APPENDIX 11
Memorandum submitted by Ms Branka Magas
A. The past policy of the British government
and its Western partners towards Kosova can hardly be described
as foresighted.
1. At the end of the 1980s Serbia forcibly cancelled
Kosova's autonomy without any protest from London, which presumably
expected—quite erroneously as it turned out—that this
would strengthen Yugoslavia's unity.
2. Although Kosova remained one of Yugoslavia's
eight constituent units, its representatives were not invited
to the all-Yugoslav conference convened in The Hague by Lord Carrington
in the autumn of 1991. One can only assume that this exclusion
reflected a hope that leaving Kosova inside Serbia would make
Belgrade more co-operative—which it did not. Indeed, Serbia
was the only Yugoslav republic which refused to sign a comprehensive
settlement that would have preserved Yugoslavia as an international
legal subject.
3. At the Dayton conference which ended
the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, Kosova's status was
once again excluded from the overall settlement, presumably in
order to facilitate Milosevic's co-operation. This proved a short-sighted
policy in that it encouraged, on the one hand, exasperated Kosovars
to turn to armed struggle and, on the other, the Serbian authorities
to seek a "final solution".
4. It was only after the emergence of the
KLA that Western governments finally pressed for official negotiations
between Belgrade and Prishtina, although they must already have
been aware—given that Serbia's Rambouillet delegation was
made up largely of inconsequential personalities—that Milosevic
was simply buying time.
5. Even though the Serbian government, supported
by the main opposition parties, then conducted a genocidal action
against the Albanian population which required an unprecedented
NATO intervention, Western governments have continued to insist
that Kosova is and must remain part of Serbia/FRY. This insistence
is all the more strange in view of the fact that the Montenegrin
government is seeking FRY's functional and constitutional transformation,
which if achieved would lead to its de facto dissolution. Such
stubborn defiance of reality on the part of Western governments
is puzzling indeed, in view of the fact that: a) the Albanian
side has made it amply clear that it does not wish to remain with
Serbia; b) the Serbian side cannot hold Kosova against the wish
of its population without permanent recourse to overt violence.
B. What is the alternative?
6. It should at all times be borne in mind
that Tito's Yugoslavia (SFRJ)—a country much bigger, wealthier
and stable than FRY—found it necessary to remove Serbian
rule from Kosova. Consequently it not only devolved to Prishtina
as much power as was held by the six republican centres, but also
found it necessary to subsidise Kosova's economy. It is obvious
that Belgrade today is both unable and unwilling to follow any
such policy.
7. One should also recall that Kosova's
self-government within SFRJ did not in any way threaten the stability
of either Montenegro or Macedonia. Indeed it only strengthened
it, since Kosova assumed responsibility also for maintaining good
relations between Albanians and their Slav neighbours.
8. Kosova's self-government, moreover, improved
the relationship between Belgrade and Tirana, thus further contributing
to stability in south-eastern Europe. The increased cultural co-operation
between Tirana and Prishtina during the 1970s showed no tendency
towards unification of these two Albanian states.
9. It seems reasonable to conclude from
the above that the time has come finally to grasp the nettle of
Kosova's independence and use it as a building block for a peaceful
and prosperous Balkans. Recognition of its independence will help
Kosova to acquire a democratic and responsible government, and
generally to direct the energy of its young and growing population
towards the constructive endeavour of state-building. Dissolution
of the shot-gun marriage between Kosova and Serbia will also aid
Serbia's own democratic renewal, most obviously by removing the
need for maintenance of an extensive military and police apparatus.
10. It would indeed, be absurd, if the NATO
presence were to be used to keep Kosova's population away from
the national independence they so desire, and for which they have
already sacrificed so much. The present situation, moreover, untenable
in the long run, only feeds the forces of anarchy in both Serbia
and Kosova.
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