdrawal, suspension
of NATO airstrikes, the adoption of the UNSCR and the deployment
of an international security force (KFOR).
5. Intensive and difficult talks on the
Macedonian border between KFOR's Commander, General Sir Mike Jackson,
and Serb generals led to the signature on 9 June of a Military
Technical Agreement (MTA) on the terms of the Serb withdrawal
from Kosovo. The agreement specified:
— phased withdrawal from Kosovo of
all Serb military personnel within an 11-day timetable, starting
on 10 June;
— removal by withdrawing Serb forces
of mines and other obstacles;
— establishment of an air exclusion
zone of 25 kilometres and a ground exclusion zone of five kilometres
inside Serbia;
— suspension of NATO airstrikes on
verification of withdrawal from the first zone;
— deployment, following adoption of
a UNSR, of an international force (KFOR) to establish a secure
environment for the return of refugees;
— control of Kosovo's external borders
by KFOR until the arrival of a UN civilian mission.
6. As a supplement to the MTA, General Jackson
handed a side letter to FRY Generals making it clear that NATO
considered and international force to mean a NATO-led force under
a unified NATO chain of command under the political direction
of the North Atlantic Council.
7. In New York, the Chinese agreed not to
block a UNSCR but insisted on a preambular paragraph reaffirming
the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance
of international peace and security. On 10 June, following verification
that the Serb withdrawal from Kosovo was underway, NATO Secretary-General
Javier Solana notified the UN that the air campaign had been suspended
and the resolution was finally adopted by 14:1, with China abstaining.
UNSCR 1244 inter alia:
— demands FRY cooperation in implementing
the G8 principles of 6 May and the peace plan of 3 June;
— authorises an international security
presence in Kosovo to use all necessary means to maintain a ceasefire,
ensure the withdrawal and prevent the unauthorised return of Belgrade's
forces, demilitarise Kosovo Albanian armed groups, establish conditions
for the return of refugees and a transitional administration,
supervise demining and monitor Kosovo's external borders;
— requests the Secretary-General to
appoint a Special Representative to control the implementation
of an international civil presence and coordinate closely with
the international security presence. The tasks of the international
civil presence will include promoting substantial autonomy and
self government for Kosovo, performing basic administrative tasks
while building up a local capability, organising elections, facilitating
a political process to determine Kosovo's future status, supervising
reconstruction and humanitarian aid, establishing local police
forces and in the meantime deploying international police personnel
and assuring the safe return of all refugees;
— demands full cooperation with the
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY);
— reaffirms commitment to the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the FRY and other states of the region.
8. Kosovo Albanian leaders gave an undertaking
at a meeting on 9 June with Madeleine Albright that the KLA would
demilitarise and that KLA forces would not fire on withdrawing
Serb forces. Meanwhile NATO has sought to reassure the Serbia
minority in Kosovo that KFOR will protect all ethnic groups in
the province. But there are media reports that Serbian civilians
are leaving Kosovo with Serb forces.
DEPLOYMENT FOR
KFOR
9. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved
KFOR's deployment on 10 June. In total, KFOR is expected to comprise
about 45,000 troops plus support forces, spread between five (British,
French, US, German and Italian) sectors. The UK has offered up
to 13,000 troops including the ARRC HQ: most other NATO Allies,
including the US are likely to offer substantially less, making
British forces by far the largest KFOR contingent.
10. The Russians have insisted throughout
that the UNSCR leaves them free to decide the nature of their
contribution to the international security presence in Kosovo,
and that they must have their own sector under independent command.
NATO has resisted strongly, arguing that this would smack of East
Berlin-style partition and urging acceptance of a Bosnian model
for Russian participation. But Talbott's attempts to resolve the
issue in Moscow on 10-11 June foundered and on 11 June a small
Russian contingent began to deploy from Bosnia through Serbia
towards north-western Kosovo. The Russians have however assured
the US that they will not enter Kosovo until an agreement is reached
with NATO on the status of their forces within KFOR. At the time
of writing this saga is not concluded.
11. Meanwhile, the first contingent of KFOR
forces, consisting of UK and French forces, is preparing to deploy
into Kosovo by 12 June. The initial stages of the KFOR deployment
will be hazardous, with a risk of casualties from mines, booby
traps and unexploded ordnance.
HUMANITARIAN DEVELOPMENTS
12. As a political settlement has neared,
refugees in Macedonian and Albanian camps have become increasingly
restive. In an ugly incident on 5 June in a Macedonian camp, up
to 5,000 Kosovo Albanians attacked a Roma group whom they suspected
of collaboration with the Serbs. The likelihood is that the refugees
will become increasingly impatient to return to Kosovo in the
coming days, and that KFOR will have its work cut out coping with
a large influx of refugees to towns and villages devastated by
Serbian forces. NATO forces in Macedonia and Albania are working
with the agencies to discourage an early rush northwards. A massive
humanitarian task lies ahead, coping with up to a million returning
refugees and perhaps half a million internally displaced people,
many of whom have survived on a starvation diet for weeks.
CIVILIAN IMPLEMENTATION
AND RECONSTRUCTION
13. Planning for a civilian administration
in Kosovo is gathering pace. G8 Foreign Ministers agreed in Cologne
on 10 June on the need for the early appointment of a UN Special
Representative, likely to be an EU national, to lead civilian
implementation efforts. However, the concept is that other international
organisations (eg OSCE, EU, etc) with relevant expertise should
contribute as part of an integrated structure, each organisation
retaining its own separate accountability and a Steering Board
to give strategic direction, bringing together the international
organisations involved, the G8 member states and a representative
of the OIC. It is clear that the policing portfolio (putting in
an international police force; retraining local forces) will be
a key task. We have been pressing hard for speedy decisions to
finalise civil implementation structure. Inevitably, the question
of who gets the top job is proving difficult, and is not yet resolved.
14. Work is proceeding in parallel on the
Stability Pact, aimed at the economic regeneration and political
stabilisation of the region the Prime Minister and other Western
leaders have made it clear that the aim is ultimately for the
FRY to participate but that it cannot expect international assistance
as long as Milosevic remains in power.
15. UNSCR 1244 called for an early international
donors conference. At the end of G8 discussions in Cologne on
8 June the Commission said that once the SCR was adopted it planned
an early initial conference focussing on the immediate needs of
returning refugees/the displaced.
THE UK ROLE
16. The Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary
and Defence Secretary are widely credited with having played a
key role in holding NATO together and stiffening its resolve.
In many countries (with notable exceptions: Russia, China, Greece,
etc) this should have enhanced the UK's profile in a positive
way. While resisting the urge to be triumphalist, posts should
take appropriate opportunities to emphasise the leading role that
Britain has played in and continues to play in Kosovo.
FORWARD LOOK
17. This is a defining moment for the region,
for Europe and for NATO/Russian relations. It represents a body
blow to the forces of nationalism in the Balkans which have caused
so much human misery in the last 10 years. But the challenges
ahead are formidable. KFOR is likely to find what Bildt described
as "a wasteland of destruction and despair" in Kosovo.
NATO forces may well face pockets of Serb resistance, mines and
booby traps left by withdrawing Serb forces, the challenge of
controlling the KLA and grim evidence of atrocities. Establishing
control will be a major task in itself. Rebuilding the province
will require a still greater and more sustained effort.
KOSOVO: FCO WEEKLY ROUND-UP
SUMMARY
1. Serb withdrawal from Kosovo completed ahead
of schedule on 20 June. NATO announces formal end of air campaign.
KFOR completes its initial deployments. 19,000 NATO (including
9,000 UK) forces now in Kosovo, under General Sir Michael Jackson.
G8 Summit in Cologne mends fences with Yeltsin following agreement
on terms of Russian deployment in Kosovo. Agreement with the KLA
on demilitarisation. But exodus of Serb minority from Kosovo amid
reports of Albanian excesses. 170,000 Albanian refugees have already
returned. More horrendous atrocities uncovered as KFOR advances
into Kosovo. 10,000 estimated to have been killed. ICTY investigators
now in Kosovo, supported by UK team. UN Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) set up in Pristina, but Annan has yet
to appoint permanent Special Representative to head UNMIK. Ashdown
in the running. G8 leaders agree to hold conference on reconstruction
in Balkans. Humanitarian aid, but no reconstruction assistance,
for Serbia while Milosevic stays. Foreign Secretary plans to visit
Kosovo on 23-24 June.
DETAIL
2. This telegram summarises developments
in the Kosovo crisis since guidance telno 23. MIFT updates lines
to take in guidance telno 24.
MILITARY AND
DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENTS
3. Serbian forces completed their withdrawal
from Kosovo on 20 June, slightly ahead of the schedule set out
in the 9 June NATO/FRY Military Technical Agreement. This enabled
NATO to announce a formal end to the air campaign. KFOR has completed
initial deployments into Kosovo, bringing the total forces inside
Kosovo up to around 19,000 troops, of which a 9,000-strong UK
contingent forms by far the largest component. General Jackson
(COMKFOR, a NATO command post) has set up Headquarters in Pristina,
with five multinational brigade sectors (MNBs) under him:
— MNB A (northern Kosovo) led by France,
based at Kosovska Mitrovica.
— MNB B (central Kosovo), led by the
UK, with Canadian and Norwegian units, based at Pristina.
— MNB C (western Kosovo), led by Italy,
with Spanish units, based at Pec.
— MNB D (southeast Kosovo), led by
the US, with Greek units, based at Gnjilane.
— MNB E (southern Kosovo) led by Germany,
with Dutch units, based at Prizren.
4. A further 10,000 NATO troops are in Macedonia.
In addition to the NATO forces, 11 NATO partner countries (Austria,
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Russia, Slovenia and the Ukraine) and five other countries (Argentina,
Ireland, Jordan, Sweden and the UAE) have expressed an interest
in contributing to KFOR.
5. Diplomatic developments over the past
week have been dominated by efforts to reach a deal with the Russians
over their contribution to KFOR, following the surprise deployment
of Russian troops to Pristina Airport on 12 June. Russia pushed
hard for an independent sector, but NATO insisted that any arrangement
must preserve unified command under General Jackson and avoid
the de facto partition of Kosovo. Intensive discussions in Helsinki
on 16-18 June led to agreement. The Russians will contribute five
battalions totalling up to 2,850, to be located in the northwest
of the US sector (MNB D), the southwest of the French sector (MNB
A) and the northwest of the German sector (MNB E). The Russians
are to retain responsibility for the airport security etc at Pristina
Airport (but NATO will retain air traffic control). Russian troops
at the airport and nearby logistics base number a further 750.
Liaison officers in command HQ number 16.
6. President Yeltsin's appearance on 20
June at the G8 Cologne Summit set the seal on the agreement and
helped to patch up the differences of recent weeks. The Prime
Minister described the Summit as a bridge of understanding between
NATO and Russia for the future. But NATO's military and political
success in Kosovo has left Russian self-esteem bruised. Command
and control arrangements for the Russian contingents in KFOR will
be the first test of Russia's willingness to cooperate.
7. As Serb troops have withdrawn, KLA forces
have become increasingly assertive, setting up roadblocks and
establishing headquarters in the abandoned Serb police stations.
There have been media reports of KLA attacks on Serb civilians
and the burning and looting of Serb houses. KFOR have worked hard
in the face of a large exodus of Serb civilians (many of whom
left in convoy with Serb troops) to reassure minorities that they
provide even-handed protection for all the people of Kosovo. On
21 June, General Jackson accepted a demilitarisation undertaking
from the KLA. This undertaking provides for:
— an immediate KLA ceasefire;
— within seven days, KLA forces gathering
in assembly areas;
— within 30 days, all prohibited weapons
(weapons 12.7mm or larger, anti-tank or anti-aircraft weapons,
grenades, mines and explosives, all automatic or long-barrelled
weapons) being handed in;
— over 90 days, the phased handling
in of automatic small arms;
— within 90 days, all KLA members to
cease wearing uniforms and insignia.
8. Pickering (US Deputy Secretary of State)
was in Peking on 16 June to deliver the long-awaited US report
on the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. The US offered
to provide compensation to the injured and the families of those
killed. The Chinese Government, as expected, expressed its dissatisfaction
at the US explanations for the mistake. The issue is now largely
a US-China bilateral one, although NATO has still to consider
how to fulfil its undertaking to provide China with a NATO (as
opposed to US bilateral) report.
HUMANITARIAN DEVELOPMENTS
9. Despite efforts by UNHCR to prevent a
mass return of refugees in Albania and Macedonia until conditions
for their return were safer some 170,000 Albanian refugees have
returned spontaneously to Kosovo, reducing the total number of
refugees in the region to about 600,000. The UNHCR will begin
the process of organised repatriation, at a rate of around 3,000
refugees per day, on 1 July. In practice this rate will depend
on conditions in Kosovo. Some 35-40,000 homes have been destroyed
or made uninhabitable. Mines and unexploded ordnance pose huge
risks: aid agencies are reporting civilian casualties every day;
two British soldiers were killed while clearing munitions on 21
June. So far the pockets of internally displaced Albanians have
been much smaller than expected. Aid agencies will use helicopters
to airlift supplies to remote areas in Kosovo and more land convoys
are planned as the UNCHR consolidates its presence.
10. At least 34 relief organisations have
arrived in Kosovo since the UNHCR returned to Pristina on 14 June
to coordinate relief operations. DfID, whose relief trucks were
among the first to reach Pristina, have a large number of staff
in Kosovo already. The UK announced a further £50 million
in aid to the refugees on 14 June. The UNHCR is likely to suspend
its evacuation programme to third countries on 22 June: the total
number of refugees outside the region is over 88,000—4,200
of them in the UK.
11. Meanwhile, some 42,000 Kosovo Serbs
are thought to have left the province since 9 June. NATO leaders,
General Jackson, Vieira de Mello and the FRY Government in Belgrade
have all appealed to the remaining Serb community (about 110,000)
to stay, emphasising that KFOR is there to protect everyone in
Kosovo. There are reports that Serb civilians who fled are now
beginning to return to Kosovo. UNHCR has dispatched a relief convoy
for an estimated 50,000 Serbs displaced in Serbia.
ATROCITIES
12. The UK and international media have
been full or reports of the grisly remains of horrendous atrocities
uncovered as KFOR advanced into Kosovo. According to reports in
so far (mostly from refugees), it is estimated that 10,000 people
have been killed in more than 120 massacres. The final toll may
very well be far worse. Some 78 towns or villages are thought
to have been destroyed and 53 areas ethnically cleansed. There
are numerous reports of civilians being used as human shields,
of mass rapes, torture and attacks on fleeing civilians.
13. ICTY investigators entered Kosovo on
18 June. The UK has been the first country to respond to Judge
Arbour's request for assistance to support ICTY. A UK team under
Det Chief Superintendent John Bunn (Metropolitan Police) and David
Gowan (FCO War Crimes Coordinator) has been in the region since
13 June.
Bunn's team of 13 experts are now in Kosovo
working at the sites of two of the worst atrocities thought to
have taken place. FBI and other national expert teams are expected
to follow soon. We are working to ensure wider coverage of atrocities
in those countries (eg Russia) which opposed the NATO campaign.
14. There have been reports of Albanian
"political prisoners" being moved from prisons in Kosovo
during the Serb withdrawal and taken to Serbia. We have drawn
this to the attention of the ICRC.
CIVIL ADMINISTRATION
15. The preliminary arrangements are now
in place for the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).
UNMIK will be headed by a Special Representative of the Un Secretary-General,
whose task is to coordinate the activities of UN agencies and
the other international organisations operating in Kosovo, and
facilitate a political process to determine the future status
of the province. Four Deputy SRSGs will be chosen from relevant
agencies to lead in the following areas:
— Interim Civil Administration (UN).
— Humanitarian Affairs (UNHCR).
— Institution-building (OSCE).
16. A candidate for the SRSG has yet to
be chosen, but Paddy Ashdown is in the running. (Comment: the
lobbying to date has been mostly at Ministerial level, but instructions
may follow.) Meanwhile, an advance team under Vieira de Mello
(acting UN Special Representative) has been established in Pristina
since 13 June. UNMIK's immediate priority is the establishment
of a police force to provide security for the return of the Albanian
refugees and building confidence among the Serb minority.
RECONSTRUCTION
17. G8 leaders agreed in principle at Cologne
to hold a conference on reconstruction and regeneration, involving
the main Balkan countries, in the next few months. The EU and
the World Bank are to lead on the reconstruction of Kosovo. The
Commission's aim is to establish a Task Force for Kosovo by 1
July, to form the basis for the establishment of a Balkan reconstruction
agency. The next major step will be to hold a donor conference
in mid-July focusing on emergency needs.
18. There is a growing consensus that while
Serbia should continue to receive humanitarian aid eg to help
deal with the refugees from Kosovo (Kosovo Serbs) and elsewhere,
it should receive no large-scale aid for reconstruction as long
as Milosevic remains in power. We are seeking to ensure toughest
possible application of sanctions against Milosevic and his cronies,
while limiting damage to the Serbian population.
FORWARD LOOK
19. We have, as the Prime Minister has said,
made remarkable progress in the past two weeks. We have won an
agreement that fully met NATO's objectives; Serb forces have withdrawn
from Kosovo; NATO forces have deployed throughout the province;
and there is now an agreement with the KLA on demilitarisation.
The UK continues to play a leading role in the military, diplomatic
and humanitarian effort. There are many important tasks ahead:
enforcing KLA demilitarisation is unlikely to be easy; the Serb
community in Kosovo will take some persuading that it is safe
for them to stay (or go back); the humanitarian challenge will
grow as the flood of refugees back into Kosovo accelerates; and
the reconstruction task will be huge. Immediate priorities are
the substantive appointment of a UN Special Representative and
bringing the various Albanian parties together. We also need to
agree with EU partners lines on the reopening of diplomatic missions
in Belgrade and assistance policy to Serbia.
20. Another busy week lies ahead. The Foreign
Secretary will visit Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania (perhaps with
Vedrine, Fischer and Dini) on 23-24 June. The Princess Royal visits
Albania on 2 July.
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