House of Commons - Foreign Affairs

Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Eighth Report

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

Brief introduction and report on progress

87. The outline for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was first articulated in 1968, but it was the Gulf War of 1990-91 and the threat of an Iraqi chemical weapons attack that gave impetus to the proposals for a Convention. The Convention was opened for signature on 13 January 1993 and required States Parties to undertake never under any circumstances to develop, produce or use chemical weapons. Article 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention also requires States Parties to destroy chemical weapons they own or possess. The schedules of the convention provide a list of prohibited chemicals but this is not, and cannot be, comprehensive. Therefore, a catch-all provision was incorporated under the general purpose criterion which defines chemical weapons as "toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes."[158]

88. In its report on UK Policy on Weapons Proliferation and Arms Control in the Post-Cold War Era,[159] our predecessor Committee noted that "the achievement of a ban on chemical weapons and an effective system of verification [was] a longstanding United Kingdom policy goal." The UK ratified the Convention on 13 May 1996,[160] and the Convention came into force on 29 April 1997.[161] To date, there are 129 States Parties to the Convention including all EU Member states, the USA, Russia, India, Pakistan and China. We recommend that the Government exert maximum bilateral and international pressure on those countries who have not yet become States Parties to the Convention to do so.

How the verification process works

89. All States Parties to the Convention are required to submit declarations of past chemical weapons activities and also to submit regular declarations about the production, processing and consumption of certain dual-use chemicals which have possible chemical weapons applications. To monitor and verify these declarations, the Convention established an organisation, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The declarations are verified by means of routine inspections of sites and over six hundred inspections have already taken place.[162] All states are able to request copies of the declarations of other states and this creates a higher level of trust. An unexpected benefit of the Convention has been that several countries, including Iran, declared hitherto unknown stocks of chemical weapons.[163]

90. Each State Party to the Convention designates a government department as a National Authority that is responsible for its share of the funding for the OPCW. In our case, it is the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). The DTI also provides the national representative on the Executive Council of the OPCW and oversees all OPCW inspections in the UK.[164] Of the 600 sites already inspected by the OPCW, over 30 have been in the UK at both defence and industrial sites. All inspections have passed off successfully.[165] The Foreign Secretary told us that the UK National Authority has also carried out practice challenge inspections, watched by foreign observers, which he hoped would illustrate the UK's firm commitment to inspections on an objective but tough basis.[166] The UK National Authority, which has the primary responsibility for implementing the general purpose criterion, has a statutory requirement to submit annual reports on its activities to Parliament for scrutiny.[167]

Arrangements for dealing with non-compliant parties

91. The Chemical Weapons Convention is a comprehensive convention under which States Parties can monitor, verify and dispose of chemical weapons. However, the key tests of the Convention will be whether it can effectively tackle States Parties which are suspected of cheating and whether those who have not yet ratified it can be persuaded to do so.[168] Its mechanisms have yet to be tried and tested.[169] Opinion is divided as to how effective it will prove in the face of persistent non-compliance and our witnesses highlighted some of the obstacles investigators will have to overcome for challenge inspections to work successfully.[170] Distinguishing between what is and what is not legitimate chemical research and/or production is a complicated procedure and Dr Inch argued that the emphasis that is currently put on conventional agents such as mustard gas may make it more difficult for inspectors to uncover more modern forms of chemical weapons.[171]

92. The consequences of a serious breach of the Convention are also unclear. Although the Convention gives authority to the Security Council to act as the final arbiter, it does not provide it with advice on the level or extent of any punishment.[172] Colonel Taylor argued that far from being a deficiency, this was, in fact, a benefit:

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Where breaches are less severe, penalties can be introduced to build incentives towards compliance. Dr Findlay observed that "non-compliance under the Chemical Weapons Convention can lead to the loss of privileges to trade freely in chemicals."[174]

Problem of the US Presidential veto over challenge inspections

93. There have been delays in the full implementation of the inspection regime and, in particular, delays in the length of time the USA has taken to open its civil chemical industry to the necessary levels of inspection.[175] The Foreign Secretary told us that the USA had only just produced its full industrial declaration in the Chemical Weapons Convention and that inspections had yet to start.[176] Of greater concern to the inspection regime was the fact that the legislation facilitating the provision of US industrial declarations included the power of Presidential veto over challenge inspections, and a refusal to allow samples to be taken from US territory for analysis.[177] The Foreign Secretary advised us that "that particular reservation was entered at the insistence of the Hill, not of the US administration."[178]

94. The Chemical Weapons Convention is a successful arms control regime and, despite the fact that challenge inspections have yet to be used in anger, the consensus is that the verification regime is strong. However, it is only one part of a series of measures that, when working together, will curtail the proliferation and threat of chemical weapons.[179] The Convention will have its first review conference in 2002 and this will provide an opportunity to fine-tune the Convention. The intervening period gives the UK government the opportunity to continue its hard work in ensuring the strict regime of verification is adhered to. We recommend that the Government urge the USA to rescind its power of Presidential veto, bringing the USA in line with the rest of the States Parties in time for the 2002 review conference.

Funding of chemical weapons destruction programmes, particularly in Russia

95. The Chemical Weapons Convention makes it clear that the financial burden for the disposal of chemical weapons lies with the host country.[180] In most countries this is not an insuperable problem. This is not the case for Russia which has a considerable stockpile to dispose of but lacks the financial means. As Dr Averre of the University of Birmingham put it: "the programme undertaken by the Russian government to destroy stockpiles of existing chemical weapons constitutes a formidable administrative and technical task and represents a massive financial burden at a time when the state's economic and organisational capabilities are limited."[181] On signing up to the Convention, Russia declared 40,000 tonnes of chemical weapons, of which 30,000 were in munitions form. A timetable was drawn up for their destruction over 10 years, with the possibility of a five year extension if necessary. Russia has already missed its first target—the destruction of 1 per cent of weapons stocks by April 2000.[182] Financial assistance has come from the EU which has pledged up to 15m euros (£8.84m) over three years for destruction-related projects, with an additional 6m euros (£3.79m) to be spent on a chemical weapons destruction plant. Clearly Russia needs greater levels of financial assistance, but the willingness to provide additional finance is undermined by concerns over the way that loans to Russia have been mis-used.[183] Assistance can also be given in the form of technology and expertise. In our report on Relations with the Russian Federation we recommended that the Foreign Secretary report regularly to the Committee on progress with both the EU and the British funded programmes for assisting Russia with the disposal of WMD.[184] It is in the interests of the UK and the international community that Russia is able to comply with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. We repeat our request for regular updates on the progress of the projects the UK is funding and recommend that the Government, and its European partners provide higher levels of aid in assisting Russia to dispose of its chemical weapons arsenal.