Memorandum by the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office(Continued)
62. On 5 March, the British and French Foreign
Secretaries issued a joint statement designed to put on record
their views on the goals for the next round of talks, emphasising
that an invited international military force was an integral part
of the package; that those who put obstacles in the way of the
successful realisation of the Accords would be held responsible;
and that any who had recourse to violence would contravene the
commitments they had made to the international community and would
have to answer for their actions. A series of international visitors,
including Holbrooke, went to Belgrade in the week of 9 March,
but none made any headway with Milosevic. With prospects for a
deal looking bleak, planning in Whitehall focused increasingly
on the possibility that there might be further atrocities by Belgrade's
security forces, or a sustained military campaign against the
Kosovo Albanians, or that the Serbs might blatantly refuse to
accept the Accords.
63. When the talks reconvened at the Kleber
Centre in Paris on 15 March, it rapidly became apparent that the
FRY/Serbian side had no intention of negotiating seriously. Indeed,
they resiled from their Rambouillet commitments to accept the
principle of a political settlement and to discuss all aspects
of implementation. The Kosovo Albanian delegation signed the Rambouillet
Accords on 18 March. Against the backdrop of total Serbian intransigence
and renewed offensives in Kosovo, with reports of up to 250,000
internally displaced persons (IDPs), the UK and French co-chairs
decided the talks were going nowhere. They were adjourned on 19
March. The British and French Foreign Ministers sent a joint message
to Milosevic saying that the Accords remained on the table, urging
him to accept them and warning him against any military offensive.
At the same time, they wrote to Thaqi, welcoming his delegation's
acceptance of the agreement and stressing the need for all provocations
to be avoided in the critical period ahead.
64. On 19 March the OSCE Chairman-in-Office
decided to withdraw the KVM the next day as, following the unsuccessful
outcome to the negotiations in Paris, the situation in Kosovo
had deteriorated to such an extent that it was becoming increasingly
difficult for the Mission to carry out its task safely.
65. In the year leading up to 20 March around
500 ethnic Albanians had been killed in atrocities and over 400,000
people at various times displaced from their homes. Although during
the deployment of KVM Serbian forces were to some extent constrained
by the presence of observers, eye-witness accounts indicated that
Serbian operations were frequently brutal and included many instances
of beatings and torture followed by summary executions. There
were also many instances of mistreatment of women and children.
As noted above, there was a particular up-surge in violence around
Christmas 1998 and again in January 1999, but Serb police and
military activity continued throughout, including when the negotiations
were going on in France. During the Kleber talks in Paris there
were reports of forces massing in and around Kosovo and by 19
March there were reports that the offensive against the KLA and
ethnic Albanian civilians had intensified significantly, driving
thousands of Kosovo Albanians from their homes, carrying out summary
executions and destroying property.
66. Holbrooke paid a final visit to Belgrade
on 22/23 March, but failed to convince Milosevic to agree to a
ceasefire and political process. On 23 March, Solana confirmed
that he had given authority to SACEUR to begin the air campaign,
which began the following night.
March 1999-June 1999
67. Before NATO's air campaign began on
24 March, a new Serbian offensive was underway. There were strong
grounds for expecting that Milosevic was embarking on a further
onslaught which would involve civilian casualties, the further
destruction of villages and the displacement of their inhabitants.
68. As the Foreign Secretary told the Foreign
Affairs Committee on 14 April, the UK was aware that a spring
offensive against the KLA had been planned before the start of
NATO airstrikes, and knew from previous experience that it was
likely to be accompanied by ethnic cleansing. This had already
happened in Summer 1998, when a quarter of a million ethnic Albanians
were driven from their homes. It was precisely because there was
good reason to anticipate that Milosevic's forces would intensify
repression in Kosovo that NATO agreed unanimously that we had
to act. In the event, the systematic and ruthless character of
the ethnic cleansing, such as the mass deportation by shuttle
trains of the population of Pristina, exceeded any reasonable
anticipation.
69. NATO's air campaign began with airstrikes
on air defences across the FRY and a limited range of targets
in Kosovo and elsewhere in southern Serbia. As has been noted,
the international community had made its demands to Belgrade clear
in a series of public and private messages. Milosevic had the
option at any stage of acceding to those demands. He failed to
do so. His response was instead to continue at an accelerated
pace his attempt to achieve the final destruction of the KLA and
the up-rooting and expulsion of Kosovo's Albanian population.
70 When Milosevic showed no sign of responding
to the opening phase of air strikes, NATO decided in late March
to widen the range of air strikes to cover carefully selected
targets of high military value throughout the FRY. On 29 March,
NATO warned that Milosevic and his military commanders would be
held responsible for war crimes committed in Kosovo.
71. There was a wide measure of international
support for NATO's action. Evidence of this was the defeat on
26 March by 12 votes to 3 of a Russian draft Security Council
resolution condemning the air strikes. As noted above, because
of Russian and Chinese views, it had not proved possible to secure
a Security Council resolution authorising use of force. The UK
would have welcomed such a resolution as the clearest possible
signal of the will of the international community. But the need
to avert a humanitarian catastrophe provided a sound legal basis
for NATO's air strikes. As the UK Permanent Representative made
clear in the Security Council debate on 24 March:
"The action being taken is legal. It is
justified as an exceptional measure to prevent an overwhelming
humanitarian catastrophe."
72. NATO troops played a key role in the
international community's response to the ruthless expulsion of
775,000 Kosovo Albanians to Macedonia and Albania, and a further
90,000 to Montenegro and Bosnia. Forces already in Macedonia,
especially the initial elements of what was to become NATO's Kosovo
Force (KFOR), quickly assumed a leading role in the management
of the refugee inflow, feeding refugees and by early April had
begun to erect large camps. In the first half of April, NATO established
a new force in Albania—AFOR—under UK command, to respond
to the humanitarian crisis there.
73. In concert with our EU partners, the
UK took prompt action to ensure the protection of the refugees.
On 3 April the Foreign Secretary called for the establishment
of sanctuaries to provide places of safety in the region for refugees.
The Development Secretary travelled to Macedonia and Albania on
4-5 April, where she secured Macedonian agreement that incoming
refugees would be sheltered at a British-built camp at Brazde.
By 10 April, British soldiers had established a camp of 17,000
tents, capable of accommodating 50,000 refugees. Other NATO forces
established camps in Macedonia and Albania. The Prime Minister
visited Albania, Macedonia, Romania and Bulgaria during May in
order to bolster regional confidence in and support for NATO's
efforts.
74. On 9 April, UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan issued a statement expressing his deep distress at the humanitarian
tragedy taking place in Kosovo and in the region, and urgently
calling upon the Yugoslav authorities:
— to end immediately the campaign of
intimidation and expulsion of the civilian population;
— to cease all activities of military
and para-military forces in Kosovo and withdraw these forces;
— to accept unconditionally the return
of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes;
— to accept the deployment of an international
military force to ensure a secure environment for the return of
refugees and the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid; and
— to permit the international community
to verify compliance with the above undertakings.
The Secretary-General urged NATO to suspend
air strikes upon acceptance by the Yugoslav authorities of these
conditions.
75. The demands on Milosevic set by NATO
Foreign Ministers, meeting on 12 April, closely reflected those
set out by Annan. NATO demanded that Milosevic:
— ensure a verifiable stop to all military
action and the immediate ending of violence and repression;
— ensure the withdrawal from Kosovo
of the military, police and paramilitary forces;
— agree to the stationing in Kosovo
of an international military presence;
— agree to the unconditional and safe
return of all refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access
to them by humanitarian aid organisations;
— provide credible assurance of his
willingness to work on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords in
the establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo
in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United
Nations.
76. On the diplomatic front, the Russians
made an early proposal for a G8 Ministerial, but on the unacceptable
condition that NATO airstrikes should stop, which would have allowed
serbian repression to continue unchecked. A 7 April meeting of
Contact Group political Directors in Brussels failed to establish
sufficient common ground for such a Ministerial. Allied Foreign
Ministers consulted regularly on how best to pursue engagement
with the Russians and diplomatic strategy generally. This was
matched by close coordination between Defence and Development
Ministers.
77. The NATO Washington Summit of 23-25
April sent an important message of Allied resolve at a critical
time: Belgrade's forces had expelled 600,000 Kosovo Albanians
in the preceding month. If Milosevic had been counting on splits
starting to open in the Alliance he would have been disappointed.
The Summit produced agreement to intensify the air campaign, and
demonstrated the unity with the Allies of all the PfP partners—42
nations in total—except Russia and Belarus. NATO undertook
to respond to any threats from Belgrade to any of the neighbouring
states resulting from the presence of NATO forces or NATO activities
on their territories. NATO also commissioned planning work for
supporting the EU oil embargo against the FRY agreed on 23 April.
The Summit statement spelt out clearly that as long as Belgrade
did not meet the legitimate demands of the international community
and continued its repression, NATO air operations would continue.
It reiterated NATO's demands on Milosevic:
— ensure a verifiable stop to all military
action and the immediate ending of violence and repression in
Kosovo;
— withdraw from Kosovo his military,
police and para-military forces;
— agree to the stationing in Kosovo
of an international military force;
— agree to the unconditional and safe
return of all refugees and displaced persons, and unhindered access
to them by humanitarian organisations , and
— provide credible assurances of his
willingness to work for the establishment of a political framework
based on the Rambouillet accords.
78. Shortly before the summit, Solana had
said that NATO military planners would be updating their assessments
and plans for all contingencies. Reporting on the Summit to the
House of Commons, the Prime Minister said there had been discussions
on the circumstances in which ground troops would be deployed
to Kosovo, and made it clear that Milosevic had no VETO over NATO's
actions. The build up of NATO forces in the region as the basis
for a peace implementation force continued and was later accelerated
as a result of NATO's revised plans.
79. What proved to be a key breakthrough
on the diplomatic front came on 6 May when G8 Foreign Ministers,
meeting in Bonn, agreed principles to resolve the Kosovo crisis,
fully consistent with NATO's conditions for ending airstrikes.
The principles provided a solid foundation for continuing engagement
with the Russians. Work began to develop a road map to end the
conflict and a draft Security Council resolution (both UK drafted),
which underpinned the round of talks in Helsinki and Moscow between
President Yeltsin's special envoy for Kosovo Victor Chernomyrdin,
US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Finnish President
Ahtisaari whose role in the diplomatic effort on behalf of the
European Union was confirmed by EU Foreign Ministers on 17 May.
80. After a week of intensive meetings,
Ahtisaari, Chernomyrdin and Talbott agreed on 2 June a text specifying
withdrawal of "all" FRY/Serbian forces from Kosovo and
"substantial NATO participation" in an international
security presence, under unified command and control. Ahtisaari
and Chernomyrdin flew to Belgrade to present the text to Milosevic.
Milosevic informed them on 3 June that the Serbian Parliament
and the Federal Government had accepted the text. Ahtisaari then
travelled to Cologne to brief the European Council. G8 Foreign
Ministers gathered in Bonn on 7 June and, in a long session, made
substantial progress towards agreement on the draft Security Council
resolution. The meeting was suspended overnight to allow Ivanov
to consult President Yeltsin. When Ministers reconvened in Cologne
the following morning the remaining issues were speedily resolved
with agreement being reached on test incorporating the G8 principles
of 6 May and the provisions of the Ahtisaari/Chernomyrdin text
agreed by Milosevic on 3 June.
81. On 9 June KFOR and the FRY signed a
Military Technical Agreement (negotiated by KFOR Commander Lieutenant
General Sir Mike Jackson with FRY military representatives) on
the terms of and timetable for withdrawal of serb forces from
Kosovo. Withdrawal began on 10 June. Following verification that
Withdrawal was underway, the NATO Secretary-General suspended
the air campaign, and UNSCR 1244 was adopted on 10 June, demanding
FRY co-operation in implementing the G8 principles and the Ahtisaari/Chernomyrdin
text; authorising the establishment of an international security
presence (now KFOR) to create secure conditions for the safe return
of refugees and of the interim civil presence in Kosovo (the UN
Mission in Kosovo, UNMIK) to provide a transitional administration,
and outlining the main responsibilities of the two presences.
The first NATO troops entered Kosovo on 12 June. Despite Russian
assurances that they would not deploy forces to Kosovo before
joint command arrangements with NATO had been agreed, on the night
of 11-12 June a small Russian force moved to Pristina airport.
There was concern that this might complicate KFOR's overall deployment.
In the event, arrangements for the inclusion of Russian forces
in KFOR were agreed, after further negotiations in Moscow and
on the ground, in Helsinki on 18 June.
82. The withdrawal of FRY/Serbian forces
from Kosovo was completed on 20 June, ahead of schedule, when
the NATO Secretary-General terminated the air campaign. On 21
June, the KFOR Commander accepted a demilitarisation undertaking
from the KLA Commander-in-Chief Hashim Thaqi, and on 30 June the
FARK (Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo, a smaller Kosovo
Albanian armed faction) declared they would demilitarise on the
same terms.
WHY DID
MILOSEVIC CONCEDE?
83. There were probably several reasons
for the rapid capitulation by Belgrade in early June. First, Milosevic
had almost certainly calculated that NATO unity would crack, that
neighbouring countries would collapse under the pressure of refugees,
that airstrikes would halt and that he could complete unconstrained
his programme of ethnic cleansing. He must have realised that
he had miscalculated. As the conflict continued, and confronted
by the full horror of Milosevic's brutal agenda, Alliance unity
strengthened, bound together by a constant round of contacts at
Ministerial level.
84. NATO demonstrated willingness to increase
the pressure through the intensification of airstrikes (from around
100 sorties a day in late March to 500 sorties a day in late May).
Damage from the NATO airstrikes would have been a significant
factor. Well over 400 static targets were attacked, and more than
three hundred suffered moderate to severe damage. There is clear
evidence that airstrikes against Milosevic's forces in the field
were successful in restricting their operations. But an account
simply of targets hit cannot capture the deterrent effect of the
air action—the extent to which Yoguslav tanks and other
assets had to remain immobile. Nor can any purely numerical assessment
judge the wider impact of the military campaign in influencing
Milosevic's decisions and, ultimately his decision to concede.
Air operations had an impact on public opinion in Serbia: from
an early stage, there were reports of mothers demonstrating against
their sons being forced to serve in Kosovo.
85. A key development during the activity
which proved to be the diplomatic endgame was the 27 May announcement
by International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia of
the indictment of Milosevic and four other senior regime figures
(including Milutinovic and General Odjanic, Chief of the General
Staff of the FRY armed forces) for crimes against humanity and
violations of the laws and customs of war. Some commentators speculated
that the Tribunal's indictment of Milosevic would harden him in
a "bunker mentality" and frustrate progress towards
a diplomatic solution. In fact, the indictment appears to have
added to the psychological pressure on him to strike a deal, although
there was and is no prospect of him being given any sort of amnesty.
86. Finally, despite the acknowledged difference
of view between Russia and NATO on airstrikes, Milosevic appears
eventually to have got the message that there were limits to the
support Belgrade could expect from Moscow. Instead, as a result
of the work done by Chernomyrdin, Ahtisaari, Talbott and the G8,
Milosevic was confronted by an increasingly united international
community, with an agreed list of demands they insisted he had
to meet.
UK ROLE
87. The reversal of Milosevic's ethnic cleansing,
with the return of the Kosovo refugees, and the insistence on
a fair political solution represented a significant defeat for
the forces of repression in the Balkans, and involved intense
activity by the international community as a whole—in NATO,
the UN, the EU, the G8 and the Contact Group.
88. The UK played a leading role in focusing
international attention on Kosovo and determining the shape of
the international community's response to the crisis. In 1997,
the UK put Kosovo on the Contact Group's agenda. When violence
flared in early March 1998, the Foreign Secretary travelled to
Belgrade to urge Milosevic to offer moderate Kosovo Albanians
a political alternative and, with the authority of the EU Presidency,
to emphasise that improvement in FRY/EU relations was impossible
while Belgrade's policies continued. The 9 March 1998 Contact
Group meeting in London set the agenda for international efforts
in the months ahead. Apart from its bilateral activities with
both the government in Belgrade (including two personal letters
from the Prime Minister to President Milosevic), the UK drafted
or co-sponsored all the key Kosovo resolutions and played a key
role in developing status models and refining the Hill proposals.
We convened the Contact Group Ministerial on 8 October1998 which
gave Holbrooke his mandate to negotiate with Milosevic. With France,
we co-chaired the talks at Rambouillet and Kleber. The Foreign
Secretary played a leading role in securing Russian agreement
to the text of SCR 1244, establishing the international civil
and military presences in Kosovo. The UK led efforts to get verifiers
on the ground quickly, in the ultimately unsuccessful effort to
make the October 1998 Holbrooke package stick. The British Embassy
in Belgrade was in regular high-level contact with key players
in Belgrade and Pristina throughout 1998 and early 1999.
89. The UK played a key role in shaping
events in NATO. In particular, the UK's intensive contacts with
key Allies helped strengthen Alliance cohesion at crucial moments.
One important example was the Foreign Secretary's visit to Washington
on 20-21 May and his visits to Paris, Rome and Bonn on 26 May,
which underlined NATO's unity of purpose and made clear that planning
for various ground troop options was under active consideration.
Throughout the crisis in 1998 and 1999, UK influence, exerted
through the formal decision processes in the North Atlantic Council
and Military Committee and through close and regular contacts
with NATO'S key decision-makers, was instrumental in ensuring
that NATO had at its disposal a range of militarily credible options
and that NATO's objectives for the military campaign reinforced
the demands of international community.
90. On the humanitarian front, the UK spear-headed
the need to find effective solutions to the unfolding refugee
crisis in March/April 1999. The Department for International Development
set the strategic objectives of providing rapid assistance to
refugees, protecting their dignity and rights, helping host communities
come to terms with the influx and planning for further contingencies.
Its broad range of activities included bolstering the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees as lead agency for refugees; channelling
assistance through UN agencies and Non-Governmental Organisations;
advising host governments on planning and finances; and working
with the EU and the International Financial Institutions to minimise
the impact of refugees on regional economies. UK troops in KFOR
set up Macedonia's most significant "frontline" camp
at Brazde/Stenkovac when the resources of the civilian agencies
were at full stretch.
91. The UK supported the EU's policy of
helping refugees to stay in the region wherever possible. Our
contribution to this was worth £40m in total, largely made
up of in-kind support including airlifts of personnel and supplies,
logistics management on the ground, support to UN agencies and
NGOs, and building camps. At the same time, we recognised that
some of those massing at entry points in Macedonia were in need
of immediate protection, and took part in the humanitarian evacuation
programme led by UNHCR, extending comprehensive protection programmes
to over 4,000 refugees. The UK approach of help to the region
and protection for those whose needs were most urgent was vindicated
by the overwhelming rate of return since KFOR's entry into Kosovo.
92. The UK played the key role in the early
stages of implementing the military aspects of the settlement
in Kosovo, and will continue to play a major part in stabilisation.
The UK was by far the biggest troop contributor to KFOR in the
initial period, and Lieutenant-General Sir Mike Jackson played
a critical role in negotiating the FRY/NATO agreement on modalities
for withdrawal of Serb forces. The British AFOR commander Lieutenant-General
John Reith did most of the face-to-face work to negotiate the
terms of the demilitarisation undertaking made by the KLA, subsequently
also made by the FARK.
93. The UK is giving strong support to UNMIK.
We were the first country to contribute to the UN Trust Fund for
Kosovo. We are providing a wide range of support, from policemen
and prison officers to healthcare services and mine clearance
teams. A fuller account of the current UK effort is at Annex B.
94. This UK activity is a major part of
the international effort to restore normal life to Kosovo, as
part of the wider strategy of promoting peace and stability in
the Balkans. This will be covered in our second Memorandum, which
concentrates on the main themes of and lessons learned from the
Kosovo crisis and the challenges ahead there and more widely in
the region.
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