House of Commons - Foreign Affairs

Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Tenth Report

TENTH REPORT

The Foreign Affairs Committee has agreed to the following Report:—

CHINA

1. When the new Government was elected in 1997, it would have been very surprising if there had not been a paper in Ministers' boxes which invited them to formulate a new China policy. There were still some weeks to go before the final handover of Hong Kong to China, but the course of events for Hong Kong was long settled. No doubt there was scenario planning for things going badly wrong, but Ministers would have been told that the issue of Hong Kong, which had dominated British relations with China over 50 years, was likely to become much less important.[7] At the same time, China was apparently making rapid economic advances. With its size and its population, it offered an enormous potential market for British commerce. Not only that, but economic progress could be expected to bring political change in its wake. That might in turn bring about a loosening of the grip of the Communist Party, and move in the direction of a pluralistic society where there would never be a repeat of the 1989 massacre of Tiananmen Square. Moreover, China needed to be engaged in a whole raft of other policy areas, including the environment, where what happened in the world's most populous country would affect everyone.

2. Elements of the new policy were outlined to the House on 10 June 1997, when the late Derek Fatchett, then Minister of State at the FCO, answered oral questions on China. He told the House that China had "emerged as a major power with a rapidly growing economy" and that this would "lead to internal change within Chinese society". He went on to say that the Government wanted "to open a new chapter of more constructive relations across the board, addressing both trade and more difficult issues such as human rights".[8]

3. When Hong Kong had been safely transferred without major political upset, any suspicions about British intentions in the minds of the Chinese authorities had manifestly not been realised, and the theme of a new beginning could be pursued The most visible demonstration of this was the exchange of visits by Heads of Government. Mr Blair visited China in October 1998. The joint statement of the two Prime Ministers on that occasion again used the words "the opening of a new chapter in relations."[9] A whole range of areas of co-operation was described in the joint statement. After Hong Kong, the main stress was on economic ties and trade, where "positive measures" were promised to expand bilateral trade and investment. Other areas included environmental, military, police and cultural co-operation. The key word was partnership. In an eighteen paragraph statement, the issue of human rights formed part of one paragraph. The stress here was upon a new policy of constructive dialogue, designed to broaden mutual understanding.

4. A crowning manifestation of the positive relationship with China was intended to be the State Visit of President Jiang Zemin to the United Kingdom in October 1999. Much business was concluded at the time with contracts worth £2 billion signed.[10] During the visit, however, the principal focus of public debate was on human rights. Those who took issue with the Chinese Government on human rights were restrained by the police in a way which was found unlawful by the courts and which led to accusations of FCO/police complicity to suppress free expression. The result of these heavy handed tactics may have been to strengthen sentiment against the Chinese Government in this country.[11] Certainly fundamental questions arose about the nature of the partnership which we should have with China.

5. Principal among those questions was the issue of whether human rights had slipped down the bilateral agenda of our relationship with China by being confined to a box labelled "dialogue" while the main focus of government effort was to be devoted to a new assault on the market opportunities which China offered. This was one of the reasons which convinced us that it was opportune for us to undertake an inquiry into the "role and policies of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in relation to China."

6. It was therefore only natural that in our inquiry we have looked in particular at the balance between concern for human rights in China and the commercial benefits which may flow from good relations with China. The United Kingdom's continuing responsibilities towards the people of Hong Kong, and the welcome democratic developments in Taiwan, have also been issues which we considered it important to address. A subsidiary question that arises relates to the nature of United Kingdom official representation in China, and the role of the FCO vis-à-vis other agencies and organisations.

Conduct of the inquiry

7. We took oral evidence on four occasions: on 13 June we heard from a panel of experts made up of Hugh Davies, former British Senior Representative on the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group and now Asia Adviser to Prudential plc; Dr Chris Hughes and Professor Michael Yahuda of the London School of Economics, and Katie Lee, the Director of the Britain-China Centre. They were followed by three journalists with extensive knowledge of China: James Harding of the Financial Times, Graham Hutchings formerly of The Daily Telegraph and Lorna Ball of the BBC World Service. Our second session of 4 July was given over to witnesses representing business: first we heard from Lord Powell of Bayswater and Peter Nightingale of the China-Britain Business Council, David Brewer of British Invisibles and Roger Caseley of the China-Britain Industrial Consortium. The second panel that day consisted of Tom Goldberg of Atlas Ward Structures Ltd, Stephen Perry of London Export Ltd and James Richards of Rolls Royce. The third oral session on 18 July was devoted principally to human rights, with evidence taken from Tim Hancock of Amnesty International and Alison Reynolds of the Free Tibet Campaign. Our final session of oral evidence was on 25 October when we heard from the Foreign Secretary and his officials. A large number of written submissions were also received. As always, we are extremely grateful to all our witnesses, both oral and written.

8. We visited China from 19 to 23 June. Unfortunately our outward travel was delayed by one day because of the severe disruption at Heathrow caused by computer failure on 17 June. This meant that our time in Beijing was restricted to little more than 24 hours. After that, we divided into two groups, travelling to Shanghai and Chongqing respectively. We reunited in Guangzhou on 22 June, travelling on to Hong Kong that evening. After an intensive day of meetings in Hong Kong, we flew home overnight on 23 June. Details of our programme are published as an Annex to this report.[12] We are extremely grateful to the officials of the Embassy and Consulates General who arranged an excellent programme for us, and gave us many valuable insights into China. We are also grateful to all the others who gave up their time to meet us during our visit, and to those who showed us generous hospitality. Our official hosts were the National People's Congress (NPC), and we were accompanied throughout our visit by Members and officials of the NPC, to whom also we express our gratitude.

British objectives in China

9. The FCO summarised the United Kingdom's principal objectives in relation to China under five headings. These were:

"(a) to encourage and support China's closer integration into the international system, in all fields, as a friendly and responsible partner in dealing with global and regional issues, and to draw China into international economic, financial and trade structures;

(b) to help China deliver economic reform and prosperity and to eradicate poverty;

(d) to advance our commercial interests, and

(e) to fulfil our political and moral commitment to the people of Hong Kong as co-signatory of the Sino-British Joint Declaration and to follow policies that sustain Hong Kong's autonomy and independent values."[13]

10. The second of these objectives is the principal responsibility of the Department for International Development, and we have only addressed it tangentially in this report. It has been the subject of an evidence session held by the International Development Committee.[14] In the case of the other objectives, it is very difficult to measure success, and, in the case of objectives (a) and (c), British activity can have only marginal impact. We have, however, attempted to analyse the success of the FCO in achieving each of its objectives in this report. Extra sections have been included on Taiwan and on United Kingdom representation in China, a heading which encompasses matters such as size and location of missions, quality of staff, visa handling and the cultural diplomacy of the BBC World Service and British Council.

7 Indeed, the question of the transition of Hong Kong to Chinese rule was at the heart of our predecessor Committee's last inquiry into relations with China. Back

8 HC Deb 10 June 1997, col. 932. Back

9 Ev. p. 113. Back

10 Ev. p. 102. Back

11 Q86. Back

12 See p. lxxx. Back

13 Ev. pp. 98 and 99. Back

14 Minutes of Evidence on DFID's Policy towards China and Pakistan, HC 126 (Session 1999-2000). Back



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