APPENDIX 11
Memorandum submitted by TAPOL
1. This memorandum is provided by TAPOL,
the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign, which has campaigned for
26 years for the realisation of human rights in Indonesia and
East Timor.
"Constructive engagement"?
2. The Human Rights Annual Report 1998 was
notable for its use of Indonesia as an example of a country with
which the Government could pursue a policy of "constructive
engagement" and for its picture of Foreign Secretary Robin
Cook shaking hands with the authoritarian President Suharto responsible
for massive violations of human rights during his 32 years in
office. The picture was published just a month before Suharto
was forced to resign by popular protests against his regime. The
Foreign Affairs Committee in its December 1998 report on foreign
policy and human rights condemmed the Government's implementation
of its policy as "seriously flawed" and stated: If the
policy of constructive engagement is to be meaningful, we recommend
that the Government conducts a rigorous examination of the failures
of assessment and judgement in the case of Indonesia." Given
that the Government insists on retaining "constructive engagement"
as an important policy option, it is regrettable that the 1999
Annual Report does not indicate whether the Committee's recommendation
was acted upon and what conclusions were reached. The Annual Report
should not be just a public relations vehicle, but should be frank
about the failure of Government policy and the steps taken to
address that failure.
3. Although the 1999 Report (ironically)
appears to welcome the downfall of Suharto and outlines changes
that took place under former President Habibie, it is difficult
to discern any substantial initiatives by the Government during
the period covered by the Report. It refers to a six-point plan
for co-operation on human rights announced by Robin Cook in Jakarta,
but that announcement was made in August 1997 and was detailed
in the 1998 Report. The plan was a central feature of the discredited
"constructive engagement" policy. The provision of computer
equipment to the National Commission on Human Rights (Kommas HAM)
and the facilitation of human rights workshops and training (p
29), while of some help, amount to little more than tinkering
at the edges of the human rights problem and indicate an alarming
failure to understand or address the bigger picture.
Military repression and arms sales
4. Human rights violations in Indonesia
are structural and relate to the dominant security and political
role of the armed forces (TNI), which ensures them a repressive
presence at all levels of society and in many aspects of everyday
life. The armed forces continue to exercise a malign influence
even though the country now has a democratically elected government.
The Annual Report suggests that the Government is unwilling to
address this fundamental issue.
5. One reason for this is that the maintenance
of strong military ties with Indonesia is also an important foreign
policy objective (not mentioned in the Report). It is disingenuous
for the Report to claim that security forces in areas of insecurity
and conflict are among the key advocates of arms flows and excessive
military expenditure. It is the arms exporting countries, particularly
Britain, which take the lead in promoting arms sales. The question
of strategic is being considered by other committees of the House
of Commons, but it is important to stress here once again the
inconsistencies inherent in a policy which strives to both maintain
a strong defence industry and promote human rights. The sale of
arms enhances Indonesia's military capacity and thereby legitimises
the current role of the armed forces. The necessary reform of
the military will not be brought about exposing a few officers
to lessons in human rights and democracy at the same time as supplying
them with arms. It is no defence to say that the arms will not
be used for internal repression or that they are merely spare
parts for equipment licences by the previous administration. The
current four-month arms embargo introduced in response to the
violence and killings in East Timor—must be extended until
the issue of military repression throughout Indonesia has been
properly addressed and resolved.
Impunity
6. The issue of impunity is rightly highlighted
in the Report and the support the Government has since given to
the UN Commission of Inquiry into human rights violations in East
Timor is welcome (although the delay in the start of the Commission's
work will critically undermine its effectiveness). However, it
is regrettable that the Report is silent on the serious issue
of impunity in Indonesia. Whereas the Report refers to the praiseworthy
efforts of Kommas HAM, it fails to mention that Komnas HAM's recommendations
on almost all cases of abuse have been ignored by the government
in Jakarta. No members of the security forces have been charged
with the many atrocities committed in East Timor post-1975, Aceh,
West Papua and other places during President Suharto's time in
power. Again, it is likely that the Government regards military
ties as more important than the prosecution of armed forces personnel.
The ending of military impunity is vital to the realisation of
human rights in Indonesia and the Government should press for
all those responsible for human rights violations to account for
their crimes.
East Timor
7. The Government has attempted to claim
a large share of the credit for developments in East Timor, which
have resulted in the current transition to independence. It has
pointed out in the Report and on several other occasions that
it played a leading role in Europe and in the Security Council
and in the diplomatic moves which led to Jakarta's acceptance
of an international force in September. In the light of its leading
role, the Government must, on the contrary, share the blame for
the appalling violence and humanitarian crisis suffered by the
East Timorese people after their vote for independence was announced
on 4 September. The Government's willingness to rely on Indonesian
assurances regarding security was an appalling disregard for thehuman
rights of the East Timorese people. The 5 May accords between
Portugal and Indonesia—endorsed by the Government in the
Security Council—which handed security over to the army
of occupation were a blank cheque to the armed forces and their
militia proxies to subject the people to the most atrocious violence
and intimidation. The accords were signed just a month after at
least 21 people were slaughtered in the church in the town of
Liquica by militias supported by the police and army and at a
time when it was already clear that terrible revenge would be
visited on the population if they voted for independence.
8. The Government was also guilty of a disgraceful
response to an incident in July when a British Aerospace Hawk
aircraft made two low passes over Dili, the capital of East Timor,
in a clear act of intimidation the day before the start of registration
for the popular consultation. Instead of acting immediately to
stop further deliveries of Hawks to Indonesia, the Government
chose to seek yet more meaningless assurances from the Indonesian
Government. It preferred to wait until East Timor was in ruins
before introducing the current military sanctions.
Contents of the Annual Report
8. The Report generally fails to provide
a proper assessment of the human rights situation in Indonesia.
Abuses are seriously understated. The "clashes" between
troops and civilians in Aceh in May 1999 (p 28) was in fact an
attack by armed troops on unarmed protestors. Several hundred
people have been killed in Aceh since August 1998 while no-one
has been brought to justice. There is no mention of West Papua/Irian
Jaya where many people were killed following the release of British
hostages in May 1996. The suggestion that only 28 political prisoners
remain after 212 out of 240 were released by President Habibie
is wrong. Many more East Timorese, Acehnese and West Papuans are
still being held. The Report should in future provide more comprehensive
individual country reports on human rights. These would encourage
a more consistent approach to the promotion of human rights and
an opportunity for independent assessment of the implementation
of government policy.
18 November 1999
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