Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1
- 19)
TUESDAY 13 JUNE 2000
MR HUGH
DAVIES, DR
CHRIS HUGHES,
MS KATIE
LEE AND
PROFESSOR MICHAEL
YAHUDA
Chairman
1. May I welcome our four witnesses of the first
panel to the Committee this morning. We welcome Mr Hugh Davies,
who is a former British Ambassador on the Sino-British Joint Liaison
Group, and is now Asia Adviser to Prudential plc. We welcome Dr
Chris Hughes of the London School of Economics. Ms Katie Lee,
Director of the Great Britain-China Centre, welcome, and Professor
Michael Yahuda of the London School of Economics, welcome again.
We, as a Committee, have embarked on this inquiry, which is looking
into the policies and role of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
in relation to China; so our focus is the United Kingdom administration,
how we maximise our contact, our influence, our relationship with
China—this colossus in all of its manifestations—in
terms both of the UK plc and the United Kingdom as a country,
with a serious concern about human rights, cultural exchanges,
and so on. We are, as you know, at the start of our inquiry. The
Committee will, in fact, be visiting China—Beijing, a number
of regional centres, and Hong Kong—from next Saturday; so
it is wholly appropriate that we listen to you and discuss with
you, as experts on the China field, so that we might learn and,
through us, our colleagues and our wider public. It is perhaps
those misperceptions that I would like to begin with: on how we
try to understand China, China to understand us, and seeing ourselves
as others see us. We are going, on Saturday, as a parliamentary
delegation. It would be helpful, as a start, to know how the Chinese
perceive that. Do they see the difference in kind between the
British Government, the administration, and a parliamentary body,
with clearly a very different perspective? Who can help us on
that?
(Mr Davies) I think my experience would
suggest that they see Parliament of this country, as parliaments
of other countries, as very much part of the whole panoply of
the state. They find it a little bit more difficult to distinguish
between parliamentary attitudes and governmental attitudes than
we do. So I think that they will regard your deliberations and
your decisions as being extremely important in terms of their
perception of how the British Government will be reacting towards
China in the future.
2. In so far as we are independent of Government
policies, sometimes critical of Government policies; in so far
as we take a position on human rights, for example; will that
be seen to be an echo of Government policy? I do not know if any
other colleagues would wish to come in. Professor Yahuda?
(Professor Yahuda) There are experts in China who
understand these things quite well. Whether that would be true
of the people they advise is another matter. Of course, they have
become accustomed to the independence of the American Congress.
Whether or not they understand the difference between the parliamentary
system here, where the executive has to have a majority in the
legislature in order to govern, as opposed to the American one,
where obviously Congress is much more independent in that sense,
is a moot point. I think they tend to look to governments, to
the executive, to handle any embarrassing things that Parliament
may throw up. In the British case, they tend to get reassurance
from the Government side that they need not worry too much about
what may or may not be said in Parliament, even though they are
representative of particular bodies of opinion of a particular
country.
3. I was going to ask next about the National
People's Congress. Can I pose the question in a different way
in respect of the National People's Congress, whom we are obviously
going to meet. To what extent is there a degree of independence?
How should we field with the NPC?
(Dr Hughes) The NPC has been growing steadily more
independent. It is far from independent in the sense that we understand
it. It has, over the past decade, expressed dissent from the administration.
4. Can you give examples of that.
(Dr Hughes) In particular, on the issue of corruption
and law and order. The usual process is for almost unanimous assent
to anything that the Government does; but with the issue of law
and order and corruption there has been a steadily decreasing
vote of approval when the reports are given each year. So that
is the key issue in Chinese politics, at the moment, and a good
example of where the NPC can voice deep public concern on this
issue. That would be an example. But it is far from independent.
5. Any examples in the field of foreign affairs?
(Dr Hughes) Not that I can think of, no. That is a
different issue altogether.
6. What role does the NPC have in Parliament?
(Dr Hughes) I can think of one issue which is not
easy to define. They would not define it as foreign affairs. The
Taiwan issue, for example. There was apparently some dissent during
the last presidential election in Taiwan in 1996, where the local
delegates from the NPC were not happy with the military manoeuvres
that were carried out along the coast opposite Taiwan. In their
definition it is not foreign affairs.
7. They were more doveish in respect of Taiwan
and its administration?
(Dr Hughes) That is right. It is always hard to assess
the truth of that. It is very difficult to establish exactly what
does goes on. There were quite a lot of reports at the time that
the representatives from those coastal areas were very unhappy
and expressed their dissent about the manoeuvres that were going
on.
8. One final point. The European Union as a
force in foreign affairs. To what extent do they distinguish us
from our European colleagues? Clearly Hong Kong was one reason
why bilateral relations were important but what is the perception
of the United Kingdom within the EU context?
(Dr Hughes) Since the Desert Fox operation in 1998,
when the United States and the United Kingdom operated outside
the Security Council remit, there has been a growing perception
that the United Kingdom is more allied with the United States
than it is with Europe due to a shared doctrine of intervention.
That is one aspect. On the other hand, they see Europe as a pole
in what they see to be a multi-polar world order. I am not sure
whether they see the United Kingdom as part of Europe or not.
Sometimes they do but sometimes—
(Professor Yahuda) May I add one or two points. One
is that the main problem for the Chinese leadership, as they see
it in the world, is the United States. Therefore, they are looking
to Europe and also to Britain, as not exactly counter-weights
to the United States, but at least as some sort of centre which
can reduce the capacity of the United States to lay down the law.
Associated with that they look at the European Union first of
all as an alternative market, as an alternative supplier of technology,
but also as having a political voice that is separate from the
United States. Obviously they hear that voice loudest in France.
To a certain extent, they sense it here in the United Kingdom
too. So there is a certain ambivalence in the way they look at
the United Kingdom. In one sense it is seen as American's closest
partner in Europe. On the other hand, it is also seen as part
of Europe. It should be noted that they also seek to try and play
on some of the differences between, say, France and Britain or
Germany and Britain, as a way of trying to get a degree of advantage
in commercial terms.
9. On the WTO were they surprised, when they
had done their deal with the United States, that it was not the
end of the story? That the EU also had a voice as well?
(Professor Yahuda) I think they were a little bit
surprised. They felt, quite rightly, that the United States was
the key, but I think they thought that the European Union did
not have that much leverage. It was possibly a salutary lesson
for both sides, to have the matter prolonged in the way that it
was. To reach a conclusion that, in the end, involved a degree
of compromise on both sides.
Sir John Stanley
10. As the witnesses know, this Committee's
responsibility is to examine the performance of the Foreign Office.
Therefore, our terms of reference of this inquiry are to enquire
into the role and the policies of the FCO in relation to the People's
Republic of China. Against that background I would be grateful
if each of the witnesses could list for the Committee what they
consider to be the successes of the British Foreign Office during
the lifetime of the present Government, and what they consider
to be the failures in the British Foreign Office during the present
Government's lifetime. Mr Davies, I am sure, will put his distinguished
past behind him.
(Mr Davies) That is very unfair, Sir John! I was,
of course, in the Foreign Office until only 15 months ago. I was
associated very closely with what I think is probably the major
achievement of foreign policy towards China over the last 20 years
and that is the successful return of Hong Kong. I think that was
by all measures a very successful operation, which took many years
and many people's efforts. It certainly was not simply down to
the Foreign Office, but the Foreign Office was the instrument
through which many of the contacts were made. Failures: I am not
certain I shall venture into an attempt on failure. On the whole,
the Foreign Office is faced with the difficulty of handling the
relationship with a very, very important and growingly important
country, where there are issues that come to face this country.
It has already been touched on by the Chairman. The question of
human rights, Tibet, and Taiwan and these issues. They are very
difficult to handle. Inevitably there will be times when matters
are perceived to have been mishandled by Government, whether it
is the Foreign Office or other parts of the Government. Certainly
there was a great deal of criticism after the visit of President
Jiang Zemin about the police handling, and a perception that the
Foreign Office was partly responsible for that. I am not going
to enter into that discussion, but I will just flag that up as
a point which caused concern at the time. In my view, I would
say that the Foreign Office, (but I would say this, wouldn't I?)
does its best in difficult circumstances. In general, the relationship
between China and the United Kingdom has come through difficult
times but is now, at the moment, set on a fairly fair course.
I think the Foreign Office has a lot to do with having achieved
that.
(Dr Hughes) I suppose the Foreign Office has done
a good job in terms of consular affairs and facilitating trade
and investment and so on. It does that kind of thing well. But
to many of us outside the FCO it sometimes appears that they could
take (I am searching for the right word here) a more positive
or forward looking attitude on other issues; specifically, security
issues. To give an example: I think there is a crisis, at the
moment, in relations with Taiwan. I just wonder what sort of policy
is being developed or how far forward it is looking. What sort
of contingencies are being prepared for an issue, with so serious
an aspect, which does threaten security and regional stability?
So I am not quite sure how much thought is going into those sorts
of issues.
(Ms Lee) I can only comment at a micro level. One
of the successes I would have thought is the establishment of
a Human Rights Project Fund, which has been very influential in
increasing the number of exchanges between Chinese partners and
the United Kingdom on a number of key issues of concern.
Chairman
11. Can you give examples.
(Ms Lee) We ran a British Law Week at the time of
the visit of the Prime Minister, and within that there were a
number of seminars supported by the Fund. We have run a criminal
court procedure seminar. There is a whole range of projects that
have been supported by this Fund. If there is a failure, the failure
is that there is not enough resource there to do more. In terms
of our work, they are extremely supportive.
(Professor Yahuda) I agree with Mr Davies about the
significance of the return of Hong Kong. I think that was a very,
very difficult time. At the time, as you know, opinions were divided
on the British side as to how best to handle this. I think that,
in the end, the matter seems to have been handled—at least
from the British side—with a degree of success. Certainly
the Chinese seem to be honouring their side of the bargain. If
there is a problem there, it is more to do with the position of
the local government in Hong Kong, which perhaps is putting less
emphasis on developing further this "high degree of autonomy"
that was promised than many people would wish to see. More broadly,
there has been a success obviously in arguing that we have now
entered a new phase in Sino-British relations. There were successful
visits of leaders. There is an issue which arises with regard
to seeking to develop a dialogue on human rights rather than confrontation,
as it is sometimes called. That is, what are the criteria for
judging this as a success or a failure? That seems to be very,
very unclear. If one is to say one wants to have a continual interchange
with the Chinese side on human rights, doubtless you could say,
yes, that is a good thing. It is looking for the long-term. It
is encouraging a greater interaction between the Chinese and the
outside world. From a long-term point of view it is an encouraging
change. But in the meantime the Chinese Government can be doing
many, many objectionable things arising out of its own ruthlessness,
or sense of weakness, perhaps, or sense of danger. There may be
occasions when Britain needs to take a more robust position. It
is not very clear what criteria will apply when such a thing might
be required.
Chairman: Before you continue, Sir John, Dr
Starkey has a supplementary.
Dr Starkey
12. Really, to Mr Davies. He said that the hand-over
in Hong Kong had been successful. I wondered if he could be slightly
more specific about what his criteria were for measuring that
success.
(Mr Davies) If one looks from the broad historic point
of view, the chances of achieving what was achieved were, at an
earlier stage, regarded as fairly low. It was a very unprecedented
operation that the two sides were embarked upon. "One country,
two systems", which was the concept of Deng Xiaoping, was
pretty revolutionary; but actually to put flesh on the bones of
that was very difficult. Although the Joint Declaration in itself
was a major triumph in 1984 in getting the two sides to agree
on the outline, actually fitting in all the details that were
subsequently done over the next 12 to 13 years; and getting an
enormous measure of consensus at the end—despite the major
political difficulties that the two sides faced domestically—was
a very great achievement. If you woke up, as I did, in Hong Kong,
on 1 July, you did not notice any difference to what Hong Kong
had been like on 30 June other than that the flags had been changed.
The achievement of really achieving a smooth transition through
a major change of sovereignty, from a system which was bound here
by parliamentary democracy to a system which was not bound by
such a system of accountable government, back at the metropolitan
centre, was a remarkable achievement. It is one of which this
country and China can be proud.
13. Do you think it was universally successful
for everybody, including the people of Hong Kong?
(Mr Davies) It is difficult to judge for each individual.
Of course, there have been one or two issues that have arisen
since the hand-over and these have been well documented: to do
with decisions in the Court of Final Appeal and one or two other
issues. Most people in Hong Kong are relieved that the situation
has gone as well as it has. However, there is one factor which
cannot be counted out. That on 2 July, the day after the Handover
took place, the Thai baht went into free fall, precipitating the
Asian financial crisis. That has had much more effect on individuals
in Hong Kong than the change of sovereignty.
Sir David Madel
14. Following that, do the Chinese regard it
as successful as the Foreign Office do?
(Mr Davies) I think it is rather presumptuous for
me to judge how the Chinese see it, but my own feeling is that
they are very happy with what has been achieved. They were looking
for a success story. They wanted Hong Kong to continue to be beneficial
to the Mainland and generally speaking that has been the case,
despite the financial downturn.
15. That being so, do they think we should move
on from that and Britain should become an honest broker in the
dispute over Taiwan between China and the United States?
(Mr Davies) I do not think they would enter into that.
Again I feel it is presumptuous for me to judge how they would
react. As my colleague has already said, they regard the Taiwan
issue as an internal matter between them and the Taiwan people.
They would not want an honest broker, certainly from the United
Kingdom. There have been talks. Both sides have been talking to
the United States about some of the issues. But I am not a politician
any more. I am a businessman.
(Professor Yahuda) On that point, you must bear in
mind that the Chinese were very suspicious of the British side
at the time of the Handover. After all, there was a governor there
whom they disliked personally. Quite a number of them expected
Britain, as they put it, to leave behind "some trouble".
So from that perspective they feel relieved that there has been
no trouble. In that sense, they have been willing to think in
terms of Britain as a new partner. But that does not mean to say
that they would want Britain to play any kind of role as an intermediary
in any of their major foreign policy or domestic concerns.
Chairman
16. Dr Hughes, you are the specialist on Taiwan,
I understand. Would you like to comment on Sir David's question?
(Dr Hughes) About the United Kingdom acting as a go-between?
I think it is out of the question. I do not think the rumours
about the United States' actions are going to be more than recent
rumours. It is viewed as an internal issue. The British do still
have some stigma as an imperialist power, which is taught in class
in schools and is part of the political culture in China. That
Britain is one of the big imperialist powers responsible for much
of China's suffering and present problems. So I would have thought
the United Kingdom is not well placed. I would not have thought
that any external power was well placed to be a go-between, least
of all the United Kingdom.
17. Is Taiwanese investment in Mainland China
still rising?
(Dr Hughes) It has been dropping off over the last
recent couple of years.
Chairman: Mr Rowlands on Taiwan and then Sir
John.
Mr Rowlands
18. Hong Kong first, if I may, because I may
as well finish the retrospection of that. To Mr Davies. First,
there were the dire warnings about the impact of Mr Chris Patten's
governorship, and then there was Mr Patten. What do you think
Mr Patten's legacy was? Do you think he managed to move democracy
more in Hong Kong rather than if he had not been governor, had
not been there?
(Mr Davies) With Mr Patten there was a degree of dignity
in the British withdrawal which might not have been there before.
We left Hong Kong with our heads held high. We had done our best
for Hong Kong. The people of Hong Kong, in my view, were encouraged
to see that they had a future and were able to express and articulate
their own views in a way that they had not been able to do before.
There was, as I say, a good deal more stress on this because of
the way that Chris Patten conducted the Government—on the
importance of issues such as the rule of law and accountable government
and a degree of democratic accountability. No-one will claim that
Hong Kong ended up at the time of the British withdrawal with
a totally democratic system. That was certainly not the case.
But all those things came together, and Chris Patten's legacy
is a fine one for Hong Kong.
(Professor Yahuda) I agree with that. Much of the
criticism that was voiced here, perhaps elsewhere, that the key
was to have as good relations with the Chinese as possible, did
not put enough emphasis on the need for people in Hong Kong to
feel that they too could shape their own future. I think his legacy
has given them more of an opportunity to do so than might otherwise
have been the case.
19. Turning to Taiwan. It should not be briefly
because it could become a very big regional issue. Do you think
the Chinese authorities are clear in their minds as to how the
international community would react if there was any real serious
attempt, either directly or militarily, to intervene in Taiwan,
and possibly be seen to try to displace or replace the newly elected
president?
(Dr Hughes) Again, as my colleague said, it is hard
to speak for the Chinese and what they are thinking and what they
are saying. All I can say is that the United States apparently
did make it very clear to them, in private meetings during the
recent presidential election in Taiwan, that there would be very
serious measures taken; but I do not think there is any clarity
about other states and what sort of attitude they have, apart
from perhaps going along with the United States. That is what
I said earlier about not being really sure what the United Kingdom
policy is on this issue and how well thought-out it is. I do not
know. The Chinese probably do not think it is particularly important
because the United States is the major power. I am not sure if
that is a particularly good thing either. Maybe we should have
an interest in this kind of issue.
(Professor Yahuda) I think I agree substantially with
what Dr Hughes has just said but there is a further qualification
to be made. That is, that the primary concern of the Chinese leaders
is to retain themselves and the Communist Party in power. They
recognise that the continued development of the economy is crucial
for them. So in their calculations as to what they may or may
not do with regard to Taiwan, they take into account what the
international reaction may be in terms of the economics of it.
In so far as the European Union and the United Kingdom do make
statements from time to time that they oppose the use of force
and so on, this adds a certain amount of weight, if you like,
to those who argue for caution on the Chinese side.
|
