APPENDIX 15
Memorandum submitted by Dr G W Hopkinson
1. The foreign policy lesson of the Kosovo crisis
cannot be divorced from the military ones. What was done or not
done, and by whom, reflected military capabilities and the willingness,
or lack of it, to use them. A much greater military capacity,
as well as its relatively simpler decision making process, has
given the United States a preponderant voice in the affairs of
the Balkans in recent years. Despite their wealth, the aspirations
of the early 1990s and the significant financial contributions
made to reconstructing Bosnia, Europe and the European nations
have not been the prime actors.
2. In Bosnia, US concern over keeping its
military free from the control of any other authority contributed
to the international community's doing less than might have been
desirable and achievable in the reconstruction. More importantly,
for a long time, the US showed great unwillingness to become directly
involved militarily, and certainly on the ground. Nevertheless,
it constantly pursued its own agenda politically, effectively
frustrating the Vance-Owen proposals. Its eventual military engagement
on the ground brought to bear capabilities which the Europeans
were unable to muster. Also, the US was locked in politically,
with the result that the US had to be the political driver of
the settlement. It is almost always unwilling to play unless it
is the leader.
3. In Kosovo, US unwillingness to suffer
casualties dictated a form of intervention which exposed the Western
position to a very high degree of risk. The Europeans were too
weak militarily to intervene alone on the ground. Only the US
had large numbers of the systems and weapons which could operate
with any degree of accuracy in the high-level or stand-off bombing
campaign on which it insisted. Thus, it had the predominant say
in how NATO conducted its campaign.
4. During the course of 1998 signs of Serbian
ill treatment of the Kosovar Albanians mounted. The US threatened
a form of military action but was opposed to engagement on the
ground. There was more desire in Europe for military action but
a lack of capacity. The outcome of the consequent frustration
was the St Malo Declaration at the Franco-British Summit in December
1998. This committed the two European powers most prepared for
such engagement to developing the necessary capabilities. However
attainment of substantial European force projection capabilities
still lies someway in the future. Meanwhile both the US and Europeans
draw lessons from Kosovo which have significant implications for
the future of NATO and the transatlantic relationship.
5. The Kosovo campaign was waged by NATO,
despite Russian objections, and in the absence of specific UN
Security Council authority. Intervention by force in a sovereign
state, over the ill treatment of its own citizens, raises many
difficult issues of international law. Those will need further
careful consideration for the future, not least as regards the
role of the UN where force is used or threatened. The UN Secretary
General's statement of 20 September was not only a plea for a
shift in states' immunity as regards internal affairs but also
an assertion that intervention was a matter for the UN not individual
states or military alliances.
6. On the one hand, it will be necessary
to give effect to international law prohibiting certain forms
of behaviour; on the other, it will be necessary to discourage
any cult of unilateral action. Neither NATO nor any of its members
can or should be able to intervene by force simply on the basis
of their own judgement of a desirable course. That would set precedents
which they would come to rue as others seized upon them and intervened
in other cases, contrary to the judgements or interests of Western
states.
7. Some of the smaller and some of the newer
members were perhaps surprised to discover that NATO membership
involved intervention in a sovereign rather than territorial defence.
For its part, the US found it extremely frustrating having to
deal with 18 other countries, many of whom had very different
ideas about what should be done, and in what manner (The US preferred
model of civil-military relations is not of universal application;
NATO learned important lessons about politico-military control,
public relations and so on).
8. Despite differing views over the Kosovo
intervention, NATO members managed to maintain solidarity during
the campaign. The degree of cohesion shown was remarkable but
had Mr Milosevic not yielded when he did it is conceivable that
public differences would have become so stark that NATO would
have had to end the bombing. For the future, it is possible that
Kosovo marks the end of intervention operations by NATO as such,
as opposed to coalitions of the willing amongst its members. The
US will feel happier with a smaller number of like-minded states.
Some of the smaller European countries will be more at ease with
no implicit commitment to intervention or expeditionary warfare.
9. Moving from the military related lessons,
by the time of the Dayton Agreement on Bosnia in November 1995,
it was clear that there would be a major problem over Kosovo.
The particular nature and urgency of the negotiations at Dayton
precluded its inclusion. Mr Milosevic was regarded as an integral
part of that settlement and additional pressure could not be brought
to bear on him over this separate question. Nevertheless, the
issue remained and it appears, in retrospect, that the winding-up
of the EU-UN led International Conference on former Yugoslavia,
after Dayton but before a more comprehensive settlement of Balkan
issues, was a mistake. It was compounded by the fact that the
continuing diplomatic sanctions included the suspension of Yugoslavia
from the OSCE. That did not bring about the desired result, and
indeed had a negative effect.
10. A more serious foreign policy lesson
of the period between Dayton and the start of the Kosovo campaign
was the unhappy result of posing at Rambouillet demands which
could not be accepted by Mr Milosevic, and which were in fact
omitted from the post-campaign settlement. These included the
idea of a referendum after three years, and the entrance of NATO
into Serbia proper. Proper analysis of likely Serbian positions
should have indicated that these were non-starters.
11. Because of history and geography, overall
pacification and stabilisation of the Balkans must include the
integration of Serbia. That is not possible under the current
regime but integrating the whole area into the wider European
structures, and the problem of recreating civil society in Serbia
itself, Kosovo, Bosnia and several other states in the region,
cannot be tackled if Serbia is excluded.
12. The Stability Pact can be a most useful
instrument for integration, and should help with civil society.
The short lesson of the last few years is that both aspects will
require the involvement of outside powers. Those will include
the US and the EU members, but also Central and Eastern European
countries which have made, or are making, successful transitions
from communist regimes.
13. Over a period of years, diplomatic and
economic sanctions alone have not proved effective in changing
Mr Milosevic's stance. Military action has proved essential but
diplomatic and military measures need to be combined for an effective
result. There is very little evidence to suggest that the NATO
bombing campaign was by itself effective in inducing Mr Milosevic
to come to terms. Even its extension to economic and infrastructure
targets seems not to have tipped the scales. The senior NATO officer
conducting operations was forecasting about another two months
as being necessary. The conjunction of renewed hints of ground
intervention, pressure from the KLA on the ground, and more significantly,
political pressure from Russia appear to have been necessary.
Of these, history will probably show that the Russian engagement
was the decisive factor. A relevant question, therefore, is why
Russia put pressure on Belgrade after being initially so opposed
to NATO military intervention. The answer may well be that Russia
sought to get matters back into channels where it might have more
of a voice, rather than being manifestly excluded from the process.
SUMMARY
14. To summarise the foreign policy lessons
the Western powers should have been able to see the crisis coming
well before they did. Even if preventative action was not possible
at Dayton then it should have been pursued immediately afterwards.
The suspension of Yugoslavia from the OSCE was not helpful.
15. At a later stage, if military threats
were to be made, then, to be credible, they should have involved
ground forces. Appearing to rule out their involvement was a most
serious error. The US unwillingness to engage on the ground gave
rise to a feeling in Belgrade that Serbia might be able to hang
on until NATO's unity cracked. The comparative military weakness
of the Europeans in those capabilities which are required for
intervention meant that they could not take the necessary steps
on their own. Meanwhile civilian casualties, the failure to halt
(indeed the exacerbation of) the exodus of refugees, and the lack
of impact of the bombing on the Serbian position, increased the
already substantial doubts of some NATO members.
16. European military weakness meant the
involvement of the US to a very great degree, but that in turn
meant that the campaign was conducted very much on lines that
met US requirements. NATO has lessons to learn over the conduct
of operations. Many NATO countries are faced with a new realisation
about what membership now involves. The US realises as never before
the difficulties of taking decisions and getting its way in the
Alliance. These factors together may mean that NATO, as such,
undertakes no further significant interventions.
17. Most important of all, exclusion of
Russia from the process of European security is likely to be counter-productive.
Mr Milosevic buckled when there were increasing hints of ground
involvement and when the Russians joined in putting pressure on
him. Involving the Russians not only helped repair fences with
them in general but also ensured that there would be no obstruction
in the Security Council on the post bombing settlement.
18. European security must involve, in some
degree or another, an element of force but also the political
participation of all the major countries. That cannot allow a
preponderant share to any one actor. The US has by far the greatest
military strength of any player in the various security structures
but its preferred way of using that strength may accord neither
with European wishes, nor the needs of the situation. Military
means are only tools: they should be used in furtherance of carefully
defined political ends. Those ends should be proportioned to the
means available, not simply to desirable gestures.
19. There are major questions to be addressed
about intervention and the role of the UN. There will not be unanimity
about the answers; Asian countries in particular will have reservations.
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