| Integrating China into the international system
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| (1) | We accept the FCO's view that "encouraging and supporting China's closer integration into the international system, in all fields, as a friendly and responsible partner in dealing with global and regional issues, and to draw China into international economic, financial and trade structures" should be a high priority of United Kingdom policy (paragraph 12).
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| Human rights
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| (2) | We conclude that the way we were prevented from meeting human rights activists during our visit was a graphic illustration for us personally of the absence of human rights in China (paragraph 23).
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| (3) | We conclude that Chinese actions against democracy activists are entirely out of keeping with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with its guarantees of freedom of opinion and expression, and of the right to take part in public affairs through free elections (paragraph 25).
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| (4) | We conclude that the Chinese suppression of workers' rights is not in keeping with the rights under Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to freedom of association and to form and join trade unions (paragraph 27).
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| (5) | We conclude that Chinese practices in respect of national minorities are not fully in keeping with the spirit of Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights under which persons belonging to national minorities "shall not be denied the right.... to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion or to use their own language"(paragraph 33).
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| (6) | We conclude that Chinese practices in relation to religions and belief systems are not in keeping with Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guarantees the rights to hold any religion or belief and to manifest it (paragraph 36).
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| (7) | We conclude that the system of criminal justice in China is not in keeping with Articles 9 or 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with their guarantees against arbitrary arrest or detention, and their guarantee of fair trials (paragraph 37).
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| (8) | We conclude that there is prima facie evidence that China has not complied with the provisions of the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, notwithstanding the fact that China has both signed and ratified this Convention (paragraph 39).
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| (9) | We conclude that the restrictions on reproductive rights in China are not in keeping with Article 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which give men and women the right to found a family (paragraph 41).
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| (10) | We conclude that restrictions on the media (including the electronic media) are not in keeping with Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with its guarantees of free expression and of the right to seek, receive and impart ideas of all kinds regardless of frontiers and through any medium (paragraph 42).
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| (11) | By the international standards which China has itself accepted, we must conclude that China is guilty of persistent and major abuse of human rights (paragraph 45).
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| (12) | We conclude that the Government should always welcome progress in China on human rights, while making it clear that much more needs to be done for China to meet its legal and moral obligations in relation to international instruments it has ratified or signed (paragraph 55).
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| (13) | We recommend that the Government continue strongly to endorse the principle of the universality of human rights, regardless of the political, economic and cultural systems of individual states, as reaffirmed in Article V of the Vienna Declaration of 1993 (paragraph 61).
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| (14) | We conclude that a programme of legal co-operation is a sensible way for the United Kingdom to advance the human rights agenda in China. We must make clear that legal co-operation in the sphere of commerce must not eclipse the human rights aspect of legal co-operation. We therefore recommend that the Government commit itself to a long-term co-ordinated programme of legal co-operation in the interests of human rights in China (paragraph 71).
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| (15) | We recommend that, so long as the dialogue process continues, the Government should set out in each year's Human Rights Report its objectives in relation to China for the year to come and its achievements over the past year. Both objectives and achievements should be expressed in as explicit and measurable a form as possible (paragraph 74).
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| (16) | We recommend that the Government does all that it can to involve human rights organisations in the dialogue process (paragraph 75).
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| (17) | We recommend that the Government publish the forward work plan of the joint working group on the ratification of the core UN human rights conventions (paragraph 84).
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| (18) | We recommend that the Government work with other Governments to press the Chinese to ratify the core UN human rights conventions at the earliest possible date (paragraph 85).
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| (19) | We recommend that the Government seek to act in concert with its EU and other partners to bring pressure upon China to ratify the ILO Conventions 29, 87, 98 and 105 on Forced Labour, Freedom of Association and Right to Organise (paragraph 86).
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| (20) | We recommend an early co-ordination of policy between EU states towards a draft resolution on human rights in China to be tabled at the UN Human Rights Commission in 2001, and a concerted attempt to lobby support in Geneva for the EU stance (paragraph 91).
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| (21) | We recommend that the Government should publicly state its willingness to support EU sponsorship of a motion which draws attention to continuing human rights abuses in China (paragraph 93).
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| (22) | We recommend that the British and other EU Governments should make it plain that the human rights record of a country is a factor which must be considered it if wishes to host the Olympic Games. At this time we believe that it would be inappropriate for China to host the Games (paragraph 94).
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| (23) | We recommend that the British Government consider, in conjunction with other like-minded governments, how to exploit information age opportunities for the benefit of human rights in China, and in other countries where there are deficiencies in their observance (paragraph 96).
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| (24) | We recommend that the Government continue to press the Chinese Government to give Tibet real control over its own affairs, and to enter proper dialogue with the Dalai Lama (paragraph 97).
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| (25) | We welcome the Foreign Secretary's commitment to seek to obtain photographs of the Panchen Lama, and we recommend that the British Government continue strongly to press the Chinese authorities to assure the world of the health and freedom of the Panchen Lama (paragraph 98).
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| (26) | We recommend that the Government assess carefully the implications for the Tibetan people of any project in Tibet which involves British Government support either bilaterally or multilaterally (paragraph 99).
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| (27) | We recommend that the FCO and BTI take steps positively to encourage British businesses operating in China (including those operating through intermediaries, for example in Hong Kong) to adopt practices which fully respect international human rights standards (paragraph 101).
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| (28) | We welcome—and endorse—the strong language which the Government uses to condemn human rights abuses in China, and we recommend that it continue to do so in all appropriate circumstances (paragraph 103).
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| (29) | We recommend that Ministers and officials should use the same strong language of condemnation of human rights abuses to all audiences, whether in the United Kingdom or in China, and whether in public or private (paragraph 105).
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| (30) | While we appreciate that business people will not want to expose themselves to possible extra risk, we conclude that the risk posed by a tougher stance [on human rights], especially one taken by all EU states, may have been overstated (paragraph 107).
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| (31) | We conclude that the Government has been supportive of a number of positive developments for human rights in China, but that it now needs, in concert with our EU partners, to toughen its stance in response to the deterioration in human rights standards which have occurred in China over the past two years (paragraph 108).
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| Advancing British commercial interests
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| (32) | We conclude that China is a significant market—but not an enormous one (paragraph 114).
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| (33) | We recommend that the FCO publish a cost-benefit analysis of the post in Chongqing, and consider the possibility of opening other similar commercial posts in cities of economic importance (paragraph 131).
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| (34) | We recommend that it should be a priority for the Government to lobby the Chinese government to allow the establishment of official Chambers of Commerce outside Beijing (paragraph 134).
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| (35) | We recommend that the BTI's long term trade and investment strategy for China take account of the potential overlaps between the CBBC, the diplomatic posts' commercial work, and the Chambers of Commerce in China, and should aim to eliminate duplication (paragraph 138).
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| (36) | We recommend that the British Government support a tough EU line on monitoring and enforcing Chinese compliance with WTO obligations (paragraph 141).
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| Hong Kong
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| (37) | Despite the ending of the work of the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group, the Government should continue to maintain its focus on events in Hong Kong. We welcome the Government's decision to continue presenting six-monthly reports to Parliament. We recommend that the Government should continue to comment, publicly and forthrightly, on the implementation of the Joint Declaration in Hong Kong (paragraph 143).
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| (38) | We agree with the Government that the United Kingdom has a continuing moral and political obligation to ensure that China respects its obligations under the Sino-British Joint Declaration. We also note that the Government has a legal obligation to uphold the Joint Declaration, as this document has the force of an international treaty (paragraph 144).
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| (39) | The Foreign Secretary argues that nothing should be done to disturb the Basic Law and the Joint Declaration, implying that preserving them is more important than accelerating the introduction of democracy. We find this line unconvincing. We find nothing incompatible with an acceleration in the Joint Declaration, and there is an established procedure for amending the Basic Law. In any event, democracy is both a basic human right for the people of Hong Kong and the strongest defence against unwelcome intervention by the mainland. We repeat our recommendation that universal suffrage for all seats in the LegCo should be adopted as soon as possible, by passing an amendment to the Basic Law. We also believe that Hong Kong should move towards election of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage by the next election in 2002 (paragraph 160).
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| (40) | While we accept that the reinterpretation of the Basic Law was a necessary measure, we agree with the FCO that reinterpretation should be sought only in limited and exceptional cases (paragraph 164).
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| (41) | We conclude that it is important that British National (Overseas) passport holders are given the same consular protection as British Citizens, and that this is widely seen to be the case. We recommend that the Government continue to pursue the case of the BN (O) passport holder, Wu Man, with the Chinese authorities (paragraph 167).
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| (42) | We recommend that the FCO should take a keen interest in the rendition agreement, and should encourage both sides to ensure that any agreement has proper safeguards to prevent human rights abuses (paragraph 170).
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| (43) | Recent interventions in Hong Kong by mainland officials are unwelcome and appear to betray a misunderstanding both of Hong Kong's autonomy and of what it means to live in a free society. As well as acting as a guarantor of Hong Kong's freedoms, a free press remains vital to Hong Kong's future as an international business centre. We recommend that the United Kingdom Government frequently reinforces this point both to the Hong Kong administration and to Beijing (paragraph 174).
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| Taiwan
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| (44) | We recommend that, if the Chinese government issues further threats to Taiwan, the United Kingdom should make clear to the Chinese government the political and economic costs of military action, in a public statement, preferably but not necessarily in concert with our European partners (paragraph 187).
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| (45) | We recommend that the United Kingdom should take account of the remarkable development of Taiwanese democracy by incrementally strengthening relations. This should include enhancing the status of Taiwanese inward visits and the level of outgoing ministerial visits to Taiwan, but not recognition of Taiwan as a state (paragraph 191).
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| United Kingdom representation in China
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| (46) | We recommend that the FCO consider the possibility world-wide of opening more mini-posts in regional cities of political, economic or commercial importance (paragraph 196).
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| (47) | We recommend that the FCO consider innovative methods of recruiting China experts in mid career both on term and permanent contracts (paragraph 197).
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| (48) | We recommend that senior management attention in Beijing, including the personal attention of the Ambassador, should be directed towards building upon the improvements already achieved in the visa issuing service (paragraph 201).
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| (49) | We recommend that pressure continues to be put upon the Chinese authorities to provide documentation to their citizens who arrive illegally in the United Kingdom (paragraph 202).
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| BBC Services in China
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| (50) | We conclude that the World Service's strategy of developing its internet services for China while continuing to provide a short wave radio service is a sound one. We recommend that there should be no reduction in the current level of radio service (paragraph 204).
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| (51) | We recommend that the British Government strongly press the Chinese authorities to ensure that the jamming of the BBC World Service cease forthwith (paragraph 205).
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| (52) | We recommend that the BBC World Service regard provision of its services in Cantonese in Hong Kong (and in South China) as a matter of high priority (paragraph 206).
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| (53) | We recommend that the British Government make it plain to the Chinese Government that there should be no inhibition on the free availability in China of BBC World transmissions (paragraph 207).
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| (54) | As far as the World Service is concerned, we recommend that an assurance is given to the House that the close relationship developed by them with the Chinese authorities has not prevented critical reporting of China on the service (paragraph 208).
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| British Council
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| (55) | We recommend that the British Council and the FCO maintain a high quality service for Chevening scholars when they are in the United Kingdom, and seek to retain positive contact with them when they return home (paragraph 214).
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| (56) | We recommend that the British Government again approach the Chinese for permission for the British Council to become directly involved in English language teaching in China (paragraph 218).
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| (57) | We recommend that funding should be provided for a British Council presence in any new Consulate General established in China (paragraph 219).
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| (58) | We recommend that the British Council establish a clear, targeted strategy designed to win friends for the United Kingdom among residents of the Hong Kong SAR aged under 30 (paragraph 221).
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| Conclusion
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| (59) |
The introduction to our Report identified that the Government had adopted a new China policy in the wake of the successful handover of Hong Kong. The Prime Minister and Ministers have chosen to describe it as "a new chapter in our relations with China."
This report analyses the first few pages of that chapter. We have identified and concentrated upon certain key aspects of the new policy; particularly the increase in trade and commercial effort backed by a huge increase in UK-based staff; and a radical new approach to human rights based upon what Ministers claim is a unique bilateral dialogue. Because of this claim and clearly from the evidence of Ministerial concerns that the new process of dialogue should not be jeopardised, this Report has inevitably and rightly concentrated upon the human rights relationship with China.
We acknowledge the significant advances in the living standards and choices available to the majority of the people of China. We note the Foreign Secretary's observation that "one should not under-state the fact that there is a degree of support for the regime".
We also fully understand and appreciate that China is a major international player as a permanent member of the Security Council, and a major military power which seeks to influence not only its own region. We share fully the FCO's objective "to encourage and support China's closer integration into the international system." Membership of the WTO could enhance China as an economic power and as a significant market, though we counsel caution about exaggerating its actual potential.
All these important factors cannot and should not mask one fundamental fact: that, from all the evidence gathered, China remains now one of a minority of the world's nations which institutionalises abuse of human rights and sustains an unacceptable degree of surveillance over and restriction upon its people in regard to the basic civil and civic freedoms such as those of speech and assembly.
Our report sadly reveals that there has been a serious deterioration in the human rights situation during the last two years which calls into question the efficacy of the Government's new approach to human rights through the dialogue. The dialogue has not yet delivered meaningful results.
This should be a matter of great common concern to Ministers and Parliament. The Foreign Secretary confessed that his Department has not analysed why there had been such a deterioration. We believe it imperative that such an analysis be conducted to contribute to the way forward.
For we would consider it utterly unacceptable if there were to be, in effect, a trade off between improved economic and commercial relations and a less forceful approach to human rights. The Government has placed human rights at the core of its foreign policy. They should make no exceptions in the case of China. They should apply universal human rights standards universally. They must not be transfixed by the commercial opportunities China presents.
The list of recommendations relating to human rights in this report probably constitutes an alternative strategy, though it may be possible to accommodate them within the dialogue. However, we remain adamant that effective pressure on human rights issues bilaterally, collectively through the European Union, and internationally through the United Nations, must remain central to our relations with China (paragraph 222).
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