Supplementary memorandum submitted by
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
SIERRA LEONE
At the Committee's 22 May hearing, members raised
the allegation in the 21 May Sunday Times that the FCO ignored
warnings from Peter Penfold and a request from President Kabbah
for military assistance.
The Sunday Times is wrong. As I indicated to
the Committee on 22 May and the House on 23 May, the facts are
that:
— on 11 April President Kabbah called
Mr Penfold to say that Kabbah had appointed a Sierra Leonean as
temporary Chief of Defence Staff for the Sierra Leone Army (SLA).
This was to replace the seriously ill Nigerian, General Khobe;
— Kabbah was concerned that Khobe's
departure would lead to a collapse of morale in Freetown and a
boost for the RUF rebels.
He asked us to:
(i) move one of the British advisers working
on the reform of the Sierra Leone Army into the Defence HQ alongside
the new CDS;
(ii) advance the arrival of the new British
Commander of the Military Assistance and Training Team (MATT);
(iii) have Brigadier Richards, then in Sierra
Leone visiting on other business, stay on in-country.
— We instructed Mr Penfold to tell
Kabbah that the Government of Sierra Leone should work with the
UN to ensure that they were jointly acting to reassure the population;
that Brigadier Richards would be departing Sierra Leone as planned;
but that we were prepared to move the UK adviser into the Defence
HQ and see if we could accelerate the arrival of the MATT commander;
— What President Kabbah clearly wanted
was the appearance (and perhaps the fact) of UK operational control
of the Sierra Leone Army;
— That was not our policy. Our strategy
was to build up the UN, which was the only force capable of stabilising
the situation and protecting the population in the short term,
while helping create an effective SLA in the longer term;
— Nor was Kabbah's request related
to the subsequent deterioration in the situation. The spark that
lit the current crisis had nothing to do with Khobe or the SLA
in Freetown. The immediate cause, three weeks later (1 May), was
a dispute upcountry between the UN and the RUF, when RUF commanders
tried to stop their troops entering a disarmament camp. And the
underlying cause was Sankoh's decision to breach the Lomé
Agreement;
— Moreover, the solution we recommended
to Kabbah delivered the result we intended. The UN increased its
visibility and patrolling in Freetown and beyond. Mr Penfold subsequently
reported that this had calmed the population. Neither he nor Kabbah
came back to challenge our original decision;
— This was a routine operational matter,
handled by officials acting on the ministerial guidance they already
had. Kabbah's request fell squarely within the policy Ministers
had laid down; that we should support the UN and help train a
new Sierra Leone Army, but that there should be no UK operational
control of the SLA.
I of course saw the telegram, and had full confidence
in my officials to carry out the policy Ministers had previously
set out. The decision taken was correct. The handling was correct
and I trust that the Committee will acknowledge this now that
the proper context has been explained and the misleading Sunday
Times report corrected. As I promised on 22 May, we are happy
to make arrangements for members of the Committee to see the relevant
telegrams, which confirm these facts, in confidence and in secure
conditions: they are classified papers. We shall be in touch with
the Clerk of the Committee about the necessary arrangements.
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