APPENDIX 27
Memorandum submitted by Serbian Information
1. THE PRESENT
DAY RELEVANCE
OF THE
HISTORY OF
KOSOVO AND
METOHIJA
Although it is difficult, almost impossible, for
a Serb to start a discourse on Kosovo without referring to history,
in this paper we shall endeavour to concentrate on the present.
In Annex I we submit a paper prepared by the Serbian Information
Centre in 1998 under the title "The Kosovo Crisis",
which gives a history of Kosovo and Metohija as seen through a
Serbian eyes.
We fully appreciate that all European nations
have had to overcome their historical aspirations and traditions
in order to achieve the lasting peace and harmony. The Serbs have
a particular difficulty here because the Kosovo battle from 1389
has been woven into the Serbian national poetry, tradition and
beliefs. The modern day nationhood of the Serbs is rooted in the
Kosovo tradition.
It is to no avail to call it a myth, a legend
or a delusion. Be what it may, it plays an important part in the
contemporary politics of Serbia. No Serbian politician of consequence,
and by the same token, no diplomat or foreign affairs department
can turn a blind eye and fail to recognise the relevance of Kosovo
in present-day Serbia.
Like any history, the Kosovo tale can play either
a positive or a negative role in the development of a nation.
In the nineteenth century the memories of Kosovo uplifted the
national spirit and led to the liberation of Serbia from the centuries
of Turkish occupation. At the beginning of the twentieth century
the Kosovo legend helped the Serbs endure and win several wars
and, as they saw it, liberate the Slav population of the former
Yugoslavia.
However, in the hands of unscrupulous leaders
the Kosovo legend may only too easily be turned into a tool of
political manipulation. The current rulers of Serbia have, for
their own ends, inflated the Kosovo myth out of all proportions
and turned it into a means of oppression of their own people.
The Serbs, in the last years of the former Yugoslavia, were artificially
confronted with the Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Muslims in
Bosnia and finally the Albanians.
2. THE CAUSES
OF THE
DISINTEGRATION OF
YUGOSLAVIA
The Serbs were, in a way, victims of their own
historical success. The Serbian view that their victories resulted
in the liberation of the Slavs from the Turkish and Austro-Hungarian
yoke, was half-heartedly shared by the Croats, Slovenes and Macedonians.
It could not have, and has not been, shared by non-Slavs, such
as Albanians and Hungarians in Yugoslavia.
Therefore the regionalisation of Yugoslavia
and decentralisation of the political powers was an obvious solution.
The process started in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia through negotiations
between the democratically elected representatives of the Croats,
Slovenes and Serbs. This was curtailed by the advent of communism
in 1945, and restarted again under Tito's dictatorship in the
late 1960's and early 1970's. The process of decentralisation
was undemocratic, the population of Yugoslavia did not have any
say in it, and, in, sense, it was immaterial at the time, because
whatever the Constitution comprised, all the reins of power were
firmly in one hand.
In other words, all autonomy notionally given
was only an empty shell meant to conceal the fact that all power
was centralised in one figure. This centralisation and concentration
of the political powers in one pair of hands allowed Tito to play
with the Constitution of 1974 and grant an almost independent
status to the republics and autonomous provinces, knowing fully
well that all such autonomy is just a farce as long as the Communist
Party, the secret police and the army played neatly to his tune.
Following Tito's death in 1980, the Communist
Party apparatchiks found themselves in charge of near independent
provinces. It took them some time to realise that, and when it
dawned on them it signalled the end of the former Yugoslavia.
The erstwhile Tito's puppets, whom he could remove by a slight
motion of his hand, all of a sudden treated as abhorrent an idea
of power sharing at federal or any other level.
It took several years of hard propaganda work
before the idea of disintegration of Yugoslavia was hammered into
the heads of ordinary Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Bosnian Muslims
and Macedonians.
3. THE CAUSES
OF CONFLICT
BETWEEN THE
SERBS AND
ALBANIANS IN
KOSOVO
Like the others, the Albanians in Kosovo and
Metohija had an "empty shell" autonomy. All the seats
in the Kosovo Assembly and all the top jobs in the Autonomous
Government were filled by the obedient Albanian members of the
Communist Party, and they towed the line dictated by Tito and
by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Once the centre
weakened in the early 1980's the province descended into near
anarchy and lawlessness used by the Albanian extremists to suppress
the Serbs and start the ethnic cleansing.
The Kosovo and Metohija autonomy, under the
1974 Constitution was drafted very liberally because it was not
ever intended to be used. It was just window dressing designed
to conceal Tito's personal dictatorship and unlimited power of
the Communist Party and comprised very obvious inconsistencies
putting Serbia in a constitutionally and politically humbling
position reflected in the fact that the Kosovo Assembly could
pass decisions independently, whereas the Kosovo delegates had
a power of veto in the Serbian Assembly. On the federal level
Kosovo, although notionally a province within Serbia, had an equal
status with Serbia and other republics.
Slobodan Milosevic, in his fight for supreme
power in Serbia, put together the Kosovo legend, the humbling
constitutional position of Serbia and the plight of the Kosovo
Serbs at the hands of the Albanian extremists. This explosive
mixture rocketted him to the top position in Serbia, whence he
hoped to climb to power in Yugoslavia.
4. ABSENCE OF
NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN
SERBS AND
ALBANIANS
By his ideological formation Slobodan Milosevic
was not given to tolerating different political opinions. His
instincts were authoritarian, and his actions were oppressive
and harsh. Rather than negotiate with what modetare leaders the
Albanians in Kosovo had, he orchestrated the trial of Azem Vlasi
and Kacusha Jashari and arranged for them to be sentenced and
imprisoned in 1988.
This attitude opened the way for more radical
leaders such as Ibrahim Rugova. They were also ignored by the
Serbian government which led to their demise and the appearance
of armed insurgents. True to his form, Milosevic used an excessive
force and brutality to quell the mutiny in 1998.
The Albanians were not in a negotiating mood
either. In the period between 1990 and 1998, Ibrahim Rugova and
his Kosovo Democratic Party refused any contacts with the Serbian
opposition parties. The Albanians did not value a compromise and
declined to take part in the fledgling democratic processes in
Serbia since 1990. The Albanian boycot of elections in Serbia
greatly helped the Milosevic regime because it gave it as a gift
some 30 seats in the National Assembly of Serbia. It appears that
both sides actually shared the same values of tolerance, authoritarianism,
and national exclusivity, and supported the most extreme exponents
one within the other.
5. PUNISHMENT
OF THE
SERBIAN REGIME
OR OF
THE SERBIAN
PEOPLE?
It is probable that the Serbian regime was complicit
in the war crimes and crimes against humanity in Bosnia. The massacre
of the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica seems to have finally tipped
the scales of the western public opinion against the Serbian regime.
It appears that, subsequent to Srebrenica, the
western public opinion was ready to believe in any imaginable
crime against humanity allegedly perpetrated by the exponents
of the Serbian regime. When the reports of massacres started trickling
out of Kosovo they were received as a gospel truth. The adverse
reports of the OSCE observer mission did nothing to alleviate
fears of the international community that frightful crimes against
the civilians were being committed. The constant provocations
of the KLA, although reported have been ignored. The fact that
the KLA was an armed organisation of the Albanian civilians was
also ignored. In the aftermath of Srebrenica any dead Albanian,
armed or unarmed, was a civilian. In the Racak ditch all 30 dead
bodies were in civilian clothes and armed.
The exodus of the OSCE observers from Kosovo
in 1998 mean that in the future any story from Kosovo, reporting
the most despicable atrocities, would be believed. Such stores
of 1,000 here and 10,000 there were helpfully distributed by the
KLA, and they helped the western leaders commit themselves finally
and irrevocably to a war against Serbia.
It seems that the so called Rambouillet negotiations
were doomed from the start because nobody believed the Milosevic
regime any more, and because a decision to punish Serbia by an
armed attack had, at that time, already been made. This decision
was based on frustration and anger, two very bad counsels in any
political matter. Sadly, the bombing of Serbia in the spring of
1999 meant that the western powers, instead of lifting the Milosevic
regime out of the mud it has created, descended into that muddy
pit and started fighting him on the only terms he understands,
force without rules. The regime received a well deserved beating,
the Serbian people suffered unnecessarily and the western powers
emerged dirtied by the very muck they so detested and strived
to remove.
6. RAMBOUILLET
WAS NOT
DIPLOMACY
It emerges now that the publication of the Appendix
B: Status of Multi-National Military Implementation Force was
suppressed and delayed. At least one of the German members of
Bundestag declared that she would not have voted for a military
action in Yugoslavia had she known of the existence and the contents
of the Appendix B. In his learned report under the title Kosovo:
Law and Diplomacy, Mark Littman QC stated in a footnote on page
11 that the military annexes were not placed in the House of Common
Library before 1 April 1999, one week after the bombing started.
How many honourable Members of Parliament would have voted in
favour of an armed intervention had they been aware of Appendix
B? We shall never know that, but it is clear now that the parliamentarians
in at least two key countries have not been properly briefed by
their executives.
The Yugoslav delegation accepted a political
settlement as early as 23 February 1999 and declared that Yugoslavia
was ready to consider the scope and character of an international
presence in Kosovo. All political provisions contained in the
Rambouillet draft had been agreed by 15 March 1999. On 23 March
1999 the Serbian Assembly adopted a resolution offering to negotiate
the composition of the international presence in Kosovo to monitor
the implementation of the Rambouillet agreement.
However, NATO regarded the military proposals
set out in Chapter 7 of the draft and Appendices A and B as non
negotiable. Therefore they were not proposals, they were an ultimatum.
Appendix B contained provisions which no self
respecting independent country could have accepted. Under the
draft the NATO forces would have been permitted to display NATO
or national flags; be immune from all legal processes and jurisdiction
of Yugoslav courts, arrest and detention. NATO personnel would
have enjoyed free and unrestricted passage throughout the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (in further text FRY), including the airspace
and territorial waters and would have been entitled to the right
of bivouac, manoeuvre, billet and utilisation of any areas or
facilities as required for support, training and operations.
The list goes on: NATO would have been exempted
from duties, taxes and other charges and inspections and custom
regulations. The FRY authorities would have facilitated all movement
of personnel, vehicles, vessels, aircraft, equipment or supplies
and no charges might be levied for air navigation, landing or
takeoff of aircraft. Vehicles, vessels and aircraft would not
have been subject to licensing or registration requirements, nor
commercial insurance.
NATO would have been granted the use of airports,
roads, rails and ports without payment of fees, duties, dues,
tolls or charges occasioned by mere use. NATO personnel would
have been exempted from taxation on the salaries and emoluments
and from all duties, taxes and other charges on moveable property
imported into or exported from FRY. The local personnel hired
by NATO would have been immune from legal process for declarations
or acts performed in official capacity, immune from national military
service obligations and exempted from taxation on the salaries.
NATO would have been granted all telecommunications
services, including broadcast services. The necessary utilities,
such as electricity, water and gas would have been provided at
the lowest rate. NATO and NATO personnel would have been immune
from all civil claims. In the conduct of the operation NATO would
have been entitled to detain individuals.
These terms were only proper for a signature
by a country defeated in war. They were rather meant to provoke
than to avert war. They were not an act of diplomacy but a bare
threat with military attack and invitation to surrender. IT was
a declaration of intent of NATO to occupy Kosovo and to deploy
in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav delegation was given no option but
to turn down such a diktat. Yet, the refusal was termed in cautious
words: "The FRY is ready to consider the scope and character
of an international presence in Kosovo..."
7. LEGALITY OF
BOMBING OF
SERBIA
In his report Mark Littman, QC is asking a question
whether the Serbs were the only aggressors, and his reply is as
follows:
"A common misapprehension is that, in the
several weeks leading up to a start of bombing on 24 March 1999,
there was a continuation of Serb aggression against the Albanians.
This is true. But it ignores the fact that so too was there a
continuation of aggression on the part of the Albanians.
A more accurate picture can be obtained from
extracts from current official NATO, OSCE and UN reports, extracts
of which can be found in Appendix 7 (of the Mark Littman report).
These reports show that, although were was considerable Serb military
activity in this period, it was by no means one-sided. These reports
support the statement of the OSCE that, although there was the
use of disproportionate force by the Serbs, it was in response
to persistent attacks and provocations by the Kosovo Albanian
paramilitaries."
The conclusion based on the principle of equal
treatment of both parties in the dispute would be that the Serbian
side was prevented to defend itself whereas the acts of aggression
of the Kosovo Albanian paramilitaries were condoned and rewarded.
Under International Law the government of the day is entitled
to defend its territory against the attacks of the insurgents.
NATO member countries have violated a number
of international treaties and conventions with air bombardment
of Serbia and Montenegro over the issue of Kosovo province.
1. It was a violation of Article 2, paragraph
4, of the UN Charter which states that all members of the UN shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state.
2. It was a violation of Article 2, paragraph
7, of the UN Charter which states that nothing contained in the
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state.
3. It was a violation of The North Atlantic
Treaty which in the preamble recites that the signatory states
are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence. Article
5 defines a purpose of NATO when it states that the parties agree
that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or
North America shall be considered an attack against them all,
and they will assist each other to fend off such an attack. Article
6 of the Treaty lists the territories against which an armed attack
would trigger a collective self-defence. Neither Kosovo nor Serbia
or Montenegro are on the list.
4. Finally, the bombardment was a violation
of the Helsinki Conference Final Act of 1975 which guarantees
the territorial frontiers of the European states. The Final Act
declares that the participating states will respect the territorial
integrity of one another and will refrain from any action against
the territorial integrity or the unity of any signatory state.
The proposed peace plan anticipated the secession of Kosovo through
NATO occupation and eventually the change of borders of Serbia
and Yugoslavia through a local referendum three years later on.
It is a widely accepted misconception that the
armed intervention in Yugoslavia would have been legal had the
UN Security Council authorised it. In fact, the UN Security Council
is bound by the UN Charter and UN Resolutions, and all decisions
must be taken in accordance with the provisions of the Charter
and Resolutions. Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter and Resolutions
2131 and 2625 exclude the matters which are within the domestic
jurisdiction and within the internal or external affairs of state
from the sphere of intervention by the United Nations. Therefore,
the Security Council would not have had power to authorise an
armed intervention in Yugoslavia over Kosovo, which is exclusively
an internal affair of the Yugoslav state. Any such decision would
have been "ultra vires".
8. THE UN RESOLUTION
1244 (1999) TERMINATING THE
BOMBING
After 68 days of the bombing campaign, peace
between NATO countries and Yugoslavia was brokered by Russians
and agreement finalised by the Finish president Ahtisari. This
agreement was, on 10 June 1999, embodied by the UN in the Resolution
1244.
Under the terms of the Resolution the FRY accepted
to put an end to the violence and repression in Kosovo and begin
withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary
forces synchronised with the deployment of the international security
presence. After the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and
Serb military and police personnel would be permitted to return
to Kosovo. An international civil and security presence would
be deployed in Kosovo under the United Nations auspices.
Such international security presence would:
— maintain the ceasefire, deter renewed
hostilities and prevent the return to Kosovo of Yugoslav forces:
— demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation
Arm (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian Groups;
— secure the return home of the refugees
and displaced persons;
— ensure public safety and order until
the international civil presence takes responsibility for this
task;
— supervise the mine fields clearing;
— support and co-ordinate work with
the international civil presence;
— conduct border monitoring duties;
— ensure the protection and freedom
of movement of the international civil presence and other international
organizations.
The international civil presence would, among
others:
— perform basic civilian and administrative
functions;
— organise and develop provisional
institutions for democratic and autonomous self government;
— maintain civil law and order, including
establishing local police and deployment of international police
personnel to serve in Kosovo;
— protect and promote human rights;
— assure the safe and unimpeded return
of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo.
It is obvious that NATO, after 10 weeks of bombing
made concessions which they could have made at Rambouillet and
resolved the matter peacefully. These concessions are (a) that
armed force should be authorised by the United Nations; (b) that
international force shall involve troops not only from NATO countries;
(c) that the civil administration shall be under control of the
United Nations; (d) that the international force shall have no
access to any parts of Yugoslavia outside Kosovo; (e) that the
international force shall disarm the KLA, and (f) that the sovereignty
of Yugoslavia over Kosovo should be acknowledged and confirmed.
9. DAMAGE CAUSED
BY ARMED
INTERVENTION
Damage caused by the bombing campaign has been
inflicted in Kosovo and in the rest of Serbia. Other than direct
damage caused by the bombs in the Kosovo cities, the bombing triggered
the "ethnic cleansing" of the Albanians from Kosovo.
Far from averting the humanitarian disaster, which was the prime
goal of the campaign, it appears to have aggravated the situation.
The NATO countries were aware of this contingency, but nevertheless
went ahead with bombing, contributing to the unfolding of human
suffering. Inevitably some bombs hit civilian targets causing
many victims among Albanians. The suffering continues because
many unexploded cluster bombs are taking their toll, specially
among the children in Kosovo.
In Serbia proper the bombs practically reduced
to ashes what industry there was and a substantial portion of
infrastructure. The estimates of damages range from $30 to $100
billion. It would take Serbia 18 years of development and reconstruction
to recover fully. However, under the regime of sanctions and lack
of foreign loans and investment Serbia is doomed to languish and
decline further.
There was an estimated death toll of 1,500 civilians
and 8,000 wounded.
The environmental damage is unquantifiable
following the destruction of the Pancevo agrochemical plant releasing
into the Danube 1,500 tons of vinyl chloride, 15,000 tons of ammonia,
800 tons of hydrochloric acid, 250 tons of liquid chlorine, large
quantities of dioxin and 100 tons of mercury. The use of the depleteduranium
tipped shells by NATO will lead to the contamination of the environment.
Serious psychological damages have been suffered
by many inhabitants of Serbia. Interminable series of bombing
missions preceded by air raid sirens instilled fear and anxiety.
The sound of explosions scared everybody. It is the children and
women who suffered most. Only the future psychological tests shall
establish the full extent of the harm done.
The political damage is huge. The Serbian democratic
opposition parties offered in their party programmes a political
model widely accepted and followed in the West. It is almost impossible
after the bombing to attract much political support for the introduction
of a political model followed by the NATO countries which took
part in the attacks on Yugoslavia. In this respect the armed intervention
had an adverse effect: instead of destabilising the current regime
in Serbia, it has actually reinforced it.
10. CURRENT SITUATION
IN KOSOVO
The withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces from Kosovo
and deployment of KFOR troops ought to have represented a turning
point from civil war towards the introduction of law and order.
The positive development is the return of the displaced Albanians
to their homes. However, the Serbs started leaving their homes
in great numbers and fleeing out of Kosovo apprehensive of the
revengeful Albanians.
It was not hard to envisage that the Albanian
extremists would take their revenge against the Serbs remaining
in Kosovo and the NATO countries, the UN and KFOR ought to have
been prepared for that contingency. As it happens, the troops
deployed in Kosovo are the combat troops armed with tanks, mortars,
cannons and high powered guns, totally unsuitable for the task
of keeping peace and order on the streets of cities and villages.
For example, the Serbs in the village of Gorazdevac
near Pec, live under protection of two KFOR tanks and a dozen
Italian Soldiers. On 29 June 1999 we could see the Serbian villages
burning in the mountains above Gorazdevac, which was very disturbing.
The Serbs can move freely through the village and about the neighbouring
fields, but are at great risk if they leave the village for Pec.
In this way the Serbian villagers are denied human rights such
as access to public services, healthcare, education and employment.
The Serbs in Orahovac are living in a virtual imprisonment and
cannot leave their enclave. The food and other supplies are brought
in by KFOR, and water and electricity supplies are irregular.
The Serbs in Prizren live under similar conditions.
The OSCE Report under the title "As Seen,
As Told", June to October 1999, states that many acts of
revenge assumed a more systematic pattern and appeared to be organised.
The evidence points to a careful targeting of victims and an intention
to expel. The Albanian KLA was reported to run their own police,
before and after the demilitarisation deadline. Criminals have
infiltrated the KLA and are exploiting it for their own purposes.
It is clear that the deficiency in the law enforcement capability
of the international community created an atmosphere of lawlessness
in which human rights violations could be committed with impunity.
In tolerance has emerged within the Kosovo Albanian
community. Small and not so small children are instructed by their
elders to threaten and harm the Serbs, knowing that they will
not be detained by the KFOR.
On 16 December 1999 Dr Bernard Kouchner made
an emotional appeal for more money and police to restore public
services, law and order to Kosovo. He complained that the DM400
million budget promised for next year amounts to the cost of just
half-a-day's bombing by NATO earlier in the year. The more realistic
budget would have been at least DM800 million. Dr Kouchner reproached
the international community for sending only 1,800 police, when
at least 6,000 are required. Referring to the high murder rate
of Serbs in Kosovo he said that the law and order cannot be restored
by bare hands without police.
The Sunday Times on 19 December 1999
published an article under the title "Nato warns of more
chaos in Kosovo". Lord Robertson is reported to have supported
Dr Kouchner's demand saying that NATO is walking a very thin line
between success and danger of losing Kosovo to an Albanian mono-ethnic
state.
The Serbian Information Centre finds disturbing
the laxity with which the media in the western countries are treating
the atrocities committed by the Albanians against the Serbs. The
usual excuse is that a desire for revenge is understandable after
the Albanian suffering. Dr Kouchner also said that one cannot
expect people with missing sons, daughters, fathers, mothers,
to put aside thoughts of revenge until the mystery of missing
people is resolved. At any Law School the students read that revenge
is an aggravating circumstance, and murder for revenge will be
punished by the Judge more severely than murder in anger. These
crimes are even more serious because they represent revenge by
proxy: the guilty Serbs escaped, let us murder the Serbs we can
lay our hands on. Does this not smack of ethnic discrimination
and racial hatred with genocidal tendencies?
There were about 50 murders of non-Albanians
per week following the deployment of KFOR, falling down to about
three per week (OSCE Report "As Seen—As Told"
Part II). The fall may be attributed to the fact that there are
progressively fewer non-Albanians left to be murdered. There is
widespread arson, kidnappings and robberies, especially in the
southern parts of Kosovo, where the armed bands regularly cross
the border from Albania. This exposes a failure of KFOR to guard
and control borders between Kosovo and Albania, which appears
to be transparent, unmanned and unprotected. On 29 June 1999 some
of our members saw several trucks with Albanian registration plates
being loaded in the vicinity of Pec.
Many Serbs have left and are still leaving Kosovo.
The murder of 14 Serb farmers in Lipljan on 23 July 1999 focussed
attention on the precarious position of Serbs in Kosovo. The desperate
position of Serbs and other ethnic minority communities in Kosovo
is described in the UNHCR/OSCE Second Assessment of the Situation
of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, dated 6 September 1999 and OSCE
Overview of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo dated
3 November 1999 which are enclosed with this submission as Annex
3 and Annex 4.
The Serbian patrimony in Kosovo is also in danger
of total destruction. The Patriarchate of Pec is well guarded
and protected by KFOR troops. Likewise, the monasteries of Decani
and Gracanica are well guarded. However, hundreds of other churches
and monasteries are unprotected. Mr Tam Dallyell, MP quoting Robert
Fisk's report of 20 November 1999 about monasteries said in the
House of Commons:
"Last week, I drove down the same road to
Prizren and sought out the same church. I found the field and
the steel gate. But the church was a ruin. A single wall stood.
The rest was pulverised stone. Goodbye, then, to the icons and
the saints and the staring eyes. Goodbye to Jesus. Goodbye to
the Serb Orthodox church. All across Kosovo I found identical
scenes, places of worship—sometimes 600 years old—levelled
with explosives and hammers, the very identity of Serb history
turned to dust amid fields and hillsides by Nato's Kosovo Albanian
allies.
The Serb church has issued its own list of destroyed
or partly demolished buildings. Between 13 June—when Nato
troops entered Kosovo—and 20 October, they say, 74 churches
have been turned to dust or burnt or vandalised. The 15th century
monastery of the Holy Trinity above Musutiste, begun in 1465,
has been levelled with explosives. The monastery of the Archangel
near Vitina, built in the 14th century, has been looted and burnt."
The Serb Orthodox Church published a paper under
the title "Destroyed and Desecrated Christian Orthodox Shrines
in Kosovo and Metohija (June 13-20 October 1999)" which is
attached to this Submission as Annex 5. In the foreword, Hieromonk
Sava states that following the Albanian suffering from the destructive
policy of the Milosevic regime, the Serb people are now suffering
at the hands of the ethnic Albanian nationalists.
11. IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE
UN RESOLUTION 1244
It appears that the UN Resolution 1244 has not
been fully implemented. The KFOR did not fully demilitarize the
Kosovo Liberation Army. The KLA has been transformed into Kosovo
Protection Corps, rather than demobilised. The secure environment
for the return home of the refugees and displaced persons has
not been created. Public order and safety have not been ensured.
Kosovo borders are not being monitored adequately, and, as a consequence,
the border between Kosovo and Albania has become transparent.
The Serbian military and police personnel have not been permitted
to return to maintain presence at Serb patrimonial sites and at
key border crossings. The agreement covering the above aspects
has not been tabled yet.
Although the UN commitment to the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act has been reaffirmed,
this has been interpreted liberally. Thus, issuance of travel
documents other than Yugoslav passports, neutral car number plates,
the formation of the Kosovo Protection Force and of the Temporary
Council with executive powers, are all infringements on the Yugoslav
sovereignty.
12. PROPOSED
SOLUTIONS
The Serbian Information Centre is very concerned
with the position of the Serb population remaining in Kosovo and
for the Serbian national heritage in Kosovo. The United Nations,
OSCE and NATO manifestly failed in their main task of introducing
law, order and respect for human rights in Kosovo.
Current insecurity of the non-Albanian population
may be reversed only by an increase in the numbers of KFOR troops
and an increase in the numbers of the international civil police
force, which is still missing by a wide margin the numbers originally
planned and currently sought by Dr Kouchner.
It is necessary to strictly adhere to the letter
of the Resolution 1244 and efficiently protect the Kosovo border
with Albania against incursions of North Albanian bandits and
smugglers. Issuance of travel documents, other than the Yugoslav
passports, should be discontinued.
The formation of KFOR protected areas in the
villages and towns with substantial minority population would
encourage the Serbs and others to remain in Kosovo. The return
of the agreed number of the Yugoslav Army and Police personnel
and their co-operation with KFOR would improve safety and increase
KFOR efficiency.
The regionalisation of Kosovo, with cultural
and linguistic autonomy for the regions where the national minorities
are a majority or living in substantial numbers would help preserve
the current numbers and encourage repatriation.
The placement of the Serbian Orthodox churches
and monasteries under the protection of UNESCO would stop further
destruction and damage to the Serb patrimony, and indeed, patrimony
of the whole Christian Europe.
In the medium term, helping and promoting the
democratisation of Serbia and Kosovo, the gradual reintegration
into the international community and readmission into regional
and universal international organisations of Yugoslavia will foster
economic progress and mutual tolerance and co-operation between
the Serbs and Albanians. The introduction of true democratic values
in Serbia and in Kosovo will stabilise the whole Balkans and defuse
the potential for the spread of conflict to Macedonia and other
Balkan countries.
Djurdje Ninkovic,
The Serbian Information Centre in London
December 1999
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