APPENDIX 5
Memorandum submitted by the Department
of Trade and Industry and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
CHINA
1. The Committees have noted the details
on licence no. 547336 in respect of *** Radar Systems, *** and
the Government's view that these do not constitute military weapons
platforms. It would be helpful to have an indication as to the
extent to which such an export would be covered were a "standard"
EU embargo in force.
With the exception of the embargo on China,
the UK interprets the scope of all EU embargoes to cover goods
and technology in Part III of Schedule I of the Export of Goods
(Control) Order 1994 (as amended) known as the Military List.
The *** Radar System is rated under ML11 on
the Military List ("electronic equipment, not controlled
elsewhere in Part III, specially designed for military use and
specially designed components therefore"), and would be covered
by the UK's interpretation of all other EU embargoes.
2. [The Committees should be aware
that China was not removed from the destination coverage of OIEL
M/543718/98 until April 2000. Decisions on whether destination
coverage of OIELs should be amended are taken after consultation
between relevant Government departments. This can take time. In
this case the decision to remove China from the coverage of the
OIEL was taken in December 1999 but due to an administrative oversight
China was not removed until April 2000].
Noting the OIEL M/543718/98 covering China
issued in June 1998 and its amendment in [April 2000] to remove
China, it would be helpful to know:
(a) in what respect the material was regarded
on reassessment as falling within the terms of the national interpretation
of the EU embargo
Our national interpretation of the EU Embargo
on arms sales to China prohibits the export of, inter alia,
"missiles . . . and specially designed components [of them]".
*** and so as specially designed components of a missile system
are caught by the scope of the EU Embargo.
(b) if any material was delivered to China
under the OIEL between June 1998 and [April 2000];
Although OIEL M/543718/98 gave the company licence
coverage to export to China between June 1998 and April 2000,
to the best of DTI's knowledge, no goods were actually shipped.
(c) what prompted the reassessment
In September 1998 the company requested an amendment
to the OIEL. Amendment requests that concern the addition of a
permitted destination, or the addition of goods to the goods schedule
are re-circulated for advice to other Government departments with
an interest, as determined by them in line with their responsibilities.
***
3. The Committees wish to know:
(a) if police advice was sought on the
potential police use of ***.
Police advice was not sought although our Embassy
in *** was consulted.
As with all other export licence applications,
*** was scrutinised extremely carefully to ensure that there was
no risk the equipment would be used for internal repression or
to assert by force a territorial claim, or in any other way to
contravene the criteria.
***
(b) what was the basis of the judgement
that there was "no risk" that the machine pistols licensed
under *** would be used aggressively with the terms of paragraph
8 of the national criteria.
***
INDIA
4. At page 80 of the evidence printed with
the Committees' Reports of February 2000 is the reference to Licence
547900, revoked because of issue in error. It would be helpful
to have a note on the practical significance of this error.
As a result of an administrative error, licence
547900 was issued on 4 November 1998. This error did not come
to light until 26 November 1998, and the licence was revoked at
the earliest opportunity on 27 November 1998. The company was
contacted and forewarned of the revocation, but they confirmed
that the goods had already been shipped. Nevertheless, it was
considered safer to proceed with the revocation.
The licence authorised the export of very small
quantities of ***. *** The small quantities involved were commensurate
only with research laboratory or teaching use.
FCO Ministers were informed of the error on
2 December 1998.
PAKISTAN
5. (a) It would be helpful to have confirmation
of an updated figure on the number of SIEL and OIEL applications
now outstanding (Q 65).
As at 8 May 2000, decisions had not yet been
taken on 115 applications for a SIEL, of which 95 cover military
goods, 7 cover dual-use goods and 13 cover goods with the end-use
control.
As at the same date, decisions had not yet been
taken on 32 applications for an OIEL, of which 21 cover military
goods and 11 cover dual-use goods.
(b) The DMA memorandum referred to in oral
evidence stated that one licence application involved naval safety
equipment. It would be helpful to have details of (a) this application
and (b) any dual-use applications.
Please see attachments I and II[1].
(c) At Q 62 the Minister offered any information
on licences for Pakistan given by other EU Member States since
12 October
We could find no information on licences for
Pakistan given by other EU Member States since 12 October. EU
Partners will only inform us of licences they are minded to approve
when they are "essentially identical" to a United Kingdom
Denial Notification (operative provision 3 of the EU Code of Conduct).
Some EU States publish Annual Reports but as Mr Hain made clear
in his response to Q 86, they are not as transparent as that of
the United Kingdom.
ZIMBABWE
6. (a) For clarification the Committees
would be assisted by information on;
(i) the identity of the applicants for each
of the seven 24 February licences and the identity of holders
of existing OIELs for Hawk spares;
Please see attachment III1.
(ii) the licence applications referred to
at Q34, clarifying in each case whether the references are to
revocation of existing SIELs: amendment of existing OIELs: refusal
of SIEL applications: refusal of new OIELs: refusal of extension
of existing OIELs—and indicating in respect of the first
category whether the goods licensed have already been exported;
Please see attachments IV, V and VI1.
(iii) the extent to which Hawk spares were
delivered under existing OIELs between June 1999 and February
2000;
Enquiries are being made of the companies but
in the time available we have not been able to obtain this information.
[See Ev. p 22-3]
(iv) the date of the original Hawk contract
from which the 15 years run;
We have obtained this information in confidence
from BAE Systems solely for the information of the Quadripartite
Committee: ***
(b) It would be helpful to know if any attempt
was made to impose additional end-use conditions on the spare
parts licensed in February 2000, such as the aircraft in which
they were fitted not being used in DRC interventions.
We did not attempt to impose additional end-use
conditions on the spare parts licensed in February. The licences
issued after 9 February were judged against the criteria and in
light of the Prime Minister's statement of that date.
(c) It would be helpful to have information
on the licensing status of the police Land Rovers now suspended,
including the dates of application and grant of export licence.
The type of Land Rover being delivered to the
Zimbabwean Republic police was the Land Rover Defender. This variant
of Land Rover would only be subject to UK strategic export controls
if it was specially designed or modified for military use.
7. (a) It would be helpful to have details
of the licences for helicopter spares, submachine guns and any
other lethal equipment refused since August 1998 referred to at
Qs 14, 16, 19 and 30.
The only licence refused to Zimbabwe between
August 1998 and 9 February 2000 was export licence application
number 549310, details at annex VII. The Government did not actually
refuse licences to Zimbabwe for helicopter spares and sub machine
guns during this period; rather, it did not issue any, because
no such applications were received.
(b) The Minister offered at Q46 any available
information on the observance by other Member States of the June
1999 Declaration.
We have no evidence to suggest that our EU Partners
do not continue to apply rigourously the criteria in the EU Code
of Conduct for exports to all countries in the Great Lakes region.
However, EU Partners will only inform us of licences they are
minded to approve when they are "essentially identical"
to a UK Denial Notification (operative provision three of the
EU Code of Conduct). Some EU States publish Annual Reports but
as Mr Hain made clear in his response to Q86, they are not as
transparent as that of the UK.
(c) It would be helpful to have a note on
the outcome of the 6 May EU meeting referred to; and of any Commonwealth
collective embargo.
Please see attachment VIII[2].
The Commonwealth does not take decisions which
give rise to binding international legal obligations, such as
mandatory arms embargoes. Members of the association can, however,
agree to take bilateral/multilateral action, including trade restrictions,
against violators of the Commonwealth's fundamental political
values.
KOSOVO
8. At Q127 the Minister offered any information
available on the supply of police equipment to Kosovo.
On 30 December 1999 the United Nations Under-Secretary-General
for Peacekeeping Operations wrote to the Chairman of the Security
Council Committee, established pursuant to resolution 1160 (1998)
concerning the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to inform the Committee
of the intention of the United Nations Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to supply side arms for use by the Kosovo
Police Service in Kosovo. The Under-Secretary-General explained
in his letter that the weapons would remain the exclusive property
of UNMIK and would be kept under strict UNMIK control. The letter
was circulated to the members of the committee, including the
UK.
Since the establishment of UNMIK and the new
police force training school in July 1999, the UK has yet to receive
a request for the export of small arms or other police equipment
to the Kosovo police force. Any application for such an export
will be considered on a case-by-case basis against the national
export licensing criteria and those in the EU Code of Conduct
on Arms Exports.
5 June 2000
1 Not printed. Back
2
Not printed. Back
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