Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence


APPENDIX 5

Memorandum submitted by Dr Mary Kaldor, London School of Economics

  The war in Kosovo was typical of the new types of conflict that are taking place in Africa, East Timor, the Caucasus as well as the Balkans. These conflicts are very different from our traditional conception of war, as a military struggle between the armies of opposing states. Most of the violence is directed against civilians; indeed the conflicts can be described as a mixture of war, organised crime and massive violations of human rights.

  Although these conflicts are often localised, they have to be understood in the context of globalisation. They involve an array of global actors—international agencies, NGOs, global media, mercenaries, arms traders, and so on. They spill over borders via refugees, transnational criminal links, or diaspora networks. They are brought to global public attention by international electronic networks such as CNN or the BBC World Service. And above all, they arise as a result of the erosion or even disintegration of nation-states under the impact of globalisation.

  At the time of NATO's 50th anniversary summit, which took place during the air campaign, the Prime Minister enunciated his new "Doctrine of International Community" which explicitly recognised the global character of the security environment. "We are all internationalists now" he said ". . .We cannot turn our backs on conflicts and the violation of human rights if we want to be securè.

  This new internationalist approach to foreign policy, the notion that upholding international norms and principles has to be the cornerstone of foreign policy, and that national interest nowadays can no longer be pursued unilaterally, is probably the most important lesson of the Kosovo crisis. However, the other lesson of the Kosovo crisis is that strategy and capabilities were not well adapted to the new doctrine. The Prime Minister, in his Chicago speech, stated that, up to now, the international community's response to global crises has tended to be ad hoc. This was also true of the Kosovo crisis. In the end, the air campaign did succeed in bringing about the withdrawal of Serbian security forces from Kosovo and enabling the Kosovar Albanians to return to their homes. But this was only after a double ethnic cleansing had taken place—first the Kosovar Albanians and then the Serbs, Roma and other non-Albanians.

  In this memorandum, I will start by summarising the characteristics of the conflict and the type of response that is needed in this type of conflict. I will then put forward some proposals for contributing to longer-term peace and stability in the region.

THE WAR IN KOSOVO

  There are three respects in which the Kosovo crisis resembles similar types of conflict in other parts of the world. First of all, the goals of the "new wars" are generally about identity politics—that is to say, the claim to state power on the basis of exclusive identity be it ethnicity, religion, or language. The rise of exclusive ideologies is a new phenomenon related to globalisation even though the ideology makes use of history and tradition. The war in Kosovo was no exception. It was a war waged in the name of the "new nationalism". Although it is true that there has been a long history of antagonism between the Serbian and Albanian populations, especially in the 20th century (and also, a history of co-existence, mutual tolerance, and even co-operation and syncretism) the current crisis has to be primarily traced back to the mobilisation of nationalist sentiment by Milosevic in the late 1980's. The position of the Serb minority in Kosovo and the insistence on the mystical importance of Kosovo to the Serbian nation were central elements of the nationalist propaganda developed by Serbian intellectuals and exploited by Milosevic, using the all the contemporary techniques, especially television available. It was the removal of autonomy from Kosovo in 1989, which marked the beginning of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Subsequently, Albanians were dismissed from their jobs in public service and state-owned firms; Albanian students were banned from entering university buildings and a new Serbian curriculum was introduced; arbitrary arrest and police violence against Albanians became routine practices—Human Rights Watch reported that the record of human rights violations in Kosovo was the worst in Europe.

  On the Albanian side, an important "new" element was the role of the Diaspora in Germany and Switzerland who provided funding for the Albanian resistance and organised Albanian language television, which could be received through satellite dishes.

  Secondly, military strategy in this type of conflict typically aims at political control of territory through ethnic engineering, in particular population displacement. Violence is deliberately directed against civilians and refugees and internally displaced persons are not a side effect of war but the object of the fighting. Conspicuous atrocities, systematic rape, or destruction of historic monuments are all part of calculated effort to sow "fear and hatred" for the purpose of political control. Fighting between opposing military sides is rare. In Kosovo, the methods of the war represented a perfection of the techniques developed in Croatia and Bosnia, which, in turn, had many similarities with techniques used in the Caucasus and in Africa. In the period up to 24 March when the NATO air strikes began, increased KLA activities were used as an excuse to initiate ethnic cleansing—some 400,000 people were forced to leave Kosovo. Once the bombing began, what appears to have been a meticulous plan for accelerated ethnic cleansing known as Operation Horseshoe was implemented. Just as in Bosnia and Croatia, the role of regular forces was to shell an area, then, when local people were sufficiently weakened and terrorised, the para-military groups would enter the areas separating men from women, looting all valuables, including documents, burning homes and destroying historic and cultural symbols. There were 10 rape camps in Kosovo, three in Prishtina, and, reportedly, some men were also raped. The para-military groups were augmented by criminals released from prison for the purpose and also some local Serbs and Roma were mobilised. Refugees reported that "cleansers" had informed them that they were under instructions to "clean" Kosovo within a week. One of the most notorious para-military groups in Kosovo was known as "Franki's Boys" after their leader Frank Simatovic who was said to be the link between Milosevic and the freelance para-military groups. The evidence now available suggests that during the period of the air strikes, some 10,000 Kosovar Albanians were killed and over 1 million were forced to leave the country.

  On the Albanian side, the KLA could be described as 1 mixture of para-military type forces and self defence forces. For most of the 1990s, the Kosovar Albanians, under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, pursued a strategy of non-violence. The KLA started as a small Leninist party in the 1980s but it was only after the Dayton Agreement when Kosovo was left out of the agreement and violence appeared to have been rewarded that support for the KLA grew both in Kosovo and more importantly, among the Diaspora. The collapse of the Albanian State in 1997 was also an important factor since arms caches were opened and arms became easily available. It was the stepped up activities of the KLA that gave Serbian security forces the excuse to begin a strategy of ethnic cleansing.

  The third respect in which the Kosovo conflict was typical of a "new war" was economic. Both Kosovo and Serbia were characterised by very high levels of unemployment and growing criminalisation of the economy. Para-military groups were "paid" in loot. The various global and local linkages established as a result of the political economy of these conflicts, via illegal trading, the Diaspora, or shadowy security relationships, generate vested interests in the escalation and spread of violence across borders.

  The methods chosen by the international community to prevent the war in Kosovo, diplomacy backed by the threat of air strikes, were not well adapted to these characteristics. Politically, it is important to find ways to promote a political alternative to extreme nationalism, by sidelining extreme nationalist leaders, and by supporting those groups and individuals who can offer a democratic alternative—opposition political parties, NGOs, independent media, and intellectuals. However, right from the beginning of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, the international community has chosen the option of negotiating a solution about status with nationalist leaders. A series of partial agreements were signed in an effort to contain violence within borders, which was not possible. The partial agreement in Slovenia was followed by the war in Croatia. The agreement in Croatia in early 1992 was followed by the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Dayton agreement after a brief respite was followed by the eruption of the conflict in Kosovo. Each agreement had the effect of legitimising nationalist leaders who participated in the talks, of appearing to reward the use of violence, and of marginalising Democrats and civic-minded groups.

  In the case of Kosovo, the idea was to reach agreement before the violence had taken place. It was apparently believed that the air strikes during the final stages of the Bosnian war had been an important factor in determining the Dayton agreement. But the Dayton agreement took place after four years of war when ethnic cleansing was almost complete. In the case of Kosovo, the threat of air strikes was ineffective in persuading Milosevic to agree to stop the violence in Kosovo. Indeed, it could be argued that Milosevic was ready to accept the consequences of a Western air campaign because it provided a cover under which he could accelerate the ethnic cleansing campaign. The Yugoslav Army, with vast underground networks of stores, airports and barracks, was well prepared to withstand an attack of this kind. A week before the bombing began, Serb policemen were marking the homes of ethnic Albanians with crosses so that the "cleaners" would know where to go. Seselj, the leader of the Serbian Radical Party and Deputy Prime minister of Serbia, warned on television one week before the bombing began, that "not a single Albanian would remain if NATO bombed".

  Militarily, it is important to counter the strategy of sowing "fear and hatred" by a strategy of "winning hearts and minds". The goal of any military intervention has to be the protection of peoples not the defeat of an enemy. This is why a ground military presence is absolutely essential. The kind of intervention that was undertaken in Bosnia—the establishment of safe havens and humanitarian corridors—represents a model, albeit a weak one, for this kind of operation. Such an intervention would require close air support but not a wider destructive air campaign. It would also require heavy equipment and firepower to be used very selectively. Some European armed forces, notably Britain and Denmark, have made use of the lessons of Bosnia to retrain their forces for this type of operation. If possible such an intervention should be based on consent. But instead of high level negotiations aimed at finding a political compromise between irreconcilable parties, negotiations should focus on the position on the ground. In the case of Kosovo, the goal should have been to establish an international ground presence in Kosovo not to resolve the issue of status. Instead of backing negotiations with the threat of air strikes, they should have been backed up by the NATO position on the ground in neighbouring Macedonia.

  In the end, the air strikes did bring about the capitulation of Milosevic. But they failed to prevent ethnic cleansing of, first the Albanians, and then the Serbs and other non-Albanians. As General Wesley Clark put it, "you cannot stop para-military murder from the air". Moreover, the air strikes had negative political consequences. Opposition to the air strikes was virtually unanimous in Serbia. The air strikes allowed Milosevic to crack down on NGOs and independent media during the war and thus minimise domestic constraints on his activities in Kosovo. Even though the opposition to Milosevic has grown stronger since the end of the war, this is not necessarily opposition to his nationalistic activities. There is a widespread sense in Serbia that what happened to them as a consequence of bombing is, somehow equal to what happened to Kosovo, that the air strikes effectively exonerated Serbian responsibility for the war. There were probably around 1,400 civilian casualties as a result of the bombing, not to mention damage to infrastructure, industry, and the environment as well as the psychological effect of being subjected to air strikes over a prolonged period. Despite the insistence of NATO spokesmen that there is a big difference between killing by mistake and killing deliberately, this difference was not obvious to the victims of the bombing. Who determines whether the killing of civilians counts as a "massacrè or as "collateral damagè? Likewise, the insistence of Western leaders that the bombing was directed against the regime and not against Serbs was not at all evident to those who experienced the effect of bombing.

  Finally, the war in Kosovo and the air strikes have had destabilising consequences for neighbouring states, especially Macedonia and Montenegro. The influx of refugees into Macedonia further disturbed the fragile balance between Albanians and Slav Macedonians. Montenegro is currently polarised between those who favour the process of democratisation and those who support the Milosevic regime. The air strikes provided an opportunity for a comeback by pro-Milosevic forces. Albania and Bosnia Herzegovina were also affected.

  Two particular lessons for foreign policy can be drawn from this experience. First of all, a genuinely internationalist doctrine that offers a convincing alternative to the narrow particularism of nationalism, cannot privilege the lives of Western troops over the lives of civilians from whatever country. Humanitarian intervention should aim at minimising all casualties even if this means risking the lives of international troops. This does require a major cognitive change in the way we think about international violence. Secondly, military capabilities need to be adapted to the new wars. In particular, Europeans need to restructure their armed forces to be able to respond to the requirements of humanitarian intervention. The choice of methods in Kosovo was evidently influenced by the European dependence on American capabilities, particularly air power. In future, the choice of methods should be determined by effectiveness rather than expediency.

PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE BALKAN REGION

  It has been said that the intervention in Kosovo was a defining moment for the Balkans. The decision to launch a Stability Pact, to undertake an integrated approach towards the region as a whole, and to give priority to stability in the Balkans are all very positive steps. It is very important that the relevant lessons are learned from previous experience in the Balkans if the Stability Pact is to succeed and that the strategy underlying the Stability Pact is adapted to the character of the conflicts in South east Europe. Some of these can be briefly summarised.

  First of all, the priority is support for democratic, multi-national and multi-ethnic political forces in the region as a whole and especially in Kosovo and Serbia. The removal of Milosevic would not solve the problems of the region but it would begin to unblock the process of democratisation and it would have knock-on effects on neighbouring countries. In Serbia, the isolation of the regime should be maintained but at the same time, assistance should be provided to democratic opposition groups especially independent media. Humanitarian assistance should be provided to Serbia but through non-official channels. In Kosovo, the influx of criminal gangs and the establishment of protected enclaves of Serbs and/or divided cities poses real risks for the future.

  A useful initiative could be the proposal to establish a citizen's dimension to the Stability Pact put forward by President Havel and others. It is very important to build links among pro-democracy groups and individuals in the region as a whole and with the rest of Europe and to find ways in which these groups could have access to official governmental processes. Twinning arrangements with towns, universities or citizens groups should also be encouraged.

  Secondly, the renewal of violence has to be prevented. It is essential to provide a secure environment in which alternatives to extreme nationalism can be stimulated. For some time to come, the international community will have to fill the security gap in the region and this both an internal and an external security problem. Existing international forces in Kosovo and Bosnia will have to remain as long as it takes to reach a lasting political settlement. It is also important that international forces remain and are even strengthened in Macedonia and Albania and it may be necessary to establish an international security presence in Montenegro. These forces do constitute an obstacle to the outbreak of war and are relatively successful at such tasks as separating forces or controlling heavy weapons. But they are much less successful at internal security tasks and thus are unable to tackle some of the underlying causes of the continuing conflicts. The internal security gap will have to be filled either by international police, or by rebuilding local police forces, or by adapting military forces to undertake these tasks.

  Thirdly, there needs to be a strategy for reconstruction that gives priority to legitimate employment in order to provide an alternative to the criminalised war economy. Many experts have recommended trade liberalisation and euroization as a way of stabilising the economies of the region. These measures will only work if they are accompanied by a substantial injection of investment funds as well as micro-economic measures aimed at stimulating productive employment.

  If the Doctrine of International Community is to become the hallmark of British foreign policy, then the Stability Pact has to succeed as a first step. It is a daunting task, which should, first and foremost, take into account conditions in the region and not short-term considerations about alliance politics or domestic public opinion. Otherwise there is a real risk that, instead of bringing peace to the Balkans, the tendencies for political extremism and violence that are currently to be found in the Balkans and elsewhere, will spread.


 
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