APPENDIX 26
Memorandum submitted by Mr Mark Thompson
1. Two months ago, and perhaps still today, the
OSCE head of mission in Kosovo was saying (privately) that the
greatest threat to UNMIK was posed by the situation at Mitrovica,
where the stand-off between the Albanian majority and the Serb
minority had taken territorial shape. For security reasons that
are all too understandable, KFOR troops have in some places interposed
themselves—the bridge(s) at Mitrovica being the most notorious
place. Let no one misunderstand: if territorial partition is seen
to succeed. Even on a relatively minuscule scale, then the overall
chances of stabilising Kosovo will be greatly damaged.
2. On this theme: the Dayton settlement
in Bosnia and Herzegovina presents a grim precedent for Kosovo,
understood by the various leaders there. Dayton is a bad agreement,
indifferently implemented. BH is 98 per cent ethnically partitioned
and undemocratic. The refugee problem—indeed, the "democracy"
shortfall as such—is single and indivisible, regardless
of "internationally recognised". Kosovo is tiny; international
action in neighbouring countries and areas will swiftly wash through
it.
3. The positive momentum created by NATO's
action in Kosovo should have been used for a vigorous, concerted
push on refugee and democracy issues throughout the region, wherever
the international community possesses leverage (ie everywhere
except Serbia). This opportunity was not so much lost as ignored.
Regrettably too, tentativeness seems to be the international order
of the day concerning Croatia, where President Tudjman's imminent
disappearance makes diplomats worry about stability—overlooking
the fact that Tudjman has been a factor of regional instability
since his election in 1990.
4. In short, it will be even more difficult
to prevent the consolidation of one-party authoritarianism in
Kosovo if the selfsame democratic goals (refugee return, rule
of law, accountable government, etc) are not vigorously pursued
elsewhere in the region. The redeployment of international resources
to Kosovo from BH—where, admittedly, they have not always
been highly effective—is a dismaying expedient that may
boomerang in the medium term.
5. The UK has already contributed generously
to the media-development plans of UNMIK. However, it is obvious
that progress in this vital area of democratic institution-building
has been delayed by misunderstanding between the UN and the OSCE
(the latter holding mandated responsibility for this area). As
a result, I am told that errors and wastefulness are dogging the
reform and relaunch of the radio-television network, and the new
regulatory process to licence private broadcasters.
6. Given the intricacy of the mandate with
its multiple pillars under the umbrella of the SRSG, it is not
surprising that this has happened. Based on information which
may not be complete, I suggest that the answer lies in allowing
the OSCE to exercise the untrammelled authority that it has been
granted, and resourcing it accordingly. Yet the problem will not
easily be resolved without clarification at a high level-perhaps
requiring intervention by the UN Secretary-General and the OSCE
chairman in office. Urgent pursuit of such clarification in New
York, with according instructions to UNMIK, would be most worthwhile.
It is regrettable that the "best" mandate for media-development
that has yet been devised in the Balkans risks being squandered.
7. Three further points on Kosovo: (a) Kosovo
was never "multiethnic" in the accepted sense of the
term. This misnomer probably makes life a bit easier for Kosovar
Albanian hardliners, because they can exploit it as implying an
international "threat" to repatriate Serbs. Our watchwords
should be tolerance and rule of law. (b) Hashim Thaci and other
ex-KLA leaders must be required to deliver, repeatedly, unconditional
messages of support for tolerance and against vigilante-type violence.
(c) It would help if highly visible justice could be served upon
some, at least, of the thugs and killers who terrorise Kosovar
Serbs.
8. On Montenegro: The progression towards
full independence is as unstoppable as gravity, unless the Milosevic
regime falls; because his regime does not and cannot negotiate
such matters. The game of "chicken" is less hazardous
for it. Tudjman and Izetbegovic, both "genuinè nationalists,
were excellent partners in their time. Fortunately for us, perhaps
unfortunately for Belgrade, Montenegro's leader Milo Djukanovic
is not an ideological nationalist. Moreover, the pro-Serbian portion
of Montenegro's population with its heartland in the north, as
well as the presence of a Yugoslav Army, will not let him rush
headlong to independence. Assuming no change in Belgrade over
the next six months, then, the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavià
will probably disintegrate. A degree of violence will probably
be unavoidable—with Muslims in the north among the victims.
As long as the casualties remain within "acceptablè
limits, the violence, will be convenient both for Milosevic ("we
fought to keep the common state!") and Djukanovic ("our
heroes shed blood to win independence from the butcher of Belgrade!").
9. Two personal recommendations: (a) International
visitors should keep advising Djukanovic to apologise for Montenegro's
role in the war against southern Croatia. He should be made uncomfortable
about this; it would be difficult to keep repeating the absurd
rebuttal he used earlier this year (that he doesn't know who should
apologise for what). His likely private excuse will be that he
is not yet strongly enough placed to make such gestures. That
would be merely an excuse. He wants us to think he has changed;
let him prove it with a few words that could really make a difference.
(b) Likewise, Djukanocvic should be pressured into publicly renouncing
any claim to the Prevlaka peninsula, in Croatia. Such a gesture
would mend fences with Croatia, expose Belgrade's obstructionism
on this small but significant issue, and accelerate a peaceful
solution of this dispute, possibly involving international arbitration
to settle the maritime border.
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