Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence


APPENDIX 27

Memorandum submitted by Serbian Information

1.  THE PRESENT DAY RELEVANCE OF THE HISTORY OF KOSOVO AND METOHIJA

Although it is difficult, almost impossible, for a Serb to start a discourse on Kosovo without referring to history, in this paper we shall endeavour to concentrate on the present. In Annex I we submit a paper prepared by the Serbian Information Centre in 1998 under the title "The Kosovo Crisis", which gives a history of Kosovo and Metohija as seen through a Serbian eyes.

  We fully appreciate that all European nations have had to overcome their historical aspirations and traditions in order to achieve the lasting peace and harmony. The Serbs have a particular difficulty here because the Kosovo battle from 1389 has been woven into the Serbian national poetry, tradition and beliefs. The modern day nationhood of the Serbs is rooted in the Kosovo tradition.

  It is to no avail to call it a myth, a legend or a delusion. Be what it may, it plays an important part in the contemporary politics of Serbia. No Serbian politician of consequence, and by the same token, no diplomat or foreign affairs department can turn a blind eye and fail to recognise the relevance of Kosovo in present-day Serbia.

  Like any history, the Kosovo tale can play either a positive or a negative role in the development of a nation. In the nineteenth century the memories of Kosovo uplifted the national spirit and led to the liberation of Serbia from the centuries of Turkish occupation. At the beginning of the twentieth century the Kosovo legend helped the Serbs endure and win several wars and, as they saw it, liberate the Slav population of the former Yugoslavia.

  However, in the hands of unscrupulous leaders the Kosovo legend may only too easily be turned into a tool of political manipulation. The current rulers of Serbia have, for their own ends, inflated the Kosovo myth out of all proportions and turned it into a means of oppression of their own people. The Serbs, in the last years of the former Yugoslavia, were artificially confronted with the Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Muslims in Bosnia and finally the Albanians.

2.  THE CAUSES OF THE DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA

  The Serbs were, in a way, victims of their own historical success. The Serbian view that their victories resulted in the liberation of the Slavs from the Turkish and Austro-Hungarian yoke, was half-heartedly shared by the Croats, Slovenes and Macedonians. It could not have, and has not been, shared by non-Slavs, such as Albanians and Hungarians in Yugoslavia.

  Therefore the regionalisation of Yugoslavia and decentralisation of the political powers was an obvious solution. The process started in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia through negotiations between the democratically elected representatives of the Croats, Slovenes and Serbs. This was curtailed by the advent of communism in 1945, and restarted again under Tito's dictatorship in the late 1960's and early 1970's. The process of decentralisation was undemocratic, the population of Yugoslavia did not have any say in it, and, in, sense, it was immaterial at the time, because whatever the Constitution comprised, all the reins of power were firmly in one hand.

  In other words, all autonomy notionally given was only an empty shell meant to conceal the fact that all power was centralised in one figure. This centralisation and concentration of the political powers in one pair of hands allowed Tito to play with the Constitution of 1974 and grant an almost independent status to the republics and autonomous provinces, knowing fully well that all such autonomy is just a farce as long as the Communist Party, the secret police and the army played neatly to his tune.

  Following Tito's death in 1980, the Communist Party apparatchiks found themselves in charge of near independent provinces. It took them some time to realise that, and when it dawned on them it signalled the end of the former Yugoslavia. The erstwhile Tito's puppets, whom he could remove by a slight motion of his hand, all of a sudden treated as abhorrent an idea of power sharing at federal or any other level.

  It took several years of hard propaganda work before the idea of disintegration of Yugoslavia was hammered into the heads of ordinary Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Bosnian Muslims and Macedonians.

3.  THE CAUSES OF CONFLICT BETWEEN THE SERBS AND ALBANIANS IN KOSOVO

  Like the others, the Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija had an "empty shell" autonomy. All the seats in the Kosovo Assembly and all the top jobs in the Autonomous Government were filled by the obedient Albanian members of the Communist Party, and they towed the line dictated by Tito and by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Once the centre weakened in the early 1980's the province descended into near anarchy and lawlessness used by the Albanian extremists to suppress the Serbs and start the ethnic cleansing.

  The Kosovo and Metohija autonomy, under the 1974 Constitution was drafted very liberally because it was not ever intended to be used. It was just window dressing designed to conceal Tito's personal dictatorship and unlimited power of the Communist Party and comprised very obvious inconsistencies putting Serbia in a constitutionally and politically humbling position reflected in the fact that the Kosovo Assembly could pass decisions independently, whereas the Kosovo delegates had a power of veto in the Serbian Assembly. On the federal level Kosovo, although notionally a province within Serbia, had an equal status with Serbia and other republics.

  Slobodan Milosevic, in his fight for supreme power in Serbia, put together the Kosovo legend, the humbling constitutional position of Serbia and the plight of the Kosovo Serbs at the hands of the Albanian extremists. This explosive mixture rocketted him to the top position in Serbia, whence he hoped to climb to power in Yugoslavia.

4.  ABSENCE OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN SERBS AND ALBANIANS

  By his ideological formation Slobodan Milosevic was not given to tolerating different political opinions. His instincts were authoritarian, and his actions were oppressive and harsh. Rather than negotiate with what modetare leaders the Albanians in Kosovo had, he orchestrated the trial of Azem Vlasi and Kacusha Jashari and arranged for them to be sentenced and imprisoned in 1988.

  This attitude opened the way for more radical leaders such as Ibrahim Rugova. They were also ignored by the Serbian government which led to their demise and the appearance of armed insurgents. True to his form, Milosevic used an excessive force and brutality to quell the mutiny in 1998.

  The Albanians were not in a negotiating mood either. In the period between 1990 and 1998, Ibrahim Rugova and his Kosovo Democratic Party refused any contacts with the Serbian opposition parties. The Albanians did not value a compromise and declined to take part in the fledgling democratic processes in Serbia since 1990. The Albanian boycot of elections in Serbia greatly helped the Milosevic regime because it gave it as a gift some 30 seats in the National Assembly of Serbia. It appears that both sides actually shared the same values of tolerance, authoritarianism, and national exclusivity, and supported the most extreme exponents one within the other.

5.  PUNISHMENT OF THE SERBIAN REGIME OR OF THE SERBIAN PEOPLE?

  It is probable that the Serbian regime was complicit in the war crimes and crimes against humanity in Bosnia. The massacre of the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica seems to have finally tipped the scales of the western public opinion against the Serbian regime.

  It appears that, subsequent to Srebrenica, the western public opinion was ready to believe in any imaginable crime against humanity allegedly perpetrated by the exponents of the Serbian regime. When the reports of massacres started trickling out of Kosovo they were received as a gospel truth. The adverse reports of the OSCE observer mission did nothing to alleviate fears of the international community that frightful crimes against the civilians were being committed. The constant provocations of the KLA, although reported have been ignored. The fact that the KLA was an armed organisation of the Albanian civilians was also ignored. In the aftermath of Srebrenica any dead Albanian, armed or unarmed, was a civilian. In the Racak ditch all 30 dead bodies were in civilian clothes and armed.

  The exodus of the OSCE observers from Kosovo in 1998 mean that in the future any story from Kosovo, reporting the most despicable atrocities, would be believed. Such stores of 1,000 here and 10,000 there were helpfully distributed by the KLA, and they helped the western leaders commit themselves finally and irrevocably to a war against Serbia.

  It seems that the so called Rambouillet negotiations were doomed from the start because nobody believed the Milosevic regime any more, and because a decision to punish Serbia by an armed attack had, at that time, already been made. This decision was based on frustration and anger, two very bad counsels in any political matter. Sadly, the bombing of Serbia in the spring of 1999 meant that the western powers, instead of lifting the Milosevic regime out of the mud it has created, descended into that muddy pit and started fighting him on the only terms he understands, force without rules. The regime received a well deserved beating, the Serbian people suffered unnecessarily and the western powers emerged dirtied by the very muck they so detested and strived to remove.

6.  RAMBOUILLET WAS NOT DIPLOMACY

  It emerges now that the publication of the Appendix B: Status of Multi-National Military Implementation Force was suppressed and delayed. At least one of the German members of Bundestag declared that she would not have voted for a military action in Yugoslavia had she known of the existence and the contents of the Appendix B. In his learned report under the title Kosovo: Law and Diplomacy, Mark Littman QC stated in a footnote on page 11 that the military annexes were not placed in the House of Common Library before 1 April 1999, one week after the bombing started. How many honourable Members of Parliament would have voted in favour of an armed intervention had they been aware of Appendix B? We shall never know that, but it is clear now that the parliamentarians in at least two key countries have not been properly briefed by their executives.

  The Yugoslav delegation accepted a political settlement as early as 23 February 1999 and declared that Yugoslavia was ready to consider the scope and character of an international presence in Kosovo. All political provisions contained in the Rambouillet draft had been agreed by 15 March 1999. On 23 March 1999 the Serbian Assembly adopted a resolution offering to negotiate the composition of the international presence in Kosovo to monitor the implementation of the Rambouillet agreement.

  However, NATO regarded the military proposals set out in Chapter 7 of the draft and Appendices A and B as non negotiable. Therefore they were not proposals, they were an ultimatum.

  Appendix B contained provisions which no self respecting independent country could have accepted. Under the draft the NATO forces would have been permitted to display NATO or national flags; be immune from all legal processes and jurisdiction of Yugoslav courts, arrest and detention. NATO personnel would have enjoyed free and unrestricted passage throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (in further text FRY), including the airspace and territorial waters and would have been entitled to the right of bivouac, manoeuvre, billet and utilisation of any areas or facilities as required for support, training and operations.

  The list goes on: NATO would have been exempted from duties, taxes and other charges and inspections and custom regulations. The FRY authorities would have facilitated all movement of personnel, vehicles, vessels, aircraft, equipment or supplies and no charges might be levied for air navigation, landing or takeoff of aircraft. Vehicles, vessels and aircraft would not have been subject to licensing or registration requirements, nor commercial insurance.

  NATO would have been granted the use of airports, roads, rails and ports without payment of fees, duties, dues, tolls or charges occasioned by mere use. NATO personnel would have been exempted from taxation on the salaries and emoluments and from all duties, taxes and other charges on moveable property imported into or exported from FRY. The local personnel hired by NATO would have been immune from legal process for declarations or acts performed in official capacity, immune from national military service obligations and exempted from taxation on the salaries.

  NATO would have been granted all telecommunications services, including broadcast services. The necessary utilities, such as electricity, water and gas would have been provided at the lowest rate. NATO and NATO personnel would have been immune from all civil claims. In the conduct of the operation NATO would have been entitled to detain individuals.

  These terms were only proper for a signature by a country defeated in war. They were rather meant to provoke than to avert war. They were not an act of diplomacy but a bare threat with military attack and invitation to surrender. IT was a declaration of intent of NATO to occupy Kosovo and to deploy in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav delegation was given no option but to turn down such a diktat. Yet, the refusal was termed in cautious words: "The FRY is ready to consider the scope and character of an international presence in Kosovo..."

7.  LEGALITY OF BOMBING OF SERBIA

  In his report Mark Littman, QC is asking a question whether the Serbs were the only aggressors, and his reply is as follows:

  "A common misapprehension is that, in the several weeks leading up to a start of bombing on 24 March 1999, there was a continuation of Serb aggression against the Albanians. This is true. But it ignores the fact that so too was there a continuation of aggression on the part of the Albanians.

  A more accurate picture can be obtained from extracts from current official NATO, OSCE and UN reports, extracts of which can be found in Appendix 7 (of the Mark Littman report). These reports show that, although were was considerable Serb military activity in this period, it was by no means one-sided. These reports support the statement of the OSCE that, although there was the use of disproportionate force by the Serbs, it was in response to persistent attacks and provocations by the Kosovo Albanian paramilitaries."

  The conclusion based on the principle of equal treatment of both parties in the dispute would be that the Serbian side was prevented to defend itself whereas the acts of aggression of the Kosovo Albanian paramilitaries were condoned and rewarded. Under International Law the government of the day is entitled to defend its territory against the attacks of the insurgents.

  NATO member countries have violated a number of international treaties and conventions with air bombardment of Serbia and Montenegro over the issue of Kosovo province.

    1.  It was a violation of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter which states that all members of the UN shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.

    2.  It was a violation of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the UN Charter which states that nothing contained in the Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.

    3.  It was a violation of The North Atlantic Treaty which in the preamble recites that the signatory states are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence. Article 5 defines a purpose of NATO when it states that the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and they will assist each other to fend off such an attack. Article 6 of the Treaty lists the territories against which an armed attack would trigger a collective self-defence. Neither Kosovo nor Serbia or Montenegro are on the list.

    4.  Finally, the bombardment was a violation of the Helsinki Conference Final Act of 1975 which guarantees the territorial frontiers of the European states. The Final Act declares that the participating states will respect the territorial integrity of one another and will refrain from any action against the territorial integrity or the unity of any signatory state. The proposed peace plan anticipated the secession of Kosovo through NATO occupation and eventually the change of borders of Serbia and Yugoslavia through a local referendum three years later on.

  It is a widely accepted misconception that the armed intervention in Yugoslavia would have been legal had the UN Security Council authorised it. In fact, the UN Security Council is bound by the UN Charter and UN Resolutions, and all decisions must be taken in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and Resolutions. Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter and Resolutions 2131 and 2625 exclude the matters which are within the domestic jurisdiction and within the internal or external affairs of state from the sphere of intervention by the United Nations. Therefore, the Security Council would not have had power to authorise an armed intervention in Yugoslavia over Kosovo, which is exclusively an internal affair of the Yugoslav state. Any such decision would have been "ultra vires".

8.  THE UN RESOLUTION 1244 (1999) TERMINATING THE BOMBING

  After 68 days of the bombing campaign, peace between NATO countries and Yugoslavia was brokered by Russians and agreement finalised by the Finish president Ahtisari. This agreement was, on 10 June 1999, embodied by the UN in the Resolution 1244.

  Under the terms of the Resolution the FRY accepted to put an end to the violence and repression in Kosovo and begin withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces synchronised with the deployment of the international security presence. After the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb military and police personnel would be permitted to return to Kosovo. An international civil and security presence would be deployed in Kosovo under the United Nations auspices.

  Such international security presence would:

    —  maintain the ceasefire, deter renewed hostilities and prevent the return to Kosovo of Yugoslav forces:

    —  demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Arm (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian Groups;

    —  secure the return home of the refugees and displaced persons;

    —  ensure public safety and order until the international civil presence takes responsibility for this task;

    —  supervise the mine fields clearing;

    —  support and co-ordinate work with the international civil presence;

    —  conduct border monitoring duties;

    —  ensure the protection and freedom of movement of the international civil presence and other international organizations.

  The international civil presence would, among others:

    —  perform basic civilian and administrative functions;

    —  organise and develop provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self government;

    —  maintain civil law and order, including establishing local police and deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo;

    —  protect and promote human rights;

    —  assure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo.

  It is obvious that NATO, after 10 weeks of bombing made concessions which they could have made at Rambouillet and resolved the matter peacefully. These concessions are (a) that armed force should be authorised by the United Nations; (b) that international force shall involve troops not only from NATO countries; (c) that the civil administration shall be under control of the United Nations; (d) that the international force shall have no access to any parts of Yugoslavia outside Kosovo; (e) that the international force shall disarm the KLA, and (f) that the sovereignty of Yugoslavia over Kosovo should be acknowledged and confirmed.

9.  DAMAGE CAUSED BY ARMED INTERVENTION

  Damage caused by the bombing campaign has been inflicted in Kosovo and in the rest of Serbia. Other than direct damage caused by the bombs in the Kosovo cities, the bombing triggered the "ethnic cleansing" of the Albanians from Kosovo. Far from averting the humanitarian disaster, which was the prime goal of the campaign, it appears to have aggravated the situation. The NATO countries were aware of this contingency, but nevertheless went ahead with bombing, contributing to the unfolding of human suffering. Inevitably some bombs hit civilian targets causing many victims among Albanians. The suffering continues because many unexploded cluster bombs are taking their toll, specially among the children in Kosovo.

  In Serbia proper the bombs practically reduced to ashes what industry there was and a substantial portion of infrastructure. The estimates of damages range from $30 to $100 billion. It would take Serbia 18 years of development and reconstruction to recover fully. However, under the regime of sanctions and lack of foreign loans and investment Serbia is doomed to languish and decline further.

  There was an estimated death toll of 1,500 civilians and 8,000 wounded.

   The environmental damage is unquantifiable following the destruction of the Pancevo agrochemical plant releasing into the Danube 1,500 tons of vinyl chloride, 15,000 tons of ammonia, 800 tons of hydrochloric acid, 250 tons of liquid chlorine, large quantities of dioxin and 100 tons of mercury. The use of the depleteduranium tipped shells by NATO will lead to the contamination of the environment.

  Serious psychological damages have been suffered by many inhabitants of Serbia. Interminable series of bombing missions preceded by air raid sirens instilled fear and anxiety. The sound of explosions scared everybody. It is the children and women who suffered most. Only the future psychological tests shall establish the full extent of the harm done.

  The political damage is huge. The Serbian democratic opposition parties offered in their party programmes a political model widely accepted and followed in the West. It is almost impossible after the bombing to attract much political support for the introduction of a political model followed by the NATO countries which took part in the attacks on Yugoslavia. In this respect the armed intervention had an adverse effect: instead of destabilising the current regime in Serbia, it has actually reinforced it.

10.  CURRENT SITUATION IN KOSOVO

  The withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and deployment of KFOR troops ought to have represented a turning point from civil war towards the introduction of law and order. The positive development is the return of the displaced Albanians to their homes. However, the Serbs started leaving their homes in great numbers and fleeing out of Kosovo apprehensive of the revengeful Albanians.

  It was not hard to envisage that the Albanian extremists would take their revenge against the Serbs remaining in Kosovo and the NATO countries, the UN and KFOR ought to have been prepared for that contingency. As it happens, the troops deployed in Kosovo are the combat troops armed with tanks, mortars, cannons and high powered guns, totally unsuitable for the task of keeping peace and order on the streets of cities and villages.

  For example, the Serbs in the village of Gorazdevac near Pec, live under protection of two KFOR tanks and a dozen Italian Soldiers. On 29 June 1999 we could see the Serbian villages burning in the mountains above Gorazdevac, which was very disturbing. The Serbs can move freely through the village and about the neighbouring fields, but are at great risk if they leave the village for Pec. In this way the Serbian villagers are denied human rights such as access to public services, healthcare, education and employment. The Serbs in Orahovac are living in a virtual imprisonment and cannot leave their enclave. The food and other supplies are brought in by KFOR, and water and electricity supplies are irregular. The Serbs in Prizren live under similar conditions.

  The OSCE Report under the title "As Seen, As Told", June to October 1999, states that many acts of revenge assumed a more systematic pattern and appeared to be organised. The evidence points to a careful targeting of victims and an intention to expel. The Albanian KLA was reported to run their own police, before and after the demilitarisation deadline. Criminals have infiltrated the KLA and are exploiting it for their own purposes. It is clear that the deficiency in the law enforcement capability of the international community created an atmosphere of lawlessness in which human rights violations could be committed with impunity.

  In tolerance has emerged within the Kosovo Albanian community. Small and not so small children are instructed by their elders to threaten and harm the Serbs, knowing that they will not be detained by the KFOR.

  On 16 December 1999 Dr Bernard Kouchner made an emotional appeal for more money and police to restore public services, law and order to Kosovo. He complained that the DM400 million budget promised for next year amounts to the cost of just half-a-day's bombing by NATO earlier in the year. The more realistic budget would have been at least DM800 million. Dr Kouchner reproached the international community for sending only 1,800 police, when at least 6,000 are required. Referring to the high murder rate of Serbs in Kosovo he said that the law and order cannot be restored by bare hands without police.

  The Sunday Times on 19 December 1999 published an article under the title "Nato warns of more chaos in Kosovo". Lord Robertson is reported to have supported Dr Kouchner's demand saying that NATO is walking a very thin line between success and danger of losing Kosovo to an Albanian mono-ethnic state.

  The Serbian Information Centre finds disturbing the laxity with which the media in the western countries are treating the atrocities committed by the Albanians against the Serbs. The usual excuse is that a desire for revenge is understandable after the Albanian suffering. Dr Kouchner also said that one cannot expect people with missing sons, daughters, fathers, mothers, to put aside thoughts of revenge until the mystery of missing people is resolved. At any Law School the students read that revenge is an aggravating circumstance, and murder for revenge will be punished by the Judge more severely than murder in anger. These crimes are even more serious because they represent revenge by proxy: the guilty Serbs escaped, let us murder the Serbs we can lay our hands on. Does this not smack of ethnic discrimination and racial hatred with genocidal tendencies?

  There were about 50 murders of non-Albanians per week following the deployment of KFOR, falling down to about three per week (OSCE Report "As Seen—As Told" Part II). The fall may be attributed to the fact that there are progressively fewer non-Albanians left to be murdered. There is widespread arson, kidnappings and robberies, especially in the southern parts of Kosovo, where the armed bands regularly cross the border from Albania. This exposes a failure of KFOR to guard and control borders between Kosovo and Albania, which appears to be transparent, unmanned and unprotected. On 29 June 1999 some of our members saw several trucks with Albanian registration plates being loaded in the vicinity of Pec.

  Many Serbs have left and are still leaving Kosovo. The murder of 14 Serb farmers in Lipljan on 23 July 1999 focussed attention on the precarious position of Serbs in Kosovo. The desperate position of Serbs and other ethnic minority communities in Kosovo is described in the UNHCR/OSCE Second Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, dated 6 September 1999 and OSCE Overview of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo dated 3 November 1999 which are enclosed with this submission as Annex 3 and Annex 4.

  The Serbian patrimony in Kosovo is also in danger of total destruction. The Patriarchate of Pec is well guarded and protected by KFOR troops. Likewise, the monasteries of Decani and Gracanica are well guarded. However, hundreds of other churches and monasteries are unprotected. Mr Tam Dallyell, MP quoting Robert Fisk's report of 20 November 1999 about monasteries said in the House of Commons:

    "Last week, I drove down the same road to Prizren and sought out the same church. I found the field and the steel gate. But the church was a ruin. A single wall stood. The rest was pulverised stone. Goodbye, then, to the icons and the saints and the staring eyes. Goodbye to Jesus. Goodbye to the Serb Orthodox church. All across Kosovo I found identical scenes, places of worship—sometimes 600 years old—levelled with explosives and hammers, the very identity of Serb history turned to dust amid fields and hillsides by Nato's Kosovo Albanian allies.

    The Serb church has issued its own list of destroyed or partly demolished buildings. Between 13 June—when Nato troops entered Kosovo—and 20 October, they say, 74 churches have been turned to dust or burnt or vandalised. The 15th century monastery of the Holy Trinity above Musutiste, begun in 1465, has been levelled with explosives. The monastery of the Archangel near Vitina, built in the 14th century, has been looted and burnt."

  The Serb Orthodox Church published a paper under the title "Destroyed and Desecrated Christian Orthodox Shrines in Kosovo and Metohija (June 13-20 October 1999)" which is attached to this Submission as Annex 5. In the foreword, Hieromonk Sava states that following the Albanian suffering from the destructive policy of the Milosevic regime, the Serb people are now suffering at the hands of the ethnic Albanian nationalists.

11.  IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN RESOLUTION 1244

  It appears that the UN Resolution 1244 has not been fully implemented. The KFOR did not fully demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army. The KLA has been transformed into Kosovo Protection Corps, rather than demobilised. The secure environment for the return home of the refugees and displaced persons has not been created. Public order and safety have not been ensured. Kosovo borders are not being monitored adequately, and, as a consequence, the border between Kosovo and Albania has become transparent. The Serbian military and police personnel have not been permitted to return to maintain presence at Serb patrimonial sites and at key border crossings. The agreement covering the above aspects has not been tabled yet.

  Although the UN commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act has been reaffirmed, this has been interpreted liberally. Thus, issuance of travel documents other than Yugoslav passports, neutral car number plates, the formation of the Kosovo Protection Force and of the Temporary Council with executive powers, are all infringements on the Yugoslav sovereignty.

12.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

  The Serbian Information Centre is very concerned with the position of the Serb population remaining in Kosovo and for the Serbian national heritage in Kosovo. The United Nations, OSCE and NATO manifestly failed in their main task of introducing law, order and respect for human rights in Kosovo.

  Current insecurity of the non-Albanian population may be reversed only by an increase in the numbers of KFOR troops and an increase in the numbers of the international civil police force, which is still missing by a wide margin the numbers originally planned and currently sought by Dr Kouchner.

  It is necessary to strictly adhere to the letter of the Resolution 1244 and efficiently protect the Kosovo border with Albania against incursions of North Albanian bandits and smugglers. Issuance of travel documents, other than the Yugoslav passports, should be discontinued.

  The formation of KFOR protected areas in the villages and towns with substantial minority population would encourage the Serbs and others to remain in Kosovo. The return of the agreed number of the Yugoslav Army and Police personnel and their co-operation with KFOR would improve safety and increase KFOR efficiency.

  The regionalisation of Kosovo, with cultural and linguistic autonomy for the regions where the national minorities are a majority or living in substantial numbers would help preserve the current numbers and encourage repatriation.

  The placement of the Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries under the protection of UNESCO would stop further destruction and damage to the Serb patrimony, and indeed, patrimony of the whole Christian Europe.

  In the medium term, helping and promoting the democratisation of Serbia and Kosovo, the gradual reintegration into the international community and readmission into regional and universal international organisations of Yugoslavia will foster economic progress and mutual tolerance and co-operation between the Serbs and Albanians. The introduction of true democratic values in Serbia and in Kosovo will stabilise the whole Balkans and defuse the potential for the spread of conflict to Macedonia and other Balkan countries.

Djurdje Ninkovic,

The Serbian Information Centre in London

December 1999


 
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