APPENDIX 16
Memorandum submitted by Dr Flemming Christiansen,
University of Leeds
This memorandum addresses some general issues
of Chinese politics in order to put on record a general evaluation
of Chinese political and social development. The only recommendations
that emerge from this are:
1. Interaction with China should be based
on a long-term view of achievements in development and take into
consideration the large regional and social differences that are
emerging.
2. Issues of inhuman work conditions in some
Chinese export manufacturing industries and of illegal immigrant
Chinese labour in Europe should be regarded as functions of global
labour markets and addressed in forums suitable for this.
3. China should be deemed to be in need of
aid to solve problems of regional development.
4. Recognition should be given to the needs
of Chinese middle classes to pursue education, to travel and to
trade in Britain and the rest of Europe.
5. Chinese unification should be regarded
as an internal matter of China.
LEADERSHIP ISSUES
President Jiang Zemin's succession is becoming
a matter of intense speculation. Jiang Zemin is due to give up
his party and state top-posts in Spring 2002, and as Chinese politics
is dominated by personalities, the succession has great importance.
Far from speculating on which person may appear as his successor,
I will here describe some of the dynamics that underlie the transfer
of power, so as to provide a broader view of the potential outcomes.
Jiang Zemin's position in Chinese politics does
not rely on one, but three, core posts: He is President, Secretary
General of the Chinese Communist Party, and Chairman of the Central
Military Commission. The fact that he holds three posts concentrates
dominant political power in his hands. In 2002, he must retire
from the Presidency and the post as Secretary General. However,
the Chairman of the Central Military Commission is not limited
to a maximum period of office.
It is obvious from this that Jiang Zemin's succession
is not just a matter of yielding the presidency to somebody else,
but rather of whether he retires from all posts, whether he designates
one or several persons to take over his posts, and whether he
aims to balance the power between a number of individuals.
Jiang Zemin has the option to retire to a position
similar to that of Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s, where he will only
be the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, while reserving
the power of ultimate informal power arbitration for himself.
In this scenario he would be the peremptory leader. His successors
to the posts of President and Secretary General would each have
a much weaker position than Jiang has now.
Jiang Zemin may decide to yield strong centralised
power to one person, meaning that one person would take over the
three posts Jiang holds now, or at least two of them. In this
case, one could talk about real succession.
Jiang Zemin may prefer a situation where he
retires fully from politics, and puts in place a younger team
of leaders in positions that out-balance each other; the new core
leaders would then be the President, the Prime Minister, the Secretary
General, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress, and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission,
supplemented with several dozen second-line leaders in the state
and the party. This would probably require of a number of leaders
of relative seniority that they given up any further political
ambitions, and would involve their retirement into a position
similar to the Central Advisory Committee of the CCP in the 1980s.
This would likely lead to the formation of an information oligarchy
dominated by Jiang, supervising the activities of the formal leadership
behind the scenes.
Although observers claim the Jiang Zemin is
presently grooming Hu Jintao to take the lead among the next generation
of leaders, it is the strategy of power transfer in terms of balancing
the five leadership top posts that will determine the ramifications
of Chinese politics after 2002.
Jiang has already presented himself as a successor
to Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping (rather than as the successor
to past CCP chairmen and secretaries-general or state presidents;
such a list would include names like Hua Guofeng, Zhao Ziyang,
Hu Yaobang and Yang Shankun); his self-projected image is that
of paramount leader and contributor to Marxism-Leninism-Mao-Zedong-Thought.
One may guess that Jiang Zemin hopes to retain
a controlling function similar to that previously held by Deng
Xiaoping. In that case he would be able to fulfil his political
ambition of directing work on the "great cause of national
unification" (ie the unification of Taiwan with the Mainland)
as a powerful statesman elevated above political office. He is
on record as having said that the Taiwan Straits issue should
be resolved while the older generation of politicians is still
around. Whether or not he achieves it, depends on the compromises
he can strike with different parts of the leadership in the period
leading up to the relevant congresses in 2002.
CHINA'S
POLITICAL SYSTEM
Much attention has in recent years been given
to the practice of democratic village elections in China, and
the question whether we are witnessing incipient transition to
a system of genuine democratic representation has been asked by
many outside observers. The village elections are a convenient
way of dealing with local improprieties and are likely to result
in better local governance; by their very nature, they are contained
and unlikely to cause the emergence of oppositional proto-parties.
They do not constitute a direct challenge to the rest of the political
system.
Outside observers often take a sombre view of
the general potential for democratic development in China, especially
due to the consistent efforts to prevent the formation of independent
political parties and other oppositional organisations (like independent
trade unions), and the top-down political organisation of the
country. One may, however, turn the issue around and note that
the infrastructure exists, within which representative democracy
could gradually grow strong: Formal division of legislative, executive
and judiciary powers, a system of election and delegation to the
legislature, an expanding system of codified law, formal separation
of the Chinese Communist party from the state organs, a professional
and formally independent civil service, and so on. While the Chinese
Communist Party dominates the political process, the formal divisions
of power are scrupulously adhered to.
Since the introduction in 1979 of multiple candidates
for elections to each seat in the local people's congresses we
have witnessed a slow process of institutional change towards
democracy. Recent efforts at strengthening the National People's
Congress' supervision of the government, by demanding early submission
of draft budgets, draft state plans and government reports is
a step in that direction. The increasingly rigorous scrutiny of
bills in NPC sub-committees means that the political process includes
more interests and hears more opinions than ever before in the
history of the People's Republic. Local interest organisations
(like consumer associations and environmental groups) play an
increasing role in putting issues on the agenda. There is still
a long way to go, and the destination is uncertain. The sum of
the last 22 years of political development in China has, with
some setbacks, been positive, towards more freedom, a greater
spread of political participation, less emphasis on political
dogma and more rights for the individual. Persistence of iniquities,
imperfections and transgressions in the political system must
be seen against this overall improvement.
The slow speed of the changes that have taken
place reflect the size and complexity of the political reforms;
rapid change and imbalances are held by Chinese politicians to
potentially lead to political chaos. A careful analysis of the
Tiananmen incident in 1989 will reveal that too great haste in
forcing about political reform causes a rift to emerge in the
leadership. At the time no viable democratic alternative could
be realised.
National sentiments have a strong presence in
Chinese politics and among common people, a nationalism cast in
the difference between Chinese and westerners, and highly sensitive
to international humiliation of China or incursions on Chinese
territory or sovereignty. Hawkish and aggressive statements from
foreign politicians, scholars and media, who claim to promote
democracy and human rights in China, have seriously impeded progress
towards these aims, for they have incited retrograde nationalist
feelings among Chinese and thus hampered constructive dialogue,
cooperation and the forms of balanced criticism that might otherwise
have great effect.
CHINA'S
SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Perhaps the most spectacular development of
China during the last two decades has been the rapid economic
growth. The effect of this has been greater inequalities between
regions, sectors of the economy and social classes. While one
can safely say that all regions and groups in China are better
off due to the reforms, some have gained disproportionately more
than others.
Parts of Chinese industry are technologically
sophisticated and have the potential of competing seriously on
the world market. Much has been said about persistent problems
of state-owned enterprises; many such enterprises have turned
around in the last few years, and others are still to follow;
some will be wound up or merged in ways that gradually do away
with inefficiency. State-owned enterprises in some cities have
run with profit and with fully-fledged social security systems
for a decade now, while in other cities they are still propped
up with state subsidies. This reflects regional diversity and
the concern of the leadership that social deprivation must be
avoided. The process of reforming these enterprises is slow, mainly
because redundant workers are funnelled into other sectors or
given (largely symbolic) benefits. Changing the structure of the
enterprises is a formidable task, for they tended to be small
societies in their own right; their social and other non-productive
assets and functions must be sold off or made independent in the
least disruptive manner.
These huge transitions in urban society create
great anxiety and lead to local outbreaks of unrest; the process
of change entails many instances of corruption and social injustice
that anger people. New pockets of poverty emerge, but there is
no general picture of social destitution. More people now rely
on their own initiative in trade and petty production activities
than ever before.
China is catching up with the rest of the world
in terms of the use of high-level technology. Central and local
governments as well as the higher education system have gone onto
the World Wide Web during the last few years; natural science,
technology and engineering education and training in China are
good, and further leaps in technology can be sustained by available
skilled manpower. At the moment, the high demand for engineers
across Europe draws in a supply of highly qualified people from
China.
A stratum of professionals is emerging in China,
consisting of well-educated and high-earning engineers, managers,
traders, artists, and entrepreneurs. Countries in Europe and the
New World are gradually adapting to this situation; more and more
students arrive at educational institutions without public scholarships
and subsidies and read for degrees at their own expense; this
has become widespread during the last 15 years with regard to
further and higher education, and the trend is now expanding to
secondary education; upper and middle class people wish their
children to read for the equivalent of GCSEs and A-levels abroad.
Chinese individual and corporate traders have
increasingly entered the European and other markets, and European
governments award them the necessary permits to ply their trade.
Safeguarding the legitimate interests of these groups is perhaps
the greatest contribution Europe can offer to Chinese development,
as it will consolidate a new economic class with a cosmopolitan
worldview. Much concern has been voiced about brain-drain crippling
Chinese industry; however, China's most advanced industries and
teaching and research institutions seem to be able to achieve
staffing at levels commensurate with their technical sophistication.
As China's technological development proceeds, domestically and
foreign educated people will fill any gaps. A certain level of
international competition in the field of skills and education
will strengthen rather than weaken Chinese economic and technological
development.
Many organisations and governments outside China
are concerned about the use of unskilled labour in sweatshop factories
in China, where labour regulations, work hours, and labour safety
fall short of those prevailing in Europe. The goods processed
under such circumstances may be cheaper, but this is at the cost
of the dignity, health and welfare of Chinese workers. This is,
of course, not an entirely Chinese problem, for it relates to
many third world countries. There is no doubt that assembly and
processing on foreign, Hong Kong and Taiwanese contracts is an
important source of income for local people in China (most of
the factories are privately owned or owned by rural collectives,
providing revenue and direct income for local authorities, as
well as labour and income opportunities for the unskilled rural
labour force). Restricting this type of production in China is
likely to move the problem.
The large illegal Chinese migration to Italy,
Spain, France and other European countries, for example, is due
to the emergence in those countries of an illegal and semi-legal
sector of labour-intensive low-skills production of garments,
leather ware, and gadgets. Illegal Chinese migrants (alongside
illegal immigrants from other countries) have become a poorly
paid and unorganised work force in certain parts of Europe due
to the demand for processing from major European department stores
and fashion houses. The fully justified moral indignity at the
sub-standard treatment of Chinese workers (be it in China or in
Europe), therefore, should not be considered as an issue of China-relations,
but be elevated into the realm of international agreements on
trade and labour. It should probably also be considered a moral
issue in terms of to which degree department stores and procuring
agents choose to guarantee the ethical provenance of their wares.
THE TAIWAN
ISSUE
The relations across the Taiwan Strait are still
tense. The recent election of President Chen Shui-bian in Taiwan
has, however, created hope for a new direction of the negotiations.
The Mainland and Taiwanese economies have since 1986 become mutually
independent, for Taiwan has invested heavily in the Mainland.
Travel restrictions from Taiwan to the Mainland have been lifted
since 1986, and cultural and other exchange between the two sides
is intense.
Although the two sides fail to agree on the
basic interpretations of sovereignty and definitions of terms,
negotiations have been pragmatic and substantial.
Although the Taiwanese and Mainland sides seem
poised to engage in tough and firm negotiations on a stronger
platform than ever before, the key to their success is in the
hands of the USA. There is a strong opposition among some groups
in the USA to a Chinese unification, and a constructive approachment
between the two sides may meet opposition in US political circles
and media. A strong and united China is seen as a security challenge
by the USA, and as Taiwan does provide the USA with a certain
presence in the West Pacific, unification is met with great unease.
Both sides of the Taiwan Strait will be reluctant
to allow the USA to play a role in negotiations on what they regard
as a domestic matter; yet they will need to involve the USA to
a degree that pre-empts undue interference in the negotiation
process (be it from the administration, Congress, pressure groups
or the media). As both sides in the past have used lobbying and
diplomatic contacts with the USA to seek support for their negotiation
position, excluding US interference may prove to require a diplomatic
balancing act.
The popular opinion in Taiwan on the issue is
far from decided, and neither the opposition to nor the support
for unification is strong; in reality, there is very little to
form an opinion on, as the negotiations have not so far brought
out any clear conditions, and as Taiwan's long-term international
isolation and unstable relations with the Mainland do not seem
an attractive alternative, Taiwanese assets, family links, as
well as linguistic and cultural affinity in the Mainland may sway
the Taiwanese population towards acceptance of unification.
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