Examination of Witnesses (Questions 60
- 79)
TUESDAY 23 NOVEMBER 1999
MR PETER
HAIN MP, MR
TONY BRENTON,
AND DR
CAROLYN BROWNE
60. I do not expect you to do so in front of
the Committee now, but could you provide the Committee with the
text of the particular paragraphs of the Resolutions you are referring
to which, in your words, provided a degree of legal cover?
(Mr Hain) I will happily do that and reply more fully
to the points that the honourable Member has raised.
61. Do you consider that in other areas where
genocidal human rights violations have taken place, for example,
in some situations in the Central Lakes area in Africa, Cambodia,
using the same criteria, leaving aside the issue of practicality,
there was prima facie a legal right of international military
intervention in those areas as well?
(Mr Hain) There may well have been. I think one of
the problems, say for example, in the Great Lakes, where the crisis
there exercises me greatly in respect of my African policy responsibilities,
is that it has been extremely difficult to get the same international
concern focused on the democratic Republic of Congo, the Great
Lakes' abuses of human rights and the genocide, whether in Rwanda
or the problems in Burundi or whatever, as it has been on our
doorstep in Europe. There are obvious reasons which we could all
no doubt agree upon, but it is a matter of concern that the international
conscience is lopsided in this respect, and it is precisely in
order to try and get it more evenly established that we are addressing
this question of humanitarian intervention with other members
of the United Nations, particularly in the Security Council.
Sir David Madel
62. Have I got it right on the Government's
thinking, that if there is a demand for international action by
members of the United Nations, yet it is blocked by the Security
Council because somebody uses the veto, is the Government looking
for greater recourse to the General Assembly of the United Nations
which does have the power in the uniting for peace resolutions
to authorise military intervention?
(Mr Hain) That is one factor which will have to be
addressed as part of a consistent and sound and legally justifiable
approach to intervention, but I do not want to prejudice the debate
around that in which we are taking a leading role at this point.
Mr Rowlands
63. Minister, by that definition you have described
it means that even one or a small number of states can define
themselves a situation as being of such a horrific humanitarian
kind that they will have a right to intervene. If that is the
case, surely the Vietnamese intervention to overthrow Pol Pot,
for example, would have fallen within such jurisdiction and could
be claimed to be internationally legally right and correct?
(Mr Hain) I understand the point that my honourable
friend is raising, and I understand the difficulties of the whole
matter. We acted in the case of Kosovo because we thought it was
the right thing to do and we thought we had international right
and law on our side, but the point that he is making, whether
retrospectively in respect of Vietnam and Pol Pot there are other
examples we could seek to hold up, is precisely why we need a
considered and serious discussion followed by, hopefully, international
agreement to underpin the basis for all of this. I think with
the end of the Cold War this is becoming an increasingly prominent
area that the international community must address.
64. I certainly agree with that. I am just saying
that the definition that we have heard repeatedly presented to
this Committee, that any state has a right to define a humanitarian
situation has occurred in another state of such sufficient horror
that it has a right to intervene, certainly could apply in the
case of the Vietnamese and Pol Pot. Pol Pot was a genocidal regime
that was murdering millions of people and a neighbouring state
under your definition would have a right to intervene in that
situation.
(Mr Hain) I am not saying that you would have a unilateral
right simply to intervene wherever you liked, but I am agreeing
with my honourable friend that in the face of Pol Pot's genocidal
activities the international community must be sympathetic to
the countries that sought to do something about it.
65. Let me turn to the policy of constructive
engagement. You will probably from your reading note that in fact
our last Committee's report had some observations on this. Those
observations arose directly out of the situation in Indonesia
where the previous human rights Report, the view that the Government
has followed constructive engagement with relations to the Suharto
regime, it was highlighted and illustrated as an excellent example
of constructive engagement. In fact, at the very same time as
we were claiming that such constructive engagement was taking
place, the people of Indonesia were disengaging very forcefully
from the regime and indeed brought the regime down. Many of the
members of this Committee felt, and we said so in our last report,
that we did not think this was the best illustration of constructive
engagement and therefore we have been much more interested to
find out the criteria and principles which underlie it. I have
read chapter 3 of the White Paper but can you give me some key
examples of countries where you would say constructive engagement
is now at the centre of our human rights policy relations with
them?
(Mr Hain) There is a whole number. Incidentally, I
think that this Labour Government, at least in respect of Indonesia
and East Timor, has got a very honourable record in, first of
all, getting democracy established, or democratic elections at
any rate, in such an important state as Indonesia, and, secondly,
giving the people of East Timor the right to determine their own
destiny, which they were denied for over a quarter of a century,
often with Western complicity including British complicity. So
perhaps I can make that point. However, in terms of constructive
engagement now, I could mention a number of countries. I recently
returned from a visit to India, for example, where there are concerns
which have been voiced in Parliament and elsewhere about attacks
on Christians, about bonded labour, about the situation in Kashmir,
and I was able, because of our good relationship with India, the
Indian Government, to address those at the highest level in a
frank way and to meet with some positive responses.
66. So India would be an example. Would Saudi
Arabia be another example?
(Mr Hain) Saudi Arabia I visited a few weeks ago and
again raised human rights at a private level, because I think
that is more fruitful in terms of getting results, I was able
to address issues of human rights in the Saudi Arabian context
too.
67. You say "privately because that is
more fruitful", is that because that is an absolute assessment
of how best to persuade a government to change, alter or amend
its human rights policy, or is it the fact that we have huge interests
in Saudi Arabia and huge British interests with India which is
more likely to determine the policy of constructive engagement
rather the human rights issue?
(Mr Hain) Especially with my hon. friend's experience
in foreign policy at ministerial level, he will know there is
always a balance to be struck, but we as a Government have put
human rights much higher up the international agenda than ever
before, as I am sure he will agree. It is a question of how we
can best achieve better human rights in any particular country,
and it is not simply a question of whether we have good or extensive
defence contracts, as in Saudi Arabia, or good commercial relationships
as India's second biggest trading partner, though that bears on
it. It is what you can actually practically achieve. I think we
have an honourable record on that. Compare that, by the way, with
very tough action we have taken on Burma, the very tough action
we have taken on Iraq, the very tough action we have taken on
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, where we do think that open,
ultimate sanctions and pressure of that very open and public kind
is the best thing to do.
68. Sceptics will say, surely, that Burma is
in a sense an easy decision to make, because we have minimal interests
there, the regime is particularly awful and therefore it is a
pariah state almost and therefore you can speak forcefully. However,
it is the decision of going from that to the sort of private nods
and winks and nudges which in fact characterise our human rights
policy perhaps in some other countries like Saudi Arabia which
interests us, it is how you decide this gradation of response
and pressure.
(Mr Hain) I think it is a fair question and it is
not easy to give a universally applicable blanket answer to it.
It is where we think we can best get results and what I do maintain
absolutely clearly, Chairman, and defend our record on this, is
that we consistently raise human rights issues with virtually
every country we visit. I have done so I think without exception,
if I am right, with every country I have visited in the period
since I have become Minister of State at the Foreign Office. It
is not often a comfortable thing to do. Our ambassadors and high
commissioners do not often shout from the rooftops when we do
it because they want to have as good relations, naturally, with
their governments as other countries which do not talk about human
rights in their bilateral relations, but we nevertheless pursue
it and we pursue it vigorously.
69. Let us take another country like Zimbabwe,
for example. Is that an example of constructive engagement in
terms of human rights?
(Mr Hain) Zimbabwe is very difficult at the moment
and we have consistently—and I have personally—raised
human rights issues with the Zimbabwean Government and will continue
to do so. It does the Zimbabwean Government and its people no
credit at all to be seen not to be pursuing the same kind of ideals
in respect of human rights today as motivated the struggle for
freedom, which President Mugabe amongst others led in Zimbabwe.
70. Is that going to be done privately or are
we going to be more publicly forceful in the case of Zimbabwe?
(Mr Hain) In a lot of countries we have a combination
of public and private, and I think this will apply to Zimbabwe
and it will apply to other countries. We are not, as it were,
hiding our light under a bushel in this respect and there is a
growing concern, both within the Commonwealth and in Britain,
about the human rights situation in Zimbabwe, and the Zimbabwean
Government knows that very well.
71. When did we last publicly speak, as forcefully
as possible, about the rights of assembly, the rights of freedom
of expression, the right to worship and observe one's own religion
in somewhere like Saudi Arabia?
(Mr Hain) I certainly raised that privately with the
ministers, as I have said. I have not in any other context publicly
said anything about it since I have become a minister with responsibility
for policy in Saudi Arabia, but there is nothing secret about
our position. We want to see more advance on human rights throughout
the Gulf states and I think it is in the interests of all of the
Gulf countries, since you mention them, to do that. There have
been advances, including in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Arabian Assembly
now is becoming much more active on these issues and I was able
to discuss that both at a ministerial level and in terms of individual
members of the Assembly.
72. Did you meet opposition groups when you
visited Saudi Arabia?
(Mr Hain) I met members of the Assembly, some of whom
I guess would class themselves as opposition groups, yes.
73. We have had policies in the past where in
fact ministers and indeed embassies actually create links and
arrangements with dissident groups, certainly that was true in
Central and Eastern Europe but it is also true elsewhere. Is that
an intrinsic part of human rights policy in the context of constructive
engagement?
(Mr Hain) Yes.
74. They have developed regular and proper contact
with dissenting groups?
(Mr Hain) Yes, and do so both willingly and enthusiastically.
As I did in India, in Mozambique, in Uganda and a number of other
countries which I visited, I engage very often where there is
a Human Rights Commission established which we have supported
in financial terms and encouraged in political and diplomatic
terms.
75. In China?
(Mr Hain) In China we have engaged very
strongly with the Chinese Government and I think have got some
results to show for it. Despite the continuing abuses of human
rights which exist in China, yes, I do think we have got some
practical results to show for our programme of practical action.
76. At what point does one come to a conclusion? The Committee
felt we were late in deciding the Suharto regime was beyond the
pale and was therefore incapable of reform as a result of constructive
engagement.
(Mr Hain) I agree with you.
77. At what point does one decide the policy
of sotto voce, private conservation, all the things you
mentioned which are the ingredients of constructive engagement,
has run its course and there should be much more public and forceful
statement about the situation combined with support with others
of the European Union and elsewhere? At what point does one make
this decision? We got it wrong in the case of the Suharto regime,
I think.
(Mr Hain) I agree with my hon. friend that we got
it wrong; or rather the previous Government got it wrong, I do
not think this current Government got it wrong. I think the simple
answer to the point is when you are getting nowhere, and we were
clearly getting nowhere with Indonesia and in other respects.
If I can give other examples, in the Angolan context, despite
the strong commercial interests of British companies, when other
countries might not have said anything publicly, I strongly condemned
the imprisonment of an Angolan journalist which I regard as completely
unacceptable. In the case of Cameroon, we have also taken a strong
stand on that. Where we feel private representations are getting
nowhere, not only are we prepared to go public in a way which
often makes it uncomfortable for all concerned, but we are prepared
to take it up at the international level as well.
78. You do not think China has reached that
stage? You believe that you have made a sufficient impact on Chinese
human rights to continue to justify that policy as opposed to
being much more forceful and adopting resolutions of the kind
governments used to adopt on China in human rights terms?
(Mr Hain) Yes, indeed, I do. China has signed up to
a number of UN covenants and conventions which it previously did
not do. There are widespread human rights abuses in China, there
is no question about that. I met Wei Jingsheng on the eve of the
state visit and discussed those very frankly with him and had
a good meeting with him and asked him to stay in touch with me,
despite discomfort from the Chinese Government that I was meeting
him at all. So we will continue to engage at every level with
China, but at the moment there is more progress being made than
through any other alternative course.
Chairman
79. The argument the Government used for not
joining with other EU countries in having a China Resolution at
the UN Commission was that there were a number of positive factors—the
Mary Robinson visit, the signing of various UN conventions and
so on. Is it the view of the Government that since that decision
the human rights situation in China has improved or deteriorated?
(Mr Hain) The important point about that decision
was that previously Chinese Governments had been able to defeat
resolutions of that kind in the context of the Commission, which
they then exploited to show they had a good human rights record.
That does not seem to me to advance the case which we all share,
I guess, around this table—and I know you and I do—about
advancing human rights in China. That is why we have adopted that
position, it simply does not get anywhere, in fact it ends up
with you being two steps back from where you wanted to be before
it was tabled in the first place.
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