APPENDIX 21
Memorandum submitted by Malcolm Harper,
United Nations Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
1. The United Nations Association has, for
a very long time, been deeply concerned with the many issues relating
to the three categories of weapons of mass destruction—biological,
chemical and nuclear—with a special interest in the role
of the United Nations in seeking their banning and their ultimate
elimination from the face of the earth. We are thus very grateful
to have been invited to submit this evidence to the Select Committee
on Foreign Affairs as it looks at the subject of weapons of mass
destruction.
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
2. A major concern of the Association in
relation to biological weapons has been the relative weakness
of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention's verification
regime. Given that the Treaty dates from the early 1970s and is
thus a product of the Cold War era, it is, in a way, a triumph
that it ever came into being. At that point in time, intrusive
inspection potential was non-existent and this is reflected accordingly
in the treaty which was agreed.
3. It can be argued with considerable force
that biological weapons today present the greatest danger of the
three categories of weapons of mass destruction because they have
the weakest verification regime.
4. Negotiations are continuing on the Protocol
to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Some quite good
progress has been achieved. Nevertheless, even though 19 out of
the 23 Articles are essentially complete, there remain issues
to be resolved on others, including
— Article 2 dealing with definitions
on which the Russians have, ab initio, been insistent;
— Article 3 addressing the compliance
regime including the issue of non-transfers;
— Article 7 on matters of technical
co-operation.
5. We believe that Her Majesty's Government
should continue to press for the completion of the negotiations
on the Protocol during the year 2000 before next year's fifth
Biological Weapons Review Conference. Having offered to host the
signing ceremony of the Protocol in London, there is added interest
in achieving this timetable.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS
6. There is cause to be quite pleased with
the progress made in the sphere of chemical weapons. Some years
ago, we commended an initiative taken by Her Majesty's Government—when
Geoffrey Howe was Foreign Secretary—to unblock an impasse
over on-site inspections of chemical weapon sites. It certainly
helped to strengthen the verification system of the subsequent
Chemical Weapons Convention. The inspection system of the Convention
appears to be working satisfactorily.
7. The Select Committee may wish to look
into ways of enhancing the implementation of the Convention—and
of the other treaties concerning biological and nuclear weapons—in
rogue states like Iraq. Here, we believe, the United Nations Security
Council has a key role to play, whatever the difficulties encountered.
It would be in everybody's interest to see that role enhanced
in a genuinely multilateral way and not left quite so much to
the whims of the incumbent Administration in the United States
of America.
8. The complicated story of the United Nations
Special Commission (UNSCOM) in Iraq requires careful analysis.
It always depended on the support it received from UN member states,
whether this was personnel, equipment or information. Nevertheless,
the value of its presence on the ground and of its on-site development
of contacts, continuity of process and skills has been amply demonstrated,
despite all its frustrations and the capacity of the Iraqi Government
to monkey with it, since it was withdrawn and the—considerably
less than adequate—aerial surveillance regime was instituted.
It is essential that the new inspection team is allowed to start
work as quickly as possible and that the UNSCOM lessons are fully
learned and previous mistakes are avoided.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
9. There are a number of issues concerning
nuclear weapons which we would urge the Foreign Affairs Committee
to include in its enquiry. Among them are:
— the upcoming Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) Review Conference. We have always been particularly concerned
at the lack of multilateral progress on the implementation of
Article VI of the Treaty in which any nuclear weapon state, which
is party to the Treaty, accepts to negotiate the reduction and
ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons in good faith. Although
the Russian Federation and the United States of America have made
a number of important bilateral arrangements and although the
United Kingdom has taken certain steps along that route, nevertheless
there are many member states of the United Nations which feel
aggrieved at the slowness of this progress. When the Treaty was
extended indefinitely at the last Review Conference, there was
considerable pressure to secure the more active and comprehensive
implementation of Article VI. The United Nations Association fully
supports those calls;
— the current call by the United States
of America to allow an amendment to be made to the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty so that it can develop what has been dubbed
the "son of Star Wars"—a limited missile system
to protect itself against rogue states which might have long range
rockets aimed against targets in the USA.
The United Nations Association remains opposed
to any such amendment being allowed. We fear lest it would set
an unhealthy precedent for future amendments to other Treaties
and could set off a new round of the arms race whereby potential
adversaries would seek to increase their warhead and missile capacity
in order to "outdo" any star wars style of defence capacity.
We believe that it would be far better to intensify efforts to
secure everyone's acceptance of comprehensive nuclear (and other)
disarmament under the broad aegis of the United Nations.
Basically, we oppose the inclusion of withdrawal
clauses in the texts of Conventions or subsequent attempts to
secure them.
We remain highly doubtful whether the "rogue
states" mentioned by the White House and the Pentagon have,
or will easily develop or acquire, delivery systems to be able
to launch a ballistic attack against US targets.
We thus believe that the Select Committee should
not support the proposed amendment to the ABM Treaty and should
argue against the attempts being made by the US Government to
incorporate its NATO allies into the search for such an amendment.
We would like to see:
— the creation in the Conference on
Disarmament (CD) of a nuclear weapons committee, which is currently
being blocked by the United States of America. It is vital for
genuine longer-term global security that the issue of nuclear
weapons be resolved—through their elimination—and
we believe that this process cannot be left exclusively to the
"nuclear club". Although India and Pakistan have become
members of that "club", Israel, at least officially,
has not; and the position of Iran and Iraq remains clandestine.
A working committee in the CD would be a practical step forward
and would enable nuclear weapon issues to be openly discussed
and, hopefully, agreements reached;
— the timetabling of the final elimination
of all nuclear warheads on a permanent basis. The existing nuclear
weapon states are all opposed to any such structure being agreed.
Nevertheless, many non-governmental organizations, including the
United Nations Association, believe that, without such a framework,
actual reductions will take far too long to achieve and may thereby
cause other potential Indias and Pakistans to develop and to declare
nuclear weapon capacity. A timebound framework would also encourage
nuclear weapon states to negotiate actively, in keeping with Article
VI of the NPT, rather than to allow such discussions to potter
along with no great sense of urgency;
— adherence by all nuclear weapon states
to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). An end to underground
testing may not be as significant as it used to be, owing to the
enhanced systems of computer simulation now available, but the
CTBT is a significant confidence-building measure and full adherence
to it would reduce the risks inherent in all nuclear tests;
— no first-use policies. China now
stands alone, we believe, in pledging no first-use of nuclear
weapons. NATO'S doctrine of flexible response has never enabled
the Organization to adopt a no first-use policy and Russia has
reneged on its earlier position. India and Pakistan, we understand,
remain equivocal on the issue. No first-use declarations are a
valuable confidence-building initiative;
— the de-alerting of nuclear weapons.
The United Kingdom claims to have done so, but some experts remain
doubtful whether this is strictly true. This is another creative
confidence-building measure which further reduces a nuclear exchange
being triggered by mistake;
— greater tolerance of the policies
being proposed by the New Agenda Coalition in the UN General Assembly
as they seek to promote nuclear disarmament. The issues which
they raise are a vital component of the better control and final
elimination of nuclear weapons; and
— the PUGWASH study proposal to use
Aldermaston for certain aspects of verification work.
10. Although, we imagine, outside the brief
of the Foreign Affairs Committee's current study, nevertheless
we believe that all nuclear policies—military and energy—will
ultimately have to be considered as a comprehensive whole, since
there are key areas of overlap which cannot permanently be kept
separate. In the long run, nuclear energy cannot be seen as a
safe energy source and materials can be manipulated to become
useable militarily. The Committee might wish to engage in such
a study as a follow-up to the nuclear aspects of its work on weapons
of mass destruction.
11. That would be an initiative which we
would warmly applaud.
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