Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence


APPENDIX 30

Memorandum submitted by Dr Oleg Levitin, visiting research Fellow at the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London

  In the aftermath of the Kosovo war much criticism has focused on the deficiencies of the use of force. I believe that NATO's decision to intervene was the right one. Force was used after the diplomacy had failed. The question is, why the preventive diplomacy failed at all? In addressing this question, we will be able to learn a number of important lessons. Another questions that then arises is why many things are going wrong in Kosovo today and what can be done to improve the situation? Here again I would like to stress that current shortcomings should not be seen as the consequence of the use of force. This reached its direct objectives, and it gave strength to the search for political solution. However, it alone, can not be a substitute for diplomacy. While analysing the past and looking to the future, we should bear in mind the following. The international community failed in Kosovo because of the lack of willingness to tackle the Kosovo problem in due time. It failed because it did not manage to concentrate efforts, for most of the 1990s, on two core problems: realistic redefinition of Kosovo's legal status, and the coherent and consequent strategy towards Milosevic as the main troublemaker. Until both of these problems are resolved the stability is not likely to be restored in the region.

  I admit that the point—that the problem was not addressed in due time—made after the event, seems to be rhetoric. I am claiming this, however, on the basis of my experience. I was part of the Russia's Kosovo policy for some years. I also participated in international discussions on Kosovo. Moreover I have studied the Kosovo problem for 13 years now and I spent seven years in the region—in Tirana, Belgrade and Pristina. I am sure that it was possible to solve the problem earlier—and at a cheaper price.

LESSONS FROM THE PAST

  The evolution of the approach to the legal status of Kosovo in the international political and academic circles was uneven. In Russia it was not until 1998 that the understanding started to develop at the upper levels of the Foreign Ministry that Kosovo could not just be kept under Serbian jurisdiction; the West realised it earlier. Both the West and Russia, though, were late to accept the realities and to act accordingly. By the time Milosevic eliminated the former autonomy and for a time after it, it was already clear that the Kosovo Albanians would never submit to live under the Serbs. The centuries-long history of the relationship between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, and especially in the 20th century, when Kosovo became part of Yugoslavia, was the evidence enough. Repeating, for years, politically correct phrases about wider Kosovo autonomy inside "Serbia and Yugoslavià was non-productive, and meant sending wrong signals both to the Kosovars and to the Serbs.

  However, there was a possibility of an interim solution: Kosovo within Yugoslavia, but out of Serbia. It might be only provisional, it could not, by default, be long-lasting. But it could have prevented the open conflict and bloodshed. A number of different models, including existing in other states or proposed by experts, could have been implemented. For example, from 1995 I was trying to convince Russian Foreign Ministry officials of the advantages of a compromise, based on the "Tatarstan model". This particular model is based on contractual devolution and demarcation of powers. Its implementation would have created an asymmetric Yugoslav federation, with Kosovo as its subject, not necessarily equal to Serbia and Montenegro, but at any rate out of Serbian jurisdiction. To be sure, Moscow remained uncertain and hesitant, up until Rambouillet, as to which would be a preferable formula for Kosovo. But it had no strong reason to object to the compromising Tatarstan-like formula. Indeed it might have been persuaded to accept it by the West.

  At this point another issues arises, whether it was possible to attain Kosovo Albanians' consent on a special status for Kosovo, when their then leader I. Rugova insisted in all speeches on full independence? My interviews with leading Kosovar politicians in 1996-1998 showed that as late as until the beginning of 1998 such a model could have been imposed, as a provisional solution. This could have been done in spite of the growing strength of the Kosovo Liberation Army, and obviously it could have been done before, when the KLA was weak.

  What about Belgrade's consent? There was a myth (the harm of myths is after all perhaps the main lesson of Kosovo) that Milosevic could not give up Kosovo. Milosevic needed Kosovo for practical reasons. The Albanians boycott of the elections together with manipulative laws, were used to safeguard almost half of the seats that Milosevic's Socialist party held in the Serbian parliament. Milosevic, after Dayton, viewed Kosovo as the most valuable card in his hands, which if sold, had to be bargained at the last moment and at a maximum price. Emotional motives were of little importance to him; all he needed was personal power, material rather than spiritual. Nothing suggested that he would not have given up Kosovo, had he come to the conclusion that his personal power was not jeopardised by a deal. He could have coped with a provisional solution of a special status for Kosovo. The same Tatarstan model offered a number of mechanisms of practical legal solution, which would avoid constitutional obstacles or obstruction from nationalistically oriented political forces.

  In practical terms, what then should the leading countries have done regarding Kosovo status? Firstly, after Dayton they should have set a working group to define jointly the concrete parameters. An informal working group on Kosovo held two sessions in London at the end of 1997—beginning of 1998. American special envoy, Chris Hill, started his shuttle diplomacy working with Belgrade and Pristina on the draft status agreement in 1998. In the period before Rambouillet he produced, in sequence, 8 versions. His successful experience (the collapse of the Rambuillet has nothing to do with the quality of Hill's political drafts: they offered a realistic compromise and an applicable provisional solution) proves that it might not be so difficult to work out a compromise text within a relatively short period of time. What prevented this job being done earlier? I would agree that the Dayton agenda was too complex to include an address on Kosovo (although an attempt to exchange opinions was made at the final stage of the talks). However, working out the Kosovo status in the Contact group format was definitely possible after Dayton, in 1996-1997. To be sure, having a draft agreement prepared by Contact Group experts and agreed to in principle would not have substituted for the lack of will to pressure the parties to accept it. But the very existence of such a draft would have accelerated and facilitated generating such a will.

  Secondly, the political will had to be displayed in 1996-1997, as it was displayed in 1999, to address realistically the Kosovo problem.

  Thirdly, establishing better co-ordination among Western members of the Contact Group in order to reach the joint position with respect to the legal status of Kosovo. Western attempts, in the period prior to Rambouillet, to fix in the Contact Group concrete parameters of the peace plan were invariably met with a kind of slack resistance on the part of Russia. Russians believed at that time that the westerners would be unable to reach a consensus on Hill's proposals (although this was not the main reason for Russia's obstructive behaviour). There was not anything in the draft political agreement that could have really prevented consensus. In the past, though, occasional statements by Western officials did give ground to suggest that individual states had different nuances in their approaches to the Kosovo status. Such comments hardly reflected real differing interests.

  Fourthly, the problem of reaching Russia's consent . One of the misunderstandings for many years was overestimating Russia's principled opposition to Western approaches to Kosovo. This opposition was believed to be driven by Moscow's sympathy to Milosevic, traditional pro-Belgrade alignment or fear of precedents in view of the centrifugal trends in Russia. Yet Moscow always had significant disillusions with Milosevic. Further Russia had no need to fear precedent because it successfully implemented in Russia the Tatarstan model. Having accepted it in 1994 at home why should it have opposed a similar model for Yugoslavia, say, in 1996? From Moscow's perspective the threat to its interest would not be settling the Kosovo status. With NATO's spread to the East treated, though wrong, as the main threat to Russia's security (an axiom in Moscow since mid-1990s) Russia should have been interested in doing everything possible to prevent a large-scale conflict in Kosovo and subsequently NATO troops coming to Kosovo.

  To be sure, Russia missed a lot of opportunities to prevent the Kosovo conflict, contrary to its own interests. Moscow's striving to block "internationalisation" of the Kosovo problem contributed a lot to the crisis. In the early 1990s Russia ignored the problem following the policies inherited from the past: a mixture of Soviet and Tsarist ideas and aspirations. To a large extent, Moscow's Kosovo policy then, and later, was a result of sheer inertia and lack of thinking. It was by no means a principled opposition. It was surely not driven by real Russian interests. Former foreign minister Kozyrev did not talk seriously to Milosevic on Kosovo, he avoided discussing it with the West. But there was then obviously insufficient pressure from the West on the matter, which did not try to engage Moscow the way it did with the Bosnian crisis.

  In the second half of the decade when Russia finally started to participate in the Contact Group discussions on Kosovo and when Kozyrev's successor, Primakov, started, though inconsequentially, to talk with Milosevic about Kosovo, again a greater persistence was perhaps needed from the West. Moscow did procrastinate the discussions on the legal status. Before Rambouillet and in the pause between Rambouillet and Paris talks it also avoided discussions of the military implementation and in so doing contributed a lot to the collapse of Rambouillet. The fact is though that this behaviour stemmed mainly from a habit of delay and the lack of clear vision. Nobody in Moscow reasonably opposed Hill's drafts. Moreover Moscow was aware that the Kosovo operation would not work without an outside military force to implement it.

  There are two main lessons as far as Russia is concerned, and they seem to be contradictory only at the first sight. The first flows from the fact that Russia turned to co-operation with the West and started to exercise positive influence on Milosevic only after it became clear that there were no other options and that otherwise it would be involved in the conflict with the West. Moscow had exerted serious pressures on Milosevic in June and in October 1998 after it realised that NATO's bombing threats were serious. Likewise, only the assumption that a NATO ground operation was imminent convinced Moscow to play a constructive role in June 1999, negotiating an international NATO-lead military presence in Kosovo. Although it is in the West's interest to coax Russia from its path to self-isolation, engaging Moscow is not an end in itself.

  On the other hand, and this is the second lesson, the Kosovo crisis showed that it is worth trying to have Russia on board for as long as possible. What is usually assumed to be Russia's principled opposition is sometimes more the result of inertia and incompetence. Sometimes it might not be so difficult to persuade Moscow—still basically opportunistic and lacking a clear vision of its own long-term interests—to behave more constructively.[68]

LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

Kosovo's legal status

The international community has to face the reality. The Rambouillet Accords were a very good compromise solution, and the Tatarstan model would have been an earlier compromise—but both as provisional solutions. After the war they are no longer viable. Another provisional solution is being implemented these days by UNMIK and KFOR. The actual protectorate will inevitably continue for a long time to come; one can not reasonably doubt that an outside military force can not be soon withdrawn from Kosovo. But the status issue, currently frozen, remains unresolved.

  After the war, apart from the radical scenario—full independence of Kosovo—there are only two other competitive options: a confederation/very loose federation, consisting of Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo or the partition of Kosovo. The first of these two "compromisè options depends on a number of largely unpredictable things: such as the prospects for democratisation in Serbia, the developments in Montenegro (where today 36.1 per cent of the population already is for the full independence, compared to 21 per cent only a year ago)[69], and actual Belgrade's regime plans with respect to Montenegro (still uncertain and not very promising). The latter option—partition of Kosovo—despite some shortcomings, has one serious advantage: it is long-term character solution.

  To be sure, apart from Kosovo Serbs, who could otherwise loose everything, and who from the very beginning insisted on "canonisation" of Kosovo, none of the three main factors involved seem to be interested today in partition. The West is afraid of displaying contradiction to the slogan of ensuring multiethnic Kosovo. Kosovo Albanians, who were always much more negative towards ideas of partition than Serbs (there was no Albanian Despic up until now)[70], dream of full independence, and now more than ever want "the wholè of Kosovo.

  Milosevic, in his turn, does not need "part of Kosovo". A partition would not be a substitute for him for the lost region. He does not actually need Mitrovica and the northern part (economic interests, often mentioned regarding to the local mining complex, are definitely overestimated). Milosevic does not want partition de-jure, which would mean the ultimate end to the conflict. What he needs, though, is the existing de-facto division, because under it Mitrovica can be used as an outpost for the destabilisation of the situation in Kosovo. Milosevic wants the tensions there to remain for as long as possible. He can survive only by constantly causing and manipulating crises. Now, as before, he is in position to have two crises at the same time—Kosovo and Montenegro—to choose and to manoeuvre.

  As the three main factors are not interested in partition, it is, thus, not likely to happen in the nearest time. But the international community will have sooner or later to define a long-term status for Kosovo and it is worth preparing for it now. It is worth thinking now of the post-UNMIK Kosovo. The international community should not repeat the mistakes of having for years a long list of options without ever daring to make a choice. The most applicable and long-term should be chosen.

  Partition, as any other option, might not be ideal. The most often mentioned argument against it—an undesirable precedent for other areas in the Balkans and world-wide—however, does not stand. Partition of Kosovo could be followed, at maximum, by further exchanges affecting Serbian territories of Bujanovo, Presevo and Medvedja, inhabited by Albanians, and hypothetically, by an enhancement of centrifugal trends in Bosnia. Tim Judah calls partition and exchanges a simplification of the problem[71] It is not also a simplification to predict, on the basis of precedent, a trigger effect of partition to other ethnically mixed territories? According to this logic NATO should have been willing to bomb Moscow for brutalities in Chechnya because of the precedent set earlier in Kosovo. Besides which, there were already precedents of divisions and exchanges of population: in India, for example. In Bosnia, twice as strong international forces would not have been able to maintain peace, had a strict border between Serbian and Bosniac-Croat entities not been secured in Dayton (under the cover of multiethnic rhetoric and central institutions that still remain far from being effective).

Milosevic

The international community failed to work out co-ordinated and consequent strategy to Milosevic in the past. Milosevic skilfully used this lack of co-ordination and general readiness to bargain with him. He used to receive foreign officials in Belgrade granting them concession (symbolic) after concession, accepting in return "a blind eyè to his regime and to other problems he was creating, thus allowing him to strengthen his own power. Today he seems to be finally isolated and even indicated by ITFY. Nevertheless discussions continue between European countries and the US and within EU—on a sanctions regime.

  Admittedly, lifting the air embargo was a logical step once the Serbian leaders could not travel abroad anyway. A more selective and efficient approach to the instrument of sanctions is to be welcomed. One should not be trapped though by the assumption that easing sanctions will weaken the Belgrade regime. This is by no means so. The fact that sanctions have not managed to ruin Milosevic so far is not reason enough to say that lifting sanctions will reach the objective. The appeals of Serbian opposition in favour of lifting the sanctions are understandable—both from the moral and political perspectives (raising their ratings among the public). But let us be realistic. With all possible respect for opposition's efforts to achieve greater unity and overcome previous tactical mistakes it is worth stressing: if a peaceful transition of power from Milosevic to opposition is at all possible (many common people in Serbia don't believe it) it is more likely to happen as a result of people voting in future elections against Milosevic than of voting for the opposition. The people of Serbia have to realise at last that with Milosevic they can not have a future. They voted for him and for his party, they don't have to do it again. This is as far as the message to the public is concerned.

  As for Milosevic himself, he understands only one signal—that of force. A lack of such a signal, indicating an absence of determination to act, would be fatal. The international community should not allow "Kosovo" to repeat in Montenegro. The only way to prevent conflict there—and this is, to my mind, a very important lesson of Kosovo—is to send a signal to Milosevic that intervention is imminent should he try to touch Montengero. It is not enough to warn Djukanovic against provocation and to tell him to show due restraint. The initiative is with Milosevic. The West should be ready to act and Milosevic (and Moscow) should know that.

  Some analysts claim Montenegro is different from Kosovo, and a conflict there could result in civil war. The message is presumably that we shouldn't interfere with Montenegro, which is too delicate issue. However, analysts were telling, before, that Kosovo was different from Bosnia, too sensitive and thus we should show restraint and not interfere. They were wrong. There will not be a civil war in Montenegro if Milosevic makes a swift military advancement and overthrows Djukanovic. If we don't want this to happen the only option is to send Milosevic the message clear enough—no less clear than it was in June 1999 in Kosovo[72]—that he will not be allowed to make such advancement. Then indeed there will not be a civil war.

  There can not be, of course, a single formula for all conflicts in the Balkans. But if there are universal lessons to be drawn from Kosovo these are acting in time with preventative measures and maintaining (and demonstrating) willingness to act in view of brewing conflicts.


68   For a detailed analysis of Russia's Kosovo policy see: Oleg Levitin, "Inside Moscow's Kosovo Muddlè, Survival, no.1, Spring 2000, pp.130-40. Back

69   The results of the most recent poll, conducted by CEDEM/Damar, published in Montenegrene weekly "Monitor", 14.02.00 Back

70   Aleksandr Despic, President of Serbian Academy of Sciences, made in 1996 a public appeal for the partition of Kosovo. Back

71   "US troops may well spend decades in Kosovo", IHT, 16.02.00. Back

72   There is little doubt that among a number of factors that pressed Milosevic to accept UNMIK and KFOR the most important was the threat of ground operation. Back


 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2000
Prepared 7 June 2000