APPENDIX 16
Supplementary evidence submitted by Dr
W G Hopkinson
How the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
might best promote Peace and Stability in the Region
1. Some of the problems of the region arise
from the violent break-up of Yugoslavia with the displacement
of persons and the destruction of property. Others, in some senses
more difficult to remedy, stem from the absence of a political
and civic culture. The rule of law is lacking; all too often there
are no proper legal codes, no efficient police force, no independent
judiciary, and above all, no habit of recourse to the police and
courts to resolve disputes. Thus, intimidation and corruption
flourish, crime is rife, and investment is deterred.
2. The states or areas with major social,
political and economic problems include Serbia and Kosovo, Macedonia
and Croatia. Albania is amongst the worst cases in the Balkans.
Even a number of the neighbouring states such as Bulgaria and
Romania have yet to make the difficult transition to fully functioning
democratic market economies.
3. Serbia will carry a considerable burden
of guilt and bad image, particularly perhaps with Albania and
Macedonia. A key consideration for regional stability will be
the transition of Serbia to a constitutional, law based state;
that will be difficult for many reasons. Its general political
and social reconstruction will be necessary for the removal of
some of the most dangerous tensions in the region. It is by no
means clear how that can be accomplished. The present regime is
almost certainly irreformable. The opposition, though well intentioned
in part, is apparently incapable of dislodging Mr Milosevic. This
again will need to be considered principally in multilateral fora.
4. Kososvo is a special and problematic
case, at present the subject of international help and direct
international intervention. Establishing legitimacy there will
be exceptionally difficult, and there will be a long term role
for the international community in building civil society. The
resolution of its future, independence, autonomy, confederation
or whatever, will be a major internal issue for any new government,
and a great external one too. Managing that well will be a major
contribution to the stability of the region. The move to direct
responsibility of local actors will be a major and delicate operation.
5. Bosnia too is a special case both as
regards the role of outside actors, and as regards the problems
posed to the development of civil society by its ethnically based
entities. There will be understandable reluctance to revisit the
Dayton Agreement, but if it is not revised civil society's development
may be fatally impeded. At the very least, continued outside involvement
in Bosnia will be required for years to come.
6. The policy agenda is therefore massive
and complex. There will be little possibility of early international
agreement on all the issues and, even if there were, implementation
would take a long time. The prime need is for sustained international
action across a range of issues.
7. The FCO will have to work bilaterally
and multilaterally. Multilateral engagement may include the UN,
NATO and OSCE. The main forum should be the EU and the related
Stability Pact. Bilateral action should be harmonised so far as
possible with multilateral.
8. The key to long-term stability will be
the creation of appropriate economic institutions and practices.
That will involve the introduction of appropriate commercial codes;
the inculcation of modern and accountable political culture and
education as part of democratic institution-building; and the
application of OSCE and Council of Europe norms.
9. Priority tasks to be addressed include
the creation of effective police forces and of effective and incorrupt
judicial and legal systems. Those will be necessary but not sufficient
steps to start rooting out corruption and encouraging investment.
If these are grasped there will be the possibility of attracting
private sector finance to build up the economies. What will have
to be emphasised is that it is new practices, habits and attitudes
as much as institutions which are required. The challenge will
be to encourage local actors to prepare a political programme
to inculcate those. Even if the actors are willing they will have
to overcome formidable obstacles in many countries, not least
in the lack of a political culture robust enough to withstand
the undoubted discontent which the initial stages of reform will
provoke. Most of this should be approached multilaterally, though
the UK can contribute particular expertise in commercial and financial
areas and in strong political habits.
10. The longer term objective will be to
prepare the states of the region for membership of the EU after
democratisation. That will involve moving over time towards the
acquis communautiare whilst undertaking economic restructuring
and institution-building. Meanwhile, the Stability Pact should
be accessible to a new government of Serbia at an early stage
and provide the framework for relations with the EU.
11. Dealing with regional instabilities
will involve many of the institutions of the European security
architecture. The former Yugoslav nations were not part of the
CFE framework. Parallel rules on arms limitations and transparency
need to be introduced. Over time, the Stability Pact may do for
this area what CSCE and OSCE did for most of the rest of Europe.
That, however, will require great effort by all parties on confidence
building measures.
12. There will be a continuing need for
direct external involvement in almost all the countries of the
region. Stability there will require the investment of resources.
Those will certainly include finance but even more skills, political,
legal and administrative. There is a major gendarmarie role to
be undertaken in Kosovo for some years.
13. The long-term objective of integration
with Europe requires both working with the states of the region
towards that, and ensuring that EU institutions and programmes
are prepared to serve this end. That points to continuing efforts
to reform the CAP and the Cohesion and Regional Funds, an area
where the FCO should continue to keep up pressure.
14. The FCO can contribute through the normal
channels of policy formation in Brussels, and bi-laterally with
its EU partners. It should exploit the relationship with the US
to help avoid unhelpful US unilateral policies, and it should
remain aware that the solutions will require efforts over many
years. Early expectations of disengagement, even in the military
sphere should be discouraged. There are no easy options for ensuring
stability. Deep and sustained engagement is required.
15. Meanwhile the UK should undertake a
liberal policy of secondment of customs officers, police officers,
private sector financial and economic experts, and others. The
FCO should seek resources to bring actors from the region to the
UK for training and experience. An active "know-how"
fund arrangement to deal with political education in Kosovo and
Serbia would be highly desirable.
16. At the highest levels, consideration
should be given, with allies and partners, to how the regime in
Serbia could be changed. That will be difficult and probably turbulent.
However, it is one of the necessary steps to peace.
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