INTEGRATING CHINA INTO THE INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEM
11. The FCO's first objective in relation to China
is "to encourage and support China's closer integration into
the international system, in all fields, as a friendly and responsible
partner in dealing with global and regional issues, and to draw
China into international economic, financial and trade structures."[15]
The FCO did not in its evidence to us set out an explicit justification
for this objective. However, the Foreign Secretary gave us the
following justification for attaching importance to the relationship
with China: "It is one of the five permanent members [of
the UN Security Council] and we frequently meet to discuss international
affairs and international crises and, therefore, it is important
that we have a working relationship with them. It is also a nuclear
power and, therefore, very relevant to the work we have been doing
to try to maintain a global non-proliferation regime of weapons
of mass destruction. It is the largest single country in the world
at the present time. It may in the next quarter century be overtaken
by India but for the time being it is the most populous and that
in turn gives rise to other issues of immediate direct interest
to our foreign policy priorities. For instance, on climate change,
within a generation China will be producing as much greenhouse
gas as the United States."[16]
12. This justification may be a "well trodden
line" as Hugh Davies put it.[17]
That does not make it any the less valid. In the past the costs
of an isolationist, hostile China have been significant: Chinese
support for North Korea during the Korean war; Chinese support
for North Vietnam during the Vietnam war; periods of high tension
and sporadic military clashes on the Sino-Soviet border before
the fall of the Soviet Union; the threat of the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction. Where China has acted positively,
the advantages can be great. One area where China may have now
adopted a more constructive stance is in relation to North Korea.
The Foreign Secretary told us that "It is not easy to be
certain what role China has played [in the rapprochement between
North and South Korea] but it is interesting that the President
of North Korea did visit China the month before the famous summit
which achieved the breakthrough and I think the very least one
can infer from that is that China did not obstruct that move and
may well have been supportive of it."[18]
We accept the FCO's view that "encouraging and supporting
China's closer integration into the international system, in all
fields, as a friendly and responsible partner in dealing with
global and regional issues, and to draw China into international
economic, financial and trade structures" should be a high
priority of United Kingdom policy.
13. This objective is, however, a challenging one.
The FCO informed us that "China's interpretation of its interests
is still highly coloured by historical experience, notably a strong
tendency to recall the history of China's humiliation and exploitation
by western powers. Nationalism is a strong force; it is not just
one created for its own purposes by the ruling party, but a real
phenomenon to which the Party has to respond. China remains fundamentally
suspicious of the West, and of the United States in particular."[19]
Professor Yahuda also told us of the growing force of nationalism:
"I think as the appeal and significance of communism as an
ideology has decayed in Chinaand, indeed, there are quite
a number of communist institutions which have decayedso
there has been greater emphasis on what they call patriotism."[20]
In part, this recourse to, or exploitation of, nationalism is
expressed in the campaign to reunify with Taiwan: we discuss this
below.[21]
14. One of the consequences of China's attitudes
towards the outside world is that the United Kingdom can only
hope to influence events in China at the margins. This influence
is potentially greater if the EU's combined weight can be brought
to bear. The US is a much more significant market than the EU
is for China, but there is a "suspicion in Beijing of Washington's
strategic aims."[22]
This creates an opportunity for the EU, particularly as the EU
is seen by the Chinese as a counterbalance to the US.[23]
However, on China as in other areas of the EU's external relations,
finding an inter-governmental consensus is difficultnot
least because on the key issue of human rights, China works to
divide the EU. We discuss the EU's human rights dialogue with
China below.[24]
According to the Commission, the China-EU dialogue, pursued at
heads of government meetings, and Troika Foreign Minister level,
"exchange views and raise issues of concern on political
issues, human rights; economic and trade issues, including WTO
accession; bilateral co-operation; and regional developments."[25]
The Third Annual EU-China Summit took place on 23 October. It
does not appear to have produced significant concrete results
that are publicly available.
15. In part because of the nationalism which dominates
China's view of the world, and because of negative views of western
countries' past roles in China, as we heard many times at official
meetings during our visit, China is committed to "the principles
of national sovereignty and non-intervention as set out in the
UN Charter."[26]
The importance attached to non-intervention encouraged China to
oppose NATO's action against Serbiaas we heard during our
Kosovo inquiry, "the Chinese for Kosovo is Tibet". This
does not mean that China takes a negative attitude across the
board: the Foreign Secretary told us that China has "always
drawn a clear distinction that where you are present in a peacekeeping
role at the invitation of the host government then you are not
infringing sovereignty...Where China draws the line is in actions
which do not have the support of the host government."[27]
He went on to say that, on UN reform, China's "contributions
have been measured and constructive and, indeed, the Millennium
Summit produced a discussion among the P5 members which showed
a very substantial degree of common ground."[28]
16. In part China's preoccupation with non-intervention
reflects the fact that, as we were told in Beijing, China is a
"defence superpower," but has little capacity to intervene
militarily beyond its borders. Its last foreign war, against Vietnam
in 1979, was a failure. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has
developed since then, but according to the late Gerald Segal,
China remains "a second-rate military power."[29]
Richard Cobbold and Damon Bristow of RUSI also judge that "China's
current conventional military influence and potential are over-stated."[30]
Because both China's military strength, and its economic strength,[31]
have been over-rated, "Britain needs to consider ways to
free itself from the mind set that currently lies at the heart
of our relationship with China, which allows China, rather than
Britain, apparently to dominate the agenda."[32]
Arms control and non-proliferation
17. As the FCO notes "China is the world's third
largest nuclear weapons state and plays a pivotal role in international
negotiations on arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament."[33]
The importance of the bilateral relationship with China on non-proliferation
matters was stressed to us by the Foreign Secretary.[34]
China is a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and has signed,
but not yet ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT). We heard in Beijing that the ratification of the CTBT
had been disrupted by seemingly unrelated issues, such as the
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and the US rejection
of the treaty. However, the ratification was expected soon.
18. We also discussed the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR). China saw problems with this: for them it was a
gentlemen's agreement, between rich-country suppliers. As a developing
country, China had difficulties with such an approach. We were
told in the strongest terms of Chinese opposition to the proposed
US deployment of a National Missile Defence (the Chinese describe
this as Theatre Missile Defence). Part of China's opposition has
stemmed from a fear that the NMD "shield" might cover
Taiwan. The FCO notes that "China/US relations have improved
a little following President Clinton's decision not to proceed
with the deployment of...NMD."[35]
In general, China's attitude towards arms control and proliferation
is coloured by arms sales to Taiwan, principally by the US, but
also by other western states. We addressed the wider issues of
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in our recent
Report on this subject.[36]
15 Ev. p. 98. Back
16
Q226. Back
17
Ev. p. 9. Back
18
Q304. Back
19
Ev. p. 99. Back
20
Q20. Back
21
See paras. 175ff. Back
22
Ev. p. 100. Back
23
Q310. Back
24
See paras. 62ff. Back
25
Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament
on the implementation of the communication "Building a comprehensive
partnership with China," 11 September 2000, COM (2000) 552. Back
26
Ev. p. 99. Back
27
Q290. Back
28
Q292. Back
29
Foreign Affairs, September/October 1999. Back
30
Ev. p. 217, Appendix 28. Back
31
See paras. 112ff. Back
32
Ev. p. 217, Appendix 28. Back
33
Ev. p. 122. Back
34
Q226. Back
35
Ev. p. 122. Back
36
Eighth Report, Session 1999-2000, HC 407. Available on: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmfaff.htm. Back
|