APPENDIX 36
Memorandum submitted by Dr James Gow
1. The events surrounding Kosovo raise questions
in numerous areas. My intention in this brief memorandum is to
point to particular areas that might be of interest to the Committee
in its considerations. This is not an exhaustive range of issues.
Nor is the treatment given here to the issue mentioned exhaustive.
In pointing to these issues, my intention is to highlight areas
of inquiry that the Committee might wish to pursue. I base this
evidence on my expertise (a curriculum vitae accompanies this
submission), experience and on research that includes considerable
interaction with individuals from the FCO. The evidence I offer
here concerns the performance of the UK, in general, and the FCO,
in particular. There is a second area which I do not include here,
but on which I would be happy to offer further evidence, should
the Committee request it. This concerns major issues that will
have to be addressed by the FCO, Her Majesty's Government and
by the UK's partners and allies in the coming years regarding
Montenegro, Kosovo, Serbia and the region.
2. Overall, the performance of the FCO and
the Government as a whole over Kosovo has been strong and impressive.
This built on a strong UK commitment to dealing with the problems
of south-eastern Europe developed during the 1990s. This most
pronounced in support of international diplomatic efforts to secure
peace in the region, in support of multi-lateral military operations
in the region and in support of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague, where the UK role has
been exemplary. The performance over Kosovo marked a notable improvement
on early UK approaches to the break-up of the Socialist Federative
Republic of Yugoslavia and to the onset of hostilities on its
successor territories. Nonetheless, at least one key question
arises over Kosovo. This is the issue of surprise and will be
dealt with below. Before this, I will address a number of other
aspects of the FCO and UK performance over Kosovo. These are:
anticipation, leadership, legality and war crimes. I will also
address the UK role regarding Montenegro.
3. The FCO and HMG are to complemented for
preparedness and anticipation regarding the conflict in Kosovo.
From the summer of 1997, at least, I was aware of discussion and
planning in the FCO regarding involvement over Kosova. It was
already becoming clear that, aside from the activity of the emergent
Kosovo Liberation Army, the Belgrade leadership of Slobodan Milosevic
was contemplating a campaign in the province. There was reason
to suppose that this might include a programme of ethnic cleansing—that
is, the attempt to remove the population from the territory by
means of mass murder, demonstrative violence to induce flight
and forced depopulation. By October 1997, it was clear that the
Serbian MUP (Ministry of Interior Special Forces) and the VJ (Yugoslav
Army) were deploying in combat mode in Kosova and outside it.
At the end of February 1998, in direct response to activity of
the Kosova Liberation Army, which appears to have served as a
pretext, essentially MUP operations, increasingly with some VJ
support began.
4. Throughout this period, the UK took a
strong role in seeking to mobilise international diplomatic action
and was in the forefront of exploring possible military options.
After an American-brokered ceasefire in October 1998, the UK keenly
supported the monitoring force that was deployed. This move strengthened
the UK's position as events moved on it. The UK representatives
on the ground as part of the monitoring force were an important
element in building a strong picture of that situation, as it
became increasingly clear over the winter that the Belgrade leadership
planned to renew its campaign on a greater scale. The signs were
that this would happen in later March. In this context, the UK
effectively led international efforts to gain a diplomatic agreement
on the status of Kosovo that would both deal with the conditions
for armed hostilities and secure the presence of an international
peace force that would be a barrier to such hostilities, namely
the Serbian campaign.
5. The UK has to be praised for its anticipation
and preparedness in this context. It planned to deploy UK forces
as the lead element of a NATO-led force that would be ready immediately
to secure any agreement reached and so avoid the possibility of
back-sliding, reneging, or a campaign of cleansing in the time
gap between an agreement and the point at which an international
force could be deployed. Despite this strong attempt at anticipation
and prevention, the agreement sought at Rambouillet did not emerge,
as Belgrade rejected it.
6. It is clear that questions arise here
regarding attempts at prevention and why they failed. The UK did
much that was right and should be commended. This included the
preparedness to threaten the use of force, should it be necessary.
Yet, prevention did not occur, not was Belgrade deterred. The
reasons for the latter lie largely in Washington DC and Belgrade
and are outwith the scope of this submission.
7. As noted in the foregoing paragraphs
on anticipation, the UK played an important role in leading international
efforts prior to the onset of hostilities between the Alliance
and Belgrade forces. It also played an even more significant leadership
role once the NATO campaign commenced. While Washington wavered
and watched focus group research in order to be democratically
responsive, the UK took the lead with democratic responsibility.
This caused some concern in Washington DC. The true significance
of this leadership lies outside the confines of discussion on
Kosovo, however. The role played by the UK over Kosovo is important
for understanding the future development of NATO and of the European
Union, along with the European Security and Defence Identity and
the Western European Union. UK political leadership over Kosovo
demonstrated the manner in which London can be the bridge between
the US and the European members of NATO as a more European capability
is developed as a pillar within the Alliance. The UK is capable
and well-situated to provide a diplomatic and political lead that
work to the satisfaction of both Americans and Europeans. The
British role in leading over Kosovo was strong. It signalled an
important development for the future of Euro-Atlantic relations.
8. In this context, it is also worth noting
the merits of the Strategic Defence Review of 1997-98 and especially
the role of the FCO in determining the foreign policy baseline
for the MoD's review. This grasped the nature of the world as
the 21st dawns and the UK's position in it. The SDR, by its frontier
breaking nature, put the UK in a position to take the lead over
Kosovo simply because its understanding not only of the specific
situation was good, but also because it was ahead of others in
understanding the meaning of a case such as Kosovo for countries
such as the UK and for the key international multi-lateral bodies
upon which the UK depends for its security, prosperity and social
well-being.
9. Another dimension to this was the UK's
forthright lead in defining the permissive legal framework for
taking action over Kosovo. This had been a contentious issue within
the Alliance during 1998. It had only been resolved by a fudge
when Secretary General Javier Solna had asked the North Atlantic
Council if it was agreed that the Alliance had legal authority
to act and no representative spoke in the short time he allowed
for a response. One part of this problem (later reflected in public
discussion as the NATO air campaign was underway) was that some
Allies and many in the general public had difficulties grasping
change. Voices that had doubted the legality of the UN Security
Council's authorising enforcement action under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter earlier in the 1990s, had now come to the position
where they judged such action only to be legal if authorised in
this way. The UK was prominent in exploring the importance of
the evolution that had taken place in the 1990s, as well as provisions
of international humanitarian law that pre-dated the UN Charter
and in framing the legal grounds for the action which occurred.
It should be noted that although this was a radical development
in itself, it emerged from what appears to have been a deeply
conservative discussion. I first discussed the issue of the legal
grounds upon which action might be taken over Kosovo in the summer
of 1997 with an FCO official. I am aware that there was no ready
solution to the question and that the approach taken during 1999
was the outcome of a process that involved deeply conservative
and negative analysis of this question, although I cannot claim
to know the details involved.
10. War Crimes is another area of legality
that was of importance. As noted earlier, the UK has been a leading
supporter of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia. There were two ways in which this support was significantly
developed in connection with the events in Kosovo. The first of
these was the appointment of a senior official, Mr David Gowan,
as War Crimes Co-Ordinator. This was an important move symbolically
as it gave clear definition and a point of focus to the support
already offered by the UK. It also represented an important practical
step in overcoming some of the practical and security issues involved
in dealing with these matters. Mr Gowan was an experienced diplomat
who could be privy to all that was known by the UK and shared
by Allies, and, at the same time, liaise with both UK investigation
personnel and the International Tribunal itself. This was important
for ensuring that there was reliable and timely information at
the disposal of the Office of the Prosecutor regarding the commission
of crimes in Kosovo. This was important, I believe, in facilitating
the preparation and publication of indictments on two grounds
against President Slobodan Milosevic and four others (although
one of these was charged on only one of the grounds), In my judgement,
this was an extremely important part of the strategic pressure
that made Milosevic decide to meet NATO terms when he did and
to withdraw the MUP and VJ from Kosovo.
11. The second way in which UK support was
significantly developed was the decision by the FCO and the Government
to provide sensitive government information to the Office of the
Prosecutor. While the UK had been enormously supportive prior
to this date, this was a step that addressed one of the continuing
complaints of the Office of the Prosecutor, that governments did
not provide secret intelligence information. The fact that the
UK provided some information of this kind was a major and positive
step, providing, as I assume to be the case, that this was not
done in such a way as to be compromising. This may well have been
a significant factor also in enabling the indictment of Milosevic
and others, which, as noted, was an important factor in the timing
and outcome of the Kosovo campaign.
12. Given the remarkably strong and positive
role taken by the FCO and the UK, there is one element of the
Kosovo case that is somewhat baffling. This is the surprise of
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister
and others at the speed and scale of Belgrade's ethnic cleansing
campaign after NATO air operations began on 24 March 1999. The
only reasonable explanation for this surprise would seem to be
an inability or an unwillingness to contemplate and fully understand
and accept the intentions of President Milosevic. As I have indicated,
there was awareness in the FCO of possible Serbian action that
might warrant international attention and intervention at least
as early as the summer of 1997. There was also awareness that
MUP and VJ units were deploying in combat mode there in the autumn
of that year (implying that the initial consideration of this
was probably made in Belgrade in the previous February or March,
given planning and preparation cycles). There was constant attention
to Kosovo during 1998. And there was highly significant anticipatory
action taken during the winter of 1998-99 in order to pre-empt
a Serbian campaign which was understood by the FCO and the Government
to be coming, in all probability, in March. This gave urgency
to the needs of the situation and urgency to FCO and UK actions.
13. It is hard to follow how the FCO, with
the Secretary of State in the forefront, and HMG as a whole could
have been taken by surprise by Belgrade's ethnic cleansing campaign
when so much energy and so many resources had been put into trying
to avert that campaign. From my discussions with various officials
over the two years prior to the NATO air operation, as well as
my own knowledge and expertise, I find it had to believe that
there could not have been awareness of Belgrade's plans. (It should
be noted that these were plans, not as some have suggested, a
reaction. Of particular pertinence here is the fact that the logistical
means for wholesale and rapid ethnic cleansing were ready in situ—as
with other aspects of military preparation, this takes weeks and
months and does not come spontaneously over night.)
14. In addition to the specific attention
to Kosovo, understanding of Bosnia may also cast some light on
the question of surprise. Throughout the debates of 1993-94 over
the use of force against Serbian forces in Bosnia, it was clearly
understood by the FCO and by the UK Government that any move to
a use of force and a withdrawal of international troops would
lead to an ethnic cleansing campaign by Serbian forces that would
go into overdrive to achieve as much as it could before NATO action
forced it to stop. Given that this understanding was present regarding
Bosnia, even without specific attention to Kosovo it would seem
reasonable to have included the possibility of all-out cleansing
where there was no longer any reason for Milosevic to try to keep
below the threshold at which force would be used.
15. Given the precedent of Bosnia and the
specific attention paid to Kosovo, including taking a coherent
and timely set of admirable measure to prevent the Belgrade campaign,
if possible, there must be a big question mark over the way in
which the Foreign Secretary, the Prime Minister and others were
surprised by the scale and speed of the ethnic cleansing. While
initially I thought that these statements were disingenuous, I
can to regard them as straightforward, face-value reactions.
16. I believe it would be in the interests
of the Committee and of the proper functioning of the FCO and
the UK Government on questions of this kind to determine how there
could be surprise. As part of this, it would be useful to have
some sense of the information available regarding Belgrade's intentions,
specifically with regard to the prospect of cleansing Kosovo.
I would suspect that this matter must have been covered tens if
not hundreds of times in the period from 1997-99.
17. A final area in which the UK played
a strong and positive role concerned Montenegro. The FCO has been
adept in providing diplomatic support, backed by political support
from the UK Government, to the leadership of President Milo Djukanovic
and the government of Prime Minister Filip Vujanovic, as far as
diplomatic practice allows. Given that the Monenegrin leadership
has been the only real sign of positive and democratic developments
in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, this had been the right
course of action and it has had good impact. This has strengthened
the forces of democracy in the region.
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