APPENDIX 8
Memorandum submitted by The Church of
England, The Archbishops' Council's Board for Social Responsibility
1. The Board for Social Responsibility is
an advisory board of the Archbishops' Council. The Board reports
through the Archbishops' Council to the General Synod of the Church
of England. Its terms of reference require it "to promote
and co-ordinate the thought and action of the Church in matters
affecting the life of all in society".
2. The Archbishops' Council's Board for
Social Responsibility welcomes the decision by the House of Commons
Foreign Affairs Committee to launch an "inquiry into the
foreign policy lessons of the Kosovo crisis and how the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office might best promote peace and stability
in the region". The Kosovo conflict was perhaps illustrative
of a wider conflict over how the international system ought to
be defined following the end of the "post cold war erà.
The conflict touched on the following set of problems: sovereignty
vs. human rights; territorial integrity vs. self-determination;
non-intervention vs. international action and collective vs. unilateral
action. The Board is grateful for the opportunity provided by
this initiative to submit its own observations on this matter,
but is aware, that no submission can do justice to the range of
issues raised by the Kosovo crisis. In view of these considerations
the Board's submission reflects the findings of an Anglican delegation
to Kosovo (9-12 July 1999) and the conclusions of a BSR report
(GS Misc 576) to the Church of England's General Synod.
3. The inability of Kosovo and Serbia to
co-exist peacefully within a regional Yugoslav entity without
precipitating their own demise is mirrored by historical problems
of religious accommodation in the Balkans as reflected by the
three great empires—Byzantine (Eastern or Greek Orthodox),
Ottoman (Islam) and Habsburg (Roman Catholic). The politicisation
of historical religious texts for narrow political purposes challenges
all leaders, political and religious, to think creatively as to
those social and moral characteristics that empower them to act
as constructive forces for peace, conflict transformation and
reconciliation.
4. While it is impossible to understand
the 1999 Balkan's conflict without recourse to the region's ethnic
history, it is equally clear that ethnic differences and historical
animosities were not the determinant or even catalytic variable
in this context. Rather, the declining economic and political
legitimacy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, contexualised
within a virulent form of hypernationalism, brought on by the
end of the Cold War, provided the backdrop to President Milosevic's
repressive policies in Kosovo. An understanding of Balkan history
suggests, however, that once religious passions have been aroused,
they are fiercely prosecuted and prove resistant to mediation.
5. Any rationalisation of the Kosovo crisis
should not gloss over the foreign policy errors, which were committed
by the international community. How was it that the international
community found itself caught between acquiescing in ethnic cleansing
or pursuing a military solution to the crisis? It is possible,
although by no means certain, that the conflict in Kosovo could
have been avoided if the international community had learnt the
foreign policy lessons of Bosnia Herzegovina and Rwanda and properly
invested in appropriate preventative instruments capable of sustaining
a policy of soft intervention. These instruments might legitimately
include sustained political and diplomatic initiatives, development
assistance, human rights monitoring and the strengthening of civil
society through the building of democratic institutions. The conscious
decision to sideline the diplomatic energies of the UN and the
decision to withdraw, rather than strengthen, the OSCE presence
in Kosovo might suggest that the international community had not
exhausted all non-military solutions to Kosovo. Although intervening
to prevent the gross violations of human rights can be problematic,
it is considerably less expensive and generally more effective
than the traditional hard and less defensible responses to such
crises, which normally give rise to a protracted peacekeeping
effort.
6. The end of the Cold War has witnessed
an increased tendency towards humanitarian intervention in the
internal affairs of a nation state (Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia Herzegovina,
Sierra Leone, Iraqi Kurdistan, Kosovo and more recently East Timor).
Although the Board welcomes the moves towards an international
community centred on values rather than interests, it remains
concerned that further reflection is required to establish the
criteria and conditions by which a particular "intervention"
could be said to be morally acceptable or even desirable. Against
what types of objectionable behaviour can intervention be justified?
What forms can intervention most usefully and legitimately take?
How do we respond to the fact that, given the many crisis areas
in the world, double standards are often applied? The Prime Minister's
doctrine of the international community needs to be developed
into a more coherent and transparent set of principles, which
can be supported or enforced by the appropriate internationally
agreed constitutional mechanisms. The lack of a clear and consistent
set of principles and the absence of the necessary supportive
framework contributed to the raw and sometimes divisive public
emotions that were generated by the tragedy, which in turn fuelled
the opposing ideologies of withdrawal (isolationism) and engagement
(internationalism). It is evident that whatever the justice of
Nato's cause, the absence of a guiding set of principles undermined
the legitimacy of its actions with its own domestic constituents
and contributed to anger and confusion in Eastern Europe.
7. Peace will be as divisive and contentious
a process as war. Peace will not be achieved by the mere cessation
of violence or by the return of refugees, Serbian or Albanian,
to Kosovo. Instead, the success of any peace settlement will be
dependent upon the extent to which each ethnic grouping believes
that it can best promote its own welfare by developing the goodwill
and prosperity of the other. This might prove especially difficult
given the scale of the human tragedy, which has been unearthed
and the continued inter-ethnic conflict inside Kosovo. Yet until
such time as a co-operative and inclusive system of government
is developed, it will remain important for the international community,
however defined, to remain engaged in the Balkans and to mediate
between the competing interests. KFOR's and UNIMIK's current presence
in Kosovo seems incapable of providing for the safety of Slav
Muslims, Romas and Serbs. The development of a mono-ethnic culture
would be economically and politically unsustainable. It is important
that the international community strengthens the KFOR and UNIMIK
presence in Kosovo, while also making available sufficient funding
for courts, judges, court staff, police training and legal processes.
While these measures are not cost free, they are nonetheless central
to overcoming the culture of violence that appears so endemic
in the Balkans.
8. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office should
be aware that despite the politicisation of religion within this
conflict, Churches could and should play a role in promoting reconciliation
in the Balkans. Given the nature of contemporary conflict, religious
communities might be able, with their social and moral resources,
to act as constructive forces in reconciliation and peacekeeping.
Churches with their infrastructure and their presence on the ground
could encourage all parties to this conflict to participate in
a process of reconciliation based on self-reflection and the acceptance
of personal responsibility. The use of religious conferences on
the Internet might prove to be a constructive way to bridge the
divisions that currently exist between hostile communities. Such
conferences might also prove helpful in rediscovering and strengthening
those prophetic voices within the Serbian Orthodox Church that
have continually called for an end to ethnic violence. By facilitating
such a permanent dialogue Churches would be better positioned
to develop a pre-conflict capacity.
9. Although Churches have a role to play
in promoting peace they also have responsibility for ensuring
that any peace is a just peace. In post-conflict situations the
international community must see the provision of justice as a
priority concern. It is important that those who have committed
the most serious crimes known to international law (genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression) are brought
to trial. However, it is important to recognise that where, as
in Kosovo, atrocities have been so widespread as to prevent the
effective prosecution of all perpetrators, the international community
ought to consider the important and innovative contribution, which
truth commissions could make to the process of post-conflict reconstruction.
In addition to these measures, the Government should consider
making parliamentary time available, in the next session, for
the ratification of the "Statute of the International Criminal
Court".
10. The Archbishops' Council's Board for
Social Responsibility would welcome the opportunity to explore
with the Foreign Affairs Committee the rationale behind these
conclusions.
The Rt Revd Humphrey Taylor
Chairman, International and Development Affairs Committee
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