Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Tenth Report


Beyond dialogue

77. Richard Cobbold and Damon Bristow of the Royal United Services Institute argued that the United Kingdom is wrong to believe that any attempt to "tackle China over tough issues such as human rights"[209] will alienate the Chinese side, and thus threaten international stability. A similar point was made by the All Party Parliamentary Group for Tibet, who told us that the Chinese Government "has adroitly managed to use the UK/China bilateral dialogue to play on FCO fears that they might withdraw from the dialogue, further constraining HMG's ability to robustly bring pressure."[210] According to the HRIC, Beijing used the policy of dialogue as "an end in itself, a way to escape scrutiny of its human rights situation." This was because states in dialogue with Beijing imposed self-censorship and avoided multilateral efforts to exert pressure on China.[211]

78. Professor Yahuda told us that the criteria for judging whether the policy of dialogue was a success were "very, very unclear." Although he believed that continual interchange on human rights was "a good thing" in the long-term, "there may be occasions when Britain needs to take a more robust position."[212] He also argued, however, that the question of the proper mixture between dialogue and robustness was a "very, very difficult and delicate matter" and that the extent to which the West should press China on human rights was a question which "requires fine judgment."[213] The Foreign Secretary showed this balance when he told us that he had expressed to his Chinese counterpart "deep concern that [recent] negative moves were coming at the time of our human rights dialogue" and "the very strong view that if the dialogue is to continue in its present way we would expect to see more results."[214] However, he also told us that "our judgement, and it has to be a subjective judgment, is that over the past two years we have made more progress through dialogue than we would have in any other way, but I am not under-stating the many shortcomings and the many failures along the way."[215]

79. Those who advocate some sort of tougher response to human rights abuses have to answer two questions: is there a tougher response which amounts to anything more than gesture politics, and can we be certain that a tougher approach will bring dividends? On the latter point, Dr Flemming Christiansen of Leeds University, warned us that:

    "Hawkish and aggressive statements from foreign politicians, scholars and media, who claim to promote democracy and human rights in China, have seriously impeded progress towards these aims, for they have incited retrograde nationalist feelings among Chinese and thus hampered constructive dialogue, co-operation and forms of balanced criticism that might otherwise have great effect."[216]

As the Foreign Secretary told us, while he fully understood "the deep frustration this causes.... sometimes the more visible and flamboyant the gesture, the more counter-productive it can be."[217]

80. In dealing with China on human rights, we certainly have to be aware of Chinese sensitivities to what they regard as imperialism. As Professor Yahuda put it, "human rights is seen as a lever that outside powers use for their own purposes to intervene in China."[218] Lorna Ball of the BBC World Service also emphasised the enormous resentment which is caused in China by any attempt to lecture them from outside.[219] For her, "negative criticism.... will only be taken in the wrong way and will achieve nothing."[220] We accept that any external criticism of China can be portrayed as being, at best, inappropriate, and at worst, a deliberate attack on China. We also accept that the worst way of trying to influence events in China is to lecture the Chinese. It is also clear that the Chinese Government now expects to be criticised to an extent and for calls to be made for the release political prisoners. Indeed, it often does release prisoners so that the visiting dignitary can point to the success of their policy towards China to a domestic audience once they return home (though often combined with some show of strength and resolve to the domestic Chinese audience). But given the support for nationalism and anti-Westernism, a more robust stance could result in a strengthening of the party and authoritarian rule, rather than a weakening of it—the authoritarian leadership can depict itself as standing up for China.

81. In Hugh Davies's analysis, "despite considerable progress in recent years, human rights abuses continue in China and remain an issue likely to cause serious rifts with Western Governments, including HMG." He identified a two-pronged approach by successive governments, with condemnation of serious abuses coupled with dialogue, with the latter "undoubtedly" having had some beneficial effect. He suggested that the Government should continue to mix carrots and sticks according to the issue.[221] We agree that policy must be subtly modulated, without abandoning basic principles. It would be absurd to suggest that any foreign government can lay down rules for China but, as James Harding put it, "what they can do is set standards." For him, "to leave China to go its own course is as irresponsible as it is to assume that you can tell China what to do."[222] We turn now to a number of ways in which we believe additional pressure could be put on China to improve its human rights record.


82. We believe that there is clear evidence that China cares about international pressure upon it, and that it does listen and take remedial action when it is criticised, even if it takes public exception when criticism occurs. A particularly clear example of this is in the UN Human Rights Commission, as we discuss later.[223] China is also willing to trade human rights concessions for its own economic and commercial advantage, and this is another way in which international pressure for reform can be exercised.

83. The signature by China of the two core UN human rights conventions is very welcome. But signature does not mean implementation. There is as yet no timetable for the ratification which will bring the rights of the Conventions into legal effect in China. Of course, ratification will not of itself ensure that the letter of international law is actually complied with on the ground. But ratification is the vital next step. We took this matter up in China. We were told by Chinese Government officials and members of the NPC that there was a positive approach to the ratification of the Covenants, but that considerable work was needed to bring Chinese national and regional legislation into conformity with them. It was pointed out that China had not been involved in the drafting process for the Covenants, and that it had taken the United Kingdom itself eight years between signature and ratification. The FCO reported to us that a spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs said on 17 October 2000 that "the time is now ripe" for the ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.[224]

84. An example of the benefits of dialogue cited by the Government is the establishment of "a joint working group to work towards ratification of the two UN Covenants which China has signed but not yet ratified."[225] Tim Hancock of Amnesty International, however, warned us that the establishment of the group might be "yet another tie that binds us to the Chinese approach"—an ostensible sign of progress which was "just another stalling device and another way of showing, in a cost-free manner, that the dialogue is working."[226] Both he and Alison Reynolds believed that, in fact, the Chinese had moved further away from the aspirations of the UN Covenants since they had signed them. We would like to see concrete evidence of the achievements of the Working Group. We recommend that the Government publish the forward work plan of the joint working group on the ratification of the core UN human rights conventions.

85. Richard Cobbold and Damon Bristow argued to us that closer co-ordination between major EU powers, as well as Japan and the USA, on China-related issues, including human rights, would strengthen our hand in dealing with China, as well as playing a more constructive role in "China's international evolution."[227] We recommend that the Government work with other Governments to press the Chinese to ratify the core UN human rights conventions at the earliest possible date.

86. A similar united stance could be taken inside the International Labour Organisation to put pressure upon China to implement the fundamental ILO Conventions to which we referred earlier.[228] Tim Hancock agreed that this might result in increased friction, but argued that "if you do not use these organisations for what they are intended to be used for, we devalue them."[229] We recommend that the Government seek to act in concert with its EU and other partners to bring pressure upon China to ratify the ILO Conventions 29, 87, 98 and 105 on Forced Labour, Freedom of Association and Right to Organise.


87. There has been an annual opportunity at the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva to table a resolution critical of China's human rights record. In each year from 1990 to 1996, EU countries jointly tabled such a resolution. In each year except 1995 (when the motion was narrowly defeated), the Chinese succeeded in blocking discussions through a procedural device. According to the FCO, "partly because of this consistent failure and the lack of any tangible evidence that improvements in the respect for human rights in China had been achieved as a result, EU unity broke down in 1997."[230] In 1997, the United Kingdom instead backed a Danish resolution, which was again blocked. The Chinese Government subsequently imposed limited commercial sanctions on Denmark. In 1998, during the British Presidency, "the EU agreed to suspend the tabling of the resolution in favour of embarking on a process of dialogue." In 1999 and 2000, the USA tabled a resolution, which was not co-sponsored by the United Kingdom. According to the FCO, "this did not in any way indicate approval of China's human rights record but was intended to signal a preference for handling such matters through a policy of dialogue."

88. Human rights organisations expressed considerable criticism of what had happened in the UN Commission. Essentially their argument was that EU states had shown pusillanimity in the face of Chinese threats on trade.[231] The 1999 Session of the Commission came in for particular criticism from Amnesty International, whose witness described it as a "fairly chaotic session" which "led to poor diplomacy."[232] Amnesty's picture was of an EU which did not stick to the approach they had announced the previous year, and which was wrong-footed by the USA's decision to table a critical resolution. Alison Reynolds of the Free Tibet Campaign was equally critical of the failure of the EU to announce its policy in good time in 2000 which she regarded as "extremely unhelpful to other countries who were looking to the EU for a lead."[233] HRIC told us that what is remembered from the 1999 and 2000 sessions was the EU's decision not to support the resolution on China.[234]

89. We received clear evidence that China is concerned by what happens at Geneva. As Graham Hutchings put it, "the idea, fostered by China itself, that public pressure to improve its human rights record will get nowhere is belied by the enormous efforts Chinese diplomats devote each year to defeating motions critical of China placed before the UN Commission."[235] Professor Rosemary Foot also argued powerfully that the threat of the annual resolution during the 1990s had brought about real benefits in China. As she commented, "although Beijing's actions (as a consequence of activity at the UN) do not solve the huge problems associated with implementation of human rights protections, they are important and essential steps along that road."[236]

90. There was some criticism of the desire of the United Kingdom to act in concert with other EU states. For the Free Tibet Campaign, "the FCO has been handicapped in its ability to engage in more robust criticism of China.... by the imperative of the European Union to present a united front."[237] For them, the perceived need for unity "has weakened EU policy towards China rather than strengthened it."[238] On the other hand, HRIC thought it "particularly urgent" for EU states to co-ordinate their views so that splits could not be exploited by China.[239] The Foreign Secretary told us that he "would not welcome a situation in which we split the position of the European Union", and he described the way in which EU ministers had tried to coordinate policy in the context of Geneva.[240] We agree with the view that EU states are likely to be more effective when they act in concert, so long as this does not result in a "lowest common denominator" position. We also believe that the EU, with its stress on human rights is a body which ought to act decisively and speak with one voice when human rights are abused.[241]

91. The EU will conclude a "review into strengthening the dialogue procedures", taking into account the Foreign Secretary's "call for the setting of objectives", by the time of the General Affairs Council meeting on 4 December.[242] Following this, the EU should adopt a clearer approach to the next meeting of the Commission, and we are hopeful that this will happen under the Swedish Presidency beginning on 1 January 2001. As we have already said, the FCO has argued that tabling a resolution at the UN Human Rights Commission but failing to pass it has given a sort of victory to the Chinese side. According to HRIC, however, there has never been an effective lobbying campaign to ensure that a resolution, once tabled, is passed.[243] A similar point was made by Alison Reynolds.[244] We recommend an early co-ordination of policy between EU states towards a draft resolution on human rights in China to be tabled at the UN Human Rights Commission in 2001, and a concerted attempt to lobby support in Geneva for the EU stance.

92. If a critical motion is tabled in 2001, the Chinese have, according to the FCO, "made it clear that they will withdraw from the dialogue if the EU or other dialogue partners co-sponsor the resolution."[245] The Foreign Secretary was emphatic that a critical motion at Geneva was an alternative to dialogue, and that the two could not co-exist.[246] For those, however, like Alison Reynolds of the Free Tibet Campaign, who believe that dialogue is not working,[247] this is a pretty empty threat. But, in any case, the Chinese side cannot unilaterally dictate the terms of engagement. Moreover, the EU also has leverage which it is able to deploy against China—we should not forget that China needs the EU at least as much as the EU needs China. While we recognise the Chinese threat, we also believe that the British Government must not be held to ransom by a dialogue policy if that policy is not delivering results.

93. The FCO told us that the EU Presidency statement in April 2000 at Geneva had expressed "deep concern" at continuing restrictions on human rights and had "stressed that it was fundamental that the dialogue process should be translated into concrete actions." They also told us that "at the suggestion of the UK, the General Affairs Council.... agreed that the EU's approach to next year's resolution would take account of what results had been achieved through the dialogue process."[248] More recently it has been announced that the Government's position on a resolution at Geneva in 2001 will be reviewed following the next rounds of the UK/China and EU/China human rights dialogue, due in February 2001.[249] It would be difficult to argue that the positive results from the dialogue policy outweigh the negative side of the balance, and therefore we welcome this apparent willingness to take a tougher stance in Geneva in 2001. We recommend that the Government should publicly state its willingness to support EU sponsorship of a motion which draws attention to continuing human rights abuses in China.


94. China was very upset by the decision that Sydney, not Beijing, should host the 2000 Olympics. Undoubtedly the vote against China was influenced by memories of Tiananmen Square—and, to Chinese eyes, the 1993 vote of the US Congress against the Games being held in Beijing was a particularly blatant example of imperialism. We believe that China should be made aware of the inevitability that the delegates to the International Olympic Committee will again be influenced by China's human rights record when they decide on the location of the 2008 Olympics. As the Foreign Secretary told us, the same considerations will remain in the minds of those who choose the site of the 2008 Olympics as were in the minds of those who chose Sydney in preference to Beijing for 2000.[250] We recommend that the British and other EU Governments should make it plain that the human rights record of a country is a factor which must be considered it if wishes to host the Olympic Games. At this time we believe that it would be inappropriate for China to host the Games.


95. We have earlier described Chinese efforts to control the internet.[251] There was widespread acceptance from our witnesses that the internet would be a major force for change in China. Richard Cobbold and Damon Bristow of the Royal United Services Institute, for example, told us that the internet "has the potential to open up Chinese society to the outside world in a way unimaginable ten years ago."[252] The growth in the use of new communications technology in China is phenomenal, albeit from a small base. Mobile phone use is growing by 60 per cent, and internet use by over 300 per cent per annum. Use of mobile phones to access the internet is becoming more common. As in the case of the more traditional communications, (many Chinese people acquired a television without ever having had a radio) Chinese are jumping over the stages of development seen in West. These figures were given to us by the BBC World Service, which also quoted an estimate from the Computer Industry Almanack that internet users in China will outnumber those in the USA by 2010.[253]

96. There is a case for considering whether a new approach to human rights might be effectively based on developing internet access, telecommunication access, broadcasting outlets, education, and all the other key elements of the information age which in the short-term as well as in the long-term could do far more to advance human rights and multi-party politics in China than the conventional means of exerting influence. From the point of view of human rights organisations, Alison Reynolds of the Free Tibet Campaign told us that Chinese dissidents were already posting information on the internet which would be picked up by users outside the country—it was by this means that the story that the Panchen Lama had died was disseminated.[254] The Foreign Secretary also accepted the importance of British activity in these areas.[255] We recommend that the British Government consider, in conjunction with other like-minded governments, how to exploit information age opportunities for the benefit of human rights in China, and in other countries where there are deficiencies in their observance.


97. The United Kingdom is the only country which does not recognise Chinese sovereignty over Tibet,[256] though it does not recognise Tibet as independent. Since 1943, "successive British Governments have regarded Tibet as autonomous while recognising the special position of the Chinese there." Identical words were used in evidence to us[257] as were used by the Minister of State who gave evidence to our predecessor Committee in 1993.[258] This is a convenient formulation since autonomy is a concept which can be stretched a very long way. However, the FCO told us that they had "consistently informed the Chinese of our view that greater autonomy should be granted to the Tibetans," and that dialogue between the Tibetan people, including the Dalai Lama, and the Chinese authorities was the best way of resolving the situation. Importantly, the FCO drew our attention to the Dalai Lama's public statement that he did not seek independence, but greater autonomy for Tibet. This concession by the Dalai Lama needs to be reciprocated by China. We recommend that the Government continue to press the Chinese Government to give Tibet real control over its own affairs, and to enter proper dialogue with the Dalai Lama.

98. The Foreign Secretary told us that Ministers had repeatedly raised the question of the Panchen Lama with the Chinese side.[259] Assurances had been given of his good health, and photographs of him had been shown to British officials at a meeting in October 2000. The officials did not ask for, and were not given, copies of these photographs, but the Foreign Secretary undertook to us to seek to obtain copies.[260] We were told on 6 November that the British Embassy in Beijing had formally lodged a request for the photographs, but that there had so far been no response. The Foreign Secretary told us that if the FCO "were not shown photographs we would wish to have some independent or international body have direct access in order to satisfy ourselves both about the health of the child and, indeed, the extent to which he is of his own free will where he is." We welcome the Foreign Secretary's commitment to seek to obtain photographs of the Panchen Lama, and we recommend that the British Government continue strongly to press the Chinese authorities to assure the world of the health and freedom of the Panchen Lama.

99. One particular criticism directed to the British Government was of DFID support for projects in Tibet which would have resulted in further population transfers from Eastern China.[261] We recommend that the Government assess carefully the implications for the Tibetan people of any project in Tibet which involves British Government support either bilaterally or multilaterally.

100. There was some criticism of the Government for failing to treat the Dalai Lama as the leader of Tibet when he visited the United Kingdom.[262] The FCO told us that "both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have held private meetings with the Dalai Lama (in his capacity as a spiritual leader) during his visits to the UK."[263] According to the All Party Parliamentary Group to Tibet, the FCO's "deep apprehension of the Chinese aggressive style of diplomacy" meant that the Prime Minister—alone among Heads of Government in Europe—"felt the need to have a Bishop with him when he met His Holiness, to assuage Chinese anger at the meeting."[264]


101. One business person whom we met in China expressed incredulity at the poor levels of health and safety which were accepted in the Chinese work place. We also saw ourselves extremely poor working conditions, with construction workers having neither helmets nor boots—indeed working bare-footed—as they built new roads in Guangzhou.[265] Business witnesses agreed that workers' conditions were poor, though they told us that they improved when British companies became involved in joint ventures.[266] However, discussions we held with labour activists suggested that foreign companies did not always follow best practice. The Tibet Society drew our attention to a report from the Hong Kong based Christian Industrial Committee which suggested that sports goods sold in the United Kingdom are made in factories where "rates and terms of employment fell well short of even Chinese labour laws and.... abuse and intimidation of workers were routine."[267] We were also disappointed that, when asked whether human rights issues have to play a part in anyone's relationship with the Chinese, Lord Powell on behalf of the China-Britain Business Council told us that "we do not see it as part of our task. We are not a political organisation. We are not a missionary organisation."[268] We also note with surprise that there was no mention of human rights in the memorandum which we received from British Trade International.[269] We do not accept that British business can say that human rights in China are not its concern. We recommend that the FCO and BTI take steps positively to encourage British businesses operating in China (including those operating through intermediaries, for example in Hong Kong) to adopt practices which fully respect international human rights standards.


102. The FCO told us that "defence relations form an important part of the UK's overall strategy of improving relations with China", and described the increasing level of bilateral defence visits and other contacts.[270] We received evidence from the Campaign Against the Arms Trade outlining a number of concerns about military exports to, and other military links with, China. [271] Along with the Defence, International Development and Trade and Industry Committees we have already made recommendations about strategic exports to China.[272]


103. Tim Hancock suggested that Ministers and officials had not been sufficiently up-front in condemning human rights abuses in China.[273] However, the Government cannot really be accused of being mealy-mouthed in its condemnation. In his speech to the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva in March 2000, the Minister of State at the FCO, Peter Hain, coupled China with Chechnya as demonstrations that "we still have too much oppression and denial of human rights across the world." The Government's Annual Report on Human Rights for 2000[274] speaks of "maltreatment" of activists, of "backward steps", a "crackdown", "repression", and "excesses" and refers to "the gravity of our concerns about the recent violations of civil and political rights." Treatment of Tibetan activists and restrictions on freedom of religion, expression and association in Tibet are described as "unacceptable." We welcome—and endorse—the strong language which the Government uses to condemn human rights abuses in China, and we recommend that it continue to do so in all appropriate circumstances.

104. It is less clear that the Government is as robust when in dialogue with the Chinese. We were told by Vice Minister Ma Canrong that the Chinese had been very satisfied by the programme of dialogue which the FCO was having with his Ministry on human rights issues. He contrasted this sort of fruitful dialogue, where common ground could be achieved and both sides needed to make adjustments, with a policy of confrontation. This suggests that the approach adopted has been to avoid antagonising the Chinese side. The Tibet Information Network also argued for more "persistent, tenacious and informed questioning" as part of the dialogue process.[275] The FCO told us that "British ministers regularly use the opportunities presented by high level visits to and from China to raise concerns over human rights,"[276] but this was dismissed by the Free Tibet Campaign as tokenism and "tick box foreign policy."[277]

105. We were struck by the Foreign Secretary's evidence that his officials' draft of his Department's first memorandum to the Committee was only strengthened on human rights at his direct instruction.[278] This suggests that there is an official culture in the FCO which tends to pull punches on China. We recommend that Ministers and officials should use the same strong language of condemnation of human rights abuses to all audiences, whether in the United Kingdom or in China, and whether in public or private.


106. A quiet approach to human rights was defended by several business people who operated in China. For example, Lord Powell told us that "the most effective way to pursue human rights issues is without great attendant fanfare of publicity." For him, vocal criticism was "often very counterproductive."[279] Stephen Perry of London Export Ltd similarly argued that China was not susceptible to being pushed around, and that sharp public criticism should be limited.[280] James Richards of Rolls Royce warned that "depending how the dialogue is conducted and how it goes, there are potentially risks at least for some businesses in China," and he illustrated this by telling us that "the bad feeling which existed in China over Governor Patten's conduct was generally felt to disadvantage us in relation to our American competitors at that time."[281] The British Chamber of Commerce in China also told us that "direct confrontation, poorly handled, has a direct and negative impact on business."[282] There was certainly adverse action taken against Danish business interests after Denmark had sponsored a critical UN Resolution on Chinese human rights record in 1997. Similarly, China bought Airbus jets rather than Boeing when the USA imposed sanctions because of the transfer of Chinese military technology to Pakistan.

107. Other witnesses dismissed this argument. According to the Free Tibet Campaign, there is "no evidence to suggest that China follows through on" threats which it makes to block trade.[283] Professor Foot also told us that empirical evidence that China carried out such threats was "slight.... because in several of these cases, China's own interests are satisfied by the established agreement or relationship."[284] Tim Hancock of Amnesty International told us that "the threats, the picking-off.... tends to be relatively short lived."[285] Richard Cobbold and Damon Bristow argued that the USA "takes a more robust attitude towards the violation of human rights in China, but still has greater commercial penetration of China's markets than that of the many European countries which choose to ignore Beijing's human rights record."[286] The All Party Parliamentary Group for Tibet made the added point that the advantages of commercial links are greater for China than for the United Kingdom.[287] While we appreciate that business people will not want to expose themselves to possible extra risk, we conclude that the risk posed by a tougher stance, especially one taken by all EU states, may have been overstated.


108. In the Foreign Secretary's words the British Government does not "run China or even pretend to run China."[288] Our influence can only be at the margins. Nevertheless, as Graham Hutchings argued, "there cannot really be happy and satisfactory relations between the UK and China given the way the Chinese Government treats many of its people."[289] For the human rights organisations, as Alison Reynolds put it, "human rights needs to be brought out of its box and put across the relationship."[290] We agree with these propositions. In making the recommendations we have in this part of our Report, we must face up to the consequences of our proposals. If implemented by the Government, the Chinese could well withdraw from the dialogue process. But even if they do so, we believe that our recommendations ought to be adopted by a Government which rightly stresses the importance of human rights. We conclude that the Government has been supportive of a number of positive developments for human rights in China, but that it now needs, in concert with our EU partners, to toughen its stance in response to the deterioration in human rights standards which have occurred in China over the past two years.

209   Ev. p. 218, Appendix 28. Back

210   Ev. p. 238, Appendix 37. Back

211   Ev. p. 249, Appendix 40. Back

212   Q11. Back

213   QQ32, 36. Back

214   Q229. Back

215   Q230. Back

216   Ev. p. 181, Appendix 16. Back

217   Q288. Back

218   Q30. Back

219   Q81. Back

220   Q86. Back

221   Ev. p. 10. Back

222   Q79. Back

223   See paras. 87ff. Back

224   Ev. p. 122. Back

225   Ev. p. 106. Back

226   Q209. Back

227   Ev. p. 220, Appendix 28. Back

228   See para. 26. Back

229   Q213. Back

230   Ev. p. 105. Back

231   Ev. p. 83. Back

232   Q193. Back

233   Q194. Back

234   Ev. p. 248, Appendix 40. Back

235   Ev. p. 22. Back

236   Ev. pp. 161-2, Appendix 9. Back

237   Ev. p. 82. Back

238   Ev. p. 83. Back

239   Ev. p. 247, Appendix 40. Back

240   QQ267, 306. Back

241   Q236. Back

242   HC Deb 8 November, col. 275w. Back

243   Ev. p. 249, Appendix 40. Back

244   Q194. Back

245   Ev. p. 105. Back

246   QQ266-7. Back

247   Q185. Back

248   Ev. p. 107; see Q267. Back

249   HC Deb, 9 November, col. 366w. Back

250   Q287. Back

251   See para. 42. Back

252   Ev. p. 220, Appendix 28. Back

253   Ev. p. 25. Back

254   Q201. Back

255   Q262. Back

256   Cm 4774, p. 19. Back

257   Ev. p. 107. Back

258   HC 37, Session 1993-94, Q44. Back

259   Q241. Back

260   QQ243ff. Back

261   Ev. pp. 206, 86. Back

262   E.g. Tibet Society, Ev. p. 168, Appendix 14. Back

263   Ev. p. 107. Back

264   Ev. p. 238, Appendix 37. Back

265   QQ180-1. Back

266   QQ112, 179. Back

267   Ev. p. 167, Appendix 13. Back

268   Q109. Back

269   Ev. pp. 220ff, Appendix 29. Back

270   Ev. p. 109. Back

271   Ev. pp. 211ff, Appendix 26. Back

272   Seventh Report, Session 1999-2000, Strategic Export Controls: Further Report and Parliamentary Prior Scrutiny, HC 467. Back

273   Q182. Back

274   Cm 4774. Back

275   Ev. p. 204, Appendix 25. Back

276   Ev. p. 106. Back

277   Ev. p. 83. Back

278   Q260. Back

279   Q110. Back

280   Ev. pp. 61ff. Back

281   Q170. Back

282   Ev. p. 174, Appendix 15. Back

283   Ev. p. 83; Q185. Back

284   Ev. pp. 161-2, Appendix 9. Back

285   Q185. Back

286   Ev. pp. 216-7, Appendix 28. Back

287   Ev. p. 238, Appendix 37. Back

288   Q240. Back

289   Q72. Back

290   Q223. Back

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