Saudi Arabia
15. We believe that the Government's policy towards
Saudi Arabia is similarly questionable. Saudi Arabia was discussed
at the UN Commission on Human Rights (CHR) under the 1503 Procedure,
which is the Commission's confidential process for dealing with
individual complaints. Mr Hain told us that during a recent visit
to Saudi Arabia he had addressed the issue of human rights "at
a private level" because he believed that this approach "is
more fruitful in terms of getting results."[40]
He acknowledged that although he had raised issues about the rights
of assembly, the rights of freedom of expression, and the right
to freedom of worship privately with ministers in Saudi Arabia
he had not "publicly said anything about it since [becoming]
a minister with responsibility for policy in Saudi Arabia".[41]
We have particular concerns about the position of women within
Saudi Arabia and we expect the Government to raise these concerns
also in its bilateral relationship.
16. We suggested to Mr Hain that this softly-softly
approach towards human rights violations by Saudi Arabia was more
likely to be driven by the extent of the UK's trade and strategic
interests rather than by any absolute assessment that this was
the best way to proceed. Mr Hain's response did little to reassure
us. He acknowledged that "there is always a balance to be
struck" and that the Government had to determine "how
we can best achieve better human rights in any particular country."[42]
However, the three countries he chose to exemplify the tough action
the Government was prepared to take in pursuit of its human rights
agenda—Burma, Iraq and the Republic of Yugoslavia—do
not pose really hard choices for us as they are all countries
with which the United Kingdom now has minimal trade and which
are viewed as pariah states by the majority of the international
community.[43]
Even in the case of Burma the Government had to be taken to Court
before conceding that it could choose unilaterally to impose tougher
sanctions.[44]
We recommend that the next Annual Report should outline how
constructive dialogue on human rights with Saudi Arabia has been
taken forward and what specific improvements have been achieved
since the publication of the 1999 Annual Report.
17. We continue to believe that it is important
for the Government to make explicit the criteria on which it bases
decisions to pursue a policy of constructive engagement in preference
to a more robustly critical approach to a country's human rights
record or indeed a policy of constructive disengagement. We recommend
that it do so in next year's Annual Report. The failure to
make these principles explicit lays the Government open to the
accusation that it is strong with the weak and weak with the mighty.
Government human rights policy can then be portrayed as unprincipled
and insignificant when confronted by the UK's trade interests.
Such a picture of Government human rights policy would significantly
undermine the UK's ability to negotiate effectively with other
states for human rights improvements. We recognise however that
in many cases it is more effective and certainly more prudent
to make joint representations in concert with our partners.
REPORTING FROM POSTS
18. In our earlier Report we recommended that "human
rights issues should be the concern of a nominated officer at
senior level in each Post, and that a report on the human rights
situation be a specific feature of every Head of Mission's regular
reporting discipline."[45]
The Government's response to this recommendation was ambiguous[46]
and we wrote to the Foreign Secretary seeking "an assurance
that a report on the human rights situation should be a specific
feature of every Head of Mission's regular reporting discipline."[47]
The Foreign Secretary's reply to this letter indicated that our
recommendation had not been accepted. Although regular reporting
on human rights issues was a requirement in posts covering countries
where there were serious concerns, "there are other posts
where our human rights objectives are better served by reporting
on specific issues as they arise, rather than requiring the Head
of Mission to conform to a regular reporting cycle."[48]
We disagree and wish to see the implementation of our earlier
recommendation. Reporting on the human rights situation should
form a customary part of each Head of Mission's report to London,
even in countries where there is little or nothing to report.
Human rights reporting should be the specific responsibility of
a member of the post's staff, but may in some cases be the responsibility
of the Head of Mission. We also re-iterate our earlier recommendation
that human rights issues should be the specific responsibility
of a senior member of staff at each post, and note that this nominated
individual may well be the Head of Mission in some countries where
human rights concerns weigh heavily in our bilateral relations.
JOINED-UP GOVERNMENT
19. Joined-up government is a sensible objective.
If the Government is serious about furthering the human rights
agenda internationally, it cannot afford to allow the concept
to become a rhetorical fashion accessory; it must be translated
into tangible policies and practices that range across departments.
The two annual human rights reports that have been produced to
date were jointly prepared by the FCO and DFID and have shown
how these two departments have worked together to promote and
to protect human rights. However, the work of other government
departments also has a bearing on the way the Government's human
rights policy is perceived both within the UK and abroad.
20. The House of Commons Select Committee system
has proved flexible enough to allow a joined-up approach to one
of the issues which cuts across the human rights agenda—strategic
export controls. The Foreign Affairs Committee is meeting concurrently
with the Defence Committee, the International Development Committee
and the Trade and Industry Committee to scrutinise Government
policy and performance in relation to Strategic Export Controls.
We do not intend to replicate that work in this Report. However,
we do wish to draw attention to our concern about one particular
case, namely, the allegations in The Independent on 16
November 1999 that leg-irons manufactured by Hiatt, a British
company based in Birmingham, are on sale in the United States.[49]
We were pleased to learn that the Government was urgently investigating
these specific allegations and that the DTI was preparing a draft
amendment to current legislation aimed at preventing any future
confusion about the nature of goods that were being exported.[50]
The Government must take urgent steps to close whatever loopholes
remain in the existing legislation because the continued export
of such equipment from the UK weakens its ability to lobby against
torture and the use of torture equipment.
21. We understand that Mr Hain felt unable to comment
on those aspects of the Immigration and Asylum Bill that have
an impact on the UK's ability to comply with major international
human rights standards because they fall within the responsibility
of another Department. Amnesty International argued that the restrictions
or barriers to entry that may obstruct an individual's flight
to safety breached Articles 31 and 33 of the Refugee Convention.
Amnesty International also suggested that the Bill may not comply
with Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights which
deals with the right to liberty.[51]
The Minister insisted that questions about asylum policy "should
be directed at the Home Secretary, because he is responsible for
its application".[52]
While this may be strictly true, domestic policy affects the credibility
of foreign policy—and smoothing the boundaries of policy
is what joined-up government is about. We urge the Government
to consider Amnesty International's suggestion of including accounts
of the activities of other departments to further the human rights
policy agenda in subsequent editions of the Annual Report. [53]
This would help demonstrate whether and in what ways human rights
concerns have crossed departmental boundaries.
22. We welcome the decision of the Department
for Education and Employment to include human rights in the citizenship
element of the UK national curriculum.[54]
We commend this as a good example of joined-up government.
THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS DIPLOMACY
23. The evolution of EU human rights diplomacy is
a positive recent development and we applaud the efforts the Government
has made to encourage the EU to give human rights a more prominent
role within its policy agenda. We welcome the initiative the Government
has taken in pressing for the publication of an EU Annual Human
Rights Report which is now available on the Internet.[55]
The fourth section of the EU HR Annual Report gives an account
of EU action on human rights in international affairs. It is stated
that "the European Union's international action for the promotion
and protection of human rights is based on a mix of instruments,
both in its Common Foreign and Security Policy and in its external
relations, including development cooperation, covered by the EC
Treaty."[56]
Common strategies, common positions and joint actions are the
main legal instruments of the EU's Common Foreign and Security
Policy (Articles 13, 14, 15 of the Treaty on European Union).[57]
The EU HR Annual Report states that "a significant number
of [these] are focused on human rights and democratisation or
contain substantial human rights elements."[58]
Demarches to the authorities of third countries and political
dialogue are also used by the EU as means of seeking improvements
to human rights.[59]
24. The EU is also able to insert human rights clauses
into the agreements it has with third countries governing both
trade and aid relations. Section 4.25 of the EU HR Annual Report
explains that "since the early 1990s, the EU has inserted
human rights clauses in a substantial number of bilateral trade
and cooperation agreements with third countries, including association
agreements such as the European agreements, Mediterranean agreements
and the Lomé Convention."[60]
The human rights clause in these agreements does not transform
the basic nature of agreements which are otherwise concerned with
matters not directly related to the promotion of human rights.
But the clause is said to constitute "a mutual reaffirmation
of commonly shared values and principles, a precondition for economic
and other cooperation under the agreements, and expressly allows
for and regulates suspension in cases of non-compliance with these
values."[61]
25. The EU has a number of Partnership and Co-operation
Agreements (PCAs) which confer substantial economic and commercial
advantages upon signatories. In our earlier Report on the South
Caucasus and Central Asia we commented on the failure of the EU
to demand improvements in the human rights situation in a number
of countries within the region prior to signing the PCA.[62]
Once a PCA has been signed the EU has surrendered a major negotiating
card since it is almost certainly harder to suspend a PCA than
it is to sign it in the first place. The Government's Response
to our Report did little to alleviate our concern about the way
in which the human rights clauses within these Agreements are
monitored and we are not sure that all signatories take their
human rights obligations under these agreements very seriously.[63]
Mr Hain's statement that "if you have a clause in a trade
agreement and you never activate it then there is not much point
in having it" was welcome. We hope that our European partners
share this admirable view. We recommend that the Government
work both bilaterally and with its European partners to ensure
that the human rights elements of the EU's Partnership and Cooperation
Agreements are fully respected. PCAs should have teeth and, when
appropriate, the teeth should bite. States which consistently
fail to meet their obligations should have their PCAs suspended.
26. The EU Council receives reports from Member States'
diplomatic missions on the ground on human rights in countries
which cause concern. We wish to take this opportunity to express,
once again and in the strongest terms, our opposition to the EU's
decision not to release the text of these key reports. We invited
Mr Hain to reconsider this following the Government's failure
to accept the recommendation we made in our earlier Report on
Foreign Policy and Human Rights.[64]
He asserted that "it is not in our interests, it is certainly
not part of my objective, to in any way suppress information of
abuse of human rights" but qualified this statement by adding
that he had been advised that such reports contained comment and
analysis which made placing them within the public domain inappropriate.[65]
Subsequent written evidence reiterated the view that "it
would not be appropriate to publish these reports".[66]
The Government argues that the public release of information that
has been passed to EU Posts overseas in confidence "may endanger
the individuals concerned" or "other individuals or
groups referred to in these reports".
27. During our visit to Finland earlier in the year,
we were made aware of strong Finnish support for transparency
within the EU. Indeed, Mr Paavo Lipponen, Prime Minister of Finland,
in a meeting of the fifteen Chairmen of EU Foreign Affairs Committees,
said that he would be willing to publish the EU human rights reports.[67]
Taking recent reports of the EU Human Rights Watch in the Occupied
Territories (to which we have had access, but on a confidential
basis) as an example, we find the Government's arguments misconceived,
at least in this specific case. First, these reports contain no
analysis or comment; and, second, the information contained within
the reports has already been placed in the public domain by NGOs
and journalists working in the Middle East area. The FCO has now
conceded these points.[68]
Thus the strong presumption must be in favour of publication.
In its letter of 19 January 2000 the FCO raised a new objection;
that publication of the full reports would make agreement of the
text by all 15 governments more difficult, would require greater
verification, and would lead to the exclusion of material from
secondary sources such as NGOs. We understand that the Government
"cannot, unilaterally, release the documents [ie human rights
reports from EU heads of mission] to the public"[69]
but we expect it to campaign for publication with greater ardour
than is apparent at present. It should make every effort to work
alongside those states that are seeking transparency. We disagree
strongly with the EU's decision to keep the reports on the Occupied
Territories and on other countries confidential; such secrecy
and silence give comfort to the authorities responsible for the
abuse, creating the conditions in which human rights abuses are
able to flourish.
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT (ICC)
28. We recognize that the Government has been a staunch
supporter of the creation of an International Criminal Court.
The Government has done a great deal to persuade other governments
of the need for an effective court which will, once it has been
established, contribute significantly to ending impunity for war
crimes and crimes against humanity. Amnesty International has
applauded the Government for being the only permanent member of
the UN Security Council to take an active and positive role in
preparing the ICC statute.[70]
The Government signed the statute on 30 November 1998. Almost
one year later, in the Queen's Speech on 17 November 1999, the
Government announced its intention to publish in draft form the
legislation that would allow the United Kingdom to ratify the
statute that will establish the Court. Sixty countries need to
ratify this statute before the Court can be set up. The Foreign
Secretary has re-affirmed that it remains the Government's intention
to be among the first sixty states to ratify.[71]
29. We urged the Government to introduce this enabling
legislation as a priority in our earlier Report.[72]
We believe that ratifying the statute will increase the Government's
negotiating power with governments that have expressed reservations
about the Court, countries which include the United States. We
are dismayed that the Government has not committed itself to introduce
the Bill in this Session. The Minister was curiously elusive when
we pressed him on this point. Mr. Hain professed to be "straining
at the leash to get this Bill on the statute book as soon as possible".[73]
We believe the Government should give the Bill greater priority.
Given the FCO's evident eagerness to ratify the statute, we urge
the business managers to let Mr Hain off his leash, to ensure
that scrutiny of the draft Bill is concluded as soon as possible,
to seek agreement with Opposition parties and to make time available
for the passage through both Houses of this important Bill in
this Session.
MERCENARIES AND CHILD
SOLDIERS
30. We are pleased that work on a Green Paper on
mercenary activity is under way. We expect this Green Paper
to be published by November 2000 in accordance with the time frame
previously announced by the Government in its Response to our
Report on Sierra Leone.[74]
31. We welcome the Government's opposition to the
use of children as soldiers. Mr. Hain made his opposition to the
practice of recruiting under 16s to armed forces very clear. He
told us that "it is a complete prostitution of the whole
idea and sanctity of childhood that this should occur".[75]
We note Amnesty International's disappointment that, during negotiations
for the Convention for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child
Labour, the Government failed to support a proposal, which had
the backing of all African governments and many others from Europe
and the Americas, for an outright ban on the use of child combatants.[76]
The Government defended its position and argued that the Convention
focuses rightly on "forced recruitment of children
for use in armed conflict".[77]
It then added that "the wider issue of the overall age limit
for military recruitment and deployment is the focus of separate
international discussions on a possible Optional Protocol to the
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child ...We have made it clear
that we will not block consensus on a new standard, even if it
is higher than that we would be prepared to apply nationally".[78]
We await a further Government statement
on this issue. We therefore recommend that the Government reconsider
its policy on a global ban on the use of child combatants.
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
ORGANISATION (ILO) CONVENTION 138
32. In March 1999, the Government stated that it
expected to make an announcement with regard to Convention 138
(on the minimum age for admission to employment) "in the
near future."[79]
In July 1999, we wrote to the Foreign Secretary to express our
concern that no announcement had yet been made on the Government's
position on ratification of Convention 138.[80]
In August 1999, the Foreign Secretary explained that the Department
for Education and Employment led on this issue and that the Government's
review of its position on ILO Convention 138 was well advanced.[81]
Mr Andrew Smith, the then Employment Minister, announced on 14
September 1999 "the Government's firm intention to ratify
... the existing convention on the minimum age for employment."[82]
We urge the Government to ratify ILO Convention 138 (Minimum
Age) as soon as possible and to make time available for any necessary
enabling legislation.
INTERVENTION FOR HUMANITARIAN
PURPOSES
33. The FCO has stated that it is discussing "some
exploratory ideas [about its principles on humanitarian intervention],
in confidence, with key international partners. These will form
the basis of more formal proposals once we have had time to take
on board the initial views of our international partners".[83]
The apparently uncompromising stand in favour of the principle
of national sovereignty taken by Russia and China at the United
Nations General Assembly in September 1999 suggests that there
is an insufficient basis for international consensus at present.
Certainly the picture is more complex that it appeared to the
authors of the 1999 Annual Report which stated, somewhat hyperbolically,
that "the liberation of Kosovo and the message it sent to
regimes that disregard human rights will come to be seen as a
defining moment in modern history".[84]
This comment fails to reflect the complexity of any decision by
the international community to intervene in a conflict on humanitarian
grounds. The available capability and the likelihood of the intervention
achieving its aims are certainly key factors but, as Mr Hain acknowledged
"the international conscience is lopsided". The Minister
acknowledged that "it has been extremely difficult to get
the same international concern focused on the Democratic Republic
of Congo, the Great Lakes' abuses of human rights and the genocide,
whether in Rwanda or the problems in Burundi or whatever, as it
has been [when the conflict has been] on our doorstep in Europe".[85]
Equally, the dictates of realpolitik mean that intervention
for humanitarian purposes is unlikely in situations like Tibet
and Chechnya. However, the fact that it does not prove possible
to intervene in all cases where human rights are being abused
should not necessarily rule out intervention where this is possible
and warranted. We shall explore the issue of intervention for
humanitarian purposes in greater detail in our forthcoming Report
on Kosovo.
CONCLUSION
34. In our view the annual publication of a human
rights report is a valuable initiative which should continue.
We plan to hold an evidence session with an FCO Minister following
the publication of future editions of the Annual Report. Such
public scrutiny forms an important part of the democratic process.
Whilst we have indicated some ways in which the Annual Report
might be improved, we welcome its publication and support efforts
to give human rights a central role in foreign policy.
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