Memorandum submitted by Free Tibet Campaign
"THE ROLE AND POLICIES OF THE FOREIGN
AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE IN RELATION TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA"
Free Tibet Campaign stands for the Tibetans'
right to determine their own future. This memorandum addresses
the role and policies of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office with
regard to promoting human rights in China and specifically Tibet,
the other areas of the inquiry being outside my experience.
Summary
— The policy of the FCO towards China
on human rights consists primarily of a bilateral dialogue. Human
rights issues are raised in a token fashion in bilateral contacts
and there are some practical co-operation (mostly training) projects;
— The FCO has been handicapped in its
ability to engage in more robust criticism of China (eg in the
United Nations Commission for Human Rights) by the imperative
of the European Union to present a united position, and China's
threats to withdraw from the dialogue;
— Trade has a higher priority than
human rights.
Failings
— There is a substantial gap between
the verbal rhetoric of China in dialogue sessions and the situation
in Tibet and China with regard to human rights, China's abuses
having increased. China has successfully persuaded the FCO to
play its game;
— The dialogue has produced no progress
on issues relating to Tibet. China's policy towards Tibet has
hardened and Britain has failed in its historical friendship with
Tibet;
— The FCO has displayed a lack of focus
in recent months, failing to promote a clear policy with regard
to the future of the dialogue and support for a resolution at
UNCHR;
— There remains substantial controversy
over the handling of the Chinese State Visit.
Recommendations (abbreviated)
The FCO should:
(i) Suspend and review the bilateral human
rights dialogue;
(ii) Be transparent about that process of
review;
(iii) Establish specific, action focused
benchmarks for progress on human rights;
(iv) Develop alternative strategies;
(v) Co-sponsor a resolution at the UNCHR
in 2001 if the situation has not improved;
(vi) Raise the status, robustness and content
of human rights in all bilateral contacts;
(vii) Support the appointment of a EU Special
Co-ordinator for Tibet;
(viii) Confirm past recognition of Tibet
as being a de facto independent state and open relations
with the democratically elected Tibetan Government in exile;
(ix) Elevate human rights in the work of
other departments, eg to ensure DFID's projects support the Tibetans'
struggle to maintain their cultural heritage. With the DTI to
prevent British investment in Tibetan autonomous areas which is
opposed by and not in the best interests of the Tibetan people.
"THE ROLE AND POLICIES OF THE FOREIGN
AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE IN RELATION TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA"
18 May 2000
Free Tibet Campaign stands for the Tibetans'
right to determine their own future. It campaigns for an end to
the Chinese occupation of Tibet and for the Tibetans' fundamental
human rights to be respected. It is independent of all governments
and is funded by its members and supporters: This memorandum addresses
the role and policies of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office with
regard to promoting human rights in China and specifically Tibet,
the other areas of the inquiry being outside my experience.
Introduction—FCO China policy on Human Rights
The main strategy adopted to promote human rights
in China and Tibet is the UK's bilateral dialogue on human rights.
The UK is also a participant in the EU/China dialogue. The strategy
includes a number of practical co-operation projects with China,
designed to promote a better understanding of such areas as legal
reform. The FCO assert that human rights are raised during summits
and bilateral Ministerial meetings—however the time allocated
to this topic is very limited, often restricted to a brief statement
about one item of concern (eg an individual) with no opportunity
for discussion. China's contempt for this token gesture can be
illustrated by the recent sentencing to eights years in prison
of Uighur businesswoman Rebiya Kadeer, shortly after her case
was raised by the Foreign Secretary in a face to face meeting
with Foreign Minister Tang Jiuxian. I would describe the token
inclusion of human rights in summits and bilateral meetings as
tick box foreign policy. More substantive criticism in international
fora has been largely abandoned.
A little like the renaming of Windscale as Sellafield,
the above strategy of "constructive engagement" has
recently been renamed "critical engagement", but this
seems to be a public relations exercise rather than a reflection
of changes in policy. The dialogue has neither delivered improvements
in human rights or prevented a deterioration. In 2000, Britain
and the EU adopted a "wait and see" policy with regard
to the future of the dialogue and the opportunity to co-sponsor
a resolution at the United Nations Commission for Human Rights.
The FCO failed to persuade fellow EU member states to be transparent
about their decisions, and in general there seemed to be a lack
of clarity and focus.
There is little doubt that trade considerations
remain the primary factor in defining the policy of British Government
towards China.
1. The relationship between the Human Rights
dialogue and the United Nations Commission for Human Rights
The UK/China and EU/China dialogues resumed
after the hand over of Hong Kong. Since Spring 1998, under the
British Presidency, these dialogues have become the main mechanisms
for promoting human rights following the collapse of support in
Europe for a resolution on China at the United Nations Commission
for Human Rights (UNCHR). Unity of position within the EU with
regard to the UNCHR is seen as paramount, a policy supported by
the FCO. Hence the EU will not sponsor a resolution on China unless
every Member State agrees to do so. This has weakened EU policy
towards China rather than strengthened it.
China periodically threatens to withdraw trade
privileges from countries seeking to be critical at the UNCHR,
but there is no evidence to suggest that China follows through
on such threats.
Since 1998, the EU has been influenced in its
decision whether or not to co-sponsor resolutions at UNCHR by
China's threats to cancel the dialogue in that event. By placing
such emphasis on the dialogue process (which has proved so ineffective)
Britain and the EU have been rendered impotent in the important
fora of the UNCHR. It is worth additionally noting here that the
United States resumed its bilateral human rights dialogue with
China in 1998, with a single session late 1998/early 1999. It
was cancelled in the Spring of 1999, not because the US sponsored
a resolution at UNCHR that year, but because of the bombing of
the Chinese Embassy by NATO in Belgrade (May 1999). There are
currently no moves by China to resurrect the dialogue with the
United States, and no moves by the United States to do so either.
On 16 May 2000, the Foreign Secretary stated
in reply to a question from John Wilkinson MP about the UNCHR
"We did not sponsor the resolution partly because we did
not understand the purpose of handing China a victory on its motion
of no action year after year". This reply is unacceptable.
The EU's failure (which the UK is a party to) to co-sponsor the
China resolution, and its failure to publicly state its position
about this and about voting against China's no action motion until
very late in the day, contributed to the failure of Commission
members to defeat China's no action motion. China succeeded in
silencing debate on the resolution by only four votes.
2. FCO objectives for improving Human Rights
in China
The UK shares many of the objectives listed
below, which are stated in the European Commission's strategy
document called "Building a Comprehensive Partnership
with China", published March 1998 (progress report due
shortly). The protection of freedoms in Hong Kong is additionally
a priority for the United Kingdom.
— China to sign, ratify and implement
the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (signed
October 1998) and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
— Encourage enhanced co-operation with
UN agencies, bodies and mechanisms;
— Raise issues of concern (including
enquiring about "certain Chinese citizens");
— Promote respect of cultural, linguistic
and religious identity of ethnic minorities (including issues
relating to Tibet);
— Press for the ratification of the
Internal Labour Organisation core labour standards, including
freedom of association, right to collective bargaining, prohibition
of forced labour and exploitative child labour and anti discrimination.
Objectives of Co-operation Projects
— To promote the rule of law, by legal
and judicial training;
— Strengthen civil society—support
initiatives which train and assist officials engaged in implementation
of the village governance law and the development of a "voice"
for ethnic minorities/women/NGOs etc.
3. Content of the UK/China Human Rights Dialogue
Items under discussion include (not in priority
order):
— Timetable for ratification and implementation
of International Convenants on Civil and Political Rights and
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
— Encouraging visits (eg High Commissioner
for Human Rights/EU Ambassadors/UN Special Rapporteurs);
— Freedom of religion (Christians/Tibetans/Falun
Gong);
— Tibet—negotiations without
preconditions with Dalai Lama for a political solution;
— Individuals (some Tibetan, including
the 11th Panchen Lama);
— Development of criminal justice system/changes
to criminal procedure/corruption;
— Re-education through labour/non custodial
sentencing;
— Treatment of monks and nuns (Tibet).
The dialogue takes place over three days. There
is a NGO component, which a number of organisations (including
Amnesty International) have refused to participate in since the
human rights situation deteriorated in late 1998. NGOs did not
wish to be party to an ineffective process. The Chinese have never,
to my knowledge, agreed to Tibetan or Chinese democracy NGOs participating
in the dialogue.
4. Outcomes of the UK/China Human Rights Dialogue
As stated in previous submissions to the Committee,
there is ample evidence that the human rights dialogue has not
only failed to produce improvements in China and Tibet, but has
failed to prevent the recent deterioration there. China has not
justified the faith of the Government in the human rights dialogue
by attempting to give even the appearance of a willingness to
change. The UK has stated a willingness to review the dialogue,
which Free Tibet Campaign welcomes. What follows is a brief commentary
on a number of areas which the FCO have in the past publicly stated
as beneficial results of the dialogue.
(a) General
Claim: The Chinese have accepted that human
rights is a legitimate subject for discussion, (previously described
as "an internal affair" or the imposition of Western
values)
Response: There is an argument that China has
realised the expediency of accepting discussions on human rights,
as a trade off for silencing substantive criticism in other fora
(eg China Daily quote on signing of ICCPR, October 1999 "It
is not that China's stance or policies on the issue of human rights
have changed . . . rather that the belated favourable turn in
the international atmosphere has created an opportunity for China
to elaborate its perspectives . . ."). The Chinese have
become no less defensive on Tibet. However, the FCO must use this
argument to prevent China backsliding.
Claim: Dialogue encourages the Chinese into
greater co-operation in UN mechanisms.
Response: The Chinese remain wholly capable
of being disruptive in the proceedings of the UNCHR (ie not supporting
initiatives relating to other countries) if they are criticised
in that fora. This is not a positive step of the dialogue, merely
a trade off, which is unhealthy and undermines the mechanisms
of the UN rather than supports them.
Claim: Dialogue creates an environment in which
to promote co-operative projects and development projects.
Response: This may partly be true, but it is
also true that some co-operation projects have been running for
a good many years, independent of the framework of the dialogue,
and could continue even if the dialogue ceases. It is important
to recognise the limitations of co-operation projects as well
as the advantages, eg training police officers to adopt different
approaches towards the treatment of Tibetan prisoners is a worthy
objective, but when there is a discriminatory policy towards Tibetans
coming from Beijing, it remains unlikely that behaviour will be
adopted. Neither does it address the reason why that Tibetan is
in custody in the first place. See recommendation (ix) about development
projects.
(b) Tibet
See item 5 for more detail on the Tibet situation.
There has been no progress on negotiations without
pre conditions between China and the Dalai Lama and exiled Tibetan
Government. No Tibetan political prisoners have been released
or useful information about them provided. The repression of religion
has been stepped up—the 17th Karmapa escaped in December
1999 and deaths in custody continue.
Visits by the EU Ambassadors and the High Commissioner
for Human Rights have taken place and there are in principal agreements
to the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and the All Party Parliamentary
Group for Tibet to visit Tibet, however the Chinese have failed
to agree to the terms of the UN Special Rapporteur's visit. Visits
in themselves are not indicators of success. There have been more
than 50 to Tibet since 1991—most arranged and conducted
independently of the dialogue process. The EU Ambassadors' visit
and Mary Robinson's both had deaths and arrests associated with
them (protests in Drapchi Prison, the arrest of monks). The Chinese
have not allowed unfettered access to Tibet, nor have they abided
by promises to refrain from reprisals against people trying to
contact the missions.
Information about prisoners is inconsistent.
Chinese officials frequently provide no information, inaccurate
information, or pretend they do not know who the individual is.
(c) Other
— Arrangements to be made for an early
visit to China by the Foreign Secretary's death penalty panel.
I believe this has yet to take place. Note—this is the main
area of progress, but it remains to be seen how it will develop;
— The establishment of a bilateral
working group to discuss Chinese ratification of the two UN human
rights covenants. I believe this has yet to be established. Note—more
important than ratification of these covenants is the legal reform
required to implement them;
— Agreement to engage constructively
with the International Committee of the Red Cross on a prison
visiting programme. Note—it would be important to include
access to the Panchen Lama;
— A commitment to conclude a technical
assistance agreement with Mary Robinson, UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights, during her visit to Peking in early March 2000.
Note—this did not happen. The UNHCHR never expected the
technical assistance agreement would be concluded at this time.
5. FCO policy towards Tibet
The FCO position on Tibet, despite changes in
Government, has been unchanged for many years.
"Successive British Governments have
consistently regarded Tibet as autonomous, whilst recognising
the special position of the Chinese there. This remains the Government's
view. We have stressed to the Chinese authorities the need for
fuller autonomy in Tibet. However, we do not regard independence
for Tibet as a realistic option as it has never been internationally
recognised as an independent State, and no member of the UN regards
Tibet as independent."
"We believe that a lasting solution
to the situation in Tibet can best be achieved through dialogue
between the Chinese and Tibetans, including the Dalai Lama. We
take every opportunity to encourage both sides to enter into such
a dialogue"
(China and Hong Kong Department, FCO, October 1999)
The Government does not recognise the Tibetan Government
in Exile. There is no formal contact between representatives of
the Government in Exile and ministers of Her Majesty's Government.
Free Tibet Campaign believes that the current
British position on Tibet not only contains contradictions which
weaken the possible impact and effectiveness of British pressure,
but also refutes and redefines the nature of Britain's historical
relations with Tibet (see below). Britain does little to encourage
the Chinese to come to the negotiating table, beyond "reminding"
them of their position. Furthermore, pressing for talks without
preconditions while at the same time declaring independence is
not a realistic option is surely self defeating. See recommendation
viii. The United Nations have recognised the right of the Tibetan
people to self-determination (1961 and 1965) and urged China to
respect that right.
In respect to the current situation, it is worth
noting that the British definition of autonomy differs substantially
from that of the Chinese Government, where only minor issues are
decided regionally. Historically, Britain has regarded Tibet as
a de facto autonomous state. "The Tibetans have every
moral right to their independence for which they have fought successfully
in the past, and we are committed to support them in maintaining
it" (FCO to Chongqing, June 1942). The Chinese leadership
have announced that they may amend the law on regional autonomy
for minorities (see 5).
Despite being the lead department in promoting
human rights in Tibet, there has been concern that the FCO has
failed to promote these with respect to other departments, who
have not taken these issues sufficiently into consideration, eg
the Department for International Development supported a World
Bank project which planned to move 60,000 Chinese farmers into
an autonomous region in Tibet, despite opposition from local Tibetans
and a severe threat to traditional Tibetan culture and livelihoods.
The project has since been undergone an Inspection Panel Review,
which is yet to be published, but is widely understood to be critical
of the project and may lead to its cancellation.
6. Chinese policy towards Tibet
China has rejected numerous overtures for negotiations
made by the Dalai Lama. China has insisted that he recognise Tibet
as an inalienable part of China, and more recently added a precondition
that he must recognise Taiwan as an inalienable part of China.
He must also stop activities designed to split the Motherland.
These preconditions are unacceptable to the Dalai Lama, who has
stated that as a monk, he cannot lie. It is wholly unreasonable
to include a precondition that relates to the status of Taiwan.
However, in 1998, there were signs that the
Chinese leadership were becoming more amenable to the possibility
of talks with the Dalai Lama. This was illustrated by Jiang Zemin's
willingness to discuss the issue with President Clinton in June
1998 in a press conference. The Tibetan Government in exile simultaneously
revealed that informal lines of communication had been opened.
In late 1998, all contact was withdrawn without any explanation.
It remains something of a mystery whether these events were an
aberration, or whether there was an internal struggle within the
Chinese leadeship which those with an interest in a negotiated
settlement lost.
China's current priorities in Tibet are to maintain
campaigns against the Dalai Lama and Tibetan nationalism (which
manifest themselves in many ways), and to accelerate the economic
development of the western regions, which include Tibet and Xinjiang.
Associated with this is a policy of population transfer, in which
large numbers of Han Chinese workers are encouraged to relocate
to minority regions. This policy has been practised for many years,
and in addition to assisting economic development (which largely
discriminates against Tibetans), it has the advantage for China
of reducing Tibetans and Uighurs to minorities in their own country.
Tibetan culture has been systematically undermined through this
process.
If minority groups are diluted too far, their
homelands could risk losing their "autonomous" status—which
though wholly inadequate currently provides a nominal legal framework
which would not obstruct a negotiated settlement with the Dalai
Lama for genuine autonomy or self rule. There are concerns that
China's state desire to amend the law on regional autonomy for
minorities may undermine this framework. The proposed review is
likely to be part of a strategy to reduce threats to China's "unity,
social stability and reunification." (Xinhua 7/1/2000).
7. The Broader relationship
The State Visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin
to the UK last October provided ample opportunity for the FCO's
handling of the relationship with China to be considered. It is
known that FCO officials met the Metropolitan Police on eight
separate occasions in the lead up to the visit, and that concerns
were raised about the possible impact of demonstrations. No minutes
were kept of those meetings, and the only record that remains
ia hand-written note, which suggests that a senior police officer
was obliged to point out "everyones (sic) right to protest"
(Appendix, Metropolitan Police Review of the Chinese State Visit,
March 2000). Public, politicians and media were shocked at some
of the images that emerged from the State Visit, with flags and
banners removed and protesters bundled out of sight of the Chinese
President. The police have since admitted that they broke the
law in removing flags and banners from people in the Mall "solely
on the basis that they were protesting against the Chinese regime"
(High Court declaration, 3 May 2000).
Questions about the role of the FCO in the decision
making of how the State Visit should be policed have not satisfactorily
been resolved. Senior FCO officials were observed in conversation
with Chinese security personnel shortly before vans were parked
in front of protesters, effectively screening them from sight.
Commander Messinger told officers that it was "a very
politically sensitive visit" (Briefing, Metropolitan
Police Review of the Chinese State Visit, March 2000). Police
officers demonstrated that they had been briefed to recognise
the Tibetan flag. There is no reason why this would be so, if
they were not expected to take action. Attempts were made to remove
flags from the South Bank and a balcony in Wapping, and a Chinese
woman on Tower Bridge who wanted nothing more than to hold up
a picture of her imprisoned son as Jiang sailed by, was hustled
out of sight.
China reacted angrily to those demonstrations
that did take place. Clearly the FCO (with Downing Street) would
have had an important role to play in ensuring that the visit
went smoothly, given Jiang Zemin's notorious sensitivity to protest.
From my feedback I receive from the public, politicians and the
media, there remains a broad lack of acceptance of the claim that
the Metropolitan police decided to adopt this style of policing
of their own volition.
8. Recommendations—The FCO should make
the following commitments
(i) Suspend the dialogue whilst a robust,
extensive review is carried out. Co-operation projects may continue
in the meantime. Free Tibet Campaign is not opposed to dialogue,
provided it is effective;
(ii) Be transparent about the process of
review of the dialogue. What are the parameters? What criteria
will be examined? What is the timetable? Who will be consulted?
(iii) Establish benchmarks for progress on
human rights. These must be specific, should require action by
the Chinese rather than just an agreement to talk about an issue,
and have a timetable;
(iv) Develop alternative strategies, which
allow human rights policy to break out of the current dialogue
vs resolution trap;
(v) If the situation has not improved in
2001, the EU (or EU minus one or two countries) should sponsor
a UN resolution in Geneva calling on China to address human rights
violations occurring in both China and Tibet and lobby extensively
for that resolution to be carried. Note that many developing nations
are reluctant to support initiatives made by the United States;
(vi) Give commitments that human rights are
raised further up the agenda in all bilateral contacts and that
time is allocated for robust exchanges at the highest level;
(vii) Support the appointment of a EU Special
Co-ordinator for Tibet to work in close co-ordination with all
relevant governmental and non-governmental organisations to promote
a more cohesive policy in Europe towards Tibet and send a strong
signal of concern to the Chinese Government;
(viii) Confirm its past recognition of Tibet
as being a de facto independent state and agree that it
is for the Tibetan people to decide whether or not independence
for Tibet is a "realistic option". Begin formal and
open relations with the democratically elected Tibetan Government
in exile, as the legitimate representatives of the Tibetan people,
whilst Tibet remains under occupation. To impress upon China the
imperative of entering into negotiations without preconditions
with the Dalai Lama, whilst he is still alive and able to persuade
his people to refrain from violence;
(ix) Elevate human rights in the work of
other departments, eg the Department for International Development,
to make a commitment that to ensure that all projects in Tibetan
autonomous areas conform to the guidelines of the Tibetan Government
in exile as a minimum. To additionally priorities projects which
bring genuine benefit to the Tibetan people and support them in
their struggle to maintain their cultural heritage. To carry out
projects which have the maximum capacity to deliver policy changes
in China which benefit the Tibetan people. With the Department
of Trade and Industry, to prevent British economic investment
in Tibetan autonomous areas which is opposed by and not in the
best interests of the Tibetan people. This should particularly
be highlighted in relation to resource extraction, in which the
Tibetan people have no say and from which they derive no benefit.
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