APPENDIX 6
Memorandum submitted by Mr Gabriel Partos
EVIDENCE
1. Kosovo is widely regarded as the priority
for the international reconstruction effort. One reason for this
is the huge amount of destruction, particularly in some of the
rural communities, that has been inflicted on Kosovo, primarily
by the Serbian security forces. There is also a moral imperative:
much of Kosovo's ethnic Albanian majority underwent appalling
suffering at the hands of the Serbian security forces in the course
of NATO's 11-week-long campaign of air strikes during which time
NATO was unable to do much to protect people on the ground. Since
the end of the conflict international aid donors have pledged
US$2.1 billion of assistance to Kosovo.
2. However, it would be wrong to ignore
the rest of the region. The Balkan states are linked too closely
to each other to allow the outside world the luxury of being able
to concentrate on only one area at time. Kosovo cannot be rebuilt—and
transformed into a more prosperous and, consequently, more stable
region—if its neighbours continue to feel that they are
being left to cope largely on their own. For one thing, the key
parts of the infrastructure—roads and railways, in particular—do
not stop at Kosovo's borders. As a landlocked region, Kosovo needs
much better access to the sea ports of Greece (via the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM), to those of Albania, and
depending on the situation in the Yugoslav federation, those of
Montenegro.
3. For a variety of reasons, the stability
of Albania and FYROM remains precarious. There is rampant lawlessness
in Albania—the result, in great measure, of the anti-government
uprising of 1997, in the course of which rioters seized large
amounts of weapons. In FYROM relations between the country's large
ethnic Albanian community (around 25 per cent out of a total population
of 2 million) and the majority Slav Macedonians are often tense.
Both countries took great risks in providing facilities for NATO
during the conflict, and in hosting (reluctantly in FYROM's case)
at one stage about three-quarters of the 850,000 Kosovar refugees
who had fled their homeland.
4. Albania needs much greater assistance
with its efforts to restore law and order, particularly in the
areas bordering Kosovo; to establish the authority of the institutions
of state; and to raise revenue through taxation, customs, and
payments for services provided by the public utilities. Without
the consolidation of state authority in the country, Albania itself
could become a source of renewed instability in Kosovo through
the cross-border activities of the Albanian mafia. Meanwhile,
FYROM could face renewed inter-ethnic tension if the economy fails
to recover and if movement towards self-government in Kosovo encourages
FYROM's ethnic Albanians to seek autonomy. FYROM would greatly
benefit from increased investment in inter-communal co-operation
projects in the fields of business, social welfare and the media.
5. Apart from the "frontline states",
Romania and Bulgaria have had to pay the heaviest price in terms
of disruption to trade (navigation on the Danube is still blocked
by debris from bridges bombed in Serbia), and having to deal in
each case with a public that was, by and large, opposed to NATO's
action. Neither of these countries benefited from the deployment
of large numbers of NATO troops destined for the Kosovo peacekeeping
force (KFOR) which in FYROM and, to a lesser extent in Albania,
generated considerable income. The conflict over Kosovo was the
latest blow to these two countries which had already suffered
severe economic damage from the UN embargo on trade with Yugoslavia
during the Bosnian war (1992-95).
6. The Kosovo conflict has contributed to
increasing the concern felt in Romania and Bulgaria over being
left a long way behind the central European states in the process
of European integration. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
have already joined NATO; they are now looking forward to membership
of the European Union perhaps within four or five years. Bulgaria
and Romania need higher levels of aid to help prevent the return
to power of ex-communists and nationalists who could undermine
regional stability.
7. Within Yugoslavia itself, Montenegro
requires special attention as it prepares, step-by-step, for independence.
The Montenegrin authorities have been at odds with Yugoslav President
Slobodan Milosevic for more than two years over his policies
that have made Yugoslavia something of a pariah state. Montenegro
is now planning to set up a currency board to manage the republic's
planned separate currency—a move that is likely to be triggered
by a fresh round of inflation if Belgrade decides to print more
Yugoslav dinar. This could happen before the end of 1999; it could
be followed next year by a referendum on Montenegro's independence.
If the current trends continue, the impetus behind Montenegro's
moves towards independence is set to gather momentum. It is difficult
to envisage how that process can be slowed down or reversed, unless
there is a change of government in Yugoslavia/Serbia.
8. If Montenegro were to become independent,
it would raise a further question mark over Kosovo's own future.
UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which set up the UN's informal
protectorate over Kosovo, refers to the province as part of Yugoslavia.
However, if the Yugoslav federation were to be dissolved, it is
not clear which entity Kosovo would belong to. The ethnic Albanians,
who have temporarily accepted Kosovo's continued formal inclusion
within Yugoslavia, would certainly not countenance being part
of Serbia, the country they regard as their enemy. Besides, if
Montenegro, with a population of 650,000 were allowed to vote
for independence, Kosovo's ethnic Albanians—who account
for 90 per cent of its population of two million—would argue,
why not Kosovo itself?
9. As Kosovo and Montenegro move—or
are driven—towards independence the further fragmentation
of Yugoslavia is becoming a strong possibility. The more so, as
within Serbia there are increasing demands for autonomy in the
province of Vojvodina and the area of Sandzak/Raska. Serbia appears
unstable, and looks set to face further uncertainty as the Milosevic
regime continues to cling to power while opposition groups try
to oust the government through a campaign of street protests.
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