MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND TRADE
AND INDUSTRY COMMITTEES
THURSDAY 4 MAY 2000
Members present:
Mr Ted Rowlands, in the Chair
Mr Roger Berry
Ann Clwyd
Dr Norman A Godman
Mr Piara S Khabra |
Mr Martin O'Neill
Mr Andrew Rowe
Sir John Stanley
Mr Tony Worthington |
Examination of witnesses (Questions 1
- 19)
THURSDAY 4 MAY 2000
MR PETER
HAIN, MR
PAUL HARE
and MR IAN
BAILEY
Chairman
1. Good morning, Minister, and good morning
also to Mr Paul Hare, Head of the Non Proliferation Department,
and Mr Ian Bailey, Deputy Head of Section, Export Control Policy.
Thank you for coming, Minister. I am sorry that our opening remarks
on this session will hit a sour note but I have to express on
behalf of the four Committees the very deep disappointment at
the failure of the Departments to deliver a response to the first
of our major reports which was published on 11 February and that
means it is almost three months old. That disappointment was perhaps
even more bitter because on 10 March the Foreign Secretary wrote
stating that he was able to respond to our report and to the Committees'
findings by the end of March. In your letter that you sent to
us on Tuesday you said that it has taken longer to formulate a
response because of the number and complexity of the recommendations
and their interest to several Departments. I wonder if I may rather
mischievously suggest, is that a reflection of the fact that we
have not yet got proper joined up government on these issues?
(Mr Hain) Not at all, Chairman. Can I first of all
say that I am disappointed as well. I would like to have had the
response in time to answer questions from you all because I see
myself as being accountable to this Committee. It was signalled
at an official level a week or so ago if not earlier that this
would be difficult and at one point, as you know, there was talk
of postponing this meeting. I do not think it is a question of
not being joined up government; it is question of getting these
things right. You asked a number of very important technical issues
as well as matters of policy but we wanted to get it absolutely
straight. We will get it straight and you will have the response
as soon as possible.
2. What is "as soon as possible"?
(Mr Hain) Just that.
3. Is that days or weeks?
(Mr Hain) As soon as possible. I do not want to give
a commitment that I cannot honour. I want to be as open and as
direct and straight with this Committee as it is possible to be.
4. Therefore we can expect a substantive reply
to our recommendations?
(Mr Hain) We would certainly be anticipating a substantive
reply because you did raise many important points and we appreciate
that. Can I say too that I also appreciate the fact that this
Committee is taking such a detailed interest in this. When we
announced the new policy on arms exports, a more accountable policy
than any other government has had in Britain, and recognised as
such by a group such as Saferworld who take a close and
expert interest in these matters, we have actually got the most
transparent and accountable arms export licensing regime of any
country in the European Union if not across the world, and I guess
it is across the world. Therefore in a sense we are inviting precisely
this kind of scrutiny and we welcome this but we need to get our
answers right and when we have got them right of course you will
have them in full.
5. If you read the conclusion of our report
we acknowledge the importance of the moves the Government have
made. The original intention of this hearing was to pick up a
number of the issues outstanding that we could not deal with in
detail in that report and therefore we shall base this morning's
session on that. We shall begin with Zimbabwe obviously because
that was an issue that we flagged up in our report and it has
become even more relevant in the light of yesterday's statement.
Perhaps I should explain to the public as well that at the end
we may have a private session to deal with the absolute detail
of the classified material that this Committee has received so
that we can pursue it. We hope very much that in the spirit that
you have just described the vast majority of our hearing and the
vast majority of our evidence can be in public and made public.
I think we have agreed that that is the basis on which we shall
operate this morning.
(Mr Hain) Indeed. In the private session obviously
we will discuss between us subsequently what can be made public.
It is my objective, and I think I share this with the Committee,
to be as open as possible without jeopardising either commercial
or legal considerations.
6. Let us begin with the one issue that we flagged
up in our report of 2 February and has remained relevant even
after yesterday's statement, and that is Zimbabwe. The best way
I can introduce our line of questioning is by very briefly outlining
two key moments in the evolution of the policy. The first was
the European Declaration of 18 June 1999 on arms trade to and
within the Great Lakes Region. I think it is worthwhile putting
on the record and reminding ourselves of the strength of the statement
of that Declaration: "Member States will not allow exports
which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing
tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination. Furthermore,
Member States will not issue an export licence if there is a clear
risk that the intended recipient would use the proposed export
aggressively against another country or to assert by force a territorial
claim." That was a statement made in the context of the Great
Lakes. That was in June 1999. Yet on 24 February this year the
Government approved seven standard licences for Hawk spares to
Zimbabwe and in your evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee
only a week or two ago you stated that they were in fact going
for Hawks that were serviceable and in service in the Congo.
(Mr Hain) Two of them.
7. So we delivered spares on 24 February for
Hawks which we knew were going to be in operation in the Congo
in the Great Lakes, which was therefore a clear breach, was it
not, of the European declaration of June 1999?
(Mr Hain) Obviously we took very close note of the
European declaration. Indeed, we were instrumental in seeking
to form it as we have done previously in getting an EU-wide arms
control code. It was Britain under this Government that initiated
it. We reviewed the situation interdepartmentally and we took
the view that nevertheless in the case of those Hawk spares, on
the one hand there was the European Union policy and on the other
our own desire not to agree to any arms export licences which
could encourage external aggression, one of our criteria, as you
know. We nevertheless decided that in these circumstances the
Hawk spares should be allowed to proceed. They were part not necessarily
of a legal obligation which was unbreakable but of a contractual
obligation which BAe systems, the suppliers of those Hawk spares,
had entered into when the agreements were made to supply them
by previous governments.
8. Before we go on to the question of the degree
of obligation, let me at least get it on the record: would you
accept that it is not an unreasonable conclusion to draw that
the granting of these licences was a clear breach of the terms
of the European Union Declaration of June 1999?
(Mr Hain) I think that might be one interpretation
of it.
9. Interpretation?
(Mr Hain) I think that might be one interpretation
of it; I am conceding that point. Nevertheless, there are other
issues we have to take into account, which were taken into account
in reaching that decision.
10. On the status of such declarations, I would
have taken such a declaration, especially as we helped to draft
it and lead it, as binding, but in this case it is quite clear
that such declarations do not override national interest or national
obligation, is that what you are saying, and that any other nation
state that signs a European Union declaration of this kind can
also invoke the national interest and obligation to override the
terms of that declaration?
(Mr Hain) I do not think it is desirable that that
should happen, if at all, frequently. I think in these circumstances
that decision was made.
11. We set a bad example?
(Mr Hain) I think we have actually been very good
in terms of the British Government, if I can go over the changes
that we have made since the DRC conflict happened. Until August
1998 when the DRC conflict broke out we had been licensing to
Zimbabwe all sorts of equipment: helicopter spares, sub-machine
guns, ammunition and so on, in other words clearly equipment that
could be used not just for defensive purposes but aggressive purposes.
When the DRC conflict broke out on August 9th, and I stand to
be corrected on the exact date but at least early August, we stopped
doing that and the kind of equipment which was then licensed by
our Government was things like sights for sporting rifles, sporting
shotguns, sporting ammunition and so on. You do not get any of
the helicopter spares, sub-machine guns and ammunition and so
on, so there was a very clear change of policy between August
1998 and February 2000 when the new tightened policy was announced
by the Prime Minister. I accept that the Hawk spares could be
seen as an exception to that but in the round we have a much tighter,
much more rigorous set of controls on the way we judge the criteria
and the way we judge these licences, and I think we deserve credit
for that.
12. Yes, but I suppose what I think is very
serious is the knowledge that these spares were delivered in the
clear knowledge that they were to service the two Hawks that were
operating in the Congo. If you had tried to establish that these
spares were going to be delivered for Hawks and those Hawks would
not be operating, as we endeavoured to do in the case of Indonesia,
I would have understood it, but we knew that the reason the Zimbabweans
wanted them was to get their Hawks back into action in the Congo.
(Mr Hain) I do not think we know for sure that those
spares actually went into the two that are in service in the Congo
but I take the point that they could easily have been.
Chairman: Your answers to the Foreign Affairs
Committee seemed to indicate that.
Dr Godman
13. Minister, you said earlier that we have
a tougher regime than any other European Union Member State, but
in light of this distinct breach of the European Union Declaration
have any misgivings been voiced about that breach by other Member
States of the European Union or the European Commission itself?
(Mr Hain) Not that I am aware of, Dr Godman, and I
think it is important to make a distinction between spares for
equipment that had already been authorised and was out there,
supplied by the previous government as it happens, as opposed
to a decision to supply new, lethal equipment. It is a very big
distinction. Whilst this Committee is entitled to question me
about the alleged inconsistency of this policy in respect of these
few licences for Hawk spares for a couple of aircraft serviceable
in the Congo and maybe for others that were not in operation in
the Congo, what I think ought also to be acknowledged is that
we did not license any lethal new equipment which would have been
used in the Congo. That is a very important distinction.
14. You can understand the concerns. Presumably
here we are telling applicant states that when they become members
of the European Union they will have to adhere to declarations
of this kind, and yet we seem, in the Chairman's words, to be
setting a pretty poor example here or we are showing, using your
words, some inconsistency here.
(Mr Hain) As I said, if there was any inconsistency
shown, then it was in respect of a few spares for aircraft that
had been licenced, under an existing contract, by a previous government.
If we had been faced with a fresh decision, do we or do we not
agree to the export of Hawk aircraft which could be used in the
Congo, there would be no question about that. As I have shown
we would not even supply new helicopter spares or new sub-machine
guns, but each of these matters is very carefully considered.
What is important about this hearing if I may say so, and I do
not want to prolong the answer, is precisely that these individual
decisions should be opened up to scrutiny and if you as a Committee
take a different view then I think it is important that that is
stated so that we are able to get all these decisions right. We
have hundreds and hundreds of decisions coming across our desks
and these decisions need to be got right and we want to work with
you to get them right.
Sir John Stanley
15. Minister, as you know, the Foreign Secretary
announced yesterday, and I will just quote for the record, "We
have resolved that from today Britain will refuse all new licence
applications for exports of arms and military equipment to Zimbabwe.
This will include all licences for spare parts in connection with
previous contracts such as the Hawk aircraft contract." What
I wish to ask you is this, that given the deterioration in the
internal human rights situation in Zimbabwe, which has been taking
place not over days but over weeks and indeed over months, and
given the fact that, as has been widely reported, the Foreign
Office received warnings of the planned occupation of farmlands
in Zimbabwe some months ago, and given the really gross evidence
of violation of basic political rights and human rights that has
been taking place in Zimbabwe, why did it take until yesterday
for the ban to be announced?
(Mr Hain) We had a meeting in which we invited Zimbabwean
ministers in the Foreign Office last Thursday in a delegation
to discuss how we could move forward, how we could end the violence,
how the rule of law could be re-established and how free and fair
elections could be ensured. We thought it was our duty, and I
still feel that it was necessary to explore all the options, to
try and get the Zimbabwean Government, as the Foreign Secretary
sought to do last Thursday, to agree to make sure that the illegal
farm occupations ended, the violence ended, the rule of law was
re-established, that the systematic attacks, including the killings
of opposition members, stopped. They refused to agree to that.
That created therefore a different situation. Whilst it was our
obligation to seek by all sorts of means, such as diplomatic dialogue,
particularly at that high level meeting at the Foreign office
last Thursday, to get a change of policy, against that background
a decision like this could have jeopardised proper dialogue. You
have seen the reaction from, for example, a member of that delegation.
The Foreign Minister has reacted angrily to our decision, as has
President Mugabe. I think we had a duty to seek all avenues to
try and resolve this matter by traditional ministerial engagement
and diplomatic interaction. When that became impossible we then
had to consider this decision. Obviously we have kept it in review
all along. That is the principal reason. That has been the big
change, coupled of course with the backing which we received from
the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group on Tuesday and President
Mugabe's inflammatory reaction to that decision yesterday morning.
This all required a different decision. If we had rushed prematurely
into the announcement of a stop to arms exports in the way that
the Foreign Secretary announced to the Commons yesterday we would
have lost all these other options for improving the situation.
16. Minister, as you know, you can always argue
that nothing can be done because somebody might disapprove but
you will also, casting your mind back over recent years, recall,
as I certainly can, many occasions on which arms export bans have
been imposed when there is still an ongoing political dialogue
taking place, imposed both unilaterally by this country but also
sometimes in an EU context and sometimes in a United Nations context.
It certainly happened in the context of Sierra Leone. Do you not
find it somewhat regrettable now, at least with the benefit of
hindsight, that it took so long to produce yesterday's announcement?
(Mr Hain) I do not accept that it took so long, Sir
John, with respect. What have we been doing since the conflict
of the DRC broke out? After all, this concern about Hawk spares,
which I accept is a legitimate concern, only applies to the Congo.
The very serious crisis internally in Zimbabwe is not relevant
to the Hawk spares in the sense that the Hawks cannot be used
and are not being used in the assaults on farms, on farmers or
their workers or in the attacks on the opposition. They are not
relevant to that. What we had done between August 1998 and the
tightening of the policy, which the Prime Minister announced on
9 February, is that we had cut back on virtually everything else
with the exception of the Hawk spares which were in a particularly
difficult category. We were not supplying sub-machine guns as
I said previously. We were not supplying all sorts of other equipment
which could have been aggressively used in the Congo, and I think
we deserve credit for that. It is not as if we were twiddling
our thumbs and waiting for President Mugabe's next move. We were
seeking to confront and resolve a very difficult situation in
the relationship between Britain and Zimbabwe and, for that matter,
the relationship between Zimbabwe and its own people and its neighbours.
Mr Berry
17. I am very happy to give credit to the Government
on the range of issues you have mentioned but could we come back
to the spares for the Hawks? You have referred to the Prime Minister's
statement on 9 February where he talked about continuing to implement
vigorously our national criteria and the EU code of conduct. The
EU code of conduct has been referred to already, but he then went
on to say, "This will include applications to provide spares
for UK equipment already supplied under pre-existing contracts."
It is the Government's policy on providing spares under pre-existing
contracts that I am finding it unclear about. It is fair to say
that the Prime Minister went on to comment: "In reaching
decisions on such individual applications, we will take into account
the wider implications of forcing UK companies to break existing
obligations ...". You have talked about the particularly
difficult category of the spares for Hawks. What was so difficult
about it? What were the obligations that overrode the very firm
statement that the Prime Minister made about including within
our arms export control due attention to spares supplied under
existing contracts? This statement was made clearly before the
decision of 24 February, so the decision of 24 February seems
to fly in the face of what the Prime Minister said.
(Mr Hain) No. The decision to issue the licences on
24 February in respect of Hawk spares flowed from the Prime Minister's
announcement, which also, by the way, tightened the policy. With
the exception of the spares nothing else was licensed between
9 February and yesterday when the policy was tightened further[1].
I think it relates back, as I said earlier, to the particular
circumstances of obligations under existing contracts. The situation
has now deteriorated further to the point where even that consideration
has been set aside. There will be no new licences. I am not talking
about licences that have already been agreed and issued on 24
February. There will be no new licences for Hawk spares or any
other equipment which could be used aggressively in the DRC, and
I would have thought that was a statement which the Committee
would welcome.
18. I do appreciate the situation has moved
on but I was trying to clarify the Government's policy perhaps
in a more general context about British spares in relation to
pre-existing contracts. Is the Government's policy basically that
it depends on the circumstances? If it depends on the circumstances
what factors are taken into account? Was it the contract by a
large UK company to supply these spares that influenced Government
policy, or was it that it was thought, well, two aircraft are
not very many? How flexible is the Government's policy on the
provision of spares under pre-existing contracts?
(Mr Hain) I think you are entitled to an answer to
that question and it is precisely that question which we will
address in the full submission which will be coming to you shortly
in response to the questions you ask. I know there is some frustration
about this but this needs to be got right. It is not a question
of making policy on the hoof; it is a question of resolving with
our colleagues across government how we can have a consistent
policy on this matter. Again, Chairman, I am quite happy to discuss
Hawk spares all day but this is a very isolated exception to a
policy which otherwise has been rigorously enforced in not supplying
to Zimbabwe in particular but other countries as well since the
conflict in the Congo broke out in early August 1998 any equipment
from Britain which could be used aggressively in the Congo. That
is the policy. There is arguably one exception to it.
Chairman
19. Colleagues are indicating that at the first
test the policy fell down.
(Mr Hain) No. There was a whole series of tests, of
which I have mentioned a lot of things that were not licensed.
This one, which is an exception in particular circumstances, was
allowed. I understand the focus of it but I do think that it ought
to be looked at in the round. The overall credibility of the policy
should not be challenged.
1 Some licences have been issued since 9 February,
but only where it had been assessed that there was no clear risk
of the goods being used in the DRC conflict, in accordance with
the Prime Minister's Statement. Back
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