WOULD A TOUGHER APPROACH HARM BUSINESS?
106. A quiet approach to human rights was defended
by several business people who operated in China. For example,
Lord Powell told us that "the most effective way to pursue
human rights issues is without great attendant fanfare of publicity."
For him, vocal criticism was "often very counterproductive."[279]
Stephen Perry of London Export Ltd similarly argued that China
was not susceptible to being pushed around, and that sharp public
criticism should be limited.[280]
James Richards of Rolls Royce warned that "depending how
the dialogue is conducted and how it goes, there are potentially
risks at least for some businesses in China," and he illustrated
this by telling us that "the bad feeling which existed in
China over Governor Patten's conduct was generally felt to disadvantage
us in relation to our American competitors at that time."[281]
The British Chamber of Commerce in China also told us that "direct
confrontation, poorly handled, has a direct and negative impact
on business."[282]
There was certainly adverse action taken against Danish business
interests after Denmark had sponsored a critical UN Resolution
on Chinese human rights record in 1997. Similarly, China bought
Airbus jets rather than Boeing when the USA imposed sanctions
because of the transfer of Chinese military technology to Pakistan.
107. Other witnesses dismissed this argument. According
to the Free Tibet Campaign, there is "no evidence to suggest
that China follows through on" threats which it makes to
block trade.[283]
Professor Foot also told us that empirical evidence that China
carried out such threats was "slight.... because in several
of these cases, China's own interests are satisfied by the established
agreement or relationship."[284]
Tim Hancock of Amnesty International told us that "the threats,
the picking-off.... tends to be relatively short lived."[285]
Richard Cobbold and Damon Bristow argued that the USA "takes
a more robust attitude towards the violation of human rights in
China, but still has greater commercial penetration of China's
markets than that of the many European countries which choose
to ignore Beijing's human rights record."[286]
The All Party Parliamentary Group for Tibet made the added point
that the advantages of commercial links are greater for China
than for the United Kingdom.[287]
While we appreciate that business people will not want to expose
themselves to possible extra risk, we conclude that the risk posed
by a tougher stance, especially one taken by all EU states, may
have been overstated.
Conclusion
108. In the Foreign Secretary's words the British
Government does not "run China or even pretend to run China."[288]
Our influence can only be at the margins. Nevertheless, as Graham
Hutchings argued, "there cannot really be happy and satisfactory
relations between the UK and China given the way the Chinese Government
treats many of its people."[289]
For the human rights organisations, as Alison Reynolds put it,
"human rights needs to be brought out of its box and put
across the relationship."[290]
We agree with these propositions. In making the recommendations
we have in this part of our Report, we must face up to the consequences
of our proposals. If implemented by the Government, the Chinese
could well withdraw from the dialogue process. But even if they
do so, we believe that our recommendations ought to be adopted
by a Government which rightly stresses the importance of human
rights. We conclude that the Government has been supportive
of a number of positive developments for human rights in China,
but that it now needs, in concert with our EU partners, to toughen
its stance in response to the deterioration in human rights standards
which have occurred in China over the past two years.
209 Ev. p. 218, Appendix 28. Back
210
Ev. p. 238, Appendix 37. Back
211
Ev. p. 249, Appendix 40. Back
212
Q11. Back
213
QQ32, 36. Back
214
Q229. Back
215
Q230. Back
216
Ev. p. 181, Appendix 16. Back
217
Q288. Back
218
Q30. Back
219
Q81. Back
220
Q86. Back
221
Ev. p. 10. Back
222
Q79. Back
223
See paras. 87ff. Back
224
Ev. p. 122. Back
225
Ev. p. 106. Back
226
Q209. Back
227
Ev. p. 220, Appendix 28. Back
228
See para. 26. Back
229
Q213. Back
230
Ev. p. 105. Back
231
Ev. p. 83. Back
232
Q193. Back
233
Q194. Back
234
Ev. p. 248, Appendix 40. Back
235
Ev. p. 22. Back
236
Ev. pp. 161-2, Appendix 9. Back
237
Ev. p. 82. Back
238
Ev. p. 83. Back
239
Ev. p. 247, Appendix 40. Back
240
QQ267, 306. Back
241
Q236. Back
242
HC Deb 8 November, col. 275w. Back
243
Ev. p. 249, Appendix 40. Back
244
Q194. Back
245
Ev. p. 105. Back
246
QQ266-7. Back
247
Q185. Back
248
Ev. p. 107; see Q267. Back
249
HC Deb, 9 November, col. 366w. Back
250
Q287. Back
251
See para. 42. Back
252
Ev. p. 220, Appendix 28. Back
253
Ev. p. 25. Back
254
Q201. Back
255
Q262. Back
256
Cm 4774, p. 19. Back
257
Ev. p. 107. Back
258
HC 37, Session 1993-94, Q44. Back
259
Q241. Back
260
QQ243ff. Back
261
Ev. pp. 206, 86. Back
262
E.g. Tibet Society, Ev. p. 168, Appendix 14. Back
263
Ev. p. 107. Back
264
Ev. p. 238, Appendix 37. Back
265
QQ180-1. Back
266
QQ112, 179. Back
267
Ev. p. 167, Appendix 13. Back
268
Q109. Back
269
Ev. pp. 220ff, Appendix 29. Back
270
Ev. p. 109. Back
271
Ev. pp. 211ff, Appendix 26. Back
272
Seventh Report, Session 1999-2000, Strategic Export Controls:
Further Report and Parliamentary Prior Scrutiny, HC 467. Back
273
Q182. Back
274
Cm 4774. Back
275
Ev. p. 204, Appendix 25. Back
276
Ev. p. 106. Back
277
Ev. p. 83. Back
278
Q260. Back
279
Q110. Back
280
Ev. pp. 61ff. Back
281
Q170. Back
282
Ev. p. 174, Appendix 15. Back
283
Ev. p. 83; Q185. Back
284
Ev. pp. 161-2, Appendix 9. Back
285
Q185. Back
286
Ev. pp. 216-7, Appendix 28. Back
287
Ev. p. 238, Appendix 37. Back
288
Q240. Back
289
Q72. Back
290
Q223. Back