House of Commons - Foreign Affairs

Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Eighth Report

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENCE AND THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY

30. The current US Administration is considering the deployment of a system of national missile defence (NMD), designed to defend US territory against limited ballistic missile attacks from "rogue states" such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq.[57] President Clinton has stated that he will decide whether or not to proceed with NMD in autumn 2000, following the completion of a series of three tests of the proposed system, the third of which took place on 7 July 2000. The President's decision will be based on four criteria: an evaluation of whether the threat has developed sufficiently to warrant deployment; the technical feasibility of NMD; its likely cost; and finally, its potential impact on strategic stability. A decision in favour of deployment would require Russia's agreement to amend the ABM Treaty. If such agreement were not forthcoming, the USA would be forced to abrogate the treaty unilaterally.[58]

31. The USA and the Soviet Union signed the bilateral Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) in 1972. The Treaty and its related Protocol of 1974 impose strict limits on the number and location of strategic interceptor missiles deployed by both parties—each country is restricted to deploying 100 launchers at a single site. The ABM Treaty was a product of the rough parity that had developed between the strategic nuclear arsenals of the superpowers by the late 1960s. This situation, where both sides possessed the capability to retaliate in a devastating manner if the other side struck first in a nuclear exchange, came to be known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Preserving this condition of mutual vulnerability was perceived as the key to maintaining a stable deterrent relationship between the Superpowers. Indeed, MAD was the basis for strategic nuclear arms control from the late 1960s onwards and it was perceived as the bedrock of strategic stability between the USA and the Soviet Union for the remainder of the Cold War. The potential development of anti-ballistic missile defences threatened to undermine MAD by offering either side the capability to shoot down the other's nuclear retaliatory forces after initiating a first strike. The ABM Treaty was designed to ensure mutual vulnerability by preventing each side from developing an ABM system capable of nullifying the other's strategic retaliatory forces.[59] Although the treaty did not prevent a strategic nuclear arms race between the superpowers during the 1970s and 1980s, which resulted in each side possessing the capability to destroy the other many times over, it did help to preserve MAD by preventing the initiation of a highly destabilising competition between defensive anti-ballistic missile systems and offensive missile systems designed to overwhelm them.

32. The ABM Treaty does not prohibit the deployment of defensive missiles per se, but places limits on the extent of the territory that can be protected. Article 1 of the ABM Treaty forbids any national system of missile defence.[60] The Soviet Union developed a system of ballistic missile defence that remains in place today. The system is centred on Moscow. The USA deployed its anti-ballistic missile defence in North Dakota but moth-balled the system in 1976.[61] In the 1980s, President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative proposed the development of an impenetrable shield over the USA. This overly-ambitious plan, popularly referred to as "star wars" failed to materialise for a variety of political, financial and technological reasons.

33. The issue of NMD has become caught up in the current US Presidential election campaign[62]—both the Democratic and Republican parties are keen to demonstrate that they are tough on defence issues. The British American Security Information Council asserted that "there is a steadily strengthening view in the US against relying on mutual nuclear deterrence in national strategy. The idea that Americans must not be threatened with any kind of missile has led the Administration to consider deployment of [NMD] ... and many in the Republican Party to reject the ABM Treaty out of hand."[63]

The Threat from "Rogue States"

34. The pressure in the USA to deploy a national missile defence has increased over the last few years. There are many complex reasons for this, but one powerful motivator is concern within the USA about the potential threats arising from its position as the world's sole superpower. Professor Walker observed that "an unco-ordinated but terrifying army of 'rogue states', 'terrorists' and other actors has assembled in the public and political minds against the American people and government."[64] In the previous section of the report, where we discuss key regional threats, we acknowledge the threat presented by a number of countries, which have acquired or developed long-range missiles and which are suspected of developing clandestine WMD programmes. Mr George J. Tenet, US Director of Central Intelligence, made a statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 21 March 2000 in which he set out the CIA's view of the threat to the USA presented by ballistic missiles:

probably

possibly

Many politicians and officials within the USA have concluded that the deployment of NMD is the best way to respond to this threat.

35. A great deal of scepticism has been expressed to the Committee about the extent and credibility of the threat posed by "rogue states". During our visit to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, a senior European official described the idea of a North Korean ballistic missile attack upon the USA as "surrealistic". Whilst accepting that North Korea is run by an unpredictable administration, Professor Baylis believes that the threat has been exaggerated for political ends and that the Rumsfeld Commission[66] in 1998 had "hyped this issue up quite considerably."[67] Our academic witnesses viewed "pork barrel" politics as an important driver for the project. Professor Rogers advised us that many studies of the threat from "rogue states" had been financially assisted by arms companies.[68] Professor Baylis concurred, stating that NMD "has been driven ¼ by close links between political groups and various industrial complexes in the United States."[69]

36. By contrast with the USA, the UK Government acknowledges the threats generated by WMD proliferation but does not appear compelled to take defensive action. The Foreign Secretary told us that although "we take very seriously threats of proliferation to British interests... we are not currently anticipating another state other than the existing nuclear weapon states having the capacity to strike Britain by missile."[70] The Secretary of State for Defence said in the House on 3 July 2000 that "our current assessment is that there is no significant threat to the UK from weapons of mass destruction."[71] The Foreign Secretary told us that:

As the Foreign Secretary intimated, it is important to recognise that the perceptions of the threat from WMD in the hands of rogue states are not the same in the UK and the USA: the latter's superpower status may make it a more obvious target.

Strategic Stability

37. There is mounting international concern about President Clinton's decision because of fears that deployment of NMD will be destabilising in terms of its impact on strategic arms control. Strategic stability would be undermined if Russia and China felt obliged to respond to NMD by enhancing their offensive nuclear capabilities. This would adversely affect the progress of nuclear arms control which, in turn, could have serious repercussions for the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. NMD might also trigger an arms race, particularly in regions such as East Asia, the Middle East and the Indian Subcontinent which are already volatile. Professor Baylis's view of the importance of the ABM treaty and the dangers of it being compromised was representative:

"The ABM Treaty is a cornerstone treaty in terms of strategic stability. It is in the interests of the United States as well as in the interests of Britain to maintain strategic stability and not to create a situation in which the whole fabric of arms control begins to unravel. NMD potentially could be so serious as to unravel the whole basis of strategic arms control."[

38. The US administration argues that it is planning to deploy only a limited system of NMD, designed to offer protection against a small number of missiles. It claims that this would not alter the balance of deterrence that currently exists between the nuclear forces of the USA and Russia or China. In other words, the nuclear forces of Russia and China would still be capable of overcoming such defences. However, the public response of Russia and China to these proposals shows that neither regime is apparently sanguine about the USA's claim to be considering only a limited system of NMD. During our recent visit to China, we received the clear message from official Chinese sources that NMD was a prime example of US hegemony and was unacceptable. Russia has also been implacable in its public opposition to NMD. President Putin and President Jiang Zemin held a summit meeting on 18 July 2000 following which they issued a joint statement, expressing their mutual antipathy to NMD. The joint statement confirmed that, in the view of the two Presidents, "the plan by the United States to develop a National Missile Defence System seeks unilateral military and security advantages."[74] The joint statement also warned that if the USA persists with its plans to deploy NMD, this would "pose the most grave adverse consequences not only to the national security of Russia, China and other countries, but also to the security and international strategic stability of the United States itself."

39. Professor Rogers explained the reasons for Russian and Chinese anxiety about NMD:

Dr Chalmers's view of China's potential response to the deployment of NMD was typical. He thought that China might seek to increase its force of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles because NMD would reduce the effectiveness of its existing force.[76] It is not clear to what extent Russia's protests are being used as high-stake bargaining to lay the ground for future demands for concessions elsewhere in the arms control field. However, Russia could perceive China's expansion of its nuclear capability in response to NMD as a potential threat.

Technological Feasibility and Credibility of NMD

40. Whilst we recognise that threat assessments within the UK and the USA may differ for legitimate reasons, when assessing threat it is important to distinguish between capability and intention. We are concerned that the USA over-emphasises the capability component of the threat equation, when it comes to assessing the extent of the threat it faces, and attaches too little importance to intention. It is this which makes the threat which NMD is intended to counter less credible. There are a number of reasons for this. First, it is difficult to see what a "rogue state" would gain from launching a WMD-armed ballistic missile against the USA as it would do so in the knowledge that its action would precipitate massive and devastating retaliation upon itself. Secondly, if a "rogue state" did decide to inflict mass casualties on the USA, it is unlikely to use the one method of attack—ballistic missile—which would leave no doubt as to the identity of the attacker. Thirdly, as we discuss in the next paragraph, other methods of attack—such as biological or chemical weapons—can be delivered much more easily, at a minute fraction of the cost and with a real possibility of concealing the aggressor. Finally, if a future US President came to believe the US was at imminent risk of a WMD ballistic missile attack from a "rogue state", we believe it is reasonable to assume that that President would authorise the pre-emptive destruction of the rogue state's missile site or sites regardless of whether NMD had by then been deployed in the USA or not.

41. WMD do not have to be delivered by missile. Professor O'Neill and Rebecca Johnson, Director of the Acronym Institute, both warned that nuclear warheads could be delivered, for example, on cargo ships, in delivery trucks that can go across borders and in packing cases. This meant that it was impossible for the USA to make itself invulnerable to attack and external pressure.[77] NMD would not eliminate the threat posed by WMD. As the Sarin nerve agent attack on the Tokyo subway demonstrated, the USA, in common with any other industrialised state, might face as great a risk from a biological or chemical weapons which do not need to be delivered by missile. We are concerned that a decision to implement NMD may provide the USA with an illusion of security whilst increasing the risks for many other countries by undermining strategic stability.

42. We are also concerned that NMD might not in any case offer the degree of protection sought by the US Administration. Doubts have been raised about the technological feasibility of NMD. The tests to date have not been impressive: the first intercept test in October 1999 scored an ambiguous hit, the second test in January 2000 was a miss and the third test on 7 July 2000 was another miss. Although President Clinton is not due to make his decision about deployment until the autumn, there has been widespread speculation in the media that the failure of the third test will mean that the decision is delayed until after the Presidential election. The Union of Concerned Scientists and Massachusetts Institute of Technology Security Studies Program published a report, by a panel of eleven independent senior physicists and engineers, which concluded that the planned NMD system could be easily overwhelmed by simple "countermeasures".[78] According to Dr Scilla Elworthy of the Oxford Research Group, "National Missile Defence systems against strategic missile attacks are hard to rationalise. No current threat justifies them and they are not cost effective—it would be far cheaper for the enemy to deploy more strategic ballistic missiles with multiple warheads than for the defenders to develop and deploy anti-ballistic missiles to attack them."[79]

The Response of the UK Government to US Plans for National Missile Defence

43. In Professor Simpson's view, the international community now faces the problem that "many proliferation decisions, many decisions on nuclear weapons, are going to be made in domestic political contexts where the ability of the outside world to influence state decisions is going to be very limited."[80] Certainly, the UK Government has to be realistic about the extent of its influence with the US Administration, but other EU partners and allies of the USA—notably, France, Germany and Canada—have been much more vociferous in their opposition to NMD, a system which they believe will be destabilising. The Foreign Secretary denied that there was a split amongst members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. He said that he had been present at two meetings of the North Atlantic Treaty Council when there had been a full round-table discussion of NMD. In his view, it would be "fair to say that there is a lot of common ground on what are the areas of difficulty and what would be an appropriate condition for this to proceed. It is not a question of the United States versus Europe, nor of the United Kingdom being isolated in its views either from the United States of from Europe."[81] We recognise, however, that the UK is in a difficult and uneasy position on this sensitive and highly important issue, with countervailing pressures from its European and US allies.

44. The Government has been repeatedly asked to express its view of the US plans for NMD, by members of this Committee and by parliamentary colleagues, but refuses to be drawn on the issue and seeks to avoid taking a firm position at this stage, at least in public. The Government argues that the ABM Treaty, as a bilateral treaty between the USA and Russia, is a matter for these two parties alone to decide. The Government's memorandum states that:

Whilst this is certainly true, any decision to deploy NMD and to change the status of the ABM Treaty, especially if done without Russia's agreement, will have a profound effect on international relations and strategic stability. Because of this, it is incumbent on the Government, as one of the five nuclear weapon states and as a close ally of the USA, to make an early public statement on its analysis of NMD's likely impact on strategic stability and its assessment of whether this would be in the overall security interests of this country.

45. This is all the more important due to the apparently contradictory views emanating from the FCO and the MOD. While the FCO has made it clear that it continues to attach importance to the ABM Treaty and wishes it to be preserved and strengthened,[83] the MOD is keeping open the possibility of acquiring a system of national missile defence in the future. The Secretary of State for Defence announced that "we will continue to consult closely with the US and take account of the work they are doing, to help us take an informed decision on whether to acquire such a capability ourselves in the future."[84] Asked why the Government was keeping the option of NMD deployment by the UK open, the Foreign Secretary replied: "I do not honestly see that there would be any particular interest in closing it off, but at the present time there is no active commitment to it."[85]

46. The UK is not simply a bystander with regards to NMD. For implementation of the first phase of NMD to work, facilities at RAF Fylingdales will need to be upgraded, and this cannot happen without the UK Government's assent. This puts the Government in a different position to many of our EU partners and NATO allies, who will not be asked to make similar decisions. The uniquely close nature of the US-UK relationship in the security field exacerbates the complex and sensitive nature of the Government's response to NMD. A UK refusal to allow the upgrading of facilities at Fylingdales would be unprecedented and prove very testing for the alliance.

47. When the Government is asked whether it intends to allow the US Government to upgrade facilities at Fylingdales if NMD were to proceed,[86] it argues that since no such request has yet been received from the US Government, no response has been given. The Foreign Secretary defended this stance as "an eminently sane position for a government to take."[87] He argued further that "until we know both the nature of the question and also the circumstances in which we are being asked that question, it would be premature for us to debate what the response might be, particularly since at the moment there is no commitment by the United States to ask the question."[88]

48. A joint memorandum from the FCO and the MOD sets out the two most likely scenarios in which the Government might be asked to agree to the use of Fylingdales for NMD purposes and to its related upgrading. Under the first scenario, the USA and Russia would agree to modifications of the ABM Treaty which would permit the deployment of the first phase of an NMD system. Under the second scenario, an agreement would not be reached and the USA would have formally given notice of its withdrawal from the treaty.[89] The following conclusions are then drawn about each of these scenarios:

A decision by a US administration to seek permission to upgrade Fylingdales, having given formal notice of its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, would present the UK Government with an acute dilemma. Whether a "special relationship" continues to exist between the USA and the UK is open to question, but the relationship remains a particular and distinct one, rather different from any shared with the USA by other member states of the EU. A decision by the UK to refuse a US President—possibly a newly elected President committed to implementing NMD as essential to the security of the USA—would have profound consequences for UK/US relations. It is relevant to point out the Prime Minister's latest statement on NMD:[91]

"We are trying to ensure that the fear that the United States has—perfectly legitimately and justifiably—is taken account of in a way that does not put at risk the substantial progress that has been made on nuclear disarmament over the past few years. It is vital, therefore, for us to continue a dialogue on what will be one of the most important issues that we shall have to face over the next few years."

We commend the Prime Minister's approach, whilst urging the Government to impress upon the US Administration that it cannot necessarily assume unqualified UK co-operation with US plans to deploy NMD in the event of unilateral US abrogation of the ABM Treaty.

49. We understand that the British Government, in determining its policy towards NMD, has to be realistic. The UK has a degree of influence but this is not definitive. For our part, we wish to emphasise strongly that our concern about US plans for NMD does not stem from opposition to, or even indifference to, our closest ally's desire to protect itself: the question is whether the additional security that NMD might offer outweighs the negative impact of its deployment on strategic arms control. In any event, NMD would only offer the USA limited protection as the system would only defend the USA from WMD delivered by ballistic missiles and would not eliminate the total threat posed by such weapons. Other methods of meeting the threat posed by WMD, such as diplomatic persuasion, arms control, deterrence and other defensive measures, might also prove to be as effective and do not generate such difficulties for strategic stability.

50. We recommend that the Government articulate the very strong concerns that have been expressed about NMD within the UK. We are not convinced that the US plans to deploy NMD represent an appropriate response to the proliferation problems faced by the international community. We recommend that the Government encourage the USA to seek other ways of reducing the threats it perceives.

57 Ev. p. 101. Back

58 Some hard-line Republicans dispute the legitimacy of the ABM Treaty, arguing that it became invalid upon the break up of the Soviet Union. However, Russia is recognised as the successor state of the USSR, and has inherited its international obligations. Back

59 In September 1997 the USA, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus signed a Memorandum of Understanding which, once it enters force, will make all five states parties to the ABM Treaty (Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus each inherited Soviet ABM facilities on their territory). Back

60 Q67. Back

61 Ev. p. 131. Back

62 Q21. Back

63 Ev. p. 194. Back

64 Ev. p. 27. Back

65 Statement by Director of Central Intelligence, George J. Tenet, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 21 March 2000 on The World Wide Threat in 2000: Global Realities of our National Security (as prepared for delivery), available at www.cia.gov. Back

66 The Rumsfeld Commission was a bipartisan commission established by Congress in the National Defense Authorisation Act of 1997. The Commission was tasked with assessing the ballistic missile threat to the USA. Back

67 Q21. Back

68 Q34. Back