APPENDIX 10
Memorandum submitted by British American
Security Information Council
THE ISSUE:
Recent events in Kosovo have shown that KFOR troops
are struggling to cope with the quantity and scope of the tasks
that have been thrust upon them. Besides monitoring cease-fire
compliance by the warring parties and facilitating refugee returns,
they are also involved in basic policing, disarmament of the KLA,
civil administration, de-mining and aid distribution. They have
neither the training nor the time to fulfil all of these roles.
Ordinary citizens of Kosovo are suffering as a result. Looting,
arson, gangsterism and revenge attacks are happening on a scale
which is far beyond NATO's capabilities to control.
BASIC'S POSITION:
BASIC recommends the creation of Civilian Intervention
Units (CIU's). These Units would be kept on permanent standby,
in order to respond both to situations of potential conflict and
also post-conflict societies. Just like their military counterparts
in the Rapid Reaction Forces, their ability to be deployed quickly
would make them much more effective than the current well-intentioned,
but ultimately cumbersome efforts. The members of these units
would be trained in policing, interim administration, election
supervision, local languages (for the Euro-Atlantic area) and
human rights and deployed under the aegis of the OSCE or the EU
from national contingents.
COUNTER-ARGUMENT:
At a time when security and defence forces all
over Europe are having to work extremely hard to justify their
budgets, it is unrealistic to envisage the establishment of an
entire new corps in each EU member state. No-one would be prepared
to pay for this. Furthermore, unarmed civilian units would face
the same problems that UN observer forces have always faced—an
inability to enforce their mandates when confronted with armed
resistance. If these units were to be armed, with all the dangers
for escalation and incidents which that involves, you might as
well put in military forces, who at least are used to dealing
with this type of situation.
REBUTTAL:
EU states could demonstrate their commitment
to a robust Common Foreign and Security Policy by taking on the
responsibilities and costs of a secretariat and training centre
for the CIU's. Finances would come from the CFSP budget. Member
states would only have to finance the secondment of national personnel.
As regards arming, the CIU's could be unarmed or armed, depending
on the scenario. The current situation in Kosovo would seem to
require armed personnel, or civilian intervention closely backed
up by KFOR, whereas the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) monitors
were able to negotiate and mediate precisely because they were
unarmed. Horses for courses.
COUNTER-ARGUMENT:
Putting these units under the aegis of the OSCE
would ensure that they never went anywhere, as this is an institution
paralysed by its consensual political character and lack of funding.
If the EU took responsibility, two results would follow. First,
the OSCE, generally regarded as the institution best equipped
to deal with conflict prevention, conflict management and institution-building,
would be marginalised. Second, Russia, the Ukraine and other Eastern
partners would be further marginalised, at a time when their co-operation
with and integration into Euro-Atlantic politics is more vital
than ever. Why create more political structures in Europe?
REBUTTAL:
The OSCE/EU dilemma could be solved by having
the EU organise and finance the units and the OSCE training them
using knowledge gained from their various missions and offices.
Units from Eastern European states could be integrated as associate
partners in the style of the PfP (in this case, Partnership for
Policing rather than Partnership for Peace). In response to concerns
over institutional indigestion, BASIC believes that civilian intervention
represents a capacity which exists anyway, but which is organised
on an ad hoc and ponderous basis. The creation of CIU's would
only be the formal recognition of work which is being undertaken
every day in Kosovo and Bosnia, but which could be much more effective
if given the appropriate financing, structuring and recognition.
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