APPENDIX 26
Memorandum submitted by Members of the
Board of the International Security Information Service (ISIS[68])
INTRODUCTION
The variety of arms control negotiations, agreements,
treaties and supplier controls—as set out in the Committee's
terms of reference—are interdependent elements of the non-proliferation
regime, the general purpose of which is to prevent the development
and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). But questions remain
as to whether current UK policy is as actively committed to the
abolition of nuclear weapons as it undoubtedly is to the abolition
of chemical and biological weapons, or whether it prefers to live
in the present half-way house on the road to nuclear disarmament.
It is instructive to analyse this policy in relation to future
global scenarios in the context of WMD.
1. A "PROLIFERATED"
WORLD
This is the nightmare scenario, in which the
arsenals of many more states are equipped with one or more WMD.
Such a condition of complete international insecurity is not inconceivable
or even entirely unlikely. Few would disagree that it would render
the world a highly dangerous and dreadful place for all humanity.
Hence, policy makers need to work actively to prevent this scenario
becoming reality. Yet, not all the other scenarios to which we
may be heading are "fully stabilised" against irreversible
steps towards this worse-case scenario. These scenarios do also,
therefore, represent an inherent danger.
2. PERPETUATING
THE CURRENT
DIVISION
A small number of recognised nuclear weapon
states (NWS) equipped with operational nuclear weapons are trying
to prevent any further spread of these weapons to other states.
This regime is maintained internationally by a variety of treaties,
agreements and control mechanisms. In certain political quarters
in the NWS it is regarded as a satisfactory long-term condition
capable of being sustained for the foreseeable future.
On closer examination, however, the possibility
of perpetuating this state of affairs indefinitely diminishes
over time. There are a number of reasons for this.
— The existing regime is perceived
as inequitable by a number of important non-nuclear weapon states
(non-NWS). Whilst the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) permits five
states to possess nuclear weapons, this is only intended as a
transitory stage prior to complete nuclear disarmament, whereupon
equity will have been restored because every state will have become
a non-NWS;
— The fabric of arms control treaties
depends primarily on a shared perception amongst the NWS of what
constitutes strategic stability. There are signs that soon this
may be fractured as the US deploys missile defences that potentially
at least could challenge the deterrent credibility of the other
NWS—upsetting Russia and China particularly, nor pleasing
Britain or France. This is happening just at the time when Russia's
status as a world power is slipping and it is placing greater
emphasis on nuclear weapons for its continued security. The UK
may be involved in this process by participating in the construction
of new US facilities in the UK (about which there has yet to be
any proper public discussion);
— The export control regime, although
it can slow the proliferation of weapons, technology and expertise,
can never be fully effective at preventing the spread. There is
too much knowledge freely available and the dual-use nature of
much of the technology and materials makes it very hard to prevent
their "leakage" into the military sphere;
— The non-proliferation regime is inadequately
complemented with diplomatic machinery for dealing with inter-state
conflicts that fuel WMD proliferation pressures, such as those
in the Middle East or South Asia;
— The NPT regime requires international
consensus on elaborate verification, compliance and enforcement
procedures. This consensus was difficult for forge over Iraq's
clandestine and extensive WMD programme, and even more difficult
to sustain. On the other hand, some non-NWS will resent the implicit
threat that their nuclear abstinence is being "enforced"
by the P5 (Permanent Members of the UN Security Council), all
of whom appear committed to retaining their own nuclear weapons
for the foreseeable future.
The UK is playing a creditable part in supporting
the framework of treaties, export controls and consultations that
sustain this regime. But at best they can buy time, by slowing
down and making more difficult and expensive the task of a would-be
proliferator. They offer no political incentive of a safer world
order in which nuclear weapons are irrelevant as a means of national
defence. Unless accompanied by determined moves towards negotiated
global nuclear disarmament the current regime, by legitimising
the right of a group of powerful states to keep their nuclear
weapons makes the achievement of collective security less rather
than more attainable.
India and Pakistan
Much can be learnt from the case history of
India and Pakistan's nuclear weapon programmes. India's test of
1974 clearly indicated its ability to develop nuclear weapons
but India preferred to pursue universal nuclear disarmament negotiations
rather than deploy actual weapons. The UK and other members of
the non-proliferation club were more successful in slowing down
the Pakistani nuclear programme, but by the mid-1980s it became
clear that this effort had failed. We, and our partners, effectively
sat on our hands until this problem became overt in 1998 when
both countries conducted nuclear tests. The world threw up its
hands in surprise horror and has been trying in vain to put the
genie back in the bottle. This case history demonstrates the strengths
and weaknesses of the non-proliferation regime.
3. "LOW
SALIENCE"
Official UK policy is support for the global
elimination of nuclear weapons. But suspicions remain that the
unwritten policy is directed towards a "low salience"
scenario, where the UK, along with the other major NWS, retains
a small number of operational nuclear weapons. In effect, this
policy is a continuation of the mutual assured destruction (MAD)
regime of the Cold War, at a much lower level. Its justification
is that it represents a serious step along the road to a nuclear
weapon-free world (NWFW) whilst keeping open the possibility of
using nuclear weapons as a desperate "weapon of last resort":
to protect the country by deterring a devastating attack.
This "low salience" scenario effectively
would be a variation of the existing situation, but could include
a number of measures that further reduced the salience of nuclear
weapons. For instance, it might involve further reductions in
deployed and/or stockpiled warheads, more elaborate de-alerting
measures, cuts in the stockpile of military suitable fissile materials
etc. But, in this scenario such nuclear posture revisions would
not be brought about by the UK acting alone (although such action
might be very influential as an example). Rather, they would happen
as part of a multilateral negotiation process, involving all of
the NWS and probably requiring the participation of India, Pakistan
and Israel too.
At present, this potential agenda for constructive
change has virtually ground to a standstill. The test ban treaty
(CTBT) cannot enter into force while so many states refuse to
ratify it; after many years START II is still awaiting ratification
by the Russian Duma; the Fissile Material Cut-Off negotiations
cannot even get started in Geneva; and now US plans to deploy
national missile defences threaten the future of the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (AMB) Treaty, which could have a detrimental impact on
other nuclear arms control and on Russian and Chinese co-operation.
The UK needs to reassess what role it can play
in rejuvenating this arms control agenda, because if it fails
to start moving forward again soon the trend of events may put
it into reverse—in the direction of Scenario 1—the
"Proliferated" world. Pursuing a policy of "wait
and see" may no longer be sufficient.
4. "ZERO
OPERATION"
The only truly satisfactory scenario for any
WMD is internationally agreed and enforced abolition. This became
clear during the negotiations leading to the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BTWC). These negotiations showed that this scenario has a number
of stabilising features, in that it is internationally equitable,
unambiguous and consensually enforceable.
Note that the major powers recognised the dangers
of the relatively low-salience "deterrence" regime in
chemical weapons between the superpowers at the end of the Cold
War, and co-operated to eliminate them altogether. Similarly,
with biological weapons the major powers are working hard to rid
the planet of what amounts to the deliberate use of disease. Maintaining
a stable "balance" of offensive capability has been
rejected as quite unrealistic.
Experience with CWC and BTWC should provide
valuable lessons for policy on nuclear weapons. In particular,
it seems that an international convention abolishing the use of
a particular class of WMD is diplomatically feasible, despite
the manifold problems of setting up effective verification and
enforcement procedures. It is also clear that present difficulties
with nuclear arms control should not deter UK policy-makers from
taking positive steps down through the "low salience"
scenario towards the "zero option". Hence, the UK's
long-term security interests may well be best served by supporting
international efforts, in the UN and elsewhere, to establish a
convention for the abolition of nuclear weapons, modelled on the
CWC and BTWC.
Nuclear weapons policy issues are little discussed
in the UK. Yet, as this memorandum argues, there is a grave danger
that complacency, lack of urgency and vision in the nuclear weapon
states (and, more specifically, what is seen as their failure
to honour their NPT Article VI obligations) could lead to the
gradual or sudden collapse of the non-proliferation regime. This
would have grave implications not just for the security of the
UK and its allies. It would also represent a major setback for
concepts of collective global security, the strength of which
is essential if the international community is to find the will
to tackle such major emerging "non-military" threats
as resource depletion, ecological destruction, global warming
and the drugs trade.
ISIS believes that these issues urgently need
much more public exposure, and that the full range of options
needs to be adequately discussed. The ISIS Board hopes that the
Committee will endorse this perspective and that its recommendations
will call upon the Government to promote such a debate.
68 ISIS is an independent briefing service to parliamentarians
and others interested in this area of public affairs. This memorandum
was submitted by Professor John Ziman, FRS, (Chairman), General
Sir Hugh Beach, John Gordon, Dr Owen Greene and Ronald Higgins. Back
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