Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40 - 59)

TUESDAY 23 NOVEMBER 1999

MR PETER HAIN MP, MR TONY BRENTON, AND DR CAROLYN BROWNE

Mr Chidgey

  40. In the year report on foreign policy and human rights on page 11 it is confidently stated that "the liberation of Kosovo and the message it sent to regimes that disregard human rights will come to be seen as a defining moment in modern history." I think we need to challenge that, Minister, because I think it is the case that the only difference that most people will see between the barbarism of the activities of Milosevic in Kosovo and what is now being perpetrated by the Russian generals in Chechnya is the failure in many people's eyes of the western nations to react in any positive way. In fact, the present situation in Chechnya suggests that regimes will continue to disregard human rights, and I would like very much to hear on behalf of the Committee what you might have to say about this in your particular brief for protecting human rights.
  (Mr Hain) First of all, can I assume from what the honourable Member says that he strongly supports the strong stand that the Government took in Kosovo against ethnic cleansing and—

  41. It is not really, is it, Minister? This is so much hot air. You have made three key demands, but that has not materially affected the plight of the population of Chechnya in terms of the action by the Russians in the way that they are perpetrating that particular action.
  (Mr Hain) Chairman, I just want to get on the record that I assume that he does support the action we took in Kosovo.

  Mr Chidgey: We are questioning you, Mr Hain. You are not questioning me.

Ms Abbott

  42. We ask the questions.
  (Mr Hain) If I am allowed to answer questions I will do so. I am assuming that, and therefore the issue is whether we can take similar action in Chechnya. I totally deplore Russia's action in Chechnya, unequivocally. The Prime Minister has made that clear, the Foreign Secretary has made that clear, both in bilateral representations and publicly, so there is absolutely no disagreement on that. The issue is what can be done about it. We were able to intervene in Kosovo. I do not think anybody is suggesting the same thing could happen in Chechnya. However, what we did at Istanbul at the OSCE Summit is, against President Yeltsin's wishes, against his very firm resistance, we got agreement at that Summit that the OSCE would send a mission, that it would visit Chechnya, that Russia would engage in a consultative dialogue on what was going on there. That does not produce the wham-bam instant action that perhaps the honourable Member is asking for, but could I ask how he practically thinks he—

Mr Chidgey

  43. Can I, Minister, respond to your comments on that. I have never for one minute suggested that there was a wham-bam reaction in Kosovo. I seem to remember the this Government was somewhat late in making any decision on what to do in Kosovo. The point I want to stress, Minister, and tease out with you is that it seems to me that the Foreign Office is exercising different policies on human rights depending on the particular country we are trying to advise or influence on human rights. I can understand the differences myself, of course I can, but what I want is some clarity now from the Foreign Office on its policy and to let us know whether or not it is taking the actions that I consider to be appropriate in dealing with the differences in cultures and the differences in the magnitude of the countries where human rights violations are taking place. It is not good enough just to turn round and say that we have made demands to Russia. We know very well that demands are one thing; action is another. I want to hear from the Minister how he believes that some positive action is going to be taken using the influence that we do have through our own councils and those internationally to bring Russia into the fold as far as human rights are concerned.
  (Mr Hain) I have just given a concrete example of that in which we played a prominent role in the OSCE Summit in Istanbul against Russia's wishes. In terms of the general point which the honourable Member makes, I readily accept that in respect of intervention to curb human rights abuses, we are not able to do exactly the same thing in different circumstances. Of course we are not, much as I would like to do so.

  44. Is it not the question that we are not able to achieve them.
  (Mr Hain) We are either not able to or it would be impractical to. What distinguishes us from our predecessors in government is that we try to put human rights constantly at the top of the international agenda. We have succeeded in many respects and I will happily go through all of those, but I am not suggesting that there is a uniform, blanket policy or tactic or strategy that can be applied in every single country equally with every single other country where there are undoubted human rights abuses as in Chechnya across the world.

  45. I understand; of course I do, but the Minister has set out the Government's actions and their three demands that they have made in Istanbul. Can the Minister tell us what sort of forecast he has of those demands creating some positive action from Russia in meeting our desires for human rights?
  (Mr Hain) I am hopeful that the Russian Government will respond because it has signed up to that.

  46. What sort of timescale are we talking about?
  (Mr Hain) I am hopeful that it will respond because it has signed up to the agreement that was made in Istanbul. If it defaults on that in any way, and I have already condemned the appalling levels of atrocity and attacks on the Chechnyans by the Russian Government, there are 220,000 refugees who have been the victims of that, which is unacceptable, sooner rather than later because the Government of Russia has signed up to it.

Chairman

  47. Have they not said in terms that they will solve the military matter before they proceed to the discussions?
  (Mr Hain) I am not speaking for the Russian Government. I want it to fulfil its obligations under the OSCE agreement that it reluctantly was forced to sign up to, partly as a result of British Government pressure in Istanbul last week.

Sir Peter Emery

  48. Mr Hain, I do not wish to get into a political argument of which side is more interested in human rights than the other, and that is between our political parties, I mean. Let us look at humanitarian intervention. Your officials gave evidence to this Committee only last week defending absolutely the action of the Government in the intervention in Kosovo. I happen to agree that it was right we should have gone in, and I happen to agree that the overriding of the humanitarian situation in Kosovo was unbelievable. None the less, there are many people who argue that it was illegal for us to have taken that action. I do not happen to support that, but one has to accept that that argument exists and you will have heard a member of my party arguing that on the floor of the House only yesterday. What action therefore is the Government taking with the United Nations to try and get better established the legal position of intervention being allowed when there is gross humanitarian interference of any population anywhere and to be able to protect the humanitarian position of peoples wherever they may be living?
  (Mr Hain) I agree with the honourable Member that that is an important point, and indeed the Prime Minister last night laid out some principles about intervention following on the Secretary-General of the United Nations' speech to the General Assembly in September, which we broadly welcomed, and we are currently within the United Nations context working on a series of proposals on how the practicalities, both legally and in resource terms, could be taken forward so that we get as consistent a policy on humanitarian intervention as it is possible to do across the world, preferably under the UN's auspices.

  49. Can you tell us, Minister, what those recommendations or proposals are?
  (Mr Hain) I am not in a position to do so at the moment. It is very early days, but we are taking a leading role in this and we very much welcome the Secretary-General's initiative in September in order to take this issue further.

  50. But would it not be helpful for the Government to be able to have absolute support on the action they were taking and therefore surely it makes sense to publish the action that you are taking as soon as possible?
  (Mr Hain) At the appropriate time, and I realise how tempting it is to have support from the Foreign Affairs Committee which the honourable Member is kindly offering, we will of course make it public, and it will become a matter of public debate and not simply private diplomacy, but you will appreciate that it should happen at the appropriate time.

  51. I am always a little worried with the bureaucratic phrase which, Mr Hain, you have condemned at other times, of "the appropriate time". When the hell is "the appropriate time"?
  (Mr Hain) We want to see this initiative of ours work, and others are also working on the whole matter, and part of making it work is allowing our international partners in this exercise, and those with whom we have to seek multilateral or bilateral agreements, to see our proposals. It is not a question of being at all defensive or shy about them. We want an international debate because there are lots of countries in the United Nations who will oppose them.

Chairman

  52. Minister, in his speech to the UN General Assembly Mr Kofi Annan said that such intervention could only happen with the approval of the Security Council. You said you approved of his speech. Do you accept that part of it?
  (Mr Hain) I think that is an ideal which we all ought to sign up to. Whether it is always practical, as we saw in Kosovo, where people are literally being murdered by the minute, is another matter, but it is precisely because the Kosovos of this world and the East Timors, where we acted very speedily and honourably to get the United Nations' backing for the support for the people of East Timor, that to get a consistent framework if we possibly can that we are working so hard on this and have welcomed his speech, as you say.

Sir John Stanley

  53. Minister, I want to follow the same point. I am concerned about what the Government's position is not in relation to policy on intervention but in relation to legality. Can you explain to us what made the intervention in Kosovo legal as far as the British Government's view is concerned?
  (Mr Hain) I think the honourable Member will find that this has been consistently addressed and replied to by the Foreign Secretary, the Prime Minister and others. We have taken advice, we have not been challenged on this, that we are absolutely certain that it was legal.

  54. But would you answer the question?
  (Mr Hain) I thought I had.

  55. No, not at all. What were the features of the Kosovo intervention which made it legal?
  (Mr Hain) The features of the Kosovo intervention which made it legal were a combination of the genocide and the ethnic cleansing which was being perpetrated, the way in which we, together with the US, sought ourselves agreement and pursued other areas in order to get it. That was the essential environment in which the legality was set.

  56. The legality arose out of a judgement in relation to the scale of the humanitarian disaster.
  (Mr Hain) That was undoubtedly one factor, not an exclusive one, but one factor.

  57. I am not clear that there was any other factor. There was no UN Resolution cover or anything like that. Was there any other factor which in your view made it legal?
  (Mr Hain) There are a number of other Security Council Resolutions which bore down upon Slobodan Milosevic and the Government of the Federal Republic in Yugoslavia's murderous activities in Kosovo and elsewhere in the region which also provided us with the shelter under which we thought that that intervention was not just justifiable on humanitarian grounds but justifiable in terms of international law as well. I note that there has been no successful attempt to challenge that. It seems to me to speak for itself.

  58. But you would agree that none of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions in any way authorised military intervention in Kosovo?
  (Mr Hain) None of them specifically did so. Many of them had a bearing on it and none of them either condemned it.

  59. Would you say then that the issue of legality would appear, as far as the British Government's position is concerned, to largely relate to the scale of the human rights violations?
  (Mr Hain) Not exclusively, but obviously, if people are being killed under a systematic programme of ethnic cleansing and genocide, as was happening in Kosovo, and also of course in Bosnia before that, then that is a n important factor. It is very unusual to get action of this kind and when it occurs, clearly there are often extraordinary circumstances. I am not suggesting it is exclusive. If there had not been as it were any shelter provided by previous United Nations Security Council Resolutions, I think the legality matter might have been much more difficult to justify.


 
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