APPENDIX 22
Memorandum submitted by The European Commission
1. The Kosovo crisis was an important test
of the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy. As the crisis
unfolded in 1998 and early 1999 the Union was closely involved
in the ongoing diplomatic efforts. It is worth describing the
various phases of the crisis:
— During the first nine months of 1998
the Contact Group made diplomatic efforts to resolve the increasing
tensions in Kosovo. The Union was represented in the Contact Group
by the Presidency and the Commission. So until June 1998 the British
led the Union representation (and were also permanent members
of the Contact Group); In the second half of 1998 the Austrian
Presidency joined the Group The Commission therefore provided
an element of continuity in the Union's representation.
— In October 1998 the crisis entered
a new phase with the Holbrooke/Milosevic agreement which provided
inter alia for shuttle diplomacy between the Serbs and
Kosovar Albanians conducted by an American representative (Chris
Hill, US Ambassador in Skopje) and an EU representative (Wolfgang
Petritsch, Austrian Ambassador in Belgrade). The Contact Group
continued to meet regularly to review and assist the efforts of
the negotiators.
— In January 1999 the Contact Group
summoned the parties to Rambouillet in a final effort to resolve
the crisis. Talks were held at Rambouillet in February and in
Paris in March. By now the Union representation was led by the
German Presidency. The Commission were represented throughout
the Rambouillet/Paris talks. During the talks there were also
several meetings of the Contact Group at Ministerial level where
the Commission was represented by Commissioner Hans van den Broek.
— Following the start of NATO's air
campaign in March 1999 the Contact Group went into abeyance, largely
due to Russian opposition to the air strikes. Instead, diplomatic
efforts to resolve the crisis centred on the G8 which met several
times at Ministerial and Senior Official level. The Presidency
and the Commission again represented the Union (which has long
been the G8 practice). By coincidence, the Germans held the Presidency
of both bodies. The G8 continues to play a key role on Kosovo
and has just established a group of Regional Directors to meet
regularly to discuss issues connected with the implementation
of resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council.
2. The lessons that can be drawn from the
development of the crisis for CFSP include the following:
— It is important for the Union to
be properly represented in international bodies dealing with any
crisis. This was the case during most of the Kosovo crisis with
the Union represented by the Presidency and the Commission in
the Contact Group and the G8. Four members of the Union (UK,
France, Germany and Italy) were also members of both those bodies.
Union representation as such was weaker during the lacuna between
the effective end the Contact Group's activity and the decision
that the G8 should become the main vehicle for diplomatic activity
on Kosovo.
— It is also important that the various
strands of the Union's activity should be co-ordinated; and that
they should be coherent with other strands of activity by other
elements of the international community. As regards internal co-ordination
the Union performed well during the Kosovo crisis. Kosovo was
discussed at every meeting of the General Affairs Council and
Political Committee as the crisis developed in 1998 and early
1999. This internal co-ordination underpinned the Union's activity
in the Contact Group. It also meant that the Union's assistance
and reconstruction activities carried out by the Commission, could
be co-ordinated with the political and diplomatic activity.
3. The legal basis for EC reconstruction
assistance to Kosovo under the Obnova programme is Council Regulation
(EC) 1628/96 of 25 July 1996[16]
relating to aid for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
subsequently amended by Council Regulation (EC) 851/98 of 20 April
1998[17].
The objectives of this programme are to provide assistance for
reconstruction, return of refugees and displaced persons, as well
as economic and regional co-operation for the countries of ex
Yugoslavia.
4. Assistance was made available to the
province of Kosovo for the first time in 1998, when £10 million
was allocated for the following projects:
— rehabilitation of the university
of Pristina;
— supply of timber for rehabilitation
of dwellings; and
— supply of animal feed (inter alia
to preserve crops for planting and human consumption).
5. This programme has since been substantially
expanded, as a result of the recent conflict, and following the
successfully conclusion of the NATO action which culminated in
an agreement between NATO and the withdrawing Yugoslav armed forces.
6. Anticipating the large-scale reconstruction
programme that would be required in Kosovo, as well as learning
from past experiences (in particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina)
the European Commission proposed the creation of an Agency for
Reconstruction (endorsed by the European Council of Cologne) which
would be responsible for the delivery and implementation of EC
reconstruction assistance. The European Commission immediately
drafted a proposal for the amendment of the Obnova regulation.
In order to provide a legal basis for the Agency, which was submitted
to the Council of Ministers for decision, and the European Parliament
for opinion. In parallel with this legislative process the European
Commission mobilised 21 officials for the creation of a European
Commission Task Force in Pristina (TAFKO), responsible for the
implementation of the EC reconstruction programme, as a temporary
measure until such time as the Agency for Reconstruction became
operational. The Task Force has full responsibilities for implementation,
including the launch of tenders, the signature of contracts and
the payment of contractors as well as monitoring and evaluation.
7. The 1999 EC budget for Kosovo is
137 million. This has been made available in two
tranches. The first tranche of
45 million was readily available in the budget. The
second tranche of
92 million was subject to an amending and supplementary
budget, approved by the European Parliament and Council of Ministers
in September 1999.
8. The first action undertaken by the European
Commission was to carry out a rapid damage assessment in Kosovo.
The European Commission had already carried out a previous assessment
(concluded in February 1999), however, this was out of date, considering
that it had been carried out prior to the full escalation of the
conflict and the intervention of NATO. The damage assessment subsequently
commissioned was to focus on housing and local public infrastructure,
with a view to ascertaining the scope of the problem and thus
determining the best forms of assistance to the returning population.
An initial report prepared by the International Management Group
was issued at the end of July[18],
within one month of commencing the assessment. A more comprehensive
report is foreseen for the end of the year.
9. On this basis, together with indications
provided by the UN interim administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) which
pointed to specific needs in the public utilities sector, especially
energy etc, the European Commission compiled a first assistance
programme of
35.5 million: "an integrated rehabilitation
programme''. The focus of this programme was on the immediate
needs, identified by UNMIK and confirmed by the damage assessment
report, ie mainly on:
— rehabilitation of housing and public
buildings;
— support to public utilities (including
payment of local salaries on an exceptional basis);
— village employment and rehabilitation
scheme.
10. The programme was adopted by the European
Commission on 28 July 1999, just over one month after the conflict
ended.
Two additional programmes were adopted relatively
soon after the integrated rehabilitation programme, responding
to specific urgent requests formulated by UNMIK:
—
1 million for the rehabilitation of Mitrovica hospital:
a project responding not only to the significant needs of the
hospital in order to be able to provide a basic medical service
to the population, but also of highly political importance given
the divided city status of Mitrovica and the need to promote confidence-building
measures.
—
6 million for support to local administration and
transport infrastructure: The support for local administration
comprises a project for the secondment of experts from local administrations
in Member States to municipalities in Kosovo. This project is
designed to fill an urgent need with regard to the effective administration
of municipalities in a situation where there is an extremely limited
local budget, the needs are enormous, and the previous local administration
has disappeared (largely due to the exodus of the Serb population
from Kosovo) and the vacuum has been filled by inexperienced Kosovar
Albanians or self-appointed political figures who respect the
official mandate of UNMIK under UN Security Council Resolution
1244 to various degrees. With regard to transport, a project has
been compiled in order to provide urgent assistance to improve
the transport infrastructure prior to the onset of winter, which
is likely to lead to the deterioration of the already very poor
conditions (in particular of roads), and which are subject to
extremely heavy traffic, in particular of KFOR and aid convoys.
11. To date one other programme has been
committed with EC funds: the Administrative and Technical Assistance
Facility (
6 million) which is used to finance projects of mutual
benefit to the beneficiary and to the European Commission (eg
project preparation, monitoring and audit of projects etc). Of
the
62 million committed to date under the 1998 and 1999
reconstruction programme, a total of 68 per cent has been contracted
(74 per cent since July 1999).
12. The European Commission is currently
preparing a final programme for the commitment of the remaining
85 million available under the 1999 budget. A financing
proposal is due to be submitted to Member States for opinion at
the next management committee on 23 November.
13. In its initial estimates, the European
Commission indicated that a budget of
1.5 billion would be required for reconstruction
in Kosovo for the period 2000-03. This figure is now under discussion
in the context of the debate over the draft budget for 2000, which
is to be approved by the European Parliament and the Council of
Ministers.
14. The launching of the Stability Pact
at Cologne in June 1999, and its re-launch by Heads of Government
at Sarajevo the following month, was a major success. The Pact
embraces all member states of the European Union (plus the Commission)
together with all states and regional organisations with a claim
to an interest in South Eastern Europe: the states of the region
(except the FRY) and their neighbours; states with a major interest
in the region (the US, Russia, Canada and Japan); and a wide range
of international organisations.
15. The Pact commits all its members to
strive for an end to tensions and crises; democratic political
processes; peaceful and good-neighbourly relations; multinational
and multi-ethnic diversity; vibrant market economies; economic
co-operation within the region and with the rest of Europe; combating
organised crime, corruption and terrorism; preventing forced population
displacement; the return of all refugees and IDPs; and the creation
of the conditions for the countries of the region to integrate
into the political, economic and security structures of their
choice. All its members also reaffirm their commitment to the
UN Charter, OSCE norms etc.
16. The countries of the region pledge to
work for stability and growth and commit themselves to democratic
and economic reforms. Initiatives on reducing arms spending, regional
trade co-operation, political relations between regional states
etc are all helpful in this respect. In turn the international
community pledges a greater engagement in the region.
17. Another key task for the Pact will be
to rationalise and co-ordinate the plethora of international instruments/initiatives
in the Western Balkans. More is not necessarily better.
16 O J L 204 of 14.8.96. Back
17
O J L 122 of 24.4.98. Back
18
European Commission: Emergency Assessment of Damaged Housing
and Local/Village Infrastructure in Kosovo: July 1999 (International
Management Group). Back
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