Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40
- 59)
MONDAY 22 MAY 2000
MR P HAIN
MP AND MR
J BEVAN
40. We are holding the airport for a significant
major reinforcement of UN troops. Is this reinforcement going
to give the UN force a greater capacity to deal with the fundamental
problem, the one you described, that the diamond territories are
under the control of rebel forces, the diamonds are financing
the rebellion and the brutality of the war? Will the expanded
UN force be capable of dealing with the root cause of the problem,
namely the financing and supporting of the rebel forces through
the diamonds?
(Mr Hain) The raising of the level which we secured
through the Security Council last Friday from 11,000 to 13,000
is an important extra achievement. This command structure still
has to be stiffened and made more effective and we are helping
to contribute logistical and other advice to achieve that as British
forces. The whole question of the diamond areas, and you are absolutely
right to focus on it, and who controls those is absolutely fundamental
to providing a long-term sustainable solution. At the present
time—as I described earlier and as is well known, Sankoh
and the RUF have only been able to wage their war and re-wage
it in recent weeks, because of diamonds. There will be no long-term
permanent solution to Sierra Leone unless stability and order
are established in the diamond mining areas, and that is bandit
country, the proper mining regime established which sees the proceeds
of those diamonds mined in their proper proportion go through
the Sierra Leone Government rather than to fund rebel forces.
Many of them are taken across the Liberian border and Liberia's
diamond exports are very much larger than Liberian diamond production.
That gap is filled by Sierra Leone diamonds, so it is absolutely
crucial to establish that. Whether that can be accomplished by
the UN peacekeepers as presently constituted is something which
we are looking at at the present time.
Sir David Madel
41. Is the target date for the withdrawal of
British forces still the middle of June?
(Mr Hain) The Secretary of State for Defence and indeed
the Foreign Secretary have said that we hoped that the mission
would take around one month. I am not going to, nor has any Government
Minister and I am sure you would not expect me to, give a date
for the withdrawal because all that would happen then is that
those who have been causing all the trouble would bide their time.
42. Did I hear correctly that after the withdrawal
specialist advisers would stay on?
(Mr Hain) There are some British military observers
there anyway and have been now for six or seven months; a small
contingent of 15 of them. They will clearly stay on. If there
is agreement on a British Military Advisory Training Team, supplemented
by international support of around 90, that could not come in
in circumstances where the war was still being waged full tilt.
There would be a continuing commitment there to professionalise
the army in the way I have described.
43. There could be a British Military Advisory
Training Team staying there after the British army had withdrawn.
(Mr Hain) It would not be so much a question of staying
there, it would be coming freshly in as a separate unit, by separate
agreement, in circumstances where it was able to do its job.
44. These would be advisers, not observers.
(Mr Hain) They would be advisers training the Sierra
Leone army, helping it to equip itself, helping to establish command
structures, helping to create a proper army, which does not exist
there.
(Mr Bevan) There are two things: there are the 15
British observers who are currently in the UN force as military
observers and we would expect them to stay on in that context.
Then there are the efforts by Britain and others to build an accountable
and effective new Sierra Leone army, where we already have and
have had for several months a small team of British officers on
the ground helping to establish a programme to do that. What we
shall be talking about is developing and enhancing that as soon
as the conditions allow.
45. Has a formal request been made to the French
Government for help?
(Mr Hain) We have not made a request that I am aware
of. They are party to the United Nations Security Council membership.
46. The reason I raise it is the St Malo accords
were followed by the UK/French letter of intent on cooperation
in crisis management. There are two interesting points about it
at this key point. One is that it puts in place the essential
practical links to allow combined joint operations to be mounted
and another one is aimed at operations outside NATO territory
where NATO does not take a lead. To me that is a classic case
of where we would say formally to President Chirac and the French
Government, "Are you able to help us in this Sierra Leone
exercise?", naturally with the agreement of the Security
Council.
(Mr Hain) Indeed we did.
47. You asked the French for help.
(Mr Hain) We did and we have and we got that help.
The rapid reaction force which came in so quickly, came via Senegal.
The French were extremely helpful in ensuring that happened effectively
and efficiently. Without their assistance it could not have happened
in quite the admirably effective way it did, virtually deploying
overnight. They have been very helpful indeed. To that extent
the answer to your question is yes. I interpreted your question
initially as being whether we asked them to put forces alongside
ours around the airport and no, we have not done that.
48. Are you saying that really Anglo/French
cooperation is an extrapolation of the St Malo accords and that
this is the first occasion where it worked?
(Mr Hain) It is the first occasion where, as far as
I can tell, there has been a military component to a St Malo accord.
We are of course working very closely with the French, amongst
others, the Belgians and the US in particular, in the Congo as
well.
49. Just here.
(Mr Hain) I realise that but that has been going on
in tandem, so I should not like to say what came before the other.
50. If we needed more help, under St Malo we
could well make a formal request to France for more help.
(Mr Hain) We are in touch with them the whole time.
Dr Starkey
51. May I ask first about the supply of arms
to the rebels? There was a report in The Independent on 16 May
about arms being supplied to the RUF from the Ukranian Government
but via a Gibraltar based arms trader and a British airline. Has
the British Government investigated those allegations as far as
they relate to the British airline and the Gibraltar based arms
trader or asked the Gibraltar Government to do something about
it? What steps are we taking to make sure that British companies
do not in future collude in breaking the UN arms embargo?
(Mr Hain) I think you are referring to Air Foyle.
52. Yes.
(Mr Hain) Which did, a year or so ago, early 1999,
apparently fly in arms from the Ukraine. When we investigated
it, and we immediately took the matter up and referred it to the
United Nations Sanctions Committee because we saw a possible breach
there, the fact that it was a British company did not deter us
from doing that, they claimed that they were only taking it so
far; they did not realise it was going on to the RUF. Make of
that what you will, but we did take immediate action. It went
from the Ukraine to Burkina Faso in 1999 and then they were subsequently
forwarded via Liberia to the rebels in Sierra Leone but not, as
far as we could determine, in Air Foyle planes.
53. Have the Gibraltar Government acted on the
arms trader who was also involved?
(Mr Hain) We have actually discussed the matter with
the Gibraltar Government. I am happy to repeat now that any Briton
or any British company, any British group which is involved or
could be involved in open breach of United Nations sanctions,
will have us coming down on them like a ton of bricks.
Mr Mackinlay
54. Was Mr Roger Crooks involved at all in this
shipment?
(Mr Hain) I am not aware of that. I do know the questions
you have asked and I shall try to answer them as best I can, but
I am not aware of his involvement.
Dr Starkey
55. Leaving that one aside and moving onto the
RUF and the Lomé Agreement, do you have any indication
as to why the Sankoh faction of the RUF actually broke the Lomé
Agreement?
(Mr Hain) You are absolutely right to point to the
Sankoh faction of the RUF, because although he is the chairman,
there are different factions and it is quite apparent with him
in detention now that some want peace, others want to continue
the war and others are considering their position. The key to
it is the control of diamonds and the export through Liberia.
That needs to be resolved.
56. I want to pursue the human rights angle.
My understanding is that article 9 of the Lomé Agreement
said that there would be an absolute and free pardon and reprieve
to all combatants who collaborated in respect of anything done
by them up to the time of the signing of the present Agreement.
You mentioned earlier on that human rights abuses had reduced
since the Lomé Agreement. I understand that Amnesty, for
example, would agree with you on that one, but does think that
they still continued at a significant level throughout 1999 and
up to the present crisis, including continued amputations and
rapes. Is it your view, the Government's view, that the blanket
amnesty which was given in respect of human rights abuses before
July, continues to apply to RUF forces or at least continues to
apply to the RUF forces in the faction led by Mr Sankoh?
(Mr Hain) It cannot apply to any members of the RUF,
from Fodoy Sankoh downward, who have clearly torn up the agreement
by reneging on the piece of paper they signed. Therefore, as was
made perfectly clear in Lomé, they forfeit the amnesty
which they were granted, rightly or wrongly, at that time. That
was in the Agreement. Yes, Amnesty have pointed out quite rightly
that abuses have continued since July 1999 when Lomé was
agreed, but on nothing like the scale that they were beforehand
when there was the most bestial brutality that can possibly be
imagined.
57. Do you believe that the current Sierra Leone
Government has an adequate criminal justice system to investigate
the human rights abuses which have been occurring since July and
to bring those perpetrators to justice?
(Mr Hain) No. One of the reasons why we put £
million into establishing a truth and reconciliation commission,
which was provided for under Lomé, is in part to address
that. We have also been working with the Government to help them
get a proper police force, get a proper army, as I described earlier,
and get a proper legal system. I cannot overstate the importance
of the absence of a proper Sierra Leone state of the kind which
we would all recognise in this room. That has continuously hampered
the process of peace and the process of stability and establishing
a long-term future of justice for the Sierra Leone people.
58. Presumably the truth and reconciliation
commission is not meant to cover any violations which happened
after the July Lomé Agreement and in those circumstances
will the Government be supporting moves to establish an international
investigation into human rights abuses in Sierra Leone?
(Mr Hain) We shall happily look at that. What I am
interested in doing is moving the country forward to establish
peace and stability and create the necessary infrastructure and
culture and a strong civil society for instance. There is actually
quite a strong civil society, at least in the Freetown area. I
met several hundreds of them when I was there and had long discussions
with them. You need to establish their role and underpin it so
you create circumstances in which the questions you are asking
can properly be addressed, as indeed they should be.
59. Given all that you have been saying about
Mr Sankoh, do you think it is at all feasible that any future
peace deal would involve him and his faction yet again?
(Mr Hain) I cannot see, though this is a matter for
the Sierra Leone Government ultimately, how any future agreement
can have Sankoh as a party to it. I really do not. It was difficult
enough to have him as a party to the Lomé Agreement and
after the way he has behaved so shamelessly, I just cannot see
him as a party to the agreement. As to what is done with the RUF,
they are the best equipped fighting force in the country outside
the United Nations and certainly outside the British, although
they outnumber us significantly. They will have to be brought
into the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration process.
There is literally no alternative unless you leave them with all
their military equipment.
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