EIGHTH REPORT
The Foreign Affairs Committee has agreed to the
following Report:—
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
INTRODUCTION
1. Finding ways to minimise the threat to strategic
stability posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) is a key component of UK foreign and defence policy. A number
of international regimes have been established which seek to control
the availability and use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.
Our predecessor Committee reported on this issue on 30 March 1995
following its inquiry into UK Policy on Weapons Proliferation
and Arms Control in the Post-Cold War Era.[6]
Given continued international concern about the proliferation
of WMD in certain regional "hot spots", anxiety about
the progress of arms control and the potentially destabilising
impact of the USA's plans to deploy a system of National Missile
Defence (NMD), we decided that now was the time to examine this
issue.
2. A number of other factors
make this the right time for a review:
- The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT)—the foundation stone for nuclear non-proliferation
and disarmament efforts—came under scrutiny earlier this
year during the Sixth Review Conference.[7]
The NPT, which has 187 States Parties,[8]
opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. The
international political and military climate was very different
when the treaty was initiated: retaining relevance and signatories'
support so that breakout from the treaty is avoided presents a
significant challenge. The 2000 NPT Review Conference ended with
the adoption, by consensus, of a final document which reviews
the operation of the treaty over the past five years and sets
out a number of steps that should be taken to promote nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament. The next Review Conference
is due to be held in 2005.
- The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
has also reached an important stage in its development. Efforts
are being made to agree a verification protocol for the treaty
before the Fifth Review Conference, due to take place in 2001.
- The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which
entered into force in 1997, is unique in being the first multi-laterally
negotiated disarmament agreement which aims to ban an entire category
of WMD in a verifiable manner and may, therefore, offer important
lessons.
- Both the Russian Federation and the USA—central
players due to the size and technological sophistication of their
weaponry—will have elected a new President by the end of
this year. President Putin was elected in March and the new US
President will be elected in November. The policies pursued by
each of these new administrations will have repercussions for
many other states and will have a profound influence on the arms
control climate. The UK Government enjoys strong links with the
USA and the Russian Federation and must seek to influence both
administrations in ways which enhance international security and
stability.
- The Strategic Defence Review set out the UK Government's
assessment of the risks from proliferation: "Our assessment
is that there could be around 20 countries that either possess
or have shown an interest in developing offensive chemical and/or
biological warfare capabilities. The Government is also concerned
about the nuclear programmes of some non-nuclear weapon states,
as well as India and Pakistan."[9]
The Government concluded that "at present, any risk to Britain
from the ballistic missiles of nations of concern in terms of
proliferation is many years off, but the risk to some of our NATO
allies is less distant; and British forces must be able to operate
in regions, such as the Gulf, where they might face these risks."[10]
The risk presented by terrorist use of WMD is another important
factor to take into consideration. The non-classified FCO paper
"UN Special Commission (UNSCOM)" issued on 4 February
1998 stated that: "One hundred kilograms of anthrax released
from the top of a tall building in a densely populated area could
kill up to three million people." The Government highlighted
the steps it was taking to meet the threat both at home and overseas
from biological and chemical weapons in the Ministry of Defence's
publication last year "Defending against the threat from
biological and chemical weapons."[11]
- Media interest in nuclear weapons and arms control
treaties was boosted in March 2000 when Michael Douglas, UN Goodwill
Ambassador, urged Members of Parliament to encourage the Prime
Minister to take a leading role in preserving arms control regimes.[12]
The film star's speech in Westminster Hall attracted a range of
hyperbolic headlines—for example, Star begs Blair to
save the world[13],
Douglas warns MPs of nuclear anarchy,[14]
Hollywood actor sees disarming role for Blair.[15]
Despite the frivolity of the eye-catching headlines, the topics
addressed in the articles are serious ones and the actor's visit
certainly helped to raise the profile of an issue which, despite
its vast importance, is often dismissed as off-puttingly technical
and dull. Under-Secretary-General Jayantha Dhanapala, of the Department
for Disarmament Affairs at the United Nations, addressed a follow-up
meeting in the Palace of Westminster on 3 July 2000.[16]
3. Continuing WMD proliferation makes arms control
measures more vital than ever and some notable successes have
been achieved. Since our predecessor Committee's 1995 report,
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has been opened for signature;
the indefinite extension of the NPT Review Conference has been
agreed; the CWC has entered into force; the negotiation of a verification
protocol to the BTWC has started and is now hopefully nearing
successful conclusion; the USA and Russia have both ratified the
START II Treaty that, when implemented, will result in significant
reductions in the size of both countries's strategic nuclear arsenals;
the UK and France have implemented unilateral reductions in the
size of their nuclear arsenals; and four of the five nuclear weapon
states have ceased the production of fissile material for weapons
purposes.
4. At the start of this inquiry, we visited the United
Kingdom Permanent Representation to the Conference on Disarmament
in Geneva, a visit which provided us with a useful, if somewhat
depressing, introduction to the work of the Conference. We met
a number of Ambassadors to the Conference, who expressed diverse
but stimulating views. We later paid a useful visit to the United
Nations in New York and to Washington, where we met officials
from the State Department and politicians with interest and expertise
in this field. A frequent topic of discussion during the latter
visit was the USA's plans to deploy a system of National Missile
Defence. This is a subject to which we returned during our sessions
of oral evidence in London. We took evidence from academics, who
had extensive expert knowledge of the three different categories
of weapon and both the treaties and arms control measures designed
to curtail the risk they present. Regional threats, especially
those emanating from the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent,
were also raised during the visits and the formal evidence sessions.
5. We took oral evidence on 4 April 2000 from people
with expert knowledge of nuclear weapons and the related international
treaties. Professor Paul Rogers of Bradford University, Professor
Robert O'Neill of Oxford University and Professor John Baylis
of the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, made up our first panel
of witnesses; and Professor William Walker of the University of
St Andrews, Professor John Simpson of the University of Southampton
and Ms Rebecca Johnson, Director of the Acronym Institute, the
second. On 11 April 2000 we turned our attention to biological
and chemical weapons and their associated conventions. Our three
witnesses with expert knowledge of these fields were two academics,
Professors Malcolm Dando and Graham Pearson of the University
of Bradford, and Dr Tom Inch of the Royal Society of Chemistry,
Chairman of the National Advisory Committee on the Chemical Weapons
Act and a member of the Scientific Advisory Board to the Organisation
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. In the second part of
this session, we turned to the verification issues surrounding
the treaties governing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons
and took evidence from Dr Trevor Findlay, Executive Director of
the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC)
and Colonel Terry Taylor, Assistant Director of the International
Institute for Strategic Studies. The inquiry concluded on 28 June
when the Foreign Secretary appeared before the Committee.
6. Many organisations and interested individuals
submitted written evidence to the Committee. This is published
with the Report.[17]
We requested evidence from the FCO about small arms and landmines,
two issues covered in the 1995 Report. We did not seek written
evidence about these latter topics from parties other than the
FCO, but we have decided to comment briefly on the FCO's memorandum
in this Report as there is enormous public interest in these issues.
We are grateful to all of our witnesses and to those who have
submitted written evidence. We should also like to express our
thanks to the two specialist advisors who have helped us enormously
during the course of this inquiry—Dr Wyn Bowen of the Department
of War Studies, King's College, London and Dr Stephen Pullinger,
Executive Director of ISIS.
6 Second Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session
1994-95, UK Policy on Weapons Proliferation and Arms Control
in the Post-Cold War Era-henceforth HC 34. Back
7
The Conference took place at the United Nations in New York between
24 April and 19 May 2000. Back
8
A State Party is a state which has consented to be bound by the
treaty and for which the treaty is in force. Back
9
Strategic Defence Review, Supporting Essays, p. 5-13. Back
10
Strategic Defence Review, Supporting Essays, p. 5-13, 5-14. Back
11
Defending Against the Threat from Biological and Chemical Weapons,
Ministry of Defence, July 1999. Back
12
Text of speech available at www.acronym.org.uk/44speech.htm. Back
13
The Times, 21 March 2000. Back
14
The Guardian, 21 March 2000. Back
15
The Daily Telegraph, 21 March 2000. Back
16
Text of speech available at www.acronym.org.uk/ukdhana.htm. Back
17
See pp. 146-219. Back
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