APPENDIX 14
Memorandum submitted by Mr Charles Meynell,
Eastern Europe Newsletter and Russia Briefing
FOREIGN POLICY
LESSONS OF
KOSOVO CRISIS
1. The need for a consistently more forward-looking
foreign policy based on long-term objectives.
Western policy towards the politically difficult
countries and regions of "Greater Europè (eg Russia,
Ukraine and much of the Balkans) has tended to be passive unless
forced to be otherwise because of wider security implications.
A policy of merely maintaining the status quo
in Britain's relations with, and involvement in, countries of
normally marginal economic or political importance, is rational.
In the case of Serbia, which was politically important because
of heavy British involvement in Bosnia, the inability of Western
government to exert significant influence over Milosevic's regime
and local politics generally encouraged lethargy in Western chancelleries.
By mid-1998 it was clear that the Kosovar Albanians
had inexorably set in motion a drive for de facto independence
from Serbia. It was at this point that British policy—still
largely ad hoc, and somewhat restricted by EU collective
considerations—failed to establish a coherent plan based
on the inevitability of eventual Kosvar Albania independence.
It is widely appreciated that once national
discontent in a particular country or region emerges strongly,
it can usually only be channelled, not stopped. In the circumstances,
the notion that the Kosovar Albanians' drive for independence
could be thwarted was always misplaced. Internationally there
was a certain stupor over Kosova, born of the long-held fear that
de facto or de jure independence for Kosova would
automatically lead to profound regional instability, including
the collapse of the Macedonian state and a call for independence
by other minorities in the Balkans and elsewhere. A similar stupor
applied to most Western powers, including Britain, during the
start of Yugoslavia's break-up in 1991. By early 1998 at the latest
it was clear that none of the conventional fears of domino-like
southern Balkan conflagration, or of other minorities suddenly
claiming independence on the strength of Kosova's hypothetical
example, was at all likely to materialise.
Apart from the need for a forward-looking policy
unfettered by excessive conventional wisdom, individual diplomatic
and other reporting should be more free-wheeling, and not overly
constrained by London's line (when there is one) or by the embassy
"view".
2. That instability within the "greater"
Europe extending to the eastern borders of Poland, Slovakia and
Romania and south to the Bosphorus must always be addressed by
the Western powers rather than neglected until it is too late
to prevent or lessen a disaster—as happened in Bosnia-Hercegovina
and then Kosova.
The economic and human penalties of inadequate
action are too obvious to restate.
In the Balkans the EU countries collectively
and individually informally decided at the start of the decade
not to adopt a pro-active, preventative-type policy in Europe's
unstable quarters. However, in the event of war the EU and the
advanced industrialised countries have to foot the bill for refugees
and reconstruction. It is indisputable that "to do nothing"
(as in Bosnia) is vastly more expensive economically in the longer-term
than to adopt a seemingly expensive pro-active and sometimes interventionist
policy from the start. The bill to the West of the post-Yugoslav
"wars of succession" is not far short of $50 billion,
and will probably increase to well beyond this level bearing in
mind that the annual cost of maintaining 50,000 troops overseas
in combat readiness is about $10 billion.
HOW BEST
TO PROMOTE
PEACE AND
STABILITY IN
THE REGION
1. Try to arrange for the presence of a
contingent of armed NATO troops in Montenegro, and for the continued
presence of NATO troops in Albania and Macedonia. (Arrangements
for these last two appear well in place).
The presence of even a battalion-strong contingent
assists stability and greatly deters adventurists. Even informal
security guarantees given to the Montenegrin leadership under
President Djukanovic have played a key role in dissuading the
Serbian regime under Milosevic from using force against the local
administration.
2. In Kosova and Albania arrange for a long-term
commitment (ten years) for the presence at every level in the
police department and interior ministry of Albanian language-trained
British police.
While KFOR and UN arrangements for Kosova are
in-the-making, Albania itself is trapped in mediaeval-style anarchy
largely because of the inability of the local police to re-introduce
basic law and order. Until there is such basic law and order there
is little merit in financing any other aid programme for the country.
A British police contingent would need senior retired and serving
officers from the level of Chief Constable downwards. There is
scope only for experienced officers. Overall the country needs
at least 1,000 foreign police personnel. There might be a case
for deploying former Military Police personnel.
Tirana is not particularly sensitive to its
dependence on the outside world, or to the surrender of some sovereignty
that is implied in the introduction of foreign police on a large
scale.
Lawlessness in Albania critically affects stability
in Montenegro, Kosova, Macedonia and the border regions of north-western
Greece. Drug, arms and human traffiking will not be contained
until Albania has basic law and order, with a workable customs
regime as a priority. Relative stability in Albania, and in Macedonia,
reduces the scope for any future resurgence of Greek nationalism
in the region as seen in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
3. Explore the possibilities for harnessing
the knowledge of British framers (particularly hill farmers) to
assist specific agricultural programmes in Albania and Kosova.
Stabilising the highlands and rural areas in
Albania, and thus reversing the catastrophic rural-to-urban population
drift, is the second most important objective for Albania after
the re-introduction of basic law and order. Unlike Kosova, in
Albania in many districts there is now a shortage of farming know-how.
The presence of experienced British farmers working "in the
field" would enable the small-scale funding and completion
of agricultural projects—eg blocked irrigation channels,
mechanical work-shops, seed distribution etc. Obviously the farmers
would have to be selected very carefully.
Linked to the above is forestry management.
Never good, management has collapsed totally since 1990. Large
areas of highland country and lower lying foothills face serious
and often irreversible soil erosion. Natural forest regeneration
is negligible, partly because of goats eating saplings, but also
because of constant coppicing, forest fires etc. A relatively
small team of British foresters (Forest Commission and private
woodland owners) working alongside the local forestry authorities
could make a vital contribution to the country's future. A second
stage—once there is rudimentary control over the more important
afforested areas—would be investment in small furniture
manufacturing plants.
The combination of policing the country to re-establish
law and order, and the presence of "hands on" foreign
managerial and technical assistance in farming and forestry, would
be the best way of eventually establishing stability in Albania.
While much of the above is not directly within
the remit of the FCO, the latter should use its good offices to
help the introduction of foreign expertise of the right kind to
help get small-scale projects underway and properly managed.
4. Support the Montenegrin pro-independence
parties.
For several years there has been an informed
minority view that Montenegrin independence would serve both Balkan
stability and make for better relations with the West. The key
point behind this thesis was that stability in the southern Balkans
would not be achieved until the Serb-dominated rump Yugoslav federation
had been broken as the major military and economic power north
of Greece and south of Austria. The fact that Milosevic's regime
instigated wars in Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosova abundantly
proved the point. Independence for Motenegro—which would
be free to consort with Serbia in whatever confederal or other
arrangements it might wish to make in the future—would ensure
absolutely that Serbian nationalist-chauvinists could not inflict
such regional damage again for at least several generations. Hopefully
Serbia's isolation will make its inhabitants, particularly its
jaded political-power establishment, aware of the need to drop
the domineering and aggressive attitude that has pervaded much
of Serbian society for generations.
The notion that a small state such as Montenegro
does not have the essential economic attributes for successful
independence is no longer valid—partly because of global
economic interdependence and the "borderless" nature
of modern commerce, but also because in practice small economies
are easier to manage than large ones—viz Slovenia.
5. Expand the BBC External Services training
programmes for TV and radio journalists in the southern Balkans.
Even a modicum of balanced reporting in the
local media is a crucial ingredient for future stability.
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