Examination of Witnesses (Questions 80
- 99)
MONDAY 22 MAY 2000
MR P HAIN
MP AND MR
J BEVAN
Chairman
80. Yes or no. A request was made and it was
presumably rejected.
(Mr Hain) Yes, but it was rejected because it was
not the appropriate way to deal with the problem. If you get a
request, even if it is given in good faith by an embattled president,
it does not mean to say you just stand to attention and agree
it. That is the point.
Sir Peter Emery: You turned it down.
Dr Godman
81. Was the president satisfied with your response?
(Mr Hain) He did not come back.
82. We seem to be going back to the days of
the Glubb Pasha with his request.
(Mr Hain) Exactly. He did not come back and complain
about it, he accepted that situation.
Mr Rowlands
83. Given the history of ministerial/official
relationships on this issue of Sierra Leone, which we quoted heavily
in our last report, were these sum total requests reported to
Ministers and did Ministers make this decision or did officials
make the decision?
(Mr Bevan) Officials made the decision based on the
ministerial guidance which we already have. As the Minister has
said, our policy set by Ministers was quite clear: it was that
we should be building up the United Nations force, that in slower
time we should be ensuring the Sierra Leone army was effective
and democratically accountable and we shall continue with that.
Ministers had also been quite clear that they did not want us
to assume operational control of what was called the Sierra Leone
army. So we had very clear ministerial guidance about how to deal
with those kinds of issues.
84. I understand all that, but for goodness
sake, given the fact that the whole burden of our last report
was that there was not the best possible relationship and service
of information between officials and Ministers in the last crisis,
in this one at least, given that Mr Penfold was involved, the
request was from the president, surely even if that was within
any guidance, should have gone to Ministers?
(Mr Hain) As Mr Bevan has very ably explained, Ministers
set the policy direction; I did, together with the Foreign Secretary.
That was what officials were pursuing. You get daily telegrams
from Sierra Leone, as you will be aware from your own experience.
You see them all; I saw them all. This was an operational matter
to be decided ... I know there are grunts of amazement from my
left, but the truth is that this was not a request which in our
judgement could have solved the problem it was designed to solve.
We made that assessment.
85. I am not actually complaining about the
judgement personally. I think it was a hopeless suggestion that
a British serving officer should take over an army of that kind
and currently to be seen on our television screens. That is not
it. I am back to what was the burden of our last report. On these
issues and particularly this situation, given the personnel involved,
I am, to say the least, surprised that these matters, even within
guidelines, were not actually reported to and specifically signed
off by Ministers. That is all. I wish to express amazing surprise.
(Mr Hain) I think it was a crazy suggestion. I saw
the telegram concerned. Our officials dealt with it within the
ministerial guidelines which were set, dealt with it absolutely
properly in my view, absolutely properly. I would defend this
decision. I do not think the requests had anything to do with
resolving the problem, anything at all to do with resolving the
problem. If you want a serious answer to the intractable problems
of Sierra Leone, this request would not have satisfied us.
Ms Abbott
86. We are not querying the decision, we are
querying the failure to refer it to Ministers.
(Mr Hain) I do not agree with you and I shall say
why. The alternative would have been a formal submission, which
Mr Bevan could have put up to me. I was virtually in daily contact
over Sierra Leone and other matters. If I had thought that the
telegram which came from Mr Penfold was something which warranted
a specific change of policy, which would have changed the way
that he and his officials responded, then I would have indicated
that. It did not. It was a routine matter of very little importance,
despite the way it is being elevated, given the huge problems
which were resolved, the crazy idea of parachuting a senior British
soldier into that situation. May I say finally that in a way the
problem with Sierra Leone, and you feel this when you go out there,
is that there is a constant desire for Britain to come in and
run everything. It is a sovereign state. We are doing our best,
within the context of a sovereign state, to help it move forward.
We have done more than anybody else. We have done it very efficiently,
very expertly, as you have seen in recent weeks, and in the diplomacy
which we have developed around it. Every request like this has
to be considered against that background.
Sir Peter Emery
87. You did say that you would make available
Mr Penfold's last communiqué and of course we shall be
able to judge what his feeling was about this when we receive
the communiqué.
(Mr Hain) Yes. Incidentally he has told us this morning
that he did not speak to The Sunday Times.
Sir Peter Emery: I would not have thought he
did.
Chairman
88. In response to Sir Peter, the Committee
will have, on the usual terms, to the Clerk, the relevant documents
which Sir Peter has referred to.
(Mr Hain) Yes.
Mr Illsley
89. In relation to the arms embargo imposed
on Sierra Leone, in our last report on Sierra Leone you might
remember we took a lot of evidence around whether the embargoes
apply to both sides, that is the good guys and the rebels. Do
we have the appropriate authority, if we are going to professionalise
and equip the Sierra Leone army?
(Mr Hain) We do. Naturally we would only do it in
full consultation with the United Nations peacekeeping operation.
90. Will that need an alteration to the UN resolution?
(Mr Hain) No.
91. My second question brings you back to the
point about the RUF being in control of the diamond fields and
being able to fund their weapons and all the rest of it from the
proceeds of that. Is there a danger that there is likely to be
another fragile agreement with another leader from the RUF to
settle the situation in Sierra Leone, which could again be overturned
in the future, if we cannot dislodge the RUF from control of those
particular diamond fields?
(Mr Hain) There is always the danger, and you are
quite right to point to it, indeed I indicated as much earlier,
that unless and until the rebels are displaced out of the diamond
field and they no longer control them, then the situation is going
to remain inherently unstable. Securing that objective is going
to be a formidable task because, as I have indicated, the diamonds
often go across the border to Liberia where Liberian citizens
benefit from the transactions which are involved. In addition
it is an area which is very difficult to police and frankly the
Sierra Leone Government has not exercised control or responsibility
there in any serious way for a long time.
Ms Abbott
92. Obviously Britain does have a responsibility
towards Sierra Leone; it is a Commonwealth country. There is a
very large number of Sierra Leone people here in this country
in London who take a very keen interest in our policy and relations
with the country. Underlying it, as you have indicated throughout
your evidence, is the issue of the illicit trade in diamonds.
Without that illicit trade in diamonds, the RUF could not be as
well equipped and could not have sustained their insurrection
for as long as they have. So I wanted you to explain to the Committee
what the Government is doing to combat the illegal diamond trade.
(Mr Hain) We are actually taking an international
lead on this. I initiated that from my policy interventions in
Angola to begin with, where diamonds fuel that bloody war as well,
as you know. I have had detailed discussions with De Beers, who
are responsible for the trading and marketing of around 60 per
cent of the world's diamond. They are cooperating fully with developing
a proper internationally based and accepted self-certificated
scheme for rough uncut diamonds.
93. When is that likely to be implemented?
(Mr Hain) We are trying to get to that as quickly
as possible. The Foreign Secretary hopes to discuss that with
the European Council of Ministers and we are also hoping to raise
that at the G8. This is something which we have been doing more
than anybody else to progress. I have had discussions with the
Israeli Government when I visited Israel about making sure that
the illicit diamonds, the blood diamonds, which go through their
trading operations are curbed. I have had discussions with the
Belgian Government about making sure that the blood diamonds which
go through Antwerp are similarly curbed.
94. Is the Belgian Government cooperating fully,
because Antwerp is the key to all this?
(Mr Hain) You are absolutely right and that is why
I have had close discussions with the Foreign Minister and Deputy
Prime Minister of Belgium on a number of occasions about this.
There is now a much greater awareness amongst all Belgians, and
particularly those in authority, of their need to clean up the
Antwerp diamond trading market and make sure that no blood diamonds
are progressing through it.
95. May I just ask you two quick questions on
Liberia? To what extent is the RUF still provided with support
by the Government of Liberia? Can the Committee be assured that
there is no question of arms sales to Liberia? After all, last
year when we were looking at Sierra Leone, one of the issues raised
with us by Ministers was the fact that the region is already awash
with arms. Can you assure the Committee that there will not be
arms sales to Liberia?
(Mr Hain) We have a very clear policy on arms sales,
as you are aware, one of the toughest in the world about the sale
of arms for either internal repression or external aggression.
Certainly Liberia is not a country to which we plan to sell arms.
May I say beyond that, that there is a very difficult situation
at the present time with United Nations forces still held hostage
in an RUF controlled area, albeit within a vicinity controlled
by the Indians, but they are surrounded by the RUF? We are seeking
President Taylor of Liberia's assistance in resolving that.
96. What inducements have you offered him?
(Mr Hain) No inducements, save that Liberia would
enhance its reputation as would he by cooperating fully, as, I
must say, he has done, certainly in recent weeks.
Mr Rowlands
97. Who is the greatest external influence on
President Taylor?
(Mr Hain) Not Britain.
98. I know not Britain.
(Mr Hain) We could speculate. I guess the US have
had an historic relationship with Liberia which is greater than
ours.
Dr Starkey
99. Have we learned any lessons from the experience
with UNITA over controlling the flow of diamonds which could actually
be applied to Sierra Leone?
(Mr Hain) Yes, I have and we have and we have been
learning the whole time because the world of international diamonds
is a different world. Having got De Beers to agree not to take
any diamonds at all from Angola, because one way or another, even
though they appeared to be legitimate diamonds, as it were, coming
through the Angolan Government, a lot of them were traded across
the battle zone from UNITA, they have done a lot of work. We have
separately commissioned some work on how to get a self-certification
regime. As I discovered in the case of Angola and UNITA's murderous
war there, which applies equally to Sierra Leone, if you can deal
with uncut rough diamonds you can actually, the experts tell you,
identify almost and invariably always the particular mine they
come from. It is once they are polished and cut that it is virtually
impossible to do so. We need a policing regime which identifies
the problem right at the beginning, which is uncut, rough diamonds.
In Sierra Leone that is very difficult because the mines are not
under any kind of government or official or authority-led supervision.
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