APPENDIX 13
Memorandum submitted by Mr Humphry Crum
Ewing, The Centre for Defence and International Security Studies,
Lancaster University
The following points are made in summary form. I
should be pleased to elaborate on them and/or explain my reasons
for forming these conclusion if the Committee wishes me to do
so.
(i) FOREIGN POLICY
LESSONS FROM
THE KOSOVO
CRISIS
These may be summarised under four headings:
(1) Crises happen time and again in the same
place, It may not be possible to anticipate when a crisis is going
to blow up, but it is possible to anticipate where it is going
to blow up and why. Ignoring the possibilities will not prevent
it happening.
(2) Conflict prevention depends upon a combination
of positive diplomatic effort with a capability credible to the
parties to intervene with decisive force.
(3) Diplomacy must be pro-active (and thus
preventive) and not simply responsive. Planning must include contingency
planning for "worst casè scenarios.
(4) Intervention has to be conducted through
a "contact group" or "umbrella organisation"—and
this must include recognised "friends of the parties"
and "professional neutrals"—but the effectiveness
of such a group or organisation depends on the input of individual
member nations rather than on the group as such.
(ii) HOW MIGHT
THE FCO BEST
PROMOTE PEACE
AND STABILITY
IN THE
REGION?
The short answer is by learning and applying
the four lessons identified above.
This requires both UK national activity that
is well thought through, well-focused and suitably resourced plus
a positive UK contribution towards the sufficiency and activity
of the several established (and ad hoc) international organisations
concerned and of which the UK is a member.
The widely touted suggestion that this is something
that some sort of new "European" architecture can (best)
handle is a dangerous illusion.
So far as UK national activity is concerned
this may be elaborated by suggesting that:
(1) The "region" is clearly identified
as the "Balkans".[6]
(2) There is a Directorate[7]
in the FCO in London which is
— adequately staffed and resourced
— focused on the region as a whole.
— not diverted to other responsibilities.
(3) This FCO Directorate leads an effective,
continuing cross-department, "joined-up Government",
working party of other UK Government Departments (Intelligence
services; MoD; DfID; DTI; Home Office—Asylum and Refugees)
with selected non-governmental organisation (NGO) participation.
(4) The staffing and resources of UK posts
in regional countries are fully sufficient and their remit includes
feed-back both to the FCO Directorate and directly to the "joined-up"
working group.
So far as the UK contribution to organisations
is concerned
(5) This requires that there should be continuing
contact with key individuals in other "contact Group"
Governments through UK posts in their capitals and that these
feed back primarily to the Directorate.
(6) There is also a live and again pro-active
network of contacts with the European Commission, with the UNO
(and with its Agencies), with NATO and, particularly, with OSCE,
feeding back to the Directorate.
6 See Annex: The "Balkans" Region as a "working
unit" for the purposes of the management of UK Foreign policy. Back
7
I am somewhat uncertain about FCO terminology on Commands, Directorates
and Desks. Amongst these, to the extent that I correctly understand
them, I believe that "the Balkans" rates less than a
Command and more than a collection of desks. Back
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